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Studies in Abnormal Psychology



SERIES VII

RICHARD G. BADGER

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In view of the great importance of the contributions of eminent specialists in psychology which have been published in THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY, and the increasing demand for the same, the publisher has been encouraged to re-issue such numbers as are in print, in order that this valuable material may be more accessible to the general reader. The first series contains the articles published in the issues of the magazine from April, 1910, to March, 1911, inclusive; the second series those published from April, 1911, to March, 1912, inclusive; the third series those published from April, 1912, to March, 1913, inclusive; the fourth series from April, 1913, to March, 1914, inclusive; the fifth series from April, 1914, to March, 1915, inclusive; the sixth series from April, 1915, to March, 1916, inclusive; and the seventh series from April, 1916, to March, 1917, inclusive.

Many of the earlier numbers of the magazine are already out of print, so that no collected volumes can easily be made to cover their contents.

I. TO SUBJECTS

(Figures with asterisks indicate original articles.
 Figures without asterisks indicate abstracts, reviews, society
 reports, correspondence and discussions.)

	PAGE
Abnormal Mental States in Children During Convalescence (Wilson).....	*123
American Psychological Association, Seventh Annual Meeting (Discussion).....	409
Being Well Born (Guyer).....	423
Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear and Rage (Cannon).....	65
Character, Some Psychoanalytic Studies of (Emerson).....	*265
Character and Temperament (Jastrow).....	355
Children, The Development of Intelligence in (Binet and Simon).....	418
Complexes, Persistent, Derived through Free Association (C. S. Yoakum and Mary C. Hill).....	*215
Consciousness, Permutations within the Sphere of...	*178
Crowd, The, in Peace and War (Conway).....	347
Delusions, Descriptive Analysis of Manifest, from the Subject's Point of View.....	*189
Dementia Praecox, Is, Properly Described as an Infantile Mode of Reaction (Singer).....	*305
Doris Case of Quirtuple Personality, The (Walter Prince).....	*73
Dream Problem, The (Maeder).....	206
Dreams, The Apparent Inversion of Time in (Horton).....	48
Dream Problem, The and its Critic L. H. (Jelliffe).....	335
Dreams, on the Irrelevancy of (Horton).....	*143
Eros (Lucka).....	425
Eugenics, A Science and an Ideal (Schuster).....	424
Feeble Minded, The Intelligence of the (Binet and Simon).....	418
Feelings of Man, The (Harvey).....	134
Hysteria, The Clinical Delimitation of (Solomon).....	203
Imbecile, The Criminal (Goddard).....	354
Insane, Who is (Smith).....	353

INDEX TO SUBJ.

Insanity to Crime, Clinical Studies in the Relationship of (Bowers)	71
Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War (Trotter)	347
Malingerer, The (Glueck)	204
Man, an Adaptive Mechanism (Crile)	211
Manic Depressive Attack Presenting a Reversion to Infantilism (Reed)	*359
Men of the Old Stone Age (Osborn)	280
Mental and Physical Tests, Manual of (Whipple)	141
Neurology, An Introduction to (Herrick)	356
Obsessions of Normal Minds (Berry)	*19
Paranoic State, The Genesis of a (Haines)	*368
Pathological Lying, Accusation and Swindling (Healy)	130
Photo-Play, A Psychological Note on a (Last)	*344
Psychasthenia, A Case of—Analysis and Cure (Solomon)	*309
Psyche's Task (Fraser)	67
Psychoanalytic Principles in the Study of the Neuroses, On the Utilization of (Putnam)	*172
Psychoanalysis and Its Substitute, On the Use of the Term (Solomon)	205
Psychoanalyse, Grundzüge der (Kaplan)	71
Psychology, Foundations of Normal and Abnormal (Sidis)	62
Psychology of the Kaiser (Prince)	209
Psychology of Relaxation, The (Patrick)	420
Psychological Study of Three Hundred Prisoners in the Massachusetts States Prison, Abstract of a (Rossy)	60
Psychopathic Diseases, Symptomatology, Prognosis and Treatment of (Sidis)	137
Psychopathic Maladies, The Causation and Treatment of (Sidis)	275
Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Solomon)	*23
Sensory Threshold, Variations in the—for Faradic Stimulation in Psychopathic Subjects (Grabfield)	*328
Sexuality, Critical Review of the Conception of Assumed by the Freudian School (Solomon)	59.

X TO SUBJECTS

Speech Inhibition, An Unusual Case of (Blanton)	*325
Spree River Anthology (Masters)	213
Stuttering, The Developmental Psychology of (Swift)	*258
Subconscious Settings of Ideas in Relation to the Pathology of the Psychoneuroses (Prince)	*I
Unconscious, Psychology of the (Jung)	277
World-Consciousness and Future Peace (Prince)	*287

CONTRIBUTORS TO SERIES VII

Berry, Charles Scott	19
Blanton, Smiley	325
Blumgart, Herrmann L.	211
Burrow, Trigant	178, 411
Coriat, I. H.	280
Dearborn, G. V. N.	65, 134, 141-355, 356
Emerson, L. E.	265, 415, 417
Grabfield, G. P.	328
Haines, Thomas H.	368
Hill, Mary C.	215, 396
Horton, L. H.	48, 143, 206
Jelliffe, Smith Ely	335, 412, 414, 416
Jones, Ernest	71
Kallen, H. M.	425
Kempf, Edward J.	416
Lanc, Edward B.	353, 354
Last, F. W.	344
Linenthal, Harry	62
MacCurdy, John T.	71, 411, 415
Mateer, Florence	418
Prince, Morton	I, 287
Prince, Walter Franklin	73
Putnam, J. J.	172, 347, 412
Reed, Ralph W.	359, 415, 417
Rossy, C. S.	60
Singer, H. Douglas	305
Solomon, Meyer	23, 59, 67, 130, 137, 203, 204, 205, 209, 213, 275, 277, 309, 420

Southard, E. E.....	189, 410, 423, 424
Swift, Walter B.....	258
Taneyhill, Lane.....	416
White, William A.....	413
Wilson, J. G.....	123
Yoakum, C. S.....	215, 396

THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE SUBCONSCIOUS SETTINGS OF IDEAS IN
RELATION TO THE PATHOLOGY OF THE PSYCHO-
NEUROSES*

MORTON PRINCE

THAT our points of view, attitudes of mind, sentiments, and the meaning which ideas have for us are determined by the experiences of life and are, therefore, *acquired*, can scarcely be traversed. This is only to say, as observation shows, our thoughts, ideas, perceptions, etc., become, by the fact of being experienced, organized into complexes or systems and correspondingly conserved in the subconscious. This when interpreted means that the residual subconscious dispositions (psychical or neural) acquired through conscious experiences are thus organized. Consequently we may say that nearly every idea, the elements of every thought, (e. g. wars make patriotism) are organized with a large number of antecedent experiences through the medium of subconscious residual dispositions. So much we may agree upon as our starting point. Now, it is necessarily these antecedent personal experiences that form the context or setting which gives the idea that particular meaning for the individual which may be called its *experiential egocentric meaning*. This is my first thesis.

The psychological content of every idea is a complex affair. An idea of any given object, of a violet, for instance, a snake, a particular building, contains of course sensational elements conveniently called images—visual, tactile, olfactory, etc.—or what Hoernlé calls “signs.” You all remember Charcot’s classical diagram to represent the con-

* Read by title at the Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association 1915.

cept "bell"—a diagram copied freely in our text book explanations of aphasia. This diagram consists of a lot of little circles, each representing both a brain centre and a sensory memory picture—a visual picture of a bell, an auditory memory of the sound of a bell, a tactile and temperature memory, a word hearing, and a word seeing, and a word uttering memory, and so on. And all these little circles are joined to one another by conducting tracks; and thus the picture of the bell excites the centres and the memories. The combination of all these sensory memories or pictures is supposed to make the concept bell. And on this principle in our text-books aphasia has been very simply and satisfactorily explained—satisfactorily to the anatomists. But an idea or concept is much more complicated than this. I will say parenthetically, for it has nothing to do with my present subject, it is because of this inadequate notion of the content of an idea, whether of a bell or anything else, that the classical theory of aphasia has proved to be so inadequate and unsophisticated.

Besides the sensory "images" accepted by every psychologist, the content of an idea, psychologically speaking, contains what is called "meaning." If we call, following Hoernlè, the sensational elements, in Charcot's diagram, "signs," we may say every idea has, besides signs, meaning of some sort. Even nonsense syllables have the meaning nonsense. A given man may have the meaning father, or son, or physician, or murderer, or emperor—one meaning for one person and one for another. Now sign and meaning make a complex or "psychical whole," a "psychosis," using the word in a psychological not pathological sense. This "psychical whole," whatever it may be, is the content of consciousness so far as concerns the idea.

But the whole content is not vivid, clear, in the focus of attention. The meaning may be in the focus while the signs are dim, in the background or fringe, or vice versa.

The important point is that "meaning" is a very definite concrete part of the idea.

Again, while the sensational signs may be constant for a given idea, the meaning is a varying component, varying for different individuals, and varying at different moments

in the same individual. It may be only the dictionary meaning representing the use or purpose of the object, substantially such as is contained in the definition given in the dictionary. In the content of many ideas meaning is limited probably to a dictionary meaning. But with a great many ideas, in addition to this, the content of meaning is much fuller and takes on a specific personal or egocentric character. In other words, the objects of ideas have acquired by the personal experiences of life a very personal relation and, therefore, meaning to the individual. This meaning has been formed by the individual's experiences with the object and these experiences have become closely organized with his own "personality." This meaning of a given idea may, accordingly, be spoken of as the *experiential egocentric meaning*. Let me explain by an example:

The idea of blood contains sensational signs (color, fluid, smell, etc.) plus the dictionary meaning ("The fluid which circulates in the principal vascular system of animals", etc.) and these signs and this meaning may make up the "psychical whole" of the idea with a given individual. But with others, who have had very specific personal experiences with blood, the idea may have an extra meaning corresponding to those experiences. Thus to a physiologist like Harvey the meaning may contain memories in detail of the whole vascular system and of the various organs of the body; and, to a more modern physiologist, memories of the blood corpuscles and various constituents of the blood. All these memories, with biological theories of his own regarding the physiology of the blood, may be contained more or less specifically in the content of meaning and be a part of the psychical whole. To a layman, who knows nothing of physiology and has had no biological experiences, blood may have a meaning in which are contained ideas and feelings of danger to life. To a soldier who has had experiences in the trenches and has seen blood poured out as a result of ghastly wounds made by shrapnel, there may be contained in the meaning ideas of slaughter, horror, shell fire in the trenches according to his experiences; and if he has himself been wounded or has seen a comrade mutilated by the shells of the enemy there may be contained in the meaning of the

idea memories related to his own personality and associated with strong emotions of horror or pity, or aversion. To the butcher in the slaughter-house the meaning may be only that of a great pool of red slimy liquid in which he is obliged to wade, with memories of his daily occupation. To a Jack-the-Ripper it has a sexual meaning. To each and all blood has a distinct and personal meaning. All these different meanings have plainly been acquired from the life experiences of the individual, consequently the same idea has a different meaning for different persons according to the differences in the antecedent experiences of each. Consider the differences in the meaning of the word son according as the context shows it to mean your son or my son; and so consider the differences in the meanings which a snake may have for an ordinary person, a naturalist, and a Freudian psychologist. These differences plainly depend upon the differences in the antecedent ideas with which a snake is associated and organized in the mind of each. Similarly consider the differences in the meaning which X, your friend and college classmate, has for you, and the meaning which he has, respectively, for a grateful, adoring patient, and an ungrateful, dissatisfied one. Thus there may be as many experiential egocentric meanings as there are individuals, but of course there may be such a meaning that is common to a group, or community of individuals though differing slightly in each member of the group or community. These different meanings peculiar to each individual are plainly extra, or over and above the dictionary meaning, and are experiential and egocentric, in that they are, on the one hand, derived from his own experiences and, on the other, organized about his own personality. We may say that the idea is *set* in his antecedent mental experiences which may be called the *setting* which gives the idea meaning.

Going one step farther, we know that the setting is necessarily represented, according to the principle of conservation, by subconscious dispositions. Consequently, every idea, or nearly every idea, that has egocentric meaning must have roots in such dispositions. From them (or determined by them) a greater or less number of memories of antecedent mental experiences, organized with the sensa-

tional signs of a given present idea, emerge into the content of consciousness, either into the focus or fringe, as meaning. *Idea and meaning, or perhaps more correctly expressed, signs and meaning, thus become a psychical whole.*

It is obvious that not all but only a small part of the memories of antecedent experiences can emerge into consciousness as the meaning of an idea. Consequently there must still remain, below the conscious threshold, a number of these subconscious dispositions, likewise organized by previous experience with the idea. These form subconscious roots or ramifications. What subconscious elements emerge into meaning must, of course, be determined in each case—and this is a matter of considerable importance—in interpreting a psychosis. And a still more important question is the determination of what part, if any, the subconscious elements of the setting—the roots—play in psychological processes.

As to the first question: although only a relatively small part of the numerous egocentric experiences of the setting can enter the content of consciousness at any given moment, and much less the focus of attention, nevertheless the whole content of consciousness may be much richer in conscious elements of the setting than is commonly supposed. I say this, because when we speak of the content of consciousness we have usually in mind only the focus of attention, meaning thereby those elements which are vivid—of which we have vivid awareness. Whereas, we know that besides these there are other conscious elements of which we are only dimly aware. These constitute the fringe of awareness, a sort of twilight zone. Into this the vivid region of awareness shades.

Now it often happens that technical investigation reveals in this twilight zone conscious elements, derived from the setting of past experiences, which not only contribute to but may be the chief elements in the egocentric meaning of the idea. Indeed the content of this twilight zone may furnish the explanation of the view point, previously inexplicable, towards an object.

And going still further we find an ultra-marginal zone for which there is no awareness at all—a true coconscious

zone; and in this too, according to my observations, we find elements of meaning.

And so it happens, particularly with ideas of emotional value, where for instance there is intense antipathy, or fear, or hatred of an object, that the subject cannot explain his viewpoint, does not understand the meaning of his sentiment of antipathy or hatred, because in certain cases, at least, the meaning is in the twilight zone or ultramarginal zone of the content of consciousness.

Numerous psychological investigations have convinced me of this fact. In phobias therefore a complete examination must include these zones. Because the contents of these zones is dim, it must not be inferred that therefore their elements have no functional intensity. On the contrary, judging by their reactions which they excite and which can be easily traced, they may have very great impulsive intensity.

But even such findings will not reveal the Why of the meaning—Why an object has such an egocentric meaning for the subject. For this we must search still further into antecedent experiences—into the setting from which these elements, whether of emotion or memories, emerge into various zones of the content of consciousness.

This search necessarily leads us into the *subconscious part of the setting* from which meaning is derived. As I have said, only a relatively small number of elements of antecedent experiences can enter at one moment the content of consciousness to become meaning. There must always still remain below the threshold of consciousness many subconscious dispositions deposited by life's experiences and organized with the idea—all forming a dynamic psychic whole. And from whatever viewpoint we approach the subject we are compelled to believe that in many cases at least these furnish many active integral elements in a *functioning system*. The conscious meaning is but part and parcel of a larger system of which, as with an iceberg, the larger part is submerged—that is, subconscious. The conscious and the subconscious thus form a functioning whole—a psychosis. Thus it comes about that many of the elements of the fringe of consciousness, the content of the background of

the mind, will be found to be only the dimly, but consciously emerging part of a subconscious mechanism. The subconscious, conceived as functional residual dispositions, thus plays an important dynamic part in conscious thought, and it is easy to understand how it can play a dominant part in certain abnormal psychoses.

We may use the analogy of the hidden works of a clock to represent this subconscious mechanism, while the chimes, the hands and the face would represent that which is in consciousness. Though the visible hands and the audible chimes appear to record the time, the real process at work is that of the hidden mechanism.

If we would know the Why of the meaning of any object of consciousness it is obvious theoretically—and practically investigations confirm this theoretical view—that we must discover all the dispositions derived from antecedent thoughts (experiences) systematized within the setting, or from which the setting in a restricted sense is in turn derived. These give us the root-ideas, to use the language of common parlance, of the setting and therefore of the ego-centric meaning. This is what we mean when we say that the root-ideas of two persons, or the people of two communities, or nations, are the same in regard to some questions of common experience.

It is also obvious that the systematized dispositions of the antecedent experiences, root-ideas, settings and "meanings" pertaining to any object of thought determine and furnish the "point of view" or "attitude of mind" in regard to that object. This would be, for example, the psychological interpretation of a truth written by an English statesman—"We English and Americans are one people, not merely because of blood and religion and literature and history, but above all because our root-ideas are the same, because we approach every question from the same standpoint, because we are alike in all essentials and only differ in minor characteristics." Similarly, to use a more concrete illustration, A has a strong antipathy for B. He cannot adequately explain this antipathy, excepting that B means for him an arrogant, overbearing man. Let us suppose investigation discloses previous experiences of wounded

self-pride, which he does not or cannot voluntarily, for one reason or another, bring into consciousness. These would furnish the reason for the antipathy—for the ego-centric antipathetic meaning which B has for him. These experiences have formed a subconscious system of dispositions of which the antipathetic meaning of B is an emerging part—perhaps an unconscious and unrealized defense reaction. Its roots, in any case, are in the subconscious system. It is also obvious that at any given moment a very small part of such a system can become conscious thought. Though it is theoretically possible—so long as such a system is conserved—that the whole may be brought piecemeal into awareness, either voluntarily as an act of memory, or through various technical devices, nevertheless the greater part must ordinarily remain as a subconscious system of dispositions (neural or psychical?). And indeed it frequently is the case that a person cannot voluntarily reproduce but a small part of the setting of antecedents which furnishes the point of view and ego-centric meaning of an idea. Hence it is that in such cases he is ignorant of its origin, of the Why; and then it is said he is unconsciously motivated. It may or may not be that repression, because of the unpleasant character of the antecedent experiences, is the reason for the failure of reproduction. Sometimes it is and sometimes not. I am not here concerned with mechanisms of amnesia but only with subconscious systems of dispositions that determine points of view and meaning.

It follows, again, theoretically that a change of "attitude of mind," of the point of view regarding any object of consciousness involves a change in the "meaning" of the object. And such a change in meaning involves a change in the root-ideas pertaining thereto, the fundamental ideas of what we here call the "setting." Obviously the setting may be so changed by introducing into the conscious and subconscious systems of experiences composing the setting new experiences, new thoughts, new knowledge—new ideas or knowledge that was not previously organized, or systematized with the experiences out of which the setting was built up. Thus suppose that in the above example there were artificially introduced into the wounded self-pride

setting of A ideas of B's admiration of A, of new knowledge that explained A's antecedent experiences with B in an entirely new light and wholly favorable to B. As a result the setting and meaning of A's ideas of B would be changed and the antipathy would cease. This is common everyday experience and requires no psychologist to formulate the principle. The only thing required of the psychologist is to discover in obscure cases the root-ideas from which given points of view, attitudes of mind and meanings have originated. These are often almost impenetrably hidden in the subconscious and require considerable and cunning research for their discovery.

If all this is true then it is going far afield to introduce the Freudian conceptions of symbols, unconscious infantile sexual wishes, a metaphysical "libido" and what-not into the formulas.

Let us now see how far through these fundamental psychological principles we can interpret the phenomena of the psycho-neuroses. For this purpose we must consider in more detail the content of the subconscious mechanism.

EMOTION AND SUBCONSCIOUS PROCESSES

Before doing so, however, we must consider the psychology of the emotions.

We have thus far considered only *acquired* dispositions. There are a number of dispositions or tendencies to specific reactions which are admittedly *innate*. These reactions are determined by a discharge of force in various directions along neural pathways. To say they are innate means that these reactions are conditioned by congenital preformed pathways and central dynamic arrangements and dispositions. Among these dispositions are those instincts which have emotion as a correlated conscious element or accompaniment. Whatever psychological theory of the emotions we may adopt we must admit that they are psychophysical instincts which serve a biological aim. Fear and anger, for example, protect the individual, by flight or pugnacity, from threat of danger or actual harmful attack.

It is generally agreed that in the make-up of personality,

in man and animals, there are a number of such primary emotional instincts, although there is some question as to which shall be regarded as primary and which are merely compounds of the primary. We may safely say, however, that in every man and higher animal there are, besides anger and fear, the instincts of curiosity, self-assertion, self-abasement, repulsion, and the parental and sexual instincts. Each of these has its peculiar emotion—wonder, elation, subjection, disgust, tender-feeling and libido. All these instincts, the most advanced psychologists believe, have through the force of their emotions tremendous impulsive or driving force which tend to carry out the aims of the instincts. The emotional impulse in one plays exactly in principle the same part as the impulses of the others and there is no difference in this respect between the impulses of the sexual instinct and those of the others. What is true of the former is true of the latter. Biologically the libido stands in exactly the same dynamic position as fear, anger, wonder, etc. One of the most astounding things in the Freudian philosophy is that it either totally disregards every thing that has been written by capable students of psychology upon the emotions, or, when it recognizes these important innate dispositions, it does so in a most superficial and inadequate way and subordinates them all to the use of one instinct, the sexual, which it makes paramount and promotes to a hegemony in a confederation of instincts. One hardly knows whether to ascribe this attitude on the part of psycho-analysts to an amazing ignorance of psychology or to that Freudian mechanism which represses from consciousness disagreeable and intolerable facts.

The Freudian conception may be right or it may be wrong, but in either case, to dismiss without discussion well known facts and plausible interpretations, sustained by capable psychologists of world-wide reputation, is not calculated to render Freudian interpretations more acceptable to those who have a wider or different culture.

Considerable complaint is made (and with justice) by psycho-analysts that their critics have not made themselves acquainted with Freudian data and conceptions. Is not the boot on the other leg, or at least on both legs?

In the study of emotion by psychologists in general, attention has been as a rule, I believe, too strongly focused upon it as a psychological state, thereby over-emphasizing this one factor to the neglect of the instinctive process as a whole and particularly of the factor of discharge of energy, known as the impulsive force of the emotions. This discharge takes place in at least three directions: 1. To the skeletal muscles determining co-ordinated movements that manifest instinctive expression of a given emotion on the one hand, and, on the other, tend to carry out the aim of the instinct (flight in the case of fear, pugnacity in the case of anger). 2. To the viscera through the autonomic sympathetic nervous system. These discharges have been admirably studied by Pawlow, Cannon, and others. Cannon has also pointed out how the discharge to the adrenal glands, liver, blood-vessels and other viscera cooperate in the fulfilment of the aim of the instinct. 3. In directions which inhibit mental dispositions and active mental processes on the one hand and, on the other, those antagonistic instincts, bodily movements, and functions which would conflict with the aim of the given instinct. Thus thoughts and actions motivated by the instinct of anger are at once inhibited by fear, if that instinctive process be excited to activity. Thus stated the inhibition means antagonism and conflict between two opposed processes. This is a general principle of functioning of the nervous system and conditions all coordinated activity as shown by Sherrington.

Emotion then cannot be regarded as a "free, floating" conscious state, or even force, or libido, or energy, that "attaches" itself to this or that, but as only one element in an innate instinctive process conditioned by congenital nervous dispositions and pathways.

The next point I wish to make is that by experience the thus acquired dispositions become organized with innate dispositions into a complex which functions as a whole. In this way not only ideas of objects—father, friend, snake, fatherland, etc.—take on an emotional tone, but the ideas acquire the impulsive force of the emotional instinct which strives to carry them to fruition.

An idea organized with one or more emotional instincts has been aptly termed by Mr. Shand a *sentiment*. We thus have sentiments of love and hatred and jealousy of a person, of self-interest, of self abasement, of reverence for an object, etc. But we have seen that an idea has "meaning" as well as perceptual images. The emotional dispositions belonging to a sentiment therefore are necessarily organized also *with the dispositions of meaning, i. e. of antecedent experiences*. Hence it is more than a figure of speech to say that the emotion of a given sentiment has its roots in subconscious antecedent experiences. Indeed, observation shows I think, that the origin of the emotion of a sentiment is almost always, if not always, to be found in the setting of antecedent experiences from which the meaning is derived. Consequently, as all these experiences do not recur to consciousness, it often happens, as psychological studies of obsessions and hysteria have shown, that a subconscious complex of acquired dispositions provides the emotion which emerges into consciousness along with an idea. We may then conservatively speak of subconscious emotional complexes, in the sense of complexes of acquired dispositions (psychological or neural) organized by experience with innate emotional dispositions or instincts.

Now to go back for a moment to the impulsive force of an emotion manifested as discharge:

As Shand (*The Foundation of Character*) and MacDougall (*Social Psychology*) have so forcibly argued, the impulsive force of the emotional instincts (organized about an idea to form a sentiment) largely provides the driving force which tends to carry the idea to fruition and the idea guides an awakened instinct in its striving to fulfill its aim. Without such a driving force on the one hand the idea would be, comparatively speaking, inert, lifeless; and on the other without such organization with ideas, instinctive activity would be unregulated, uncoordinated and chaotic. Thus ideas are energized by being organized with emotional instincts. The impulsive force of the instinct becomes a motivating force, a striving of the idea to express itself in mental and bodily behaviour. The so-called striving or

craving of a wish, for example, on this theory, is due to the tendency of the instinct to discharge its motivating force. From this viewpoint we find the key to the explanation of the observed fact that the conserved *dispositions* of sentiments organized by experience strive to find expression, consciously or subconsciously.

When by reason of some conflicting force or dissociation, their conscious equivalents cannot enter awareness, they tend, activated by their emotional instincts, to become active autonomous subconscious processes.

CONFLICTS

This brings us to a consideration of *conflicts*. The realization of the fact that human personality is disrupted by emotional conflicts is as old as the literature of the world. In modern times psychology has attempted to formulate their laws, that is all.

Now when an emotion is aroused a conflict necessarily occurs between its impulse and that of any other existing affective state, the impulse of which is antagonistic to the aim of the former. Consequently an awakened instinct or sentiment which is in opposition to that of some other instinct or sentiment also in activity meets with resistance. Whichever instinct or sentiment, meaning whichever impulse, is the stronger necessarily downs the other: inhibits the central and efferent parts of the process—ideas, emotions and impulses—though the afferent part conveys the stimulus to the central factor. Thus processes of thought which the inhibited sentiment or instinct would normally excite, or with which it is systematized, are likewise inhibited and behaviour correspondingly modified. These statements are only descriptive of what is common experience. If one recalls to mind the principal primary emotions (instincts) such as the sexual, anger, fear, tender feeling, hunger, self-abasement, self-assertion, curiosity, etc., this is seen to be an obvious biological truth. Fear is suppressed by anger, tender feeling, or curiosity (wonder) and vice versa; hunger and the sexual instinct by disgust.

There is one difference, however, between the repression

of an instinct (anger, fear, etc.) and that of a sentiment. The former may be simply inhibited. A sentiment, however, being an idea about which a system of emotional dispositions has been organized, when repressed by conflict, or when simply out of mind, whether capable of reproduction as memory or not, is still conserved, as we have seen, as an unconscious neurogram or system of dispositions. As we have also seen, so long as it is conserved it is still a part of the personality. Even though repressed it is not necessarily absolutely inhibited but may be simply dissociated and then be *able to take on dissociated subconscious activity*. As a subconscious process the idea continues still organized with its emotional dispositions, and the conative forces of these, under given conditions, may continue striving to give expression to the idea.

All sorts of phenomena may result from the emotional discharge of a subconscious sentiment. Into these I will not enter. I may mention here only one phenomenon of this striving, namely, the emerging into consciousness of the emotional element of the sentiment while the idea remains subconscious, thus producing an apparently unaccountable fear or joy, feelings of pleasure or pain, etc.

I forbear to mention illustrative examples of the phenomena of conflict which I might easily cite from both clinical cases and experimental studies.*

THE SETTINGS IN THE PSYCHO-NEUROSES

Now let us return to our examination of the subconscious part of the settings which give meaning to the conscious or dimly conscious or subconscious ideas of a psycho-neurosis. Such an examination will always disclose, I believe from my own investigations, conserved subconscious sentiments, or dispositions of sentiments, of a varying nature; and organized in all of them intensely developed emotional instincts. The sentiments may be self-reproaches, or anxieties, or jealousies, or self-abasement, or fear, or hatred,

* For examples and a fuller description of conflicts see "The Unconscious" (by the writer) Chapters XV and XVI.

or resentment, or wishes, or doubts, or scruples, or what-not: and the instincts are one or a number—centred about each idea.

These are integral and dominating elements in the settings. One or the other has acquired a hegemony in the confederacy of the setting. Such sentiments tend to be activated by the motivating impulses of their emotions, that is by the tendency of their instincts to fulfill their aim. When so activated they express themselves in psychological and bodily behaviour. They thus give rise to conflicts with other sentiments with resulting phenomena and they excite reactions from other instincts which may be defense reactions, such as fear or anger: and from one or other of these reactions certain elements arise in consciousness. These may be simply an affect, such as anxiety, or a phobic or an insistent fixed idea, or it may even be a hallucination. Indeed hallucinations may be shown by experimental methods to be emergences from subconscious processes of this kind and consequently the hallucinations of the insane can be logically explained as phenomena determined by more or less autonomously functioning dispositions motivated into processes below the threshold of consciousness.

Of course a stimulus of some kind, either from the environment, such as a perception, or from within—an associated idea—is the spark which touches off this psychological explosive. According to this interpretation *any sentiment, that is to say, any conserved idea activated by any of the innate emotional dispositions, if sufficiently strong, may thus become the motive that determines mental and bodily behaviour, whether conscious or subconscious.*

When, owing to some specific mechanism, an activated sentiment is prevented from emerging into awareness as a conscious process, observation has shown that it may manifest itself as an autonomous and entirely subconscious process. This process, which is then said to be dissociated, may often, as in hysteria, be identified with the dissociated sentiment (subconscious idea).

This brings us to the question: Why do not such ideas (or processes) wholly emerge into the content of consciousness; that is to say, why are they subconscious?

To this difficult question various answers have been given, each being a different interpretation of the facts. According to Janet the dissociation is due to the inability of the personal consciousness to synthesize the ideas because of psychical weakness (*épuisement*). According to Freud it is due to repression which occurs because of the peculiar character of the repressed idea. This idea for him is always (or nearly always) a sexual wish, generally of infantile origin, motivated by the striving of the sexual force or libido. The wish is one which, because of its character, is unpleasant to the personal consciousness and is therefore consciously or unconsciously repressed.

According to my own view, if I may venture to formulate it in general terms, the dissociation may be effected by any mental conflict. The impulsive discharge of an emotion, whether that of a pure instinctive reaction such as fear and anger, or that of a sentiment, tends, as observation shows, to inhibit or dissociate antagonistic instincts and sentiments, and whole systems of ideas in which such instincts and sentiments are systematized. Hence in the conflict of antagonistic sentiments, wishes, doubts and scruples, of antagonistic interests evoked by unsolved problems, in the conflict of anxieties with the desire for mental peace, in a conflict with self-reproaches or the fear of self-blame, in a conflict with an overwhelming emotion discharging its impulsive force in almost every direction, in short, through any one of the multitude of conflicts, by which the human mind may be literally torn and distracted, one or other of the contending factors may be inhibited by an antagonistic impulse and so dissociated as to be incapable of taking part in the processes of thought and thus prevented from emerging into consciousness.

But it may not be absolutely inhibited. If its own motivating impulses are sufficiently strong it may take on autonomous dissociated subconsciou sativity, and manifest itself by various phenomena. The consideration of these belongs to special psychology and is beyond the scopc of our subject. I only wish to point out that, according to my observations and interpretation of such phenomena, any conserved disposition motivated by almost any emotional

impulse, that is to say, almost any of the motives of life—any of the longings or fears, or resentments, or antipathies, or jealousies, or hatreds, or affections, or curiosities—which torment poor human nature, may become a subconscious process. Any of these many activate a process which may continue entirely outside of the personal awareness and exhibit all the characteristics of intelligence—of volition, imagination, emotions, etc.

Under other conditions any subconscious motive, although not emerging itself into the personal consciousness, may indirectly determine the content of that consciousness—that is mental behaviour—in that it is a dynamic factor in that "psychic whole" of ideas which we have discussed, and also in that the *secondary or sequential processes* to which it gives rise, not being in conflict with the dissociating force, may emerge as conscious processes. Thus for example, a wholly or dimly subconscious sentiment of jealousy may determine secondary rationalization such as moral reprobation of the object of the jealousy. These ideas may emerge as a conscious interpretation of certain concrete acts of a given individual who is the object. These ideas thus emerging become conscious processes of thought without the individual realizing the motivating factor. He is then said to be "unconsciously" motivated by jealousy. Or similarly certain ideational processes may emerge, producing falsification of reasoning, self-deception, delusive viewpoints, delusions, etc. Or certain elements of a subconscious process may emerge into the focus or fringe of the personal consciousness as indefinable emotion, insistent ideas, obsessions, impulsions, hallucinations, etc. When the emotion of anxiety pertaining to a subconscious process alone emerges into awareness we have a pure anxiety state. When an idea and its emotion emerges we have a phobia. In this case it often will be found that the meaning of the obsessing idea is to be found in the fringe or background of the mind. When sensory "images" pertaining to the subconscious "ideas" emerge we have hallucinations. On the other hand, the whole process may be subconscious, producing automatisms of various kinds. Different combinations and interactions of subconscious and conscious pro-

cesses may produce multiform phenomena, normal and abnormal. Among these those of conflict are conspicuously important. These facts are easily demonstrated experimentally in subconscious personalities, and other pathological conditions. The details of mechanisms by which such phenomena are produced constitute problems which by themselves still need to be worked out.

In the light of these fundamental principles, through such phenomena we can realize the importance of a knowledge of the functions of the Subconscious for Psychiatry. Without such a knowledge no psychiatrist is properly equipped to understand the problems set before him.

THERAPEUTICS

The therapeutics is simple in principle. It consists only first in discovering the dominating sentiments in the subconscious setting, and second by educational processes altering these sentiments to others which change the egocentric meaning of ideas, viewpoint and attitude of mind, and thus adapt the patient to his environment. In the functional psychoses I find in practice that it works.

OBSSESSIONS OF NORMAL MINDS

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THE following study is necessarily fragmentary as it is merely a part of a larger investigation which has not yet been completed. But possibly the facts that are here presented may be of some value in throwing light on the character and extent of obsessions in normal individuals.

About two hundred students in educational psychology, almost all of whom were seniors, were asked a series of questions which they were to answer in writing. The answers to these questions were handed to the instructor at the next meeting of the sections two days later. The two questions asked that bear directly upon the subject of this paper were as follows:—

1. "Do you have or have you had any fixed ideas?"
2. "Do you have any ideas which involuntarily come to you when fatigued?"

The writer explained that he meant by a fixed idea any idea which came unsolicited and remained even when the subject tried to get rid of it. The term obsession was not used as it was feared that this term would carry with it the idea of a pathological condition, and consequently stand in the way of an honest confession on the part of the student. The student was not required to describe his fixed ideas, but he was requested to do so if he were willing. Of the two hundred or more students who were asked these questions, about twenty-five per cent said that they either had had or did have fixed ideas. Many of them did not attempt to describe their ideas but a large percentage did and from these we gain an idea of the character and extent of the obsessions common to such a large percentage of normal individuals. The following are some of the answers given to these questions:—

"I used to have a fixed idea of a monstrous stone so high that I couldn't see its top, and the stone would begin

to roll toward me menacingly. I haven't had it, however, since I was a little youngster. So now it is very vague. Only the fearful sensation remains."

"When I am fatigued I always get the idea that I must solve some weighty problem that is awaiting me. I don't know what sort of problem it is to be solved, but whatever it is, it makes me worry because I realize it is my duty to unravel it, and the power to do so is just beyond my reach. I have another real problem which I try to solve when I am fatigued. I can see a table with objects upon it. This table moves upward through the air until it touches the ceiling. The objects go on through the ceiling then I turn the table upside down and all of the objects stay on it. I try to get the table to touch the floor and have the objects go right through the floor as they did through the ceiling. The distressing thing about this is that I can never get the table clear down to the floor. It seems as if it were always an inch above it. If I try to think of it a half inch from the floor it usually ascends about three inches higher."

"I have had and still have a fixed idea that causes me any amount of discomfort. I don't remember ever being seriously injured with a knife wherefore I should feel great fear toward one. I can't imagine where I ever developed such a feeling of perfect terror for that object. The thought of it comes at most inopportune times when there is no occasion at all for its appearance. I can be talking on an apparently interesting topic of conversation when all at once without any warning, whatever, I shudder as I feel the blade of a knife hurting me. I know it is ridiculous to imagine that I am being cut, but I cannot help being frightened. The knife seems to wound me in various places at different times. Sometimes I can feel the sharp blade in my mouth and I am perfectly certain that in real life it never was there. I haven't told anyone of the queer sensation for I do not wish to be considered abnormal. I was discouraged from telling by my mother, who, noticing me shudder on one occasion, said I had either a very vivid imagination, or that I should apply for a place in the psychopathic ward. I prefer to be at large."

"I can not say that I have had any fixed ideas in particular. There is one thing, however, which often comes to me, even when not suggested by the name or object itself, and it is very difficult to get rid of. I imagine the blade of a knife closing down on one of my fingers. It is either pinching the flesh between the blade and knife or else cutting into the flesh at the end of my finger. It is an unpleasant sensation, and often comes unexpected. I find it hard to get rid of sometimes."

"For three years whenever I allowed myself to be idle I was obsessed by the idea that I saw a large roll of carpet which rolled or unrolled itself eternally. As for recurrent words, I have a habit while dreaming of different things of breaking in on my reflections with the words, 'and then' or 'and after that.' The idea of the coolness of the grass is the one which comes to me most often when fatigued."

"When I was about eight years of age I had a fixed idea. I thought I was going to cut my throat from ear to ear with a certain large butcher-knife in my grandmother's kitchen. I couldn't throw off the idea. I was afraid to go near the knife. This persisted for about two weeks, then gradually wore off. When fatigued certain combinations of words or letters recur again and again. Often I am wholly unaware of their origin. For instance the words 'sy', 'cip' have come to me over and over the last few days, and I am absolutely ignorant of where or when I heard or saw them. Often at night when very tired just before I fall asleep I read page after page of a large magazine in which there is absolutely no meaning—just a jumble of words. Yet I feel no irritation and my mind is absolutely satisfied with the jumble. I read down the columns, turn the pages and am aware of a half-tone illustration in the middle of the page but never see it distinctly."

"Whether it is to the point or not I do not know—but for the past ten years I have repeatedly found myself when thoughtlessly scribbling, writing the name 'Claudius.' I have no idea why this is, but it certainly has stuck."

"When fatigued I always picture vast horizons with a single occupant—as for instance, a single ship upon a large sea, or a vast desert in the middle of which is a single

tent—outside, a camel and then a lonely Arab on his knees toward Mecca."

"I am not sure the following would be designated as a fixed idea, but I have never been able to discover any reason for the occurrence. My home for several years was on a farm. I never went into the large barn alone that I did not feel impelled to look at the rafters to see whether there was not some one hanging there. I realized the foolishness of the idea but could never drive it away, and in spite of all my resolutions to the contrary I invariably looked almost before I realized what I was doing. The impression was not nearly so vivid when others were present. Whether it would persist now that three or four years have elapsed I do not know."

"I have no fixed idea that comes to me and I can't get rid of it. However, this was not the case a few years back. At that time whenever I started upon a dreaming tour my dreams were regularly interrupted by the image of a man who was constantly sneering and making a br—br—sound at me. When fatigued I have two distinct ideas that come to me invariably if I am alone."

"I do have fixed ideas but they may not be of the kind you have reference to. Always when I am at a railway station watching a train come in I have a desire to jump in front of it and I never have been able to get rid of this feeling. The same thing happened when I saw Niagara Falls this summer. I felt as though something were urging me to jump into them."

In studying these obsessions in normal individuals one is struck by two things: First, that without external assistance the obsession in so many cases seems to run its course and disappears, or at least loses its emotional force; second, that in a large percentage of these cases the beginning of the obsession goes back to childhood.

A careful study of the mechanisms of the obsessions of normal minds by means of the psychological methods of investigation which have proved so successful in the study of pathological obsessions would doubtless be of value not only in adding to our knowledge of the obsessions of normal minds, but also in showing their relation to pathological obsessions.

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY LIFE*

A Critical Review of Dr. Sigmund Freud's Theories

MEYER SOLOMON, CHICAGO

WE have here presented to us a very welcome English edition of Freud's famous book. Brill is to be praised for the excellence of the translation which has been made of the fourth German edition. The translator explains in the brief introduction that while the original text was strictly followed, "linguistic difficulties often made it necessary to modify or substitute some of the author's cases by examples comprehensible to the English speaking reader."

By way of introduction the reviewer will say that if, as Brill says in the introduction, this book is the author's most popular work, there must be certain definite reasons for it. In the first place, Freud does not harp upon sexual themes in this work to anything like the extent that we find in his other works. In the second place, the book is very novel, very interesting and entertaining, and one feels that personal touch with the author which one generally does not gain in reading the great majority of works. One is impressed by the honesty, frankness, sincerity and boldness of the author. How many men are there who would permit themselves to be frank enough and daring enough, in a book of this sort, to give such an example, with his explanation (with which I do not agree), as Freud gives on page 193.¹

**Psychopathology of Everyday Life*. By Professor Dr. Sigmund Freud, LL. D. Authorized English edition, with introduction by A. A. Brill, Ph. B., M. D., Chief of Clinic of Psychiatry, Columbia University; Chief of the Neurological Department, Bronx Hospital and Dispensary; former Assistant Physician in the Central Islip State Hospital, and in the Clinic of Psychiatry, Zurich. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1914. \$3.50.

¹Where he attempts to prove that clumsy movements may be used "unconsciously" in a most refined way for sexual purposes, as illustrated by his awkward conduct toward a young girl when both he and she were, as it were, competing to be the first to place a chair for the girl's very old uncle, and he (Freud) endeavored to intercept her efforts which were proving successful.

The example of one of his erroneously carried-out actions with an analysis of same on page 195 and 196 is still more frank and more daring (even though, as I believe, unfounded.)

Another reason why this book is popular must be found in the fact that the fallacy in Freud's method of reasoning and arriving at conclusions which is noticeably displayed at so many points in this book is not or has not been clearly or at all unearthed or at any rate clearly understood by the general reader. Finally, it is a work which makes one think. And if Freud is wrong, and most of us believe that he is, in any of his conclusions or in his method, it is incumbent upon us to prove our case.

Before attempting to do this I may be permitted to drop the remark that, in spite of all the good qualities in the book, and even if all of Freud's conclusions were true (which, in fact, I do not believe them to be), this is not the sort of work which I would care to recommend to any but students of the mind, who are in a state of fairly positive mental equilibrium. In other words, I would not favor recommending this work to the usual lay reader, and would surely prohibit its use by individuals who are suffering from a psychoneurosis, since it would tend, in my opinion, to aggravate their mental state, it would make them more morbidly introspective and more morbidly self-centered than they were before and would give them much misinformation.

In view of the fact that this is a recent translation of one of Freud's most popular writings, and in view of the further facts that the so-called psychopathological acts of everyday life are of such universal occurrence and of such a nature that most of us have frequent, in fact almost innumerable opportunities to verify or disprove Freud's conclusion, particularly because of the simple nature of these manifestations as compared with the relative complexity and longer life history of the more pronounced forms of mental dissociation, the impulse is very strong in the reviewer to take this book as a peg on which to hang a criticism of the theories of Freud, in special relation to the ideas propounded in this book.

The reviewer must admire the frankness, the open-heartedness, the sincerity and genuineness of purpose in all that Freud says. Likewise his intensive observation, his analytical tendencies and his ingenuity call for praise. This book seems to me to be one of the most logical and one of

the least sexual of Freud's works, as it is least full of unproven and incorrect generalizations. It is no wonder to the reviewer that the naïve, witty arguments and peculiar psychological reasoning, with the implication of repression, "unconscious" and the other elements of the Freudian theories here displayed, prepared a fertile soil for or flowed out of his ideas of the significance of wit and its relation to "the unconscious."

There is a noticeable tendency here and there to speak in careful, non-generalized but nevertheless frequently vague statements, but this is more than compensated for by his general and unqualified declarations at other points, particularly in the last few pages of the final chapter of this book. The author has throughout adopted a modest and commendable method of presentation.

Freud endeavors to prove the truth of his conclusions by the presentation of numerous illustrations. It may even be said that the number of supportive cases presented in certain portions of the book is apt to confuse the issue if one is not on one's guard. A thorough, far-reaching, profound, intensive analysis of one case or of a few typical cases would be of much more value than the citation of so many cases as are at times presented by Freud. The cases cited are all very interesting little stories, most of them witty and ingenious. But it must be remembered that stories may be true or untrue, or positively, probably or possibly true. But even in the case of the possible truth of the explanations offered by Freud, this possibility could not be proven by the argument and reasoning of Freud, with the free manipulation of "the unconscious," repression, and the rest.

Another point worthy of mention in this connection is that Freud apparently accepts, at least he presents without criticism, the explanations offered by Jones, Brill, Frenczi, Maeder and others, in support of illustrative cases which are perhaps more generalized, more dogmatic and more positive in their generalizations than his own statements are. Although recognizing that Freud himself has come forward and criticized *Wilde Psychoanalyse*, yet it has always seemed to me that his nearest friends and followers have been the worst transgressors, and are recognized generally as the dis-

semitors of his theories. His acceptance and quotation of many borrowed cases added to this addition without criticism leads me to believe that he also accepts their analyses and interpretations as true. To prove that this assumption on my part is correct I need do no more than mention the fact that Hitschmann's compiled work (Freud's Theories of the Neuroses,²) revised by Freud, as Hitschmann states in the preface, shows that Freud himself believes in these ideas.

The ideas or theories or rather the general thesis here laid down, to the superficial thinker and to him who accepts things somewhat uncritically and jumps to conclusions, may seem not only plausible but even conclusive, let alone interesting, novel, entertaining, and suggestive.

There is more than a grain of the Sherlock Holmes sort of guess work, of jumping to conclusions with (possible) explanations, the result of superficial investigations. The explanations offered might as well or as often be wrong as right—if not more so. Snap-shot, short-cut diagnosis seems to be the rule.

Hardly a single case presented, *as a matter of fact I do not really find a solitary one*, is sound or in any way logical proof, let alone clinching evidence, of the views offered us. This is dependent upon the faulty reasoning.

In spite of his failure to prove the validity of his thesis, many of Freud's remarks not directly related to this general theme, show a keen, penetrating psychological insight and a lively imagination.

The book is divided into ten chapters which deal, respectively, with the following subjects: Forgetting of proper names, forgetting of foreign words, forgetting of names and order of words, childhood and concealing memories, mistakes in speech, mistakes in reading and writing, forgetting of impressions and resolutions, erroneously carried out actions, symptomatic and chance actions, errors, combined faulty acts, and a concluding chapter on determinism, chance and superstitious beliefs.

The reviewer would like very much to take this book up chapter by chapter and dissect the various conclusions,

²No. 17, Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series.

the proof for them and the method of arriving at same. He is prevented from doing this not because he considers the problems not sufficiently important but because of limitation of space. Besides, since the final chapter in the book contains Freud's final conclusions, he feels that this is sufficient to force home the general problems and issues under consideration.

FREUD'S CONCLUSIONS RADICAL

Tempting as it is to present an abstract of each chapter in this book, with a critical dissection of the conclusion reached, I shall merely offer a few illustrations of Freud's careful and guarded statements at one point as contrasted with his more generalized and sweeping standpoints in another. For example, at the end of the first chapter in which he deals with the forgetting of names, Freud says that he surely will not venture to assert that all cases of name-forgetting belong to this same category (discussed in the chapter) and admits that without doubt certain cases of name forgetting occur in a simpler way and concludes by stating that "*besides the simple forgetting of proper names there is another forgetting which is motivated by repression.*"³ And yet in a foot-note in the next chapter Freud says: "It seems now quite possible that the appearance of *any kind* of substitutive recollection is a constant sign—perhaps only characteristic and misleading—of the purposive forgetting motivated by repression,"⁴ while on the preceding page he declares that "the appearance or non-appearance of incorrect substitutive recollections does not constitute an essential distinction."⁵ This means that word forgetting without substitutive recollection can be explained by Freud in the same way as forgetting with substitutive recollection. Freud's famous example of the forgetting of the word *aliquis* by his young Jewish acquaintance is the foundation for this conclusion.

³ Italics Freud's Page 13.

⁴ Page 24. Italics mine.

⁵ Page 25.

Again Freud says that through the analysis of a large number of cases of forgetting or faulty reproduction of the order of words he found his theories of the mechanisms of forgetting mentioned below to be of "almost universal validity"⁶ and in the very next sentence but one he says: "What is common to *all* these cases regardless of the material is the fact that the forgotten or distorted material becomes connected through some associative road with an unconscious stream of thought which gives rise to the influence that comes to light as forgetting."⁷

In his consideration of mistakes in speech Freud speaks of his theory as being *almost invariably*⁸ true, then in the next chapter includes mistakes (including omissions) in reading and writing as being of the same order, and then under his discussion of the forgetting of impressions and experiences (knowledge) and resolutions and intentions, with which he deals in the self-same manner, he formulates the following statement: "*The forgetting in all cases is proved to be founded on a motive of displeasure.*"⁹

At another point, under "erroneously carried-out actions," Freud says that all lapses of motor functions (speech, actions, etc.) are included in his explanation which is the same as for the other slight functional disturbances of the daily life of healthy people."¹⁰

⁶Page 36.

⁷Italics mine. Page 36. It may be argued that possibly Freud here means only all those cases in which he found his theories to be true. My interpretation of this passage, however, plus what precedes and follows it in that chapter and in the entire book, does not seem to lead to any other conclusion than that Freud really means "*to all these cases,*" of the type mentioned (forgetting or faulty recollection of the order of words), without further qualification.

⁸Italics mine. Page 80.

⁹Page 138 Italics Freud's. It may be argued that "in all cases" here means in all the cases reported in this work. On page 163, Freud says: "As in the preceding functional disturbances, I have collected the cases of neglect (of resolutions or intentions) through forgetting wh'ch I have observed in myself, and endeavored to explain them. I have found that they could *invariably* (italics mine—M. S.) be traced to som' interference of unknown, and unadmitted motives—or, as may be said, they were due to a counter-will." But later, on pages 169 and 170, Freud makes this statement even more generalized and unequivocal by declaring: "We have *invariably* (italics mine—M. S.) found that intentions of some importance are forgotten when obscure motives arise to disturb them. In still less important intentions we find a second mechanism of forgetting. Here a counter-will becomes transferred to 'he resolution from something else after an external association has been fo med' between the latter and the content of the resolution."

¹⁰Page 177.

Whereas, on page 186 he says: "I actually believe that we must accept this explanation for a whole series¹¹ of seemingly accidental awkward movements," and on page 189 he asserts: "As can sometimes¹² be demonstrated by analysis, the dropping of objects or the overturning and breaking of the same are very frequently utilized as the expression of unconscious streams of thought, but more often they serve to represent the superstitious or odd significances connected therewith in popular sayings;" and again on page 191 he declares: "Similarly, to fall, to make a misstep, or to slip need not always¹³ be interpreted as an entirely accidental miscarriage of a motor action;" and whereas yet again in his discussion, extending from page 198 to 209 inclusive, of unconscious intentional attempts at self-infliction of injury and even self-destruction (unsuccessful or successful) originating from a desire for self-punishment, "usually expressing itself in self-reproach, or contributing to the formation of a symptom, which skilfully makes use of an external situation" being at the bottom of apparent accidents of this sort, he uses such terms as "sometimes," and "as a rule;" we are surprised to find such an unqualified statement as that on pages 192 to 193 which reads as follows: "That accidental actions are really intentional will find no greater credence in any other sphere than in sexuality, where the border between the intention and accident hardly seems discernible."

A statement, made by Freud himself, is most illuminating on this point. He says, "we are forced to conclude that all divisions used in this treatise are of only descriptive significance and contradict the inner unity of the sphere of manifestation."¹⁴ This means that *the basic mental mechanisms and mental content as well as the ultimate explanations or motives are the same for all of the psychopathologic acts of everyday life.* With this I agree. Therefore, in spite of the less positive and more careful assertions in some places, I am led to believe that his final and general conclusions are his real beliefs.

¹¹ Italics mine.

¹² Italics mine.

¹³ Italics mine.

¹⁴ Page 179.

Without attempting to prove this point by further quotations or by analyzing and presenting his many interesting but erroneous conclusions throughout the book, let us proceed to his final chapter. I believe that I can serve my purpose best by giving a brief presentation of Freud's views as they are offered to us in this concluding chapter, supplemented by certain helpful statements in other portions of the work.

Although, as mentioned above, Freud here and there assumes a conservative attitude, we find, however, that in the end his conclusions are radical and sweeping.

Exposition of Freud's views. I can best and most truthfully give the reader Freud's ideas by quoting him more or less at length. He says: "As a general result of the preceding separate discussions we must put down the following principle: *Certain inadequacies of our psychic capacities whose common character will soon be more definitely determined—and certain performances which are apparently unintentional prove to be well motivated when subjected to the psycho-analytic investigation, and are determined through the consciousness of unknown motives.*

"In order to belong to this class of phenomena thus explained a faulty psychic action must satisfy the following conditions:—

"(a) It must not exceed a certain measure, which is firmly established through our estimation, and is designated by the expression 'within normal limits.'

"(b) It must evince the character of the momentary and temporary disturbance. The same action must have been previously performed more correctly or we must always rely on ourselves to perform it more correctly; if we are corrected by others we must immediately recognize the truth of the correction and the incorrectness of our psychic action.

"(c) If we at all perceive a faulty action, we must not perceive in ourselves any motivation of the same, but must attempt to explain it through 'inattention' or attribute it to an 'accident.'

"Thus there remain in this group the cases of forgetting

and the errors, despite better knowledge, the lapses in speaking, reading and writing, the erroneously carried-out actions, and the so-called chance actions.”¹⁵

Freud asks himself the question: “Does the solution given for faulty and chance actions apply in general or only in particular cases, and if only in the latter, what are the conditions under which it may also be employed in the explanation of the other phenomena?”¹⁶

His reply to this question is as follows: “In answer to this question my experiences leave me in the lurch. I can only urge against considering the demonstrated connections as rare, for as often as I have made the test in myself and with my patients it was always definitely demonstrated exactly as in the examples reported, or there were at least good reasons to assume this. One should not be surprised, however, when one does not succeed every time in finding the concealed meaning of the symptomatic action, as the amount of inner resistances raising themselves against the solution must be considered a deciding factor. Also, it is not always possible to explain every individual dream of one's self or of one's patients. To substantiate the general validity of the theory, it is enough if one can penetrate only a certain distance into the hidden associations. The dream which proves refractory when the solution is attempted on the following day can often be robbed of its secret a week or a month later, when the psychic factors combating one another have been reduced as a consequence of a real change that has meanwhile taken place. The same applies to the solution of faulty and symptomatic actions. It would therefore be wrong to affirm of all cases which resist analysis that they are caused by another psychic mechanism than that here revealed; such assumption requires more than negative proofs; moreover, the readiness to believe in a different explanation of faulty and symptomatic actions, which probably exists universally in all normal persons, does not prove anything; it is obviously an expression of the same psychic forces which produced the secret, which there-

fore strives to protect and struggle against its elucidation.”¹⁷

And again: “If in the determinations of faulty and symptomatic actions we separate the unconscious motive from its co-active physiological and psychophysical relations, the question remains open whether there are still other factors within normal limits which, like the unconscious motive, and in its place can produce faulty and symptomatic actions on the road of the relations. It is not my task to answer this question.”¹⁸

Freud then asks himself: (1) What is the content and the origin of the thoughts and feelings which show themselves through faulty and chance actions? (2) What are the conditions which force a thought or a feeling to make use of these occurrences as a means of expression and place it in a position to do so? (3) Can constant and definite association be demonstrated between the manner of the faulty action and the qualities brought to expression through it?¹⁹

“In the examples which I have given from my psycho-analyses” says Freud, “it is found that the entire speech is either under the influence of thoughts which have become active simultaneously, or under absolutely unconscious thoughts which betray themselves either through the disturbance itself, or which evince an indirect influence by making it possible for the individual parts of the unconsciously intended speech to disturb one another. The retained or unconscious thoughts from which the disturbances in speech emanate are of the most varied origin. A general survey does not reveal any definite direction.”

“Comparative examinations of examples of mistakes in reading and writing lead to the same conclusions.”²⁰

“But one is on different ground when it comes to the examination of forgetting in the literal sense—*i. e.*, the forgetting of past experiences. The principal conditions of the normal process in forgetting are unknown. We are also reminded of the fact that not all is forgotten which we

¹⁷Pages 325-6

¹⁸Page 326.

¹⁹Page 327.

²⁰Pages 328-9.

believe to be. Our explanation here deals only with those cases in which the forgetting arouses our astonishment, in so far as it infringes the rule that the unimportant is forgotten, while the important matter is guarded by memory. Analysis of these examples of forgetting which seem to demand a special explanation shows that the motive of forgetting is always an unwillingness to recall something which may evoke painful feelings. We come to the conjecture that this motive universally strives for expression in psychic life, but is inhibited through other and contrary forces from regularly manifesting itself. The extent and the significance of this dislike to recall painful impressions seems worthy of the most painstaking psychologic investigation. The question as to what special conditions render possible the universally resistant forgetting in individual cases cannot be solved through this added association."

"A different factor steps into the foreground in the forgetting of resolutions; the supposed conflict resulting in the repression of the painful memory becomes tangible, and in the analysis of the examples one regularly recognizes a counter-will which opposes but does not put an end to the resolution. As in previously discussed acts, we here also recognize two types of the psychic process: the counter-will either turns directly against the resolution (in intentions of some consequence) or it is substantially foreign to the resolution itself and establishes its connection with it through an outer association (in almost indifferent resolutions).

"The same conflict governs the phenomena of erroneously carried-out actions. The impulse which manifests itself in the disturbances of the action is frequently a counter-impulse. Still oftener it is altogether a strange impulse which only utilizes the opportunity to express itself through a disturbance in the execution of the action. The cases in which the disturbance is the result of an inner contradiction are the most significant ones, and also deal with the more important activities.

"The inner conflict in the chance or symptomatic actions then merges into the background. These motor expressions which are least thought of, or are entirely over-

looked by consciousness, serve as the expressions of numerous unconscious or restrained feelings. For the most part they represent symbolically wishes and phantoms."²¹

In this way Freud has answered the third question propounded above.

In answer to the first question concerning the origin of the thoughts and emotions which find expression in faulty actions, Freud says: "We can say that in a series of cases the origin of the disturbing thoughts can be readily traced to repressed emotions of the psychic life. . . . The manifold sexual currents play no insignificant part in these repressed feelings."²²

In reply to the second question concerning the psychologic conditions which are responsible for "the fact that a thought must seek expression, not in its complete form but, as it were, in parasitic form, as a modification and disturbance of another"²³ Freud states that "from the most striking examples of faulty actions it is quite obvious that this determinant should be sought in a relation to conscious capacity, or in the more or less firmly pronounced character of the 'repressed' material. But an examination of this series of examples shows that this character consists of many indistinct elements. The tendency to overlook something because it is wearisome, or because the concerned thought does not really belong to the intended matter--these feelings seem to play the same role as motives for the suppression of a thought (which later depends for expression on the disturbance of another), as the moral condemnation of a rebellious emotional feeling, or as the origin of absolutely unconscious trains of thought."²⁴ But this is of value only in showing us that "the more harmless the motivation of the faulty act the less obnoxious, and hence the less incapable of consciousness, the thought to which it gives expression; the easier also is the solution of the problem after we have turned our attention to it. . . . Where one deals with motivation through actually repressed

²¹Pages 330-1-2-3.

²²Page 333.

²³Page 334.

²⁴Pages 334-5.

feelings the solution requires a painstaking analysis, which may sometimes strike against difficulties or turn out unsuccessful. . ."²⁴

This leads Freud to speak in the following fashion: "One is therefore justified in taking the result of this last investigation as an indication of the fact that the satisfactory explanation of the psychologic determinations of faulty and chance actions is to be acquired in another way and from another source."²⁵ And he then goes on to indicate the direction of this broader direction. "The mechanism of the faulty and chance actions, as we have learned to know it through the application of analysis, shows in the most essential points an agreement with the mechanism of dream formation, which I have discussed in the chapter 'The Dream Work' of my book on the interpretation of dreams. Here, as there, one finds the condensation and compromise formation ('contamination'); in addition the situation is much the same, since unconscious thoughts find expression as modifications of other thoughts in unusual ways and through outer associations. The incongruities, absurdities, and errors in the dream content by virtue of which the dream is scarcely recognized as a psychic achievement originate in the same way—to be sure, through freer usage of the existing material—as the common error of our everyday life; *here, as there, the appearance of the incorrect function is explained through the peculiar interference of two or more correct actions.*"²⁶

"The correct understanding of this strange psychic work which allows the faulty actions to originate like the dream pictures will only be possible after we have discovered that the psychoneurotic symptoms, particularly the psychic formations of hysteria and compulsion neurosis, repeat in their mechanisms all the essential features of this mode of operation. The continuation of our investigation would therefore have to begin at this point."²⁷

Freud justly declares that "the border line between the nervous, normal, and abnormal states is indistinct, and

²⁵Page 335.

²⁶Pages 335-6. Italicized Freud's.

²⁷Page 337

that we are all slightly nervous. Regardless of all medical experience, one may construe various types of such barely suggested nervousness, the *formes frustes* of the neuroses.²⁸

He insists that "the common denominator of the mildest as well as the severest cases, to which the faulty and chance actions contribute, lies in the ability to refer the phenomena to *unwelcome, repressed, psychic material, which, though pushed away from consciousness, is nevertheless not robbed of all capacity to express itself.*"²⁹

I have quoted Freud verbatim at such length in order to present his ideas in his own words. I regret that I cannot quote him at greater length since many of his statements are most astonishing.

SOME WIDER MEANINGS OF FREUD'S VIEWS

Summarizing Freud's views, in general terms, we may say that he considers all these so-called psychopathological acts of everyday life to be dependent upon, in fact due to certain definite internal factors of a determining nature, the motive or purpose being of a personal, individualistic psychological nature; unconscious streams of thought or ideas, of which the individual is entirely unaware, which have been repressed at some time in the past by the individual because of their disagreeable, displeasurable or painful nature, which are striving for expression, and which, without any real evidences of emotional disturbance, produce these psychopathologic acts in an intentional manner as symptoms of their existence or as defensive movements against their too frank expression. The circumstances attending these performances do but act as favorable opportunities for these striving thoughts to come to the surface.

This conception, then, postulates an inner, hidden, contriving and ingenious personality or other self, allied to the concepts of demoniacal possession. There, hidden in the region of Freud's "unconscious," skulk those sneaking thoughts which have been crowded into the subterranean

²⁸Page 337.

²⁹Page 338. Italics Freud's.

regions of the mind. In the words of the street, "the lid has been put on" and the little fellow who is cooped up in his prison house is making desperate efforts to escape. He hides himself from the fellow who is holding and keeping the lid on him and at the same time hides himself from or is hidden from the knowledge of others. Thus the spectators as well as the personal consciousness of the individual have no inkling of what is going on within the cooped-up regions of the unconscious. But these unconscious thoughts, this real and living personality on the floor below, is fighting bravely for survival and for a means or an opportunity for expression. And he takes or rather seizes upon every favorable opportunity for stealthily, unbeknown to everybody, including his very master, giving evidence of his insistent presence. And how does he make himself known in this manner? It is in hidden form, in disguise, in mask, in remote bodily disturbances, in breaches of conduct—in the psychopathologic acts of everyday life (as well as in other ways). And so we find that this little fellow, really the little or better the big devil down below, fights vigorously for freedom. And all of this goes on without the owner of this little fellow knowing a blessed word about it all, and with none of the ordinary manifestations of emotion. Only by little tricks, by sleight-of-hand work, by peculiar manipulations, does this hidden and repressed personality throw faint shadows of his form upon the screen. These are the psychopathologic acts of everyday life of which Freud speaks. They are but the checkers on the board which are being shifted from place to place, are made to disappear or to appear, frequently with suddenness, always in most startling and mysterious ways, the moves in the game being made by hidden hands which, when followed back, show that the unknown force arose from the unconscious personality which was directing the play or leading the orchestra from behind the scenes.

And so we have every favorable opportunity being taken advantage of for the appearance, in symbolic or disguised form, of these thoughts, with the forgetting, with or without substitutive recollection, of proper names, of

foreign names, of the order of words, and of impressions and resolutions, with mistakes in speech, reading and writing, with erroneously carried out and symptomatic and chance actions, with errors and in other ways.³⁰

In brief Freud deals with the various so-called psychopathological acts of everyday life in the same way that he has dealt with dreams, wit, the psychoneuroses and other conditions.

Let us approach the problem by a consideration of the significance of this book of Freud in the light of his work in dreams and the psychoneuroses.

A point which has frequently been lost sight of by many of the critics and adherents of Freud is this: The basic mental mechanisms and mental content are the same in all states of mental dissociation. Thus the fundamental mental mechanisms and mental content are the same for these psychopathological acts of everyday life as for dreams and the psychoneuroses. The possible motives are the same. As a matter of fact Freud admits this to be true of the mental mechanisms. But it is no less of the mental content, the sources of energy, the motives. Hence, what is a primary and invariable law for the psychoneuroses, such as hysteria, is likewise applicable to dreams and to the slips of the tongue and pen and the rest of the psychopathologic acts of each one of us, normal or abnormal. *If, therefore, sexuality is at the bottom of all the psychoneuroses it must be the raison d'être operative in all dreams and in all*

³⁰The recital of the following example of an erroneously carried out action, with its explanation, offered by Freud on pag. 193, should prove the truth of my previous statement concerning the nature of "the unconscious" as conceived by Freud:

"In a friend's house I met a young girl visitor who excited in me a feeling of fondness which I had long believed extinct, thus putting me in a jovial, loquacious, and complaisant mood. At that time I endeavored to find out how this came about, as a year before this same girl made no impression on me.

"As the girl's uncle, a very old man, entered the room, we both jumped to our feet to bring him a chair, which stood in the corner. She was more agile than I and also nearer the object, so that she was the first to take possession of the chair. She carried it with its back to her, holding both hands on the edge of the seat. As I got there later and did not give up the claim to carrying the chair, I suddenly stood directly back of her, and with both my arms was embracing her from behind, and for a moment my hands touched her lap. I naturally solved the situation as quickly as it came about. Nor did it occur to anybody how dexterously I had taken advantage of this awkward movement."

psychopathologic acts of everyday life. Therefore, if Freud's theories of the invariably sexual etiology of the psychoneuroses be true, then, in the light of this viewpoint, dreams and psychopathologic acts of everyday life must always be dependent upon sexuality. And if sexuality is not invariably at the bottom of these latter conditions, then it is not invariably the disturbing factor in the psychoneuroses. Freud aids us here, since he admits that we are all slightly nervous and that the psychopathologic acts of normal and abnormal individuals are nothing more nor less than the *formes frustes* of the neuroses (meaning the psychoneuroses). Hence, since the dividing line is more one of degree than of kind, and since, in a broad sense, the psychopathologic acts of everyday life are manifestations, in slight degree, of psychoneurotic disorder, the mental mechanisms and the mental content are the same. Freud openly states this to be true of the mental mechanisms. But he does not mention this concerning the mental content. On the other hand, Freud asserts: "The manifold sexual currents play no insignificant part in these repressed feelings"³¹ (which are at the basis of faulty and chance actions and the rest). He admits that "At other times it seems that the disturbing thoughts originated from the most harmless objection and consideration."³²

Here, then, we are in a position to state that Freud is wrong in one or the other of his conclusions. If all the psychopathologic acts of everyday life are not motivated by sexuality, then Freud's theory of the sexual etiology of the psychoneuroses falls. If the latter assumption is maintained, then Freud's admission that sexuality is not always the causative disturbance in the production of the psychopathologic acts of mankind is unfounded. To this we are led by Freud's own admissions and statements. Of course most of us who are not blinded by Freudism will at once agree that sexuality is by no means always the motivating source in the psychopathologic acts, dreams, psychoneuroses, wit and so forth. If, therefore, Freud's standpoint in this connection is valid, he himself explodes his theory of the sexual motive as the universal motive in the causation of the psychoneuroses.

I need not carry this discussion further.

³¹Page 333.

³²Page 334.

The next problem is the mental mechanisms. In general Freud applies his theories of the endopsychic censor, painful or disagreeable thoughts, psychic repression, "unconscious thinking," wishfulfillment, symbolism, etc., as developed in the psychoneuroses. The readers of this Journal have read and heard much of these, pro and con, and, because of the issues involved, I cannot be expected to take this matter up in this place. Others have already critically examined Freud's theories as applied to the psychoneuroses, but it seems that these criticisms have thus far been of no avail to the Freudian school. The great error of the Freudians in this connection has been their misuse of the terms employed and the false conceptions assumed. In two previous papers I have briefly registered certain general criticisms. The main fault has been with their psychology—their standpoints or attitudes. Realizing that the conception of sexuality was very seriously abused and misapplied, I recently took up in a brief manner, for separate consideration this very problem.³³ How successful I have been in demonstrating the misconception of Freud and his school, I leave to the reader. To discuss the errors in Freud's psychology and the misuse of the terms employed calls, in my opinion, for a discussion in a separate communication, which I shall prepare in the near future.

A full discussion of the sort to which I refer would apply *in toto* to the psychology and conclusions of Freud, including his method of reasoning as presented to us in the *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*.

It may be asked what Freud has to say concerning forgetting in general; for instance, forgetting of past experiences. The quotations above given are not satisfying on this point. Although he states that the principal conditions of the normal process in forgetting are unknown, in an attached foot-note³⁴ he gives an outline of what he believes to be the mechanism of actual forgetting. Although this explanation is not as explicit as I should like it to be, yet

³³Critical Review of the Conception of Sexuality Assumed by the Freudian School. Medical Record, March 27, 1915.

³⁴Pages 330-1.

he employs condensation, disfigurement, "the unconscious" and other terms much the same as he generally does, and I can take it in no other way than that even normal, ordinary forgetting of past experiences is explained by him in the same way as he explains the forgotten experiences or basic sources in the production of dreams, the psychoneuroses and our so-called psychopathologic acts. There is one remark made by Freud which confirms this assumption on my part. In his efforts³⁵ to explain the forgetting of proper names during exhaustion, circulatory disturbances and intoxication (migraine, etc.) he is led to the belief that the unknown psychic force which he conceives to be present in the usual acts of forgetting of names is still predominant and determines the choice of the substitutive names which are thus involved, for, he argues, these same forces can, under other circumstances, produce just such a memory disorder in states of health. Now, we do know that in these organic states which Freud mentions, not only can names be forgotten, but other words, phrases, etc., may be forgotten. What is true here for the forgetting of proper names is likewise true for the forgetting of the other parts of speech and acts mentioned. Furthermore, if Freud's explanation of the forgetting with substitutive recollection in the case of the specific organic states which he mentions be well founded, then his theory would apply to similar conditions in all sorts of organic mental states. It would thus be applicable to these occurrences in arteriosclerotic and senile dementia, apoplectiform and epileptiform disorders, and in fact in all states of mental dissociation or disorder of organic origin (general paresis, cerebral syphilis, etc.,) Now, without establishing the truth of my next assertion by my method of argument, I may make the bald statement that what is universally true of the functional disorders represented in the psychopathologic acts of everyday life must be true in like manner of all functional disorders in the psychoneuroses and psychoses. In other words, whether the mental disorder be of functional or organic origin, if we follow Freud and if my conclusions are sound, all states of substitutive re-

collection following upon forgetting, and hence all conditions of memory falsification or even retrospective falsification (comparable to the mechanism of secondary elaboration employed by Freud in his theory of dreams) find their explanation in Freud's conception. In addition, since, as Freud himself states (mentioned above), there is no essential difference between forgetting with substitutive recollection and forgetting without substitutive recollection in the case of the psychopathologic acts of everyday life, this statement is also true for all the conditions just enumerated. *Consequently, forgetting, with or without substitutive recollection, in any of the organic or functional states of mental disturbance must be explained by Freud according to his theory.* Even following Freud himself, we are led to the final conclusion that this theory must be directly applicable to normal forgetting, of whatever nature; for, as I stated above, Freud, in the footnote mentioned, apparently explains ordinary forgetting in accordance with his well-known mental mechanisms, and in his theory of the forgetting of dreams, and of the significance of the failure to continue forever to give free association (so-called resistance) we have definite evidence of this belief. In fact, the chapter on childhood and concealing memories,³⁶ and also the entire theory of hysteria with the distortion of past experiences or thoughts harmonize quite well with the assumption (really proven conclusion) which I have presented to the reader. For instance, in the footnote in which Freud gives his outline of the mechanism of normal forgetting he terminates his remarks with the following sentence: "By virtue of this theory every former state of the memory content may thus be restored, even though all original relations have long been replaced by newer ones." His insistence on the universality of the determination of apparently arbitrarily selected names, numbers and words, and also mental occurrences and their explanation by "unconscious," purposive ideas supports my contention.³⁷ I am, as is seen, led to the conclusion that an extension of Freud's ideas really includes all forgetting with or without substitutive recollec-

³⁶ Chapter IV, pages 57-68.

³⁷ Pages 278-302.

tion within the purview of his theories, and that he himself must believe so, if not openly and self-consciously, then in the practical application of his theories.

If my reasoning from Freud's statements is logical, and if I have correctly quoted Freud (which I have endeavored conscientiously to do), then it must be true that Freud's theories must be applicable to all forgetting of whatever nature, to psychopathologic acts of everyday life, to the choice of chance memories of whatever nature, to false or substitutive recollections of all sorts, and in fact to all normal or abnormal mental functioning. In every instance, following Freud, his theory would refer the phenomena to "unwelcome, repressed, psychic material, which, though pushed away from consciousness, is nevertheless not robbed of all capacity to express itself." The mechanisms of repression, of "unconscious," symbolical wishfulfillment and the concealment of disturbing or painful ideas, and the usual mechanisms elaborated in dreams and the psycho-neuroses by the Freudian school hold sway.

GENERAL REMARKS

Perhaps it is worth my while noting here some random remarks of a general nature. Specific criticism of the special terms and theories I shall leave for another occasion, since these problems have a general application to all of Freud's work and conclusions and must be taken up in a general sort of way. But I must mention here some points which are noteworthy in this connection.

What experiences are we most apt to forget? Freud asserts that we are most apt to forget disagreeable or painful experiences or thoughts. This, on the face of it, is contrary to all individual human experience. I feel that it is unnecessary to prove this, since if agreement cannot be had concerning a universal experience and a well-founded truth, little progress could be effected in the matter of convincing the adherents of the Freudian school of their error. We then stand on different ground and can never come to any mutual understanding.

It is indeed true, in a way, as Shakespeare tells us,

"The evil that men do lives after them,
The good is oft interred with their bones."

We are more apt to forget pleasant experiences than unpleasant ones, pleasurable than painful ones. Painful and disagreeable experiences or thoughts are more apt to be remembered or, at any rate, are as apt to be remembered as pleasurable and agreeable ones. Our evolutionary history proves this. Pain and fear have taught man many lessons.

Freud speaks only of forgetting things associated with unpleasant experiences. Do we also not remember such occurrences? How will Freud explain this incongruity. Freud considers disagreeable and unpleasant experiences but neglects the agreeable or pleasant experiences associated with the elements involved in the forgetting or the false recollection.

We recall and remember things—pleasant or unpleasant—especially the latter, of importance to us. Those occurrences or facts not of importance to us we are most apt to forget.

We are apt to forget and even to definitely repress that which does not interest us. In this sense it is disagreeable. But it does not continue to exert a specific, dynamic, "unconscious" striving, there is no "unconscious" motive and thinking still going on in the subconscious.

Some things which are disagreeable to us and which do not make much of an appeal to us we almost instinctively put aside at once and avoid, and hence do not remember well because we did not permit them to take up much of our time, of our consciousness or thought. We did not let them have much of an impression upon us; our experience with them, one way or the other, was slight. Our putting them aside at once is dependent upon our personality, our likes and dislikes, as determined by subconscious life experiences and trends, our habit formations, and our instinctive make-up.

Things of immediate consequence or concern to us,

however trivial their nature, are apt to take precedence over and repress other more important but not immediately necessary matters.

True, we conveniently forget things we promised to do and have no special desire to do and perhaps even have a real objection to doing, because of the work or other objectionable feature involved. Frequently it is due merely to the stress of other work and the relative unimportance (to ourselves or from our standpoint) which we have at the moment attached to these promises or intentions. Frequently, even when we promise it or intend or resolve it, we do so in a haphazard, routine sort of way, with indifference or a feeling of displeasure. We are apt to forget things which do not interest us, which we do not pay attention to. Thus inattention plays a prominent role in the way just described. Many associated factors play or may play an added role here.

The error patent in all Freudian writings concerned with their reasoning and proof of symbolization because of association of ideas is present in this book. It is forgotten that coexistence or coincidence does not prove the unity of the two elements or the cause to effect relationship. Reasoning by *post hoc ergo propter hoc* is displayed. This is especially apparent in their use of the free association test. *Freud and his followers do not go far enough. They stop short. They do not uproot all possible associations. They go only far enough to obtain facts which are possible of interpretation, by their method, according to their ideas.*³⁸ The irreasoning is thus in a veritable vicious circle.

I admit that the ideas or experiences uprooted by this method, as far as Freud and others permit themselves to go, may have been—but by no means in all cases—intimate-ly or remotely connected with the errors involved, and that they have some relation, of some sort or other, to the individual concerned, but it must be insisted upon that this is no proof for the belief that these thoughts or memories were repressed into the unconscious, that they were endeavoring by “unconscious thinking” to stealthily obtrude

³⁸This is shown throughout the present work. Consider, for instance, the example of *aliquis*, Chapter II.

themselves into upper consciousness, that they were seeking expression in distorted, symbolical form masked like a thief in the night, and that they were necessarily responsible for the slip of the tongue or pen or other psychopathologic act of everyday life.

The whole book reminds one much of the thinking of primitive minds, of superstitious individuals and of persons with unscientific, uncritical systematization of ideas. Freud himself makes some comparisons of this nature in the last chapter. He explains, however, that there are two main differences between him and the superstitious person: "First, he (the superstitious person) projects the motive to the outside, while I look for it in myself; second, he explain, the accident by an event which I attribute to a thought. What he considers hidden corresponds to the unconscious with me, and the compulsion not to let chance pass as chances but to explain it as common to both of us."³⁹

It should be clearly understood by the reader that Freud in this book does not deal with states of confusion, anxiety, worry or embarrassment, or with efforts at repression of certain thoughts into the region called by him fore-conscious and by Prince co-conscious, with the resulting consequences (of the kind described in this book) which we all know, which all of us have experienced, and which none of us will dispute since it is obvious and a universal occurrence. Freud speaks only of his "unconscious" in the sense and in the way given above. In that sense it still remains to be proven whether direct repression by the individual consciousness can put a thought so far out of (really into) the mind. And even if such convincing proof can be offered, it next remains to prove that these ideas can continue to exist as real "ideas" or "thoughts," with the possible efforts at expression in any of the ways mentioned by the Freudian school.

I am well aware of the fact that these critical remarks do not deal with the problem as thoroughly as I should like to. To do this it would be necessary for me to take up separately the various individual statements and examples given by Freud.

³⁹Page 308.

In conclusion I may say that if the discussion concerning Freudism were not so much in the air and if the Freudian school was not so active as it is and if references to this work before us were not made so frequently and with such admiration by so many members of the Freudian school, a book of this sort would not take up much of my time. The baselessness and utter absurdity of so many of the general statements, the looseness of the reasoning, the unsoundness of the conclusions, its obvious errors and its opposition to all individual and human experience, as well as much racial experience, would not hold my attention long except for its astonishing standpoints and its novelty. As it is, however, I have taken the trouble to read, in fact study this book time and again, and in the preparation of this review I have read this work many times. The result of this re-reading and study of the real meaning of Freud's ideas leads me to the following final conclusion:

The mind that accepts Freud's conclusions as true and the mind that cannot accept these views are of different kinds. They stand at opposite ends and can never meet on common ground in the matters under discussion.

And, as a parting word, I must add that the application of introspective observation, of living with and in the experience under discussion, of making one's self a part of that which is under investigation, could not possibly lead to the confirmation of Freud's views. To me it seems plain that the unprejudiced reader can actually feel that Freud is wrong. And the reason why he can so feel is because he knows and feels that he is not constituted in the way in which Freud says he is. He knows himself and his fellow-man better than that.⁴⁰

⁴⁰The presentation of individual examples of psychopathologic acts of everyday life is not attempted in this review, since it has already gone beyond the intended limits of the paper. Abundant examples could be offered. A single concrete case may upset any generalized theory. So, from the experimental standpoint, Freud's views could be easily disproved. It so happens that the writer has what he believes to be nothing other than an innate inability or difficulty in remembering proper names, so that, as a consequence, his experience in this respect may be said to be rich indeed.

THE APPARENT INVERSION OF TIME IN DREAMS

Explained by the Principle of Apperceptive Delay

LYDIARD H. HORTON

THREE is a phenomenon observable in dreams, so paradoxical that it may be described as the "inversion of time." Even today, fifteen years after the supposed revelation of the inner meaning of dreams by Freud and after the striking formulation of their mechanism by Bergson, there remains enough uncleanness regarding this particular phenomenon, and indeed regarding dreams in general, to justify me in trying to explain these matters in a new way.

By way of characterizing the features of the problem to be met, I turn to the following, as an example of the sort of explanation that does not explain; although the mind is temporarily satisfied thereby. It is credited to Havelock Ellis by the author of an enlightened book on the hygiene of the nervous system.

"Dreams influenced by sounds are rather common, and serve to raise interesting questions as to whether we recall our dreams as they actually occurred or arrange their contents in a new order. To use an illustration from Ellis: A man dreams that he enlists in the army, goes to the front and is shot. He is awakened by the slamming of a door. It seems probable that the enlistment and the march to the field are *theories to account for* the report which really caused the whole train of thought, though it seemed to be its latest item."

(The italics are not in the original: p. 191, "The Conservation of the Nervous System"—Percy G. Stiles.)

THE GLAMOUR OF THE FAMILIAR

Obviously, our conception of the *rationale* of the dreaming process in such cases, is not greatly amplified or simplified by our being told to regard the dreamer as a would-be

theorizer. For theory-making is essentially a more complex type of mental activity than we should invoke to explain mere dreaming. The above elucidation, then, merely substitutes, not a *simpler*, but a more *familiar* description of mental procedure, by way of explanation. The effect upon the mind of the reader seems to be that he welcomes the relief that comes from this veering toward the familiar, and mistakes it for the expected intellectual clarification. This circumstance appears to explain the ready acceptance achieved by many half-way theories of dreams, at present current in the literature.

From the viewpoint just stated, a good deal of the erroneous thinking in dreams might be brought under the principle of the fascination of the familiar: and this, in turn, is reducible to the idea that the nervous system, when under the influence of a given stimulus, tends to ease off the tension thereby generated, through effects along the lines of least resistance. And among such lines of lesser resistance, familiar associations must be reckoned as important—in dreams as in waking life. But the degrees of "familiarity"—using the word in a broad sense—vary exceedingly from moment to moment: in a given case, that which has just been spoken of, is more "familiar" than that which has long lain dormant, whatever may have been their relative status at an earlier time. Of this a good example is the passive inertia, the sluggishness that characterizes the recall of words in a language that one has long disused. On the other hand, the principle of "facilitation," which includes "familiarization," is illustrated by the improvement of one's vocabulary without external prompting, when one "warms up" to speaking the disused language. It then seems as if the effect of using one word was capable of spreading beneficially to other words, which thereafter lie readier for use when needed. By just such variations and differences in degrees of facilitation and of familiarization, are our responses, under a given stimulus, governed; not only in conversations and in the current affairs of life, but in free-association experiments and in dreams. And it is this principle of relative inertia—whatever else we may call it—that can be invoked to explain the apparent inversion of time in dreams.

If a dreamer fails to recognize, or apperceive correctly, the nature of the impinging stimulus or incoming sensation, it is a much *simpler* matter than any "theorizing" after the fact: it is an incident of the associative process that can be explained only by appealing to fundamental principles of mental action. And the conception of familiarization, of the mind reverting to that which is familiar, has brought into our view the physiological conception of facilitation as a stepping stone to the elucidation of dreams. Accordingly, it is by following along this path that I will now attempt to make clear the character of such a dream as above narrated.

THE PHENOMENON OF APPERCEPTIVE DELAY

In the instance in question, the dreaming mind operated, in my view, as follows:—The stimulus "door-slam" failed to evoke the appropriate image before the dream consciousness, simply because the nervous channels for the appropriate association were in a condition of low nervous tonus, and that it takes time for any stimulus to evoke the appropriate connection of ideas—this time exceeding that required for evoking the more adventitious connections of ideas. Thus, it would appear, while the stimulus was slowly acting through the appropriate constellation, and meeting high resistance, or inertia, it happened that other channels of less resistance, or greater facilitation (*Bahnung*) were left open. The bizarre apperception of the stimulus "door-slam," as "shot-fired," would then occur as a consequence of the diversion of the stimulus: spreading from the sluggish tissues forming the more appropriate connection with the stock of ideas, to the more easily aroused nerve connections.

Baldly stated, the conception is that while the stimulus is acting subliminally upon the appropriate connection with experience, there is also time for a process of evocation or reproduction of experiences registered in the less relevant nerve patterns or *neurograms* (Prince).

The relative degrees of facilitation (*Bahnung*) thus determine what shall come to the mind; a fact recognized by physiological psychologists in relation to the waking operations of associative thought, but not yet clearly applied

to the "imaginings of them that sleep" (Hobbes). For the loose-play that is favored by the sleeping condition, owing to the irregularly distributed tension of nerves, causes so much that is bizarre, that one's ingenuity is put to rout in following the train of ideas. Hence, the many abortive theories of dreams. Yet a proper application of the idea of a delay in the working of apperception, allowing a filling-in of incorrect apperceptions, will serve to explain what is now most puzzling in dream narratives. In particular, it can be shown that there is no reason for suspecting that narrators of dreams invert the order of their apperceptions, as suggested by the foregoing excerpt.

There is always to be supposed a lapse of time between the application of a stimulus and its conscious perception as a sensation; and an even longer time must elapse till the stimulus is "recognized," *i. e.* till the appropriate constellation of ideas is mobilized and till its effects are brought into the zone of attention or conscious imagination. Meantime, other constellations being already mobilized, are in a state of such readiness that they can reach and pass the threshold of consciousness more quickly than those farther from it.

APPERCEPTIVE DELAY IN THE DOOR-SLAM DREAM

Specifically, association tests would probably have shown that on account of the mobilized condition of the neurogram for "shot-fired," it was able to get ahead of the proper setting for "door-slam." The mind was taken unawares so far as "door-slam" was concerned: the corresponding neurograms were "demobilized;" but conversely, the neurograms for "shot-fired" were ready-on-the-trigger. The difference in the passive inertia or conversely in the degree of mobilization, functions as a difference in the "finding-time" for each connection of ideas; *i. e.* the apperceptive delay for "door-slamped" is greater than for "shot-fired."

According to a convenient nomenclature, "shot-fired" may be called a trial apperception of "door-slam." The trial apperception appeared first, not because the stimulus reached it first but because it took less time to respond to

the call for associations with "door-slam." In fact, we may believe, the trial apperception was actually stimulated on second call, as it were, by spill-over of stimulus from the sub-excited but slow-to-answer neurogram for "door-slam." Here, then, is no reason for believing that the dreamer's narrative inverted the order of the apperceptions, as compared with their occurrence as conscious events: for, to the dreaming mind, there is no conscious event till a subliminally mobilized neurogram "crosses the tape", no matter how soon it was started by the stimulus "door-slam."

But, one might ask, what of the enlisting and marching to the field in the dream? The answer is that the images for these dream-events are trial apperceptions bearing the same relation to the idea "shot-fired," as the latter bears to the stimulus-idea "door-slam." By repeating the foregoing explanation, *mutatis mutandis*, it will be seen that the various elements of the dream story form an echelon of trial apperceptions of the stimulus-idea. For, as the correct idea of the stimulus suggests, by analogy, the idea "shot-fired," so, by turning to associations by contiguity, we find that "shot-fired" has a close relation to warfare, and this in turn to enlistment.

VARIETIES OF TRIAL APPERCEPTIONS

If there is anything paradoxical about the above explanation of the echelon of trial apperceptions, it pertains to the shift that was made from similarity-association to contiguity-association. And this brings me to the fact that the former, being more familiar and striking, has been too often made the sole basis of explaining association in dreams; whereas, in my experience with dream analysis, I find contiguity-association often as important as analogy, and even more productive of bizarrie. Recognizing this fact, then, it is convenient to speak in special terms of those images that are capable of forming echelons of associations as above, and to divide them into two kinds: first, those images that appear through association by similarity may be suitably named Harmonic Images; and those that appear through association by contiguity in experience may be called Collateral Images. These two groups taken together may be

called Ancillary Images, in the sense that they wait upon, and form retinue for, the principal idea that appertains directly to the stimulus. Among Ancillary Images must also be included the mixed group of those images that are evoked through both types of association, of which it cannot be said that they are either pure similarity-associations, or pure contiguity-associations. In any case, the Ancillary Images, better known as Secondary Images, are stimulated in the order of their affinity with the stimulus-idea, and then, as a consequence of Apperceptive Delay, their evocation before the dream consciousness may acquire a reverse order, appearing smoothly in inverse sequence, or being, as a procession, broken up into a mixed order. However great the complications so caused, they are not so abstruse, but that a diagram, such as I append, may serve to schematize the whole procedure in such cases.

In dreams more complicated than this one, it can be shown that the ancillary images form a series of approximations to the correct reaction, *i. e.* the *stimulus-idea*; and, moreover, that this may take place through several series of approximations, each having a partial and incomplete character, although gradually the successive representations acquire more and more relevancy to the stimulus that dictates their appearance. It is as an allusion and reminder of this broader aspect of the matter that the term Trial Apperception or Apperceptive Trial is useful; but it should not be understood as implying what the theories of Bergson seem to suggest as to "effort" on the part of the dreamer; namely that the apperceptive error is a necessary function of the dreamer's "lack of energy"—whatever this may mean. That this notion, does not really clarify the dream problem, is my reason for insisting that the time-element and not the more or less effort of the dreamer is responsible for the bizarre errors of the dreaming mind. And when I refer to Trial Apperceptions, it is not to suggest the effort of the dreamer—who is, most likely, acting reflexly—but to emphasize the tentative, preliminary and more or less random character of the images first evoked.

The trial-and-error theory, which I wish to contrast with Bergson's conceptions, is that lack of appropriateness

in dream imagery is not a function of the dreamer's lack of effort, but is due to the abnormal readiness or facility of evocation belonging to images other than the appropriate one. Further, I contend that the essential mechanisms of the dreaming process are most clearly exhibited in the phenomenon of apparent time-inversion in dreams. The understanding of it through this conception of relative inertia, or of relative facilitation, is a key in a sense, to the psychology of dreams.

HOW TRIAL APPERCEPTIONS MAY SIMULATE COINCIDENCES

The relation between the primary stimulus-idea and its ancillary images, as projected into the dream is often overlooked by the would-be interpreter. This fact may be illustrated by a quotation from Bergson's essay on the Mechanism of Dreams; the point at issue being indicated by italics, not in the original:

"Often in the midst of the night the contact of our body with its light clothing makes itself felt all at once and reminds us that we are lightly clothed. Then *if our dream is at the moment taking us through the street*, it is in this simple attire that we present ourselves to the gaze of the passers-by."

Thus, Bergson presupposes a coincidence, instead of explaining the dream *in toto* by the mechanism of oniric inversion. Yet the order of mental events is no more complex to conceive of than, for instance, the inversion of letters in typewriting a given word. Such errors are so common as to furnish excellent paradigms for the principle of inverted reactions: as when, in planning to write the word i-d-e-a, I actually execute it as d-i-o-a.

As to the incitement for the dream of insufficient clothing my own data tend to show that it is a sensation of discomfort, usually from cold although sometimes from too warm covering, that arouses the mental picture of being in a state of semi-nudity. This in turn evokes the ancillary idea of indecent exposure, through a familiar connection of ideas. But this seems quite as likely to be a truly modest

fear-association as to be a repressed exhibitionistic desire, finding expression at this opportunity—as Freud would have it.

From the standpoint of the mechanism of *oniric inversion*, as hereinbefore described, it is not necessary to suppose a coincidence to have occurred between the dreamer's thought of semi-nudity and some other (precursory) dream of a street or public place. For such a setting, far from being an antecedent, is a sequel of the idea of nudity: an image that is ancillary to the idea of exposure. The fact that this setting comes about by no mere accident is emphasized by the frequent occurrence of dreams wherein the locality is an unmistakably suggestive one: such as a ballroom, "exposition grounds" or other place where to appear *en déshabillé* would be most undesirably conspicuous. It follows that the semblance of a coincidence between two independent sets of dream imagery—by which even Bergson has evidently been misled—may now be explained away by the paradox of an inverse relation obtaining at times between the order of sub-excitation of several related images and the order in which the same images become manifest in consciousness.

Without going deeper into a discussion of Bergson's suggestive treatment of the matter of coincidences, as giving birth to the dream, it may be said that oniric inversion will explain many individual dreams wherein coincidences would seem otherwise to have been operative. For instance, in the foregoing dream, there is no occasion to believe that the dreamer's train of thought about going to war merely coincided with the slamming of a door, which he later heard: the two phenomena were members of each other, as consequent and antecedent respectively. This would remain true in the premises regardless of the subsequent reversal of their time relations in crossing the frontier of consciousness. For the subliminal events are just as much realities as the supraliminal events to which the dream narrative testifies. And it is the business of the interpreter of dreams to RECONSTITUTE THE SUBLIMINAL EVENTS from the data furnished by the dreamer; in which task, a grasp of mechanisms like *oniric inversion* should prove of great assistance.


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Statistically, dreams of the sensory, or *presentative* type exhibit a stronger general tendency to *oniric inversion* than do those of the psychic or *representative* type. (The reason for this must, presumably, be sought in a study of the intensity-ratios obtaining between the external stimulation and the internal pre-exitations—a matter of mathematics suggesting the curves of Weber's Law; but too complex to dwell upon at this point.) On the other hand, one can frequently, although less easily, detect phenomena of *oniric inversion* in the course of purely psychic dreams; *i. e.* dreams in which it is not required to assume a sensory cue as accounting for the phantasmagoria.

No statistical account of the prevalence of *oniric inversion* can have much weight until the phenomenon itself becomes fully recognized; which is by no means the case today. Accordingly, the present account of the matter is limited to suggesting the simpler aspects of the apparent time-reversal, and to pointing out the foundations of its explanation in the domain of physiological psychology.

In this treatment of *oniric inversion* the emphasis has been laid upon the supposition that the given stimulus may sub-arouse the neurogram most closely (appropriately) agglutinated with it in experience, and still fail to evoke its true correlative before consciousness. The appearance of the latter (the *stimulus-idea*) is, by the same token, supposed to be delayed; whereby, we reach the view that the incorrect congeners of the stimulus-idea may appear in place of the latter. These are the manifestations I have called Trial Apperceptions of the stimulus. These it is which, being correlated with the stimulus-idea sometimes in palpable and illuminating ways, have served to support, among those untrained in psychology, the conception of a veritable "language of dreams." But the VICARIOUS EVOCATION of such erroneous images, ancillary to the stimulus-idea, should not be fancied as necessarily depending upon semi-logical relations or cryptic motives like "repression," nor upon the more or less "effort" of the dreamer, nor upon a symbolizing habit of the "Unconscious." Much more consis-

tently, this sort of vicarious evocation may be visualized as a function of specific residuary facilitations irregularly apportioned to divers neurograms; these being the ones which obtain influence during sleep or at the moment of awaking in response to an external or internal sensory stimulus.*



Regarding the sequence or order of evocation, we have seen, in the explanation of apperceptive delay, why the "first shall be last." How strictly this formula shall be carried out is seen to depend upon the relative degrees of previous facilitations, no less than on the time-sequence in which the stimulus-wave reaches the outlying (sequential) neurograms that it brings into play, *i.e.* mobilizes. As a result the order of evocation in consciousness of all or of part of the correspondingly mobilized images may be the reverse of the order of stimulation, or it may lose all apparent relation to it. Thus, variants of the principle of *oniric*

*The diagram and explanation here presented apply to a simple form of vicarious evocation, in which one thing called up others in chain-like order. This is conveniently called *oniric catena*, and differs from those cases (reserved for future exposition) in which two cues interact so as to reproduce a series of images individually affiliated with both cues.

inversion may be encountered in all permutations and combinations, affording a mechanistic analysis of those bizarre, but often peculiarly coherent dream fancies which form the subject-matter of the dream problem.

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ABSTRACTS

CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE CONCEPTION OF SEXUALITY ASSUMED
BY THE FREUDIAN SCHOOL. By Meyer Solomon. *The Medical Record*, March 27, 1915.

In a foot-note to the title the author explains in what sense he employs the term "Freudian." He then gives his reasons for taking up for separate consideration the question of sexuality and for confining himself religiously to the conception of sexuality as developed by Freud and his followers. A summary of Freud's views as presented in his "Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory" is followed by some of the many differing interpretations of Freud's original conception of sexuality, reference being made to Maeder, Putnam, Jones and Freud in particular. Jung's modification of Freud's theories of sexuality is then presented in outline.

The author then calls attention to the fact that one hardly knows what a particular Freudian means when he refers to anything as having a sexual meaning, and states that some of the meanings which "sexual" may have, according to the Freudian school, are as follows: normal mature heterosexual relationship, masturbation, incomplete coitus, interrupted coitus, ordinary sexual perversion, homosexuality, cravings of a sexual nature, pleasurable gratification or yearning for same, bodily heaving and surging, sense cravings, longings and ambitions of whatever nature, the vital energy or vital impulse which is more or less synonymous with Jung's *libido*, Bergson's *poussée vitale* or *élan vital*, Schopenhauer's *Wille zum Dasein* or will to live, Nietzsche's *Wille zur Macht* or will for power, and what we have been for some time calling the *vis a tergo*. There are other meanings also which the sexual tendency may assume according to the writings of the Freudian school. The Freudian conception thus is vague, ambiguous, indefinite, mystical, metaphorical and metaphysical. It is, moreover, a purely psychosexual concept of life.

The author criticizes the biological conception of the sexual impulse forced upon certain members of the Freudian school. He shows that Freud includes all non-sexual functions or tendencies as sexual, so that all pleasurable feelings, bodily or purely psychical, all emotion and affection, intrafamilial or extrafamilial, are classified as sexual. The play impulse and the desire for knowledge or investigation (curiosity), as well as the many other tendencies, cannot be explained biologically and phylogenetically as solely dependent upon the reproductive tendency. Self-preservation as a motive, in the biological and evolutionary sense, has not received the consideration which it deserves at the hands of the Freudians. This is important for an understanding of the genesis and meaning of any tendency or trait, since the phylogeny and ontogeny must come in for sufficient consideration.

A brief criticism of Freud's conception of infantile sexuality

is offered at this point. The author insists that despite the protestations and explanations of the Freudian school, Freud and his followers use the term sexuality in the usual, gross sense. This applies whether the form of sexuality is of one type or another. The theories of erogenous zones, polymorphous perverse sexuality, bisexuality, incestuousness, and Narcissism are then examined, and it is shown that, as developed by Freud, they are nothing more than ill-founded assumptions. The author shows that Jung has not extricated himself from the network and that his recent modification of Freud's concept of sexuality does not at all solve the problem.

The neglect of the evolutionary standpoint is stressed, and it is demonstrated that Freud and most of his followers have a disregard for and indifference toward the nature and origin and existence of instincts in the life of the race.

Most to be criticized is the exclusively individualistic and narrow psychological standpoint—the psychosexual viewpoint—of life and all its manifestations, including man, and in particular, the infant and the child.

The sexogenetic or psychosexogenetic view must be replaced by a broad psychogenetic or psychobiogenetic one, which will include within its scope not only the present life of the individual, but the past life, the world history of man and of life, with the racial (ontogenetic and phylogenetic), biological and evolutionary approach to the problem of energetic manifestations.

Self-preservation, ontogenetically, at least, the older impulse, should be given that degree of consideration which it most surely deserves.

The Freudian school must give up the conception of pansexuality.

The suggestion is modestly put forward that the paper may be worth reading in its entirety, since the conception of sexuality has been one of the main stumbling blocks in the path of the Freudian movement.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT.

ABSTRACT OF A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF THREE HUNDRED PRISONERS IN THE MASSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON¹ C. S. Rossy, *Special Investigator for the Massachusetts State Board of Insanity.*

The Massachusetts State Board of Insanity, at the request of the Prison Commission, undertook in the Spring of 1915 a psychological investigation at the Massachusetts State Prison with the purpose of determining the number of mentally deficient individuals at present confined in the institution. To ascertain the intellectual status of each subject, the Yerkes-Bridges Point Scale was used.²

The diagnosis of mental deficiency, or feeble-mindedness, was made on the basis of a positive history and a low intellectual grading. On account of the difficulty in determining whether permanent mental defect or temporary impairment was responsible

for a low intellectual grading, it was necessary to obtain a comprehensive history of each case before making a final diagnosis.

The following were the fields of inquiry from which information was sought: (a) medical history and physical examination; (b) family history; (c) personal and developmental history; (d) history of school progress; (e) social history; (f) moral reaction; (g) economic efficiency; (h) practical knowledge.¹ This information was obtained in as complete a form as possible directly from the subject. Through the kindness of the prison officials, data were made available concerning the medical examinations given by the prison physician.

Non-English-speaking subjects were examined in their own language as far as possible, a trained interpreter being used for that purpose. Their mental ages were determined by the use of norms for those whose native language is not English. A few of these individuals, though attaining a fairly low intellectual rating, were diagnosed as border-line and not as definitely feeble-minded cases, in some instances on account of illiteracy, and in other instances on account of the negative character of the history obtained.

By the end of December, 1915, the psychological examination had been given three hundred criminals. With a few exceptions, the subjects were examined according to the alphabetical order in which they were catalogued at the institution. These exceptions represent the recent arrivals at the prison and a few special cases, all of them referred for examination by the prison officials.

The examination of these three hundred cases shows that 22 per cent of the subjects are feeble-minded, 9.6 per cent border-line cases, and 3.3 per cent probably psychotic. The 22 per cent feeble-minded are custodial cases in so far as their deficient mentality and significant history indicate the need of supervision.

The subjects were classified also according to the following three headings: (1) sex offences, (2) crimes against property, and (3) crimes against life. Tables computed on the basis of this classification bring out these interesting facts: (1) that the highest percentage of feeble-minded individuals is found among prisoners guilty of sex offences, and the lowest percentage among prisoners guilty of crimes against property; (2) that the percentage of probably psychotic subjects is highest among prisoners guilty of crimes against life.

A final report of this investigation, embodying all the data obtained, will be published later.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT.

¹Preliminary reports of this investigation have appeared in Bulletins Nos. 13, 16, and 17 of the Massachusetts State Board of Insanity.

²Yerkes, R. M., Bridges, J. W., Hardwick, R. S.: A Point Scale for Measuring Mental Ability, Warwick and York, Baltimore, 1915.

³This list is adapted from a synopsis of fields of inquiry used at the Massachusetts School for the feeble-minded.

REVIEWS

THE FOUNDATION OF NORMAL AND ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY.
By Boris Sidis. Richard G. Badger, Boston.

In this volume Dr. Sidis outlines his fundamental concepts of psychology, concepts and principles which have proven in his hands so rich and fruitful in their application to abnormal mental life.

The psychic process is a biological process, and is, in its main characteristics, closely analogous to the life process. Both ontogenetically and phylogenetically the life process has a definite beginning and an end, neither being linked causally to antecedents and consequents. Purpose, or final causation is the attribute of the life process.

This teleological aspect of the biological and psychic processes has its limitation. Sidis strongly emphasizes what he calls the *chance aspects of life and mind*. This concept is of fundamental importance in his psychology and emphasizes his divergence from the Freudian psychology which ascribes a meaning, a purpose and an adaptive value to every idea, to every fleeting thought, with the resulting highly artificial, far-fetched, often absurd interpretations of mental life. While it is true that teleology is of fundamental importance in evolutionary processes, this very purpose is achieved by a selective activity from an infinite number of spontaneous variations some of which are indifferent, have no adaptive values for the organism, and some are even injurious.

Out of an enormous mass of spontaneous, purposeless mental states, the selective activity utilizes only those which are adapted for its special purpose. These chance variations form the matrix out of which the purposive, psychic process arises.

The volume is devoted to a presentation of various psychological theories and principles, such as that of Reserve Energy, for instance, which the author has briefly presented in former works, but which are developed in great detail in the present volume.

The "moment consciousness," a concept which Sidis first outlined briefly in his "Psychology of Suggestion," further in his "Multiple Personality" is fully developed in his present work. By the moment consciousness, regarded by him as the fundamental assumption of psychology, Sidis understands the synthetic unity which is the basis of all mental activity. Mental life is not simply a series of mental states, it is an individuality in which the psychic series occurs. The fleeting and ever changing psychic states are synthetized into an individuality as the physiological occurrences are synthetized into a biological organic unity, the organism. This synthetic unity, both the psychic individual and the psychic content, constitutes the moment consciousness. The moment consciousness is an organic unity very much like the

functions of the organism, and cannot be broken into parts without at the same time destroying its very existence.

Of special importance and significance are Sidis' studies of the various types of moments in the hierarchy of their complexity and stage of evolution, both ontogenetic and phylogenetic. These psychological studies of the various types of moments or of the various types of mental activities, arranged in their biological series from the lowest to the highest psychic functions of organic life, are the most important in the volume and constitute one of the most comprehensive and significant contributions in the domain of psycho-biology, both normal and abnormal.

These types of consciousness Sidis investigates closely. The studies are not only of importance in Normal Psychology, but are specially so in Abnormal Psychology. This is found in the recurrent aspect of functioning activity of the moment characteristic of the lower types of psychic life as well as of all regressive or retrogressive and degenerative forms of psycho-physiological dissociations present in psychopathic states. *The aspect of recurrence of moment consciousness of the lower types is at the very foundation of Psychopathology and gives the underlying pathology of the clinical manifestations and of the symptomatology of psychopathic diseases.* The scientific work of "The Foundations" strongly contrasts with the so-called "Psychoanalysis" and with "psychoanalytic" exegesis, characteristic of the Austrian school of Freud and his disciples, a school that occupies itself with symbols, allegories, and myths.

The reader is advised to give special attention to the second part of the volume.

In the psycho-biological hierarchy, from the monocellular to the multicellular individualities, moments of consciousness differ in the complexity of their organization, from the simplest desultory moment to the most complex association of moments into groups and systems.

The moment consciousness in its course of growth and development becomes extremely complex in its organization; it rapidly assimilates new material which it finds useful in its adaptation to the environment. The activity of the moment is either intensified or inhibited, according to the nature of the associated sets of groups of moments that have been set into activity. The organization of moments of the psychic individuality of various types carries within itself the regulative, inhibitive control. No special mechanisms are required for that purpose. Nor do we need to have recourse to Freudian repressions, suppressions, censors, and to all kinds of other mysterious agencies called in to explain with cunning ingenuity apparently inexplicable phenomena. Nor do we need to appeal to any mysterious will powers. Every psycho-biological system of groups carries within itself

its own inhibitions which are just as requisite for normal activities as are the inhibitions in the organized system of physiological activities. In pathological states, or in abnormal mental conditions the inhibitions may either become accentuated, exaggerated, or on the other hand they may become completely removed. In case of dissociation the dissociated moment will react with its full force and energy, because of the removal of the inhibitory control of associated sets of moments.

In order to have a clear conception of the activity of the moment consciousness, Sidis utilizes the well established biological principles of cellular activity, namely of stimulus threshold and of inhibition. Not only is the intensity of the stimulus to be considered, but also the quality. Certain physiological systems, such as the various sense-organs will only respond to definite qualitative stimulations. Moreover, it is well recognized that the activity of one group of cells may have an inhibitory influence on the activity of another group. These physiological principles of stimulus threshold and inhibition are shown to apply to psychophysiological systems with their concomitant moments of consciousness.

In connection with the application of the physiological factors of threshold stimulations and inhibition Sidis works out a principle of great importance, a principle also developed by Professor James at the same time with Sidis, but on other grounds, the principle of Reserve Energy.

The evolution of mental life is from the simple to the complex. The increasing complexity of mental life, produced by the association of simple states into complex groups, brings about an inhibitory effect on the function of the components of the mental system. This inhibition, a concomitant of complexity of mental organization, is of inestimable value to the individual in his adaptations and adjustments to the environment, and plays no small rôle in the growth of civilization. The increase of the stimulus threshold of the moment, due to inhibition, produced by its association with other moments, prevents an undue exhaustion and permits the storing of energy requisite in critical moments as well as necessary to the progress of the individual and the race. Individual and social education aid in the formation and accumulation of reserve energy which makes all progress possible.

With the development of mental life there is thus an ever greater storing of energy, and the ease with which this store of reserve energy may be accessible to the individual, to the race, or to society is an index of degree of civilization. The greater the store of reserve energy, and the greater the ease with which it can be reached to tide over critical moments as well as for other purposes necessary to the individual, race, and society, the higher the state of civilization may be regarded.

Again, the heightening of the stimulus threshold and consequent inhibition produced by natural selection and by education, individual and social, permits an ever greater accumulation of Reserve Energy, the condition of evolution and social progress.

We can well realize that the outcome of the volume is of the utmost consequence not only from a theoretical standpoint, but also from a purely practical, medical, therapeutic standpoint, also specially from an educational and sociological point of view.

HARRY LINENTHAL.

BODILY CHANGES IN PAIN, HUNGER, FEAR AND RAGE. By *Walter B. Cannon, George Higginson Professor of Physiology in Harvard University*. New York and London, D. Appleton & Co., 1915. Pp. xiii, 311. Illustrated, \$2.00 net.

This long-anticipated volume represents a phase of the good vivisectional work done in the Physiologic Laboratory of the Harvard Medical School in the last seven years under Doctor Cannon's direction, by himself and by Messrs. De la Paz, Shohl, Wright, Washburn, Lyman, Nice, Gruber, Osgood, Gray, and Mendenhall, to whom this report and integration of the research is dedicated. There are thirty-nine conclusive graphs and other illustrations, each record having beneath it a commendably detailed legend of explanation; there are lists of books on related researches at the end of each chapter, and there is a good index, as well as a useful analytic table of contents.

The fifteen chapter-titles, best revealing the matter of this timely volume, are as follows:

The Effect of the Emotions on Digestion; The General Organization of the Visceral Nerves Concerned in Emotions; Methods of Demonstrating Adrenal Secretion and Its Nervous Control; Adrenal Secretion in Strong Emotion and Pain; The Increase of Blood Sugar in Pain and Great Emotion; Improved Contraction of Fatigued Muscle After Splanchnic Stimulation of the Adrenal Gland; The Effects on Contraction of Fatigued Muscle of Varying the Arterial Blood Pressure; The Specific Role of Adrenin in Counteracting the Effects of Fatigue; The Hastening of Coagulation of Blood by Adrenin; The Hastening of Coagulation of Blood in Pain and Great Emotion; The Utility of the Bodily Changes in Pain and Great Emotion; The Energizing Influence of Emotional Excitement; The Nature of Hunger; The Interrelations of Emotions; and Alternative Satisfactions for the Fighting Emotions.

Clearly the book is, as the subtitle states, "an account of recent researches into the function of emotional excitement." Its style is unusually direct and clear, and the vocabulary em-

ployed is such as fits it naturally to the reading of the educated public, a style that we might term popular-scientific.

Affective psychology has long desired (although scarcely realizing the desire until in part satisfied) just the kind of physiologic explanation with which this volume is nearly filled. "The psychology of "the will," too, and that of ideation as well, come in for the benefits afforded by this chemical work, since all three are but aspects of the behavior somatically common to them all. Dynamogeny certainly is not peculiar to emotional states but floods with energy at times every phase of the mental process. Cannon's book, then, goes far toward explaining this old mystery of psychology, further than did Keith Lucas's recent all-or-none principle when applied both to voluntary muscle and to the neurones. When one finds one only hormone, adrenin, of the many produced in the secret recesses of the body, proving itself so versatile and withal so puissant in the determination of behavior, one is encouraged as to our future knowledge sometime of the relations of mind and body. This continuum is now plainer and completer every passing year, and Cannon has given its éclaircissement a new impetus along a productive line of study, and this integrative work on the hormones and koliones still goes on.

No wise man, however, is going to take as physiologic law and psychologic gospel everything set forth in "Bodily Changes." Outside the range of the battle's roar, one may be sceptical as to certain details of the easy explanation and trust better in the action of a somatic "syndrome" far more complex than this study of adrenin (for that is the *gist* of the book) certainly implies to the average reader. The pituitary notably is in the midst of things dynamogenic and emotional, and may well have a prominent part in the dynamic physiology of fear and rage and joy.

It is from this kind of consideration in particular that Cannon's opinion (following Sherrington's) as to the James-Lange-Sergi theory of emotion needs overhauling. The symbolic, syndromic mode of action of the central nervous system is too much ignored in this opinion, the great cortex in particular (as apraxia, *et al.* show) being built and actuated on a high degree and perfection of this symbolic principle. In fine, the neural organism of emotion (thalamus, cortex, and the corpus striatum perhaps, organ of muscle-tone) works inherently so and so from its hereditary structure, and there is therefore no reason why a temporary cutting-off of the visceral afferent influences *should* lessen the bodily reaction of the emotions. This work plainly tends to corroborate the theory mentioned rather than to oppose it. At the same time, the present reviewer believes that Cannon is keen enough in his conclusion (p. 281) that "evidence from uniformity of visceral response and evidence from exclusion of the viscera are harmonious, therefore, in minimizing visceral factors as the source of differences in emo-

tional states," these making only *indefinite* contributions to the affective syndrome. It is largely the muscles, certainly, and the kinesthesia generally, that differentiates the feelings and emotions from each other; or else we must accept a consistent Animism.

Every thinker on the mechanism of behavior must appreciate this work of the Harvard laboratory of physiology as the world's leading contribution of many years to the chemical side of mental Life. It will help solution of the great problem which Masefield suggests anew in the current *Atlantic*:

"What am I, Life? A thing of watery salt
Held in cohesion by unresting cells
Which work they know not why, which never halt;
Myself unwitting where their Master dwells
I do not bid them, yet they toil, they spin
A world which uses me as I use them.
Nor do I know which end or which begin,
Nor which to praise, which pamper, which condemn.

So, like a marvel in a marvel set,
I answer to the vast, as wave by wave,
The sea of air goes over, dry or wet,
Or the full moon comes swimming from her cave,
Or the great sun comes north; this myriad I
Tingles, not knowing how, yet wondering why."

It is just this "tingling" and this "knowing how" that Cannon's fine work helps to explain. The practical psychopathologists especially should value these definite results as contributions to mental theory, since, as already has been hinted, they tell us another factor, (and perhaps one apt for practical application at times?) of the psychophysical affect, the dynamic aspect of suggestion so essential, whatever name one gives it, in psychotherapy and in all habit-bending of every kind and degree.

GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.

Sargent Normal School.

PSYCHE'S TASK. A Discourse Concerning the Influence of Superstition on the Growth of Institutions. Second Edition Revised and Enlarged, to which is added The Scope of Social Anthropology—An Inaugural Lecture. By J. G. Frazer, D. G. L., LL.D., Litt. D., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Liverpool. Macmillan & Co., Limited, London, 1913. Price 5s. net.

All the works of that great social anthropologist, Prof. Frazer's are of the greatest interest to psychopathology and psychiatry, as well as to psychology and the social sciences in general. To the pen of this student of anthropology we are indebted for a number of works which may well take rank with the greatest contributions to the world's knowledge of life. We may enumerate that wonderful series of volumes by Frazer entitled "The Golden Bough. A

Study in Magic and Religion," the four volumes of that mine of information which goes by the name of "Totemism and Exogamy," "The Belief in Immortality and the Worship of the Dead," "Lectures on the Early History of the Kingship," and others.

The volume before us is a worthy addition to the writings of this author.

The author tells us that it is his object to call attention to a neglected side of superstition and to stimulate inquiry into those great institutions which still form the framework of modern society, and reminds us that "from false premises he (man) often arrives at sound conclusions; from a chimerical theory he deduces a salutary practice." This book shows "one of the ways in which folly mysteriously deviates into wisdom, and good comes out of evil."

Prof Frazer attempts to prove by examples that among certain races and at certain stages of evolution some social institutions which we all, or most of us, believe to be beneficial have partially rested on a basis of superstition. He considers only purely secular or civil and says nothing of religious or ecclesiastical institutions, and devotes his remarks to a consideration of the following four institutions: government, private property, marriage, and the respect for human life. He calls attention to the following two points: (1) How far the limited conclusions, which he shall draw for some races and for some ages, are applicable to others must be left to future inquiries to determine; and (2) No institution founded wholly on superstition, that is, on falsehood, can be permanent. If it does not answer to some real human need, if its foundations are not laid broad and deep in the nature of things, it must perish.

He then takes up for separate discussion the four institutions mentioned, and gives many definite, interesting and conclusive examples from the life and customs of savage peoples to prove the truth of his thesis.

The conclusions of each chapter will be here given.

If the evidence offered in the first chapter suffices to prove that many peoples have regarded their rulers, whether chiefs or kings, with superstitious awe as beings of a higher order and endowed with mightier powers than the common folk, it follows that, imbued with such a profound veneration for their governors and with such an exaggerated conception of their powers, they cannot but have yielded them a prompter and more implicit obedience than if they had known them to be men of common mould like themselves. Hence it may be claimed to be proved that among certain races and at certain times superstition has strengthened the respect for government, especially monarchical government, and has thereby contributed to the establishment and maintenance of civil order.

The examples given in the next chapter go to prove that among many peoples and in many parts of the world superstitious fear has operated as a powerful motive to deter men from stealing.

Consequently, he has proved that among certain races and at certain times superstition has strengthened the respect for private property and has thereby contributed to the security of its enjoyment.

In his chapter on marriage numerous examples are introduced to show that among many races sexual immorality, whether in the form of adultery, fornication or incest, is believed of itself to entail, naturally and inevitably, without the intervention of society, most serious consequences not only on the culprits themselves, but also on the community, often indeed to menace the very existence of the whole people by destroying the food supply. There can be no doubt that wherever this superstition has existed it must have served as a powerful motive to deter men from such sexual immorality. This thus proves that among certain races and at certain times superstition has strengthened the respect for marriage, and has thereby contributed to the stricter observance of the rules of sexual morality both among the married and the unmarried.

In his chapter on respect for human life Prof. Frazer shows that the dread of the ghost has operated in a two-fold way to protect human life. On the one hand it has made every individual for his own sake more reluctant to slay his fellow, and on the other hand it has aroused the whole community to punish the slayer. And when, to follow the author, with the progress of thought the shadow of the ghost passes away, the grim shadow of the gallows remains to protect society without the aid of superstitious terrors. Thus custom outlives the motive which originated it. "If only an institution is good in practice, it will stand firm after its old theoretical basis has been shattered; a new and more solid, because a truer, foundation will be discovered for it to rest upon. More and more, as time goes on, morality shifts ground from the sands of superstition to the rock of reason, from the imaginary to the real, from the supernatural to the natural. In the present case the State has not ceased to protect the lives of its peaceful citizens because the faith in ghosts is shaken. It has found a better reason than old wives' fables for guarding with the flaming sword of Justice the approach to the Tree of Life."

Therefore, if government, private property, marriage and respect for human life are all good and essential to the very existence of civil society, then, asserts Prof. Frazer, it follows that by strengthening every one of them superstition has rendered a great service to humanity, for vast as are its evils, we must not be blind to the benefit which superstition has conferred on society by furnishing the ignorant, the weak and the foolish with a motive, bad though it be, for good conduct.

It is obvious that this should be of interest and concern to those keeping abreast of the modern trends in psychopathology and its related fields.

The lecture on The Scope of Social Anthropology is important enough to demand a short abstract. Although anthropology, in the widest sense of the word, aims at discovering the general laws which have regulated human history in the past, and which, if nature is really uniform, may be expected to regulate it in the future, Prof. Frazer declares that his treatment of social anthropology will be confined to the origin, or rather the rudimentary phases, the infancy and childhood, of human society. This embryology of human thought and institutions comprises the study of the beliefs and customs of savages, and folk-lore, or the traces and relics of these beliefs and customs which have survived like fossils in civilization. It is assumed that civilization has always and everywhere been evolved out of savagery.

A savage is to civilized man as a child is to an adult. As the gradual growth of intelligence in a child corresponds to, and in a sense recapitulates, the gradual growth of intelligence in the species, so a study of savage society at various stages of evolution enables us to follow approximately, though of course not exactly, the road by which the ancestors of the higher races must have travelled in their progress upward through barbarism to civilization.

If we would understand what primitive man was, we must know what the savage is, for savagery is the primitive condition of mankind, using the term primitive in a relative and not in an absolute sense, for, while social anthropology has much to say of primitive man in the relative sense, it has nothing whatever to say about primitive man in the absolute sense. A gulf of thousands or millions of years divides the savage of to-day from primeval man.

Although by the accumulation of available evidence we may demonstrate the former prevalence of sexual communism among all the races of mankind, this would not at all justify us in concluding that this system had been practised by truly primeval man, and still less its continuous existence from the beginning until a comparatively recent period, since we must remember that human affairs seem to run in cycles, the social pendulum swinging to and fro from one extremity of the scale to the other.

Folk-lore with its superstition survives because of the essential inequality of men, many of whom remain at heart savages under a civilized exterior. Mankind is, in fact, dominated by an enlightened minority.

The early history of mankind, reconstructed from the joint testimony of savagery and folk-lore, is full of gaps, which can only be imperfectly bridged by the comparative method, the legitimacy of which rests on the similarity of the human mind in all races.

Prof. Frazer concludes by making an earnest plea for securing records of the present savage races still existing in the world by sending out efficient expeditions with these objects in view, for,

after all, in another quarter of a century probably there will be little or nothing of the old savage life left to recall.

This is a work which one has the impulse to go back to and reread every now and then.

MEYER SOLOMON.

GRUNDZÜGE DER PSYCHOANALYSE. By Leo Kaplan (Pp. 306. Deuticke, Vienna).

This book purports to give a systematical account of psycho-analysis. One therefore has to compare it with the only two other books having the same aim, namely Hitschmann's and Pfister's (those by Brill and the reviewer are not quite comparable, being rather expositions of special aspects of the subject). Of the three Hitschmann's is certainly the most accurate and authentic, its chief defect being its condensed nature and its baldness. Pfister's has the advantage over both the others of containing a large number of examples of analytical work taken from actual cases, but this is more than counterbalanced by the confused and often inaccurate presentation. The principal value of the present book lies in the large amount of material extracted from non-medical sources, the author having evidently an extensive knowledge of folk-lore and allied subjects. The fresh analytical material he contributes consists mainly of dream analyses. A prominent feature is the author's agreeable and interesting style. From the point of view of accuracy there is nothing left to be desired. The book, therefore, can be cordially recommended as a valuable pendant to Hitschmann's work, and as a trustworthy introduction to psycho-analysis. It should be mentioned further that the author makes some interesting contributions of his own, notably on the subjects of suicide and narcissism.

ERNEST JONES.

CLINICAL STUDIES IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF INSANITY TO CRIME. Paul E. Bowers, M. S., M. D. (The Dispatch Print, Michigan City, Indiana, pp. 104).

This little volume, which is the work of the Physician in charge of the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, provides in small compass a large amount of invaluable data for the perusal of jurists, general medical practitioners and laymen interested in the problems of delinquency. Its value lies in the fact that the important relationship between insanity and crime is statistically proved. Even a psychiatrist might be astounded to learn how many of the criminals in one State have definite and well marked psychoses. A short description of the symptomatology of each psychosis introduces the discussion of each group, so that the

layman has no excuse for failing to understand the material presented.

One, who is primarily a psychopathologist, will, however, be disappointed in this work. The nosological side is loosely treated, at times, with obvious inaccuracy. This may be excused, perhaps, since psychiatrists disagree so notoriously among themselves as to classification. A more important defect is the failure to relate the psychology of insanity with the psychology of criminality in general. This, however, is an ambitious task and, as the book is plainly intended to give statistical facts for the education of the uninformed, it is perhaps an unfair criticism. Any publication which may tend to illumine the minds of those, who regard crime as some sort of original sin, whose conception of the problem of delinquency begins and ends with detection and conviction, must be welcomed most heartily.

JOHN T. MACCURDY.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Honesty. By William Healy. Pp. 220. Bobbs, Merrill Co. \$1.00 net.

Being Well Born. By Michael F. Guyer. Pp. 374. Bobbs, Merrill Co. \$1.00 net.

Nervous Children. By Beverley R. Tucker. Pp. 147. Richard G. Badger. \$1.25 net.

Manual of Vital Function Testing Methods and their Interpretation. By Wilfred M. Barton. Pp. 255. Richard G. Badger. \$1.50 net.

The Colorado Industrial Plan. By John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Pp. 94.

Who is Insane? By Stephen Smith. Pp. 285. The Macmillan Co. \$1.25 net.

THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

THE DORIS CASE OF QUINTUPLE PERSONALITY

BY WALTER FRANKLIN PRINCE

THE Doris case is one of such complexity, and passed through so many panoramic stages, each marked by its own distinctive phenomena, that no adequate sketch can be presented in the limits at disposal. All that is possible is a meager outline, with some feature here and there, illuminating or problematical, set forth a little more fully. Few incidents can be told, and little attention paid to the dramatic factor which is so prominent. Emphasis will rather be laid on features which are, to a degree, novel, and to such as illustrate psychical mechanism, after the necessary general description has been presented. The material is drawn from nineteen hundred pages of manuscript record of a study continued without the intermission of a day for more than three years.

ERA OF THREE PERSONALITIES

Doris Fischer was born of German parents in 1889. No neurotic taint has been found in her ancestry, further than bad temper on the part of her father and his mother. Her mother was unusually sweet, patient and cheerful in disposition. The mother's people are an intelligent, church-belonging, well-to-do set. A great uncle Fischer is said to have been professor in a German university. The father had abilities which elevated him to a responsible executive position, but contracted a habit of alcoholic indulgence which at length reduced him to a common laborer. Thus, from before Doris's birth, the family lived in poverty. The mother, disowned by her father because of her forbidden

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marriage, and longing for affection and the refinements of her youth, expressed her thwarted instincts by imaginative reverie. Doris inherited this tendency, and it was innocently cultivated by the mother's willingness to play, for hours at a time, the "supposing" game with this the youngest and favorite of thirteen children.

Doris is psychically almost solely the child of her mother. Her nature is marked by traits the very opposite of the callous indifference of the father to the sufferings or claims of others, his complete devotion to his selfish desires, his sullen and irascible temper. Nor was there anything really bad in any of the secondary personalities, if we except the impishness with which "Margaret" would sometimes dominate over the primary personality, and react against the personality "Sick Doris" with mental and physical



"REAL DORIS" THE PRIMARY PERSONALITY AS SHE "CAME OUT" IN
THE PHOTOGRAPHER'S STUDIO, AFTER "SICK DORIS" HAD SEAT-
ED HERSELF. FOR FOUR YEARS, R. D. HAD NOT HAD A TO-
TAL OF THREE DAYS OF CONTINUOUS EXISTENCE. SHE
LAPSED PROBABLY WITHIN A MINUTE AFTER THE
CAMERA HAD DONE ITS WORK. 1910.

persecutions. The occasional "lies" and "swipings" of this member of the group were of the most innocent character, being the instinctive acts of the child-nature that knows no law. And such tendencies did not emerge in Real Doris when Margaret disappeared, but departed with her.

The "mental fissuring" was caused by three successive shocks, incurred respectively at the ages of three, seventeen and eighteen, the first shock being psycho-physical, the second psychical, and the third physical.

The first shock was caused by her father, in a fit of fury, dashing her upon the floor. Thereupon two secondary personalities resulted (ignoring the claim of the first to be named that she was a spirit sent when the disaster was imminent, and speaking in the accepted terms of science), "Sleeping Margaret," as she came to be called, and "Margaret." S. M. uniformly stated that she came first, before the actual fall, while M. came later, after the child had been taken upstairs. It was curious to observe that M., who had no access to the mind of S. M., nor even knew that she existed, always said that the first thing she remembered was R. D. crying on the bed upstairs, though she derived from the mind of the primary personality that her father had thrown her down. R. D. in after years had no recollection of the affair, but in a stage of her recovery had it pictured in a dream, unrecognized and unbelieved by her. S. M. claimed that while M. came a child, somewhat more bright and alert than R. D., she herself was as mature from the start as at any subsequent period. This statement appears sufficiently apocryphal, but it is only fair to say that while the other personalities were fading in their respective mentalities, and after they had gone, she alone underwent no essential alteration.

S. M. testifies that she spoke only when M. was asleep, as in the first stage after the case was being studied, and thus, though always present and conscious, escaped detection by either of the others. Yet, she claims, she was useful, warding off dangers mainly by influencing M., but also at times causing R. D. to hear or see that which she otherwise would not have perceived.

The subsequent history to the seventeenth year is

gleaned from three sources, the memories of R. D., M., and S. M. Oftentimes R. D. would not remember a given incident at all, in which case the witnesses were reduced to two, and sometimes, though much less frequently, S. M. was the sole authority. On the other hand, almost invariably M. could add details to an incident related by R. D., and often S. M. could remember details omitted by M., or would put another and more rational interpretation upon the matter. Sometimes, but seldom, S. M. could not remember features in M.'s story, nor was she chary of contradicting her and informing me when the latter was romancing.

In the full report there is an elaborate appraisal of the reliability of the witnesses, including the later ones, "Sick Doris" and "Sleeping Real Doris." Here only a word can be said. R. D. is proved from quite five years of daily observation to be of crystal veracity. She may imperfectly remember, she may incorrectly infer, but she cannot prevaricate. M. would at times "whopper" in fun, or romance for the delight of it, but it was found that a twinkling eye was then the index, and that when this sign was absent she was telling the truth as she understood it, even to her own cost. S. M. would sometimes, when she felt that a matter was none of my business, deviate from the strict truth, but always in cold and monosyllabic fashion. Otherwise, in matters which could be tested, she was never known to be deceitful or inventive. It may as well be said here that Sick Doris, a personality of later date, was subject to certain delusions, and would also sometimes innocently repeat romances invented by M., but outside of these categories seemed to be reliable. The somnambulic personality, "Sleeping Real Doris," simply automatically rehearsed past utterances of R. D. and S. D., and could no more lie than can a phonograph.

From the age of three, then, Doris led a (really triple) to her double life. One curious feature was that the primary personality was never the one to sleep at night. Perhaps the shock, which occurred in the evening, was what established the groove, but at the moment when she had reached the head of the stairs leading to her room M. would come, and continue except perhaps for brief sleeping intervals

until she had reached the bottom of the stairs in the morning. Never was R. D. the one to pass the night until the first stage of the cure, in 1911. M. would do her school exercises for her by the light of the street lamps, until the studies became so far advanced that *she* was no longer capable, would write R. D. notes, play and "imagine", often for hours. In the morning R. D. would find evidences of pretended banquets and other play. In the daytime the primary personality was in control the major part of the time, but with many transitions, during which M. would conduct herself in her own fashion, playing pranks and uttering audacious speeches, causing the mother mystified wonder whether her daughter would ever grow up. In school M. would come and perpetrate some antic or singular speech and then go, leaving R. D. to wonder at the laughter of the pupils and to bear the brunt of the teacher's reproof. The primary personality had a knack of pumping a certain one of her friends without seeming to do so, and in many instances learned what had taken place. Full of love and sympathy for her mother, and being enterprising as well as optimistic, she began at an early age to do household tasks for rich families before and after school, and to bring her small earnings home. M's. astonishing speeches would sometimes bring discharge, though generally the ingratiating charm of this child personality would cause her breaks to be overlooked.

From R. D.'s earliest recollection M. must, when not herself "out" or in upper control, have led a co-conscious existence. When alone they talked together, M. subliminally using the lips, and R. D. never having an inkling of her speeches until the words were actually uttered. When others were present M. talked "through her mind," there at times being the hallucination of actual speech and at times only thoughts recognized as coming from her subliminal companion whom she in childhood supposed must be a sort of a sister. It was as a subliminal co-consciousness that M. gave R. D. the first remembered lesson is *meum* and *tuum*. The latter thus told the story. "It must have been a little before my fifth birthday. I had been playing with a rubber ball which must have been claimed by the A Phase (the

name which she learned from the writer to employ in referring to M.). For I was made by a will not my own to pick up the ball with my left hand. That drew my attention to it—that I did not feel just then like playing with it, yet was made to pick it up. But then I did start in to play with it, and the ball was pressed into my right hand by a will not mine, and my left hand began to scratch my cheek and eyelid, and continued to scratch until the blood came. I suppose I was giving myself a lesson. I never touched the ball again. I had my eyes scratched a good many times when I was little, but not my face so badly as that—scratches the whole length of my cheek."

A host of incidents of those years are recorded, some ludicrous, others pathetic, caused by the presence of the child-personality in both her states, denominated by herself "out" and "in." She threatened and amused R. D., punished and helped, got her into scrapes and out of them, by turns. Of course the girl got the reputation of extreme oddity, of "lying," of chameleon "moods." Graduating from the grammar-school the youngest but one in a class of fifty-two, with the next to the best rank, in spite of her manifold difficulties, she planned to enter the high school, but here M. peremptorily put her foot down. Hereafter the girl worked in household tasks and as a seamstress.

Often, when absent at her work, she had visual hallucinations of her mother. At the age of seventeen, on a certain day, she had one of these several times repeated, and ran home in alarm to find the mother, who had been apparently well in the morning, in a dying condition. This was at about six o'clock in the evening, and the agonized girl attended her mother until her death at about 2 a. m., alone except that the father came in at a late hour, intoxicated, threw himself down by the comatose woman, and was soon in a state of stupor. R. D.'s head had been aching violently for hours, and when she drew the sheet over the dead face, Margaret put in a momentary appearance, a terrible pain came in the left lobe of the brain, and then—a new personality came into existence.

RISE AND EDUCATION OF A FOURTH PERSONALITY

Sick Doris, as she came to be called, was born what has been denominated an infant personality, of the type found in the "Hanna" case. This term is somewhat of a misnomer, since usually the intellect is not infantile, but shows only the absence of knowledge-content.

S. D. was not, like Hanna, lacking in the sense of spatial relations, nor like Haitsch,* had she forgotten how to produce vocal sounds. But she had no initial knowledge of any person, any name or word, any object or fact whatever, while she only instinctively, as it were, performed the simplest acts, such as rising, sitting down, walking and handling things.

There are four witnesses for S. D.'s first state and her subsequent education, S. D. herself, M., S. M., and R. D. after she had recovered the memories of S. D. in the process of the extinguishment of the last-named. "I remember in a hazy way what I myself did the night that mother died. It must have been right after that that the B. Phase came. I remember sitting down after I had washed mother and put the sheet over her face. Mr. F. slept beside her all the time I was at work. Then I found myself as Phase B sitting on the edge of the bed [all the memories recovered from Sick Doris, otherwise Phase B, are sharply discriminated in her consciousness from the memories of occurrences during her periods as R. D.] I looked at the man, whom I did not know, and then at the sheet, that seemed to have a person under it [this does not mean that she thought of the concealed object as being a person, or knew what a person was, but that the shape seemed like that of the man]. I drew the sheet down, and looked at the woman, then covered her up. I did not think anything particular about her—it did not even excite my curiosity, except that I wondered why the man had so much on and the woman so little. I looked about me but did not feel much interest. I wondered a little why the woman was so still, and yet I

*Michael Haitsch, a case of monocyclical bimorphosis with infant, or incompetent, secondary personality, was taught by the writer to utter his first sounds, to speak, write, etc.

knew nothing about sleep or death. I distinguished between the two because I touched the man and he moved a little, but when I touched the other she did not move. As I looked around I did not seem to fix my eyes on any special thing. I heard a voice [that of a bed-ridden sister] crying, "Doris," but the name meant nothing to me. The fact that she was shouting made no impression on me. Mr. F. was snoring and I wondered a little why the other wasn't doing the same. Her jaw was tied up, and I pulled her lip down a little, thinking that if her mouth was open like his she might make the same sound. I don't know how long I sat there,—it seems likely only a few minutes, as I was looking around and Trixie was calling out when Phase A came. And she must have cleaned the house from top to bottom." This is the way that M. told the story. "Do I remember when I came after the S. D. was born? I should sink I do! That was on a Choosday night. But I remember when the S. D. came, too, for I was underneath all the time watching, you know, papa. The R. D. got our mother all washed and dressed. O-o-o, how her head ached! Then when she sat down I came, and my head was aching just awful. And then—and then—there was a just dreadful pain—I sought our head would burst right open—and then I went in, but I watched, and then I knew that there was somebody else that I didn't know. I tried to come out, but I couldn't. But I was there underneath, watching all the time. What a *dumm* thing the new one was! She didn't seem to know *anysing*. She just sat there on the edge of the bed."

We must here pass all the psychologically fascinating story of S. D.'s education, except to remark its unique feature. *Another personality*—Margaret—was her chief teacher. M. taught her, speaking subliminally by the lips, and subliminally using the hands, etc., alternately with S. D. She pointed at objects and gave their names, and S. D. would then point and repeat the names; she performed acts and S. D. obediently copied them. This work was mainly done at night. The teacher was impatient and objurgatory yet persevering, and progress was very rapid, as is generally the case. Sometimes there were

misapprehensions, as where M. pointed and said "Potato, *dumm* thing!" and S. D., supposing that the combination was the name of the article, the next day insulted a lady by pointing and blurting out, "potatodummthing!" Many facts and processes familiar to R. D. or even to M.—for it was not in the nature of the latter capricious individual to continue her task indefinitely—never became known to S. D. On the other hand, S. D. finally attained phenomenal skill in certain kinds of manual work, particularly embroidery, far beyond that of R. D. and still more of M.

On the next night after her mother's death, R. D. "came out" and remained all night alone with the body, caressing it and, as S. M. put it, "listening for footsteps as though she were guilty of something." *She* had no further conscious existence for two months. Then she began to have periods of emergence so brief that, forgetting that her mother was dead, and starting to run home under the impression that she had something interesting to tell, she never got six squares before M. or S. D. replaced her.

THE GROUP COMPLETED

When she was eighteen years old she fell heavily upon the back of her head. The following night began the functions of the singular psychical entity Sleeping Real Doris, who was strengthened by another fall some months later. Her name, as those of two others of the group, is ambiguous. Sleeping Real Doris was far from being Real Doris asleep; Sleeping Margaret was utterly distinct, almost antipodal, of M. asleep or awake; and Sick Doris was not Doris in a sick condition, but a wholly distinct personality.

THE CASE COMING UNDER NOTICE AND CARE

In the latter part of 1909, Mrs. Prince became acquainted with the girl, and began to take in her an interest which constantly deepened. The first foundation of cure was laid by this lady's insistence that her friend should often eat at our house, and by her assisting the girl to get several hours of sleep nearly every day, from the spring of

1910. Hitherto the vicissitudes of her life had caused nutrition to be irregular and improper, and sound sleep, except for periods of stupor caused by utter exhaustion, had been long unknown. Even at our house, Mrs. Prince's constant vigilance was necessary. Writhings and twitchings, seemingly malevolent clutching and tearing at body and clothing, somnambulic soliloquizing and ejaculations with various tones and manifestations of emotion, shrinking from imaginary blows which had their counterpart in experience, and other phenomena too various to describe here, marked this strange sleep. Often she had to be held by main force. Busy about other affairs, I saw little of this for many months,—in fact I was Philistine enough to deplore my wife's absorption in a case of "hysteria" to an extent which was injuring her health. But she would not give up, and in fear that she would break down I determined that if the work must go on I would share it. At this time, January, 1911, the primary personality, R. D., had not had a total of three days of conscious existence in five years. For the first three and one half years of that period *she* had never talked with a human being, and only three or four times since. For three years she had not seen a human being a dozen times, as she nearly always "came out" in her room, which did not look out upon the street. *She* had no idea how any other room in the house where she then lived looked. Twenty minutes was the longest conscious period which she had experienced in five years.

The scientific study of the case began January 18, 1911. On the second day it was determined to be one of dissociation, the unravelling of the quintuple secret began, and that therapeutical campaign which was to go on unremittingly for more than three years. On March 2, the girl became a permanent inmate by adoption of the writer's home.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSONALITIES

Little need be added to what has been already said about the primary personality, R. D., under the first head. She proved to be a being of unusual amiability, self-reliance (when she got her balance again), enterprise and hopeful-

ness—not at all the combination that would have been expected. In addition, she was found to be sensitive, compassionate, antipathetic to all coarseness, and highly discriminating in her reading. She appeared several years younger than she was, doubtless because *she* had lost at least eight years of experience. Having an excellent physical constitution she had had very little sickness previous to the coming of S. D. Her habitual expression was open and cheerful.

Sick Doris was characterized by woodleness of expression and a dull eye, when her face was in repose. Her glance was apt to be furtive, and her voice was more monotonous and colorless than that of R. D. She was reserved, half-independent and half-deprecatory, and nervous. Incapable of affection, and wholly undemonstrative, she



"SICK DORIS" IN 1910. SHOWING HER CHARACTERISTIC WOODEN EXPRESSION.

could entertain a sort of doglike friendship. A slave to her narrow conceptions of duty, her chief pleasure was to make and give presents. She was religiously inclined in

a dull, unreasoning fashion. Her sense of humor was not responsive to any but the most obvious jokes, she thought in terms of the literal and concrete, and metaphorical and abstract expressions often baffled her. If affronted she made no protest, but bore silently and wept in solitude. She suffered much from pains in her hip and internal organs, and hence received from M. her title. Suggestible to a degree, she was also subject to that narrowing of the field of attention which results in "fixed ideas." Accordingly, as is common in hysteria, there grew up several delusions, of which the principal were that she was an artist of remarkable skill and that she was afflicted with tuberculosis of the bone, destined to be fatal. The building up of these from facts of which they were the enlargement and dramatization is one of the curious studies of the case. In a sense she knew that they were unreal, yet was held in the grasp of them as one is by a nightmare, the objective reality of which he doubts, and was helpless until they were shattered by an impact from another mind. On the day that the tuberculosis delusion was disrupted, most of the pains associated with and suggested by it disappeared.

Margaret, who had been in existence, when the study of the case began, nineteen years, both as an alternating and subliminally conscious personality, was never psychically more than ten years old, and, with the exception of bodily size and form her manner, facial expression, voice and whole appearance, corresponded. When the secret became known, and she was free to act out her true character (since the rule is that a secondary personality, in spite of its "breaks", endeavors to conceal itself from strangers) it was startling to see the stolid, mature face of S. D. dissolve into the laughing, mischievous countenance of a young tomboy. The very shape of the face altered, and her voice was strikingly different, strident at times, at others almost infantile, full of inflections and vocal coloring. In point of view, mental habits and tastes, she was in every way juvenile, and she had some extraordinarily naïve notions which are not usually carried beyond the age of five or six. She was mischievous, roguish, exceedingly witty, a consummate mimic, ingratiating, winsome and altogether lovable, as a rule. She delighted

to sit cross-legged on the floor and to show her dolls and the trumpery contents of "her drawer" to whilom grave doctors and others who had been initiated, and by her delightful drollery would send them irresistibly into gales of laughter. Alone of the group she was slangy, and she misspelled and mispronounced many a word of which the others were mistresses. She could not understand why R. D. and S. D. wanted to go to church,—it was all "*dumm* stuff" to her. Amiable as a rule, she had occasional fits of sullenness and even of rage, which when once begun seemed to run an



"MARGARET" IN 1911. SINGING HER FAMILY TO SLEEP.

automatic course, sometimes leading to strange states in which she did not know her friends, and stood in deadly fear of them. Later these gradually passed away. All three, R. D., S. D., and M., were suggestible, but M. most of all, besides which she was subject to a variety of motor and verbal automatisms, often going in pairs, which when once started carried her along helplessly until her attention was powerfully diverted or they had spent their force. In spite of her impish reactions against S. D., to be described, there

was nothing really bad about M. She fibbed and romanced, but could not help a betraying twinkle of the eye when doing so. Her very conceptions of badness were those of a small child. She was childishly fond of eating, and some of her gastronomic feats were noteworthy.

Sleeping Margaret was the special riddle of the case. From appearances one would say that she was always asleep, since until a later stage she talked only when M. was sleeping. But she professed never to sleep, and in fact was never known to oscillate in the clarity of her understanding. There was no question that M. was there, for, though mysteriously inhibited from hearing the other's speech, she talked much of the time herself, in her very different tones, sometimes cutting a sentence or word of S. M. in two, and frequently performed her characteristic acts, unconscious that she was interfering with another. The expressions of the two flitted over the face by turn, or sometimes momentarily blended, and many convincing illustrations are given in the full report of the two consciousnesses acting together, sometimes in unison, but often at cross-purposes. S. M. seemed as truly "out" as M. asleep, but is it possible for two individualized complexes to operate not only together but at the same psychical level? She had limited control during the sleep of M. and later of R. D., a control which (relatively to M.) grew with the cure, of the facial muscles, the instrumentalities of speech, and of the limbs. A code of signals was devised by which I was able to communicate with her while M. was awake. Thus was manifested a consciousness fully alert and at work underneath a consciousness engrossed in its own affairs and unobservant of what was going on. S. M. had her characteristic voice, pitched a little lower than that of R. D. and lacking in the kaleidoscopic intonations of M.'s. Her facial expression was usually that of philosophical calmness though she would occasionally smile sedately, or even laugh at some antic of M. Mentally, she seemed the most matured of all. She was the chief coadjutor in the cure, studying the interior situation, reporting on the results of experiments, suggesting measures of much value, and making predictions generally justified by the event. Superficially she appeared to be of

a highly analytical and logical turn of mind, but uniformly disclaimed having reasoned out her deliverances, saying, "I only tell what I *see*." Her memory in general seemed to embrace that of the remaining three active members, with additions of her own. She was the only one of the four thus far described who showed not a trace of suggestibility. Tenacious of her opinions, she was amenable to reasoning, as any sensible person is, but none of the little devices which were effective upon the others had any influence upon her. She showed her rare displeasure only by reticence or silence. Other characteristics of this singular psychical entity must be passed by here.

Sleeping Real Doris was the name given by M. to a somnambulic personality which appeared only at times when the girl was asleep. She never reached more than a low stage of development, and it is doubtful if she had self-consciousness. Yet she possessed her peculiar facial expression when she was reacting to external stimuli, one of quizzical puzzlement; her characteristic harsh, croaking tones, on the rare occasions in which her utterances were not those of an automatic transmitter; and repeated tests showed that she had memories which were exclusively her own. She passed through three stages. The first continued up to the time when S. D. began to decline, and was marked by two different though similar phenomena: (a) The substantial if not literal (the writer is inclined to think literal) reproduction of R. D.'s or S. D.'s part in past conversations, which originally took place at any time from the day before back to the days of early childhood. According to the several dates of the actual conversations, the facial expressions and the tones covered the whole range from childhood to young maturity, and sounded nearly the whole gamut of the emotions. It is easier to imagine than to describe these wonderful scenes. But it was hard to avoid the conviction, when one listened to one side of a conversation, for example, between R. D. and her mother when the former was seven years of age, heard the childish intonations so charged with adoration, saw the ecstatic juvenile countenance from which all care and sorrow had magically been erased, and noted how, when she paused for the loved voice

that none other might hear, as she laughed and clapped her hands with joy, it was, I say, hard to avoid believing that one was hearing and beholding a very transcript of the tones, looks and gestures of fifteen years before. Especially this was the case considering that at another time the conversational part reproduced would be one borne by S. D. the very day before, and that the exact similitude of her tones and looks and weary manner appeared and her characteristic expressions were heard. One brief instance is here given.

In one of the somnambulic "conversation-recitals" of S. R. D., in January, 1911, the girl seemed to be talking to her mother, with the luminous tender smile, which her face always wore when the rehearsal was of a talk originally had with that mother. "Mother, there are just two things that I want most. . . . Shall I tell you what they are? . . . [Evidently the mother diverted the theme, for the sentences for a few moments were concerned with other matter. But then she returned to her subject.] Mother, shan't I tell you what those two things I want most are? They are to be baptized and to paint. . . . O well, mother, I'll give it up. . . . Never mind, I won't say anything more about it. I've got you and I will be happy. . . . I'll tear the pictures up. . . . Don't say anything more about it, mother."

(b) S. R. D. would rehearse soliloquies, originally uttered by R. D. on her brief emergences from psychical incarceration, under various circumstances and at different times during the preceding five years. The following sample dated from the first time that R. D. "came out" after the family had moved to a strange house. "This isn't my room . This isn't my room. My room had a carpet on the floor. . That isn't my bed. . That is my bureau . . . my bureau . . . I wonder what it would be like to be out all day. . . Wonder if I ever shall," etc. These two phenomena, the conversation-recitals and the soliloquy rehearsals, marked the first stage of S. R. D. In the second stage the former had ceased, but the latter became more frequent. In the third stage, while the soliloquy-rehearsals were gradually decaying, a tendency

to respond to external sensory stimuli was first observed. S. R. D. was seemingly developing, though S. M. denied that she was really doing so. Presumably the internal seismic displacement caused by the obliteration of S. D., which, while it rounded out R. D.'s memories and increased her psychical grasp upon all her bodily machinery, at the same time put more burden upon both R. D. and M. and produced in them emotional disturbances for a time, also liberated in the flickering consciousness of S. R. D. a transient breeze of energy. There is no doubt whatever that by experimenting with different types of stimuli S. R. D. could have been educated into self-consciousness and sundry forms and degrees of mental functioning. Indeed, she showed such a disposition to respond to the few tentative essays which were made in this direction that I took alarm and wholly abstained from any unnecessary repetition. The sequel was that the feeble flame, which for a brief space seemed to burn a little brighter, soon faded, and suddenly went out altogether.

THE ALTERNATIONS

So unremitting was the study of the case that from the day that the girl became an inmate of my home I was never away over night, and seldom for more than a few hours at a time, for more than three years. Almost every alternation was either witnessed or reliable information regarding it secured, and the time set down.

There was a certain motor index which always preceded a change of personalities in this case; whether it has been noted in any other is not to the writer known. This was a sudden jerk or oscillation of the head from the neck, varying from an almost imperceptible twitch to a jerk which shook the whole body. It was more pronounced in the transition from a lower to a higher personality, and most of all, generally speaking, when the transition was from M. to R. D. In general, the abruptness of the sinking of one personality and the rise of another to take its place at the helm was the measure of the violence of the nervous impact. When, for example, R. D. had been conscious for some

minutes that M. was at hand, and the latter came without resistance, the snap of the neck might be almost imperceptible. But if R. D. was forced out by a sudden shock, or "held on," that is maintained her synthesis by an effort until an emergency was past, the jerk would be emphasised. Again, as a given personality declined in force and approached its extinction, this sign of transition between it and another weakened. A somnambulic "conversation-recital" by S. R. D. was often followed by a jerk of the head and this by an interval of silence before another began, reasonably indicating that in the meantime the sleeping R. D. had briefly risen to the surface.

The proximate reasons for the alternations probably were the same as in other cases. They may be summed up in one phrase, consumption of energy and consequent exhaustion. When the primary personality became weary, the time depending on the amount of energy accumulated (the extent to which she had rested) and the degree in which drafts were made upon it, she lost control of her synthesis, and a secondary personality took her place. In one aspect this may be regarded as a device of nature to prevent worse disaster. Whether the expenditure of energy was by the swift process of shock, like the explosion of a bomb, or by the slow one of ordinary thinking and sense-reactions, like the gradual burning of a log, the law was invariable. Early in the observed history, a half hour of thinking and talking, or a momentary return of a painful memory, might suffice to send her away. As time went on it was found that physical or mental strain, or especially emotional disturbances, always preceded an untimely transition to a lower psychical control. Pain, grief, fear, wounded sensibilities, disagreeable memories, self-reproach, or any other species of painful emotion, in proportion to its suddenness and intensity, or even a pleasurable emotion if too tumultuous or swift of approach,—such were the preludes to hasty lapses. It became almost an exact science to determine what the result of any given stimulus at a particular stage would be, like predictions of chemical reactions. As time went on the power to sustain shocks grew, minor ones dropped out of sight, and the period that a calm current

of living could be endured by the primary personality lengthened to twelve hours, twenty-four, even days. Even to sleep as R. D., while highly desirable, it was found made a certain draft upon her own proper energy.

When the primary personality was submerged it seemed to be laying up a new supply of force. M. well knew this, and was accustomed to say, "I am resting the R. D." But if M., on coming, became excited or refractory, the return of R. D. was by so much delayed. Calm must ensue, and sufficient rest secured in the secondary state to balance the previous exhaustion of R. D. plus the drain upon the system caused by the perturbation of M. Not that the equation was a purely mechanical one. M., for example, might employ devices, such as willing, or stimulating herself to pleasurable feats of imagination, which would hasten R. D.'s return, as enjoyment in a secondary state always tended to do. But if the return was premature, there would be weak control and more or less psychical disturbance, and the next lapse would come the sooner.

Shortly after the discovery of the fact of dissociation, the chance nature of the first attempts to bring R. D. to the surface resulted in the establishment of a routine for its accomplishment; she must be asleep, the hand pressed, and a set verbal formula pronounced before she would put in an appearance. For a while no part of the program could be omitted. If the hand was pressed and she was "near," her readiness to emerge would be evinced by a bright and characteristic smile upon the sleeping countenance, but the smile faded and another personality woke unless the formula was spoken. But as the weeks went on, she gradually broke loose from leading-strings, and her emergences waxed spontaneous. The practice of "calling" R. D. was laid aside, especially on account of a singular *contretemps* which took place whenever she was called prematurely, that is, before she had sufficiently rested. R. D. would come, begin an utterance of joy and quickly vanish, perhaps cutting a word in two, while M., taking her place, would look at me with twisted, reproachful countenance, and cry, "O papa! I was kicked out again." It was as when buckets are suspended from the two ends of a rope fastened

to a windlass over a well. As one bucket (R. D.) rises above the water and the other (M.) sinks below, suddenly the windlass slips and the former bucket is precipitated into the water again, and the latter rises with a jerk. R. D. was brought above the surface before sufficiently rested, could not maintain herself, and M. had to reappear posthaste. Both complained of a disagreeable sensation, which M. characterized as that of "bumping R. D."

Later, R. D. was often able to maintain her individuality for a short time after change was due, by sheer will. This was serviceable in case of an emergency, but she always had to pay high interest in the way of deeper exhaustion.

Increase or diminution in the frequency of alternations at any stage was no criterion, taken by itself, of the state of the case. Indeed, periods of rapid progress were apt to be marked by many transitions, because the swift decline of one personality threw more burden upon the others, to which they only gradually could become adjusted. The largest number of alternations in one day was fifty-one. It was January 2, 1912, that R. D. first passed from the sleep of the night into the day without a morning interval. Not until January 29, 1914, did she first bridge the evening interval, achieving a record of 46 hours and 15 minutes. February 22-25 she broke this record by a period of 70 hours and 50 minutes. March 4-8 she reached 96 hours and 10 minutes. Beginning April 8, she accomplished 8 days lacking about an hour. April 19, 1914, the alternations ceased forever.

Following are listed the average daily alternations for each month throughout the period within which the case was in process of reintegration, from March 7, 1911, when the record of these began, and also the daily average of time that the primary personality was "out" in conscious control. The latter, in hours and minutes, is enclosed in parentheses. It should be borne in mind that for five years the daily average of the primary personality had been less than five minutes, and that from March 2, 1911, when the girl was removed to a favorable environment, it gradually rose to the date when the record began. Again, the number of alternations in a particular day often differed very much

from the average for the month; for instance, in June, 1911, while the average was 9, the number varied from 2 to 18 in a day.

1911

Mar. 9 (7.16)
 Apr. 17 + (8.15)
 May 16 - (8.45)
 June 9 + (11.01)
 July 6 - (11.41)
 Aug. 10 - (17.33)
 Sept. 8 - (19.34)
 Oct. 9 - (19.15)
 Nov. 7 + (20.32)
 Dec. 7 - (21.04)

Oct. 5 (21.20)
 Nov. 5 - (21.54)
 Dec. 5 + (21.23)

1912

Jan. 6 - (19.53)
 Feb. 4 + (21.21)
 Mar. 3 - (22.26)
 Apr. 4 - (21.46)
 May 7 - (21.16)
 June 5 - (21.48)
 July 8 (20.15)
 Aug. 5 + (21.17)
 Sept. 4 - (21.52)

1913
 Jan. 4 + (21.59)
 Feb. 3 + (22.04)
 Mar. 4 - (22.17)
 Apr. 4 - (22.39)
 May 3 - (22.50)
 June 3 - (22.49)
 July 3 - (22.30)
 Aug. 3 - (22.42)
 Sept. 3 - (22.45)
 Oct. 3 + (22.41)
 Nov. 2 + (22.58)
 Dec. 2 + (22.59)

1914

Jan. 3 (22.16)
 Feb. 2 (23.06)
 Mar. 1 + (23.28)
 19 Apr. 1 -(23.32)

ABNORMALITIES OF AESTHESIA

It appears that each of the secondary personalities made certain subtractions from the keenness of the senses and the various types of physical sensation of the primary member. The correlations were particularly demonstrated during the period of S. D.'s and M.'s declension, since, in a number of instances, the disappearance of a species of sensation in one of these and the appearance of the same in R. D. were nearly or quite contemporaneous. The relation,

in some instances, of permanent access or temporary ebullition of aesthesias in the primary personality to the lower ones was obscure, but it cannot be doubted that in some way they too had their origin in the decline of the lower mentalities. It is probable that some day the significance of the anaesthesiae and hyperaesthesiae will be better understood, and to that end data should be amassed. In this case the data would be displayed to the best advantage in the form of a synchronous chart, but as that is here impracticable, it is grouped by periods.

1. *Period 1892-1906, following the first dissociation.* Real Doris's sense of taste was subnormal; she never ate anything because she liked it. She was somewhat therm-anaesthetic. There was anaesthesia in the bladder and throughout the urino-genital tract. Her vision was, it is inferred, a little lacking in clearness and range. She was otherwise normal so far as could be tested by the memory of R. D. and especially of S. M.

Margaret possessed the extraordinary auditory hyper-aesthesia that characterized her to the end. She probably saw farther than most people, as later on, and she had a form of visual hyperaesthesia (later tested) which enabled her to see in the dark. There was no anaesthesia of the bladder, but she was probably subnormal in adjacent parts. She was somewhat thermanaesthetic, but less so than S. D. was afterwards. Of course it is not certain that this or any list for a period before that of careful observation is complete.

2. *Changes in period 1906-1911, that of extreme disintegration.* In Real Doris the sense of taste probably became still more dull, as she found it almost nil when she first ate again after the close of the five years. Smell became subnormal (if it had not been so earlier). No other known change.

Margaret became subnormal to sensations from cuts, bruises, etc. She felt pains in the internal organs very little unless the trouble was extraordinarily severe. Otherwise she continued, so far as is known, as in the former period.

Tactile sensation in Sick Doris was subnormal. Feeling was keen in the neck and along the spine, otherwise there

was little in the trunk to below the ribs, thence it was fair to the middle of the thighs, diminished to the knees and was practically absent below. There was more sensation in the arms than in the legs. Conversely to M., she felt cuts, pinches, etc., little, but was not anaesthetic as to the internal organs. There was anaesthesia in the urino-genital tract as in the case of R. D. She was subnormal in taste and smelling; and there was much thermesthesia, except in the mouth.

3. *From the beginning of S. D.'s declension to psychical infancy; January 20-May 8, 1911.* By March 16, 1911, tactile anaesthesia in Sick Doris greatly deepened, especially on the right side. Taste and smell were nearly gone on March 27, and entirely soon after. By April 10, she was quite oblivious to pinches and bruises. On the same date analgesia of the internal organs began, but this never became complete. By May 6, the visual angle had narrowed much. Directly after it began to shorten, and reached the ultimate fourteen inches on May 16. S. D. disappeared June 28, 1911.

4. *From the stage of S. D.'s mental infancy to the restoration of R. D. to continuity of consciousness; May 8, 1911-April 19, 1914.* The changes in M. and R. D. had best be told together. On June 2, 1911, taste in M. was found to be dulling, little was left August 29, and the last trace was gone in September. Smell was dulling. By August 8, taste in R. D. had begun to improve (she had been earlier first heard to say that *she* was hungry), it gradually grew and was seemingly normal by September, 1913. Smell began to improve a little later than taste.

By August 1, 1911, M.'s tactile sensation while awake had much diminished, and had departed August 29. Tactile sensation while asleep on August 1, was limited to the fleshy parts, face, palms and backs of the hands, nipples and lips; on August 24 had gone from the face except the lips, and from the fleshy parts except from the upper backs of the thighs; by October 30, limited to palms and backs of hands; on April 12, 1912, found on palms only; after July 15 none discernible.

On August 27, 1911, auditory hyperesthesia with R. D., began, synchronizing with M.'s ceasing to "watch"

during the former's sleep; it gradually subsided, and hearing appeared to be normal by the early part of 1912.

With M. muscular anaesthesia had become well advanced by August 11, 1911, and this was total in October. Pinches, needle-pricks, etc., were undetected by August 29, and at least as early smell had become slight.

In December, smell partly revived, but only temporarily. In September she acquired a new sensitiveness to temperature of the air, but from this time became progressively anaesthetic to burns. Early in September, R. D. also, a little before M.'s change in this respect, became normally sensitive to atmospheric temperature. Beginning September 10, R. D. acquired painful tactile hyperesthesia, which continued eight days, then gradually subsided.

With R. D. sensation began in the bladder and urino-genital region in March, 1912, and, according to S. M., gradually increased and extended its area until possibly normal.

On October, 1911, narrowing of M.'s visual angle was first noted, and it reached its climax, when a newspaper had to be held nearly at arm's length in order for the width of a column to be included, January 1, 1912. By July 13, 1912, the visual field had shortened to about 12 feet; by August 7, to 5 feet and 6 inches; on September 20, it was 19 inches; and on April 20, 1913, it had reached its ultimate 14 inches. On October 4, 1913, M. became blind, and so continued to her last appearance April 19, 1914. On the same October 4, that she lost the power of vision, the sight of R. D. suddenly became clearer and keener than ever before.

In June, 1913, M. had developed an imperfect power of detecting touches (though apparently not by conscious sensation), but this died out as to the left side and was gone by August 8, and by October 8 she could no longer discern a touch on the right side.

Sleeping Margaret. About the time when M. was losing tactile sensation, S. M. was gradually acquiring, according to her statement, the first "independent sensations" that had ever been hers, in an area limited to the upper back and inner adjacent side of each thigh. This area narrowed until by October 1, 1911, she experienced

no feeling on the back of the thighs, and by the middle of the month only two slender lines of sensation, at the inner creases of the limbs at the juncture with the trunk. At some unknown subsequent period even this faded out. In M.'s last stage S. M. claimed to have gained "independent feeling" for a time in the tips of the fingers.

INTERCOGNITION AND ITS MECHANISM

(1) *General Statement.* Real Doris had no direct knowledge of the thoughts or acts of any of the secondary personalities. That is, she could not see into their minds or remember anything that had occurred during their supraliminal periods; no valve of her consciousness opened in the direction of any of them. She learned much from the chance remarks of her associates, inferred much from the situation in which she found herself and from what may be called the after-image of their emotions lingering subsequently to her arrival. Both M. and S. D. left notes for her to read. Habitually, in childhood, subliminal M. conversed orally with her, of course using the same mouth without her volition, but later in life only occasionally uttered ejaculations, as S. M. began to do after M. vanished. Within the period of my observation, not only sporadically unspoken sentences or single words "bubbled up" from a lower personality, conveying a hint or an admonition, but she was often aware of an inward perturbation from which she could correctly infer the sentiments of the subliminally co-conscious M. Besides, the emotionally colored thoughts of M. sometimes figured in the dreams of R. D., but without recognition or identification. All these phenomena are strictly analogous to the varied modes by which a person whose mind I cannot penetrate, conveys to me disclosures and tokens of his thoughts by means of oral statements, letters, shouts from a distance, gestures and so on. So far as R. D.'s own insight was concerned, every secondary personality was separated from her by an opaque wall.

Sick Doris knew or was capable of knowing (since like any normal person she did not always pay attention to what as within view) all that R. D. did, said, experienced and

thought. The usual assumption would be that she had this knowledge because on each of her successive arrivals following R. D., the memories of the latter were transferred to her *en bloc*, and that they were regarded by her as referring exclusively to the experiences of another than herself. I believe that this assumption is psychologically unsound, that her claim, like the claim of Sally in the Beauchamp case, to be subliminally co-conscious during the periods of the primary personality, was true. In that case, she knew what R. D. had done, said, heard and thought, because she had actually been an observer at the time, so that all these experiences of R. D. were, while they were in actual progress, incorporated into her own stream of consciousness. She remembered as I remember what Robinson did last night, not because Robinson mysteriously handed over to me his memories on my waking this morning, but because I recall what I myself saw him do. Of course it cannot be absolutely proved that S. D.'s co-consciousness during R. D.'s supraliminal periods was always equally clear any more than it can be absolutely proved that it was continuous. On the analogy of M., it would seem likely that it was subject to certain fluctuations, though I cannot say that I ever found her, when in her prime, to be seriously at fault in her statements regarding R. D. But R. D. was the only one into whose consciousness she had insight. The others were enclosed from her in chambers into which she could not look. When M. was "out," S. D. was as if annihilated for the time being. She knew much about M., but because M. chose that she should know, and by processes almost perfectly coterminous with those by which R. D. became aware of a modicum of acts and sentiments of two of the characters beneath her. M. and S. D. wrote notes to each other, they held frequent oral conversations, and in the consciousness of the latter emerged emotions and unspoken thoughts of which she well recognized the source and the meaning.

Margaret had, or was capable of having (for she also might have her attention absorbed by some matters to the neglect of others) knowledge of the experiences of every sort and the thoughts of both R. D. and S. D. Curious allegations were made to the effect that her knowledge of

S. D. was immediate, while that of R. D. was mediate, reflected as it were from S. D.'s consciousness as from a mirror, and these will be quoted later. In her prime she was able to tell me all or at least something about nearly every incident that took place during a period when one of her higher colleagues was supraliminal. She too, it was declared, remembered because those incidents took place under her observation, she being subliminally co-conscious during their occurrence. Indeed, it was claimed that she had a conscious existence absolutely unbroken, waking or sleeping, save for very rare and brief intervals during her periods "out" when she entered, usually voluntarily and because of weariness, what may be called a comatose condition, and for that one of her four subliminal stages known as "away and sleeping," which so long as she was in her prime seems to have been comparatively infrequent and of short duration. But her otherwise uninterrupted consciousness was not always equally clear. Besides fluctuations when she was supraliminal and awake, analogous to those to which the normal person is liable, and the variations of her supraliminal sleeping state, from simple dreaming to the utilization of every sensory connection with the outside world except sight, she was capable, it was declared, of three distinct degrees of awareness when in a subliminal relation. That some such scheme actually existed was evidentially indicated. The situation of M. as respects Sleeping Real Doris fell out of the general order. She heard the utterances of this inchoate personality and followed her acts, but could only infer her independent thoughts, so far as the latter possessed these. And she knew none of the thoughts of Sleeping Margaret, nor even of her existence, until later in the case, when, because of a dramatic exercise of energy by S. M. in an emergency, M. inferred that there must be another personality, much as the existence of the unknown planet Neptune was inferred because of the exercise of its attractive energy. But she was earlier often aware of opposition and even punishment, the source of which she could not define.

Sleeping Real Doris was in a class by herself. She had no knowledge, properly speaking, of any of the others, she

was simply an automatic phonograph to preserve and from time to time to repeat utterances originally delivered by R. D. or S. D., anywhere from a few hours to many years previously. She did, indeed, a few times repeat a word or short phrase from M., but seemingly this was because she caught it as it were, in passing, as it was uttered by M. a few moments before her own arrival.

Sleeping Margaret completes the series whose uniformity S. R. D. only interrupts. She had insight into all the content of the consciousnesses of R. D., S. D., and M., and that insight was declared, and appeared, to admit of no varying degrees, though she as well as the others might fluctuate in attention. It was, or appeared to be, potentially perfect. She claimed to have an absolutely continuous memory so that her knowledge of the thoughts of the others was not a transference but a part of the content of her own observation. As M. declared that she had direct view of S. D.'s thoughts but saw those of R. D. meditately through S. D., so S. M. alleged that she, in turn, saw M.'s thoughts directly, those of S. D. through, or as she preferred to say, reflected from the consciousness of M., and those of R. D. as reflected from the consciousness of S. D. to M. and again from that of M. to herself. S. M. knew no more what passed in the shadowy mind of S. R. D. than did M., except that she drew shrewder inferences from her few gestures and other acts.

(2) *Co-consciousness does not impair the individuality of personalities.* The well-known interrelations of secondary personalities could lead to the inquiry how far any of the witnesses was of independent authority, and how far she simply reflected the memories of another. Did not S. M., M. and S. D., in reciting incidents of the past, simply quote from some one "higher up," and all, ultimately, from R. D., since the valves all opened in that direction? Emphatically, no! Access was only to active thoughts, never to latent memories of another. But when memories of one higher up were called into review and thus transmuted into active thoughts, would not the lower personality, now having access to them, be liable to modification of her testimony? Yes, but only to the degree that Brown, Smith and Robinson, witnesses of the same event, would be

subject to the same liability. Brown, having listened to Smith's and Robinson's versions, might take advantage of them to refresh his memory, to correct some detail or otherwise modify the manner of his own recital. But the modification would be as likely as otherwise to take the form of causing him to dilate on some feature of the incident that others had neglected, or to insist more strongly on his own view of the case; nor would anyone allege that on this account he was not a competent or veracious witness. Exactly the same was true of the personalities. For example, if R. D. was talking about a past event, and M. came out and took up the tale, M. would show a perfect comprehension of what R. D. had said, and her own testimony would doubtless be affected, but only as in the case of Brown. Frequently she dwelt on features of the incident which she said that R. D. had forgotten. She would have her own childish interpretation of the incident and as strenuously contend against R. D.'s interpretation as Brown might argue for his own and against Smith's theory to account for the facts related by both. Each of the personalities had her own independent memory, each (except the inchoate, shadowy S. R. D.) her characteristic modes of thought, pride of opinion and will to contend for the same.

It may be well further to explain how a child personality like M. could retain many infantile notions in face of the facts that she was co-conscious when the primary personality was "out," and had access to her thoughts. It is true that M. knew what R. D.'s thoughts were, so far as she paid attention to them; but it does not follow that she necessarily understood them, or, even if she understood, agreed with them. As determined by S. M.'s immediate view of M.'s interior mental operations, and by my study of their manifestations, there were at least three reasons for M.'s non-comprehension of what R. D. understood, working singly and in combination. (a) Exactly as an ordinary child within hearing of conversation utterly beyond its mental grasp receives no enduring impression from what is to it merely "words, words, words," so M. took no interest in much that R. D. thought, heard and saw because it was beyond her intellectual range, and it passed unheeded. (b) In many

cases, where the matters were such that M. could understand what R. D.'s opinion was, she held obstinately to her childish view, and thought R. D.'s a "crazy" one, or, if won over, afterward forgot and returned to her former naïve conceptions. (c) Ofttimes R. D.'s thoughts were so languid or obscure, especially if she did not herself take interest in a subject, that M. preferred to pay attention to something else than what lay in the foreground—some object, for example, imprinted on R. D.'s retina, which the latter was not consciously heeding. Such seem to have been the reasons for the unquestionable fact that M. could retain grotesquely immature notions on certain subjects, in spite of her access to R. D.'s consciousness. Sometimes she did with amazement learn a new fact, utterly at variance with her former notions, yet even then she was unable to generalize from it, so that it remained to her an isolated phenomenon. The hitherto unsuspected fact that a cow could yield milk filled her with disgust for that article, and we could not induce her to drink milk so long as she was in a town that she regarded in suspicious proximity to the particular cow which she had discovered was guilty, but she could not generalize to all cows, and as soon as she left that place, although she still saw cows she did not connect them with the notion of milk, which "we buy of the milkman." D. had never seen a cow milked in all her girlhood.

(3). *The four psychical situations of Margaret.* Gradually I became aware, from utterances casually made by both S. M. and M., that M. was supposed to be capable of being in any one of several subliminal states, when either R. D. or S. D. was "out," and that these alterations had bearings upon the whole intercognitive scheme. On May 11, 1915, S. M. spontaneously—except that she was probably aware that I was puzzled by some of the terms employed—made a statement upon the subject, speaking deliberately but unhesitatingly, in tones of calm assurance. When R. D. is *out*, said she, M. is not *away* but is *in* simply, and she may be either *watching* or *sleeping*. When S. D. is *out*, M. is not *in* but *away*, and then also may be *watching* or *sleeping*. When M. is simply *in*, she is not *resting*; when she is *away*, she is *resting*, whether *watching* or *sleeping*; and *sleeping* indicates a nearer approach to rest than *watching*.

This may be put in the form of a diagram.




Figure I.

On September 16, I asked S. M. to explain a little more clearly the difference between *in* and *away*. She answered without taking time for reflection, without hesitation, and with an air of calm authority. To a considerable extent the following was her language, and I am confident that it correctly conveys her meaning.

"M. *in* and *watching* carries on independent and conscious mental activity, concomitantly with the main current under control of the personality which is out.

"M. *in* and *sleeping* carries on independent but unconscious mental activity, concomitantly with the main current, as stated.

M. *away* and *watching* carries on no *independent* mental activity, but passively follows the thought of the personality which is out.

"M. *away* and *sleeping* carries on no mental activity whatever, independent or otherwise, but is for the time being as if non-existent.

"During the period from S. D.'s entry into the case until she began to disappear, M. was *in* when R. D. was out, *away* when S. D. was out. Only since S. D. began her decadence has M. commenced to be *away* when R. D. is supraliminal, and this tendency is increasing. In the days of S. D.'s prime

"When R. D. was out and *awake* M. was
usually *watching*
sometimes *sleeping*

"When R. D. was out, *asleep*, M. was always *watching*.
But now

"When R. D. is out, *awake*, M. is watching decreasingly
 sleeping increasingly
 When R. D. is out, *asleep*, M. is watching decreasingly
 sleeping increasingly"

On September 25, S. M. informed me that M. had ceased to be in the subliminal state known as "in and sleeping," that now, when sleeping in the technical sense she is always "away." I pressed her for a still clearer description of what is meant by *in* and *away*, and this was her reply. "Well, it is like this. Suppose R. D. were awake, looking at a street parade. If M. were *in* and *watching*, she would see what R. D. saw, and have her own opinions about it, and also see R. D.'s thoughts. But if M. were *away*, *watching*, she would only follow R. D.'s thoughts. Do you see?" I assented, and asked her to state the facts when R. D. is asleep. "When R. D. is asleep, and M. is *in* and *watching*, she sees R. D.'s dreams and thoughts. When S. D. used to be asleep and M. was *away*, *watching* she likewise saw S. D.'s thoughts, but from away off, hazy."

(4) *The facts of intercognition in the Doris case illustrated.* The accompanying diagram rudely represents the




Figure II

insight that each of the lower personalities (excepting S. R. D., whose relation to two of the group, R. D. and S. D., was not one of cognition but only of transmission) had into the thoughts of the others, when R. D. was out. The positions assigned are purely arbitrary and schematic, and have no relevance to their relative rank or alleged positions in the brain. The diagram is probably self-explanatory. When R. D. was out she looked out on the external world and had direct knowledge of it. S. D., from her subliminal position, was able to possess herself of R. D.'s thoughts and impressions. Still farther down, M. was mistress not only of R. D.'s thoughts and impressions, but also of whatever subliminal thoughts were peculiar to S. D. And S. M. knew the thoughts of all three, her own unknown to all the rest. But this diagram does not at all represent the mechanism of the transmission of thought from one to another, which will be attempted a little farther on. For the present confining attention to the bare fact of knowledge possessed by the several personalities of the thoughts of other members of the group, Figure III represents the situation when




Figure III

S. D. was out. The symbolical eyes are not repeated in this diagram, but after inspecting the former one the reader will hardly be at a loss to understand it. Here S. D. had the only direct inspection of the external world, and indulged in her own paramount thinking. Both the images of

external things and S. D.'s thoughts were perceived by M. when she was subliminally watching. S. M. in like manner possessed herself of the imagery and thoughts of S. D. and also of the thoughts of M. In the meantime R. D. (until the curative period had somewhat advanced, when she also began to be increasingly active when underneath) was cut off from the system, or if she had any consciousness it was not known to any of the others.




Figure IV

Figure IV diagrams the situation when M. was the one to be out. Now she, in her turn, saw the external world directly. S. M. saw in her mind what M. saw, and also her thoughts. R. D. and S. D. were isolated, and so far as is known mentally inactive.

(5) *Sleeping Margaret on the mechanics of intercognition.* For a statement of the psychical mechanics involved, we are indebted to S. M. I know no way of testing such a statement experimentally. At best evidence so derived could be no more than circumstantial. Yet it is difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the statement was invented, for (1) it is perfectly articulated and consistent, though complicated enough to require some study for its understanding; (2) it is hardly likely that the scheme would be slowly concocted prior to any notice that I was curious on the subject and would question regarding it, and too, without spontaneously broaching it—this on general grounds, and because it was unlike S. M. to do so; (3) the most com-

plete and detailed statement was the one given after the first question which I ever put upon the subject, and it would seem well-nigh miraculous for her to have outlined a scheme so complicated and symmetrical upon the spur of the moment, not only without any initial pause but without any subsequent hesitation whatever; (4) the subject was not again alluded to by me, purposely, until many weeks had passed, and then was rehearsed in somewhat different language, indeed, but without substantial divergence; (5) S. M.'s still subsequent utterances on the subject, though fragmentary, were always consistent; (6) many naïve remarks of M., though she was ignorant of S. M.'s existence, and therefore of her place in the scheme and of her testimony, showed that she was conscious, in the days of S. D.'s prime, that the latter stood between her and R. D. and transmitted her thoughts; (7) bearing in mind that as more fully stated in another place, intercognition in this case seems to have come about not by mnemonic channels by those of co-conscious insight, and also that double consciousness on the part of different pairs in the group was actually proved in a multitude of cases and triple consciousness indicated in a few,—it seems hardly possible to give a valid reason why the law of intercognition should not have operated according to the formula stated by S. M. as well as by any other.

It was on June 7, 1911, that S. M. made her first statement in regard to the transmission of thoughts and the products of perception from one personality to another. The statement was made in response to some questions put by me without notice, and its several parts followed each other without the taking of time for deliberation, without hesitation at any point, and with the calm, assured manner of a college professor rehearsing to a class matter with which he is thoroughly familiar. Asked when she reasoned it out, she answered that she did not reason it out, but simply told what she saw. The verbiage I give is very nearly verbatim, there is not a word in it that she did not employ, and not a phrase which is not substantially as she uttered it, except that I have changed the first person to the third. It should be carefully noted, since S. M. refers both

to existing and past situations, that the statement was made before S. D. had disappeared but when she had declined to mental infancy.

"(1) When R. D. is out and awake, and M. is not watching, S. M. sees through R. D.'s eyes and gets the reflection of all her thoughts directly. Here S. M. watches R. D.

(2) When R. D. is out and awake, and M. is watching, S. M. sees in M.'s mind what M. sees through R. D.'s eyes, and gets the reflection of R. D.'s thoughts re-reflected from M. Here S. M. watches M.

(3) When R. D. is out and asleep, and M. is not watching, S. M. gets her thoughts reflected directly. Here S. M. watches R. D.

(4) When R. D. is out and asleep, and M. is watching, S. M. gets R. D.'s thoughts re-reflected from M. Here S. M. watches M.

(5) When M. is out and awake, S. M. sees through her eyes, and receives the reflection of her thoughts. Here S. M. watches M.

(6) When M. is out and asleep, S. M. sees through her eyes, and receives the reflection of her thoughts. Here S. M. watches M. [By "sees through her eyes" in this case S. M. meant that she saw the imagery of M.'s imagining—not meaning dreams, for M. did not dream.]

S. M. hears what is said in all the above cases, but in those where R. D. is out, and M. is between them, she hears what R. D. hears and says only through M., as in the case of seeing.

After the coming of S. D., as a personality, into the case, and before the beginning of her decline, M. always watched when R. D. was out. She began to sleep only since the cure of the case began. [The word "sleep" is not used here in the ordinary sense of the foregoing paragraphs, but in the technical sense of figure 1.] She sleeps, that is, does not watch, when R. D. is out, much more than half the time at this date.

(7) When S. D. was out (that is, in her prime) and awake, M. always watched, and S. M. saw and heard in M.'s mind what M. saw and heard through S. D.'s eyes and

ears, and had reflected from M. what M. received reflected from S. D.'s thoughts.

(8) When S. D. was out and asleep, M. always watched and S. M. got the reflection from M. of what was reflected to M. from S. D.'s thoughts. But now, when S. D. has no *active* thoughts [being mentally an infant].

(9) When S. D. is out and awake, and M. is not watching, now usually the case, S. M. sees through S. D.'s eyes and hears through her ears, but gets no thoughts from her, as she has no *active* ones.

(10) When S. D. is out and awake, and M. is watching, S. M. sees and hears what S. D. sees and hears, through S. M., who sees through S. D.'s eyes and hears through her ears.


(11) When S. D. is out and asleep, M. now never watches, and S. M. is simply conscious that S. D. is there, but cannot be conscious of her thoughts, for she has none."

I here quote from the record made on the 29th of the following December. "Today I again had S. M. recite the relations of the original group of personalities (except S. R. D.) in the transmission of thought. The matter had not been referred to for some time. There was no substantial divergence from her previous testimony, though the wording varied. 'S. D. watched when R. D. was out. There would be three of us watching her, each with thoughts of her own. S. D. watched R. D.'s mind, M. watched S. D.'s thoughts of R. D., and I watched all three. Sometimes we had a disagreement. Sometimes a jealous thought would flit through S. D.'s mind,—she would think for a moment that if R. D. would not come out any more M. might like her (S. D.) as well as R. D. She never tried to hinder R. D.'s coming, though, but always to help, and only a slight thought of the kind would flit through her mind. But M. would see it and get cross with S. D. Then I would feel cross with M. for being cross with S. D., and so the disturbance inside would make R. D. go in. Often then the anxiety of the bunch to have R. D. stay out longer would prevent it." S. M. went on to a more formal statement of the psychical mechanics of transmission, which I took down in almost precisely her own words. "When R. D. was out,—she had not thoughts when she was in [but it should be borne

in mind that she began to have, in the course of the process of reintegration. See Figure VII and its explanation.]—S. D. saw her thoughts directly. M. saw them through S. D. By through I mean as reflected from S. D. There was scarcely any difference in the time of S. D.'s and M.'s getting them. And besides, M. saw S. D.'s own thoughts directly. This was generally the case with M., but there were times when S. D. was so far in that M. got R. D.'s thoughts directly. This was seldom. I don't know why it was. As for me, I saw R. D.'s thoughts as they were reflected by S. D. to M., and from M. to me, also S. D.'s thoughts as reflected by M., and besides I saw M.'s own thoughts directly. This was the case before S. D. went, but after she went I saw, as I do now, R. D.'s thoughts directly. S. D. was a barrier that prevented me from seeing them that way so long as she lasted, but now the barrier is removed.”

(6) *Sleeping Margaret's statement charted and explained.* Of course, the eleven situations specified in the June statement did not comprise the total number possible in the history of the case, including (a) the period when S. D. was in her prime, (b) the period when S. D. was psychically an infant, and (c) the corresponding periods before S. D. came into being and after she was eliminated. That richest in complexity would be the one often briefly occurring in period a, when R. D. was out and awake. It is this situation which is graphically expressed and supposed to be made more intelligible by the diagram numbered V. In it the four consciousnesses are represented by mirrors. Or rather, the four narrow oblongs stand for four consciousnesses, acting in certain respects like mirrors, in that, so to speak, they “reflect” thoughts; but being actually consciousnesses and not mirrors each has the power to originate thoughts of its own.


But according to S. M., when S. D., who somehow acted as a “barrier” between her and R. D., disappeared, she was able again, as she was before S. D. came into being, to view R. D.'s thoughts directly. But she still had the alternative of seeing R. D.'s mental picture of the external world, and her thoughts, reflected in the mirror of M.'s consciousness. See Figure VI.



Explanation. R. D., S. D., M. and S. M. represented as mirrors. a. An object of the external world. a-b. Image of an object entering the R. D. consciousness. b-c. Image of object (or any thought of R. D.) going to S. D. consciousness, being seen by S. D. directly. c-d. Same reflected from S. D.'s to M.'s consciousness. d-e. Same re-reflected to S. M.'s consciousness. f. Thought originating in the consciousness of S. D. f-g. Same transmitted direct to M. g-h. Same reflected from M.'s consciousness to S. M.'s. i. Thought originating in consciousness of M. i-h. Same seen directly by S. M. in consciousness of M. k. Thought originating in consciousness of S. M.

It should be borne in mind that the diagram is of only one relative situation of the group, *i.e.*, when R. D. was the one out; and when M. was in her active subliminal state, known as "watching." To show the mechanics of the situation, when M. was "sleeping" in the technical sense the lines would have to be changed, the changes depending on whether M was "in and sleeping" or "away and sleeping."

Furthermore, it appears that the lower personalities did not always appropriate all the several currents of thoughts, so to speak, of which they were potentially capable. For example, S. D. might be so occupied with thoughts of her own as not to notice the image in R. D.'s consciousness of what the latter was looking upon. Or M. might be so interested in the reflected image of what R. D. saw as not to take note of the thoughts of S. D. regarding it. Or, S. M., for one reason or another might not pay attention to d-e, or g-h, or i-j, or d-e plus g-h, or d-e plus i-j, or g-h plus i-j, or d-e plus g-h plus i-j, as the case might be. That is, all the possibilities of concentration or distribution of attention which lie in the ordinary person inhered in the personalities.



(7) *Alterations in the process of intercognition in consequence of Margaret's decline.* Changes were yet to come; the transmission of thoughts from R. D. to M. was to become clogged and irregular. But it never ceased sufficiently to justify removing the perpendicular line from Figure VI. The alterations in manner and periodicity were due to two reasons, M.'s decadence in psychical energy, and R. D.'s growth in the same which had already brought the beginnings of that perceptible mental activity in R. D. while occupying a subliminal position which was to increase until M.'s utter elimination. Here I copy from the record of July 21, 1913, my summary of a statement made by S. M., in which the changes referred to were in part outlined. At this time M. was in her next to the last stage, that marked "e" in Figure VII. The diagram itself is compiled from many statements by S. M., naïve utterances by M., and numberless convincing observations of the precise moments at which M. appeared to get her knowledge of the thoughts of R. D.

On the date mentioned I asked S. M. if she could explain the reasons for the changes which had gradually taken place in the mechanism of M.'s learning the thoughts and doings of R. D. "S. M. without hesitation began to expound the reasons, and while her verbiage was somewhat obscure, I understood her meaning to be about as follows: In the old days, when M. was co-conscious subliminally all the time that R. D. was out, she subtracted so much

from R. D.'s conscious life. That is, the effect was to make R. D.'s consciousness dimmer, as it were, more or less troubled and confused, in degree corresponding to the extent to which M. was interested in what was going on in R. D.'s mind, and herself active. Then, as M. gradually ceased to be co-conscious while R. D. was out, the latter became so much the more clear and free in her mentality, more and more sole proprietor of her conscious life. Then M. began, during her own periods of being out, to become aware of R. D.'s thoughts for a short time after the latter had gone beneath the threshold, that is, R. D. was beginning to encroach upon M.'s consciousness while the latter was out, being for a little while 'near the surface,' as though reluctant to go down. Now M. was the one to have her consciousness shaved thinner, so to speak. As time went on, the period during which R. D. after giving place to M. remained near the surface lengthened, that is, she left less and less of M.'s time entirely to her. At this hour, the latter portion of a long stay of M., few or none of R. D.'s thoughts have been perceived by her, showing that R. D. has sunk lower down. As in the days of M.'s greatest development it was a bad state of things that M. should be vigorously thinking underneath during R. D.'s conscious periods, so it is now a good thing that R. D. should be thinking underneath during M.'s periods out." The following diagram, with its explanation, will make the successive shifts in the process of M.'s obtaining the thoughts of R. D. easier to follow.




DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATING STAGES OF DEVOLUTION
IN THE PROCESS OF THE PASSAGE OF THOUGHTS FROM
R.D. TO M. **Figure VII**

Explanation. The thick straight line at the top stands for the consciousness of R. D., supraliminal. The wavy lines represent thoughts in the consciousness of M derived from R. D., that is, M's knowledge of what R. D. thought when she was out. The streams of consciousness are supposed to travel from left to right. The unbroken and broken lines a, b, c, d, e, f, stand for successive stages in the devolution of M's power to discern the thoughts of R. D. Each in turn is to be considered in relation with the top line representing the supraliminal consciousness of R. D. At the point that this line ceases R. D. has become subliminal, and M has "come out" or become supraliminal. The lines a, b and c being under the R. D. line, mean that at these stages M, being subliminal, saw R. D.'s thoughts during their first occurrence in the mind of supraliminal R. D. The lines d, e and f, being beyond the R. D. line, mean that at these stages M., while supraliminal, saw the thoughts of R. D.'s previous supraliminal period as they were being "reviewed" in R. D.'s subliminal mind. Of course there were no sudden transitions from one stage to another, but these shaded into each other.

Stage a. That in which the case was found in January, 1911, had been for many years, and continued to be until the middle of May. M, subliminal, had the power to "watch", i.e., see the thoughts of R. D., supraliminal, continuously.

Stage b. This began about the middle of May, 1911. M lost the power to watch continuously. Hiatuses began to occur, corresponding to the periods when R. D. was freshest in vigor and happiest in spirits.

Stage c. M. had almost lost her power to watch, but came near the surface when R. D. was exhausted with maintaining her synthesis, and for a few minutes before this dissolved was able to gather knowledge regarding such of the previous day's experiences and thoughts, usually the more striking and vivid, as passed in review in R. D.'s lower consciousness. This stage was in progress in August, 1911.

Stage d. This began in January, 1912. M had now ceased to gather thoughts from R. D. a few minutes before the latter went, but did so during the first few minutes after she herself had become supraliminal, and while R. D. was rapidly "going down." R. D. at this stage had become the dominant personal factor, and her thoughts were, so to speak, pushed up into M.'s consciousness by her own energy.

Stage e. Later R. D. seemed to go down more slowly, and at same date M. would for half an hour occasionally get sight of happenings and impressions of the day reviewing in the consciousness of the now more psychically abounding R. D. After the gradually lengthening period during which this process continued, R. D. would seem to have descended to such a depth that M saw nothing more. This stage was in its beginnings in May, 1912.

Stage f. By December, 1913, it was found that the period following the departure of R. D. during which M. glimpsed the thoughts of the former was shortening, and that the glimpses were few and further between. This was not due to any reversal of the process as far as R. D. was concerned, for she lingered nearer the surface than ever before, but was owing to growing decay in the M. complex. She was failing in her power to perceive what was being pushed up more continuously than hitherto, and even doubted, at times, the reality of what she did perceive. As she approached her extinguishment in April, 1914, she had been for more than two years unable when "in" to exercise co-consciousness with R. D. "out," and now, when herself out, seldom gleaned more than a stray glance into the consciousness of the subliminal R. D.

MISCELLANEOUS PSYCHICAL PHENOMENA

A selection of phenomena of various types will here be made by way of the most summary mention.

(i) *Double and Multiple Consciousness.* Exhibitions of co-consciousness in which S. M., and M. asleep shared

were seen daily, up to nearly the end, in great variety. A code was devised by which, while M. was awake, S. M. would signal affirmative and negative responses to my queries by movements of the feet, the former being entirely ignorant of what was going on. There were likewise numerous demonstrations of co-consciousness according to the following combinations; M. + S. D., M. + R. D. and S. M. + R. D., besides claims and strong appearances of co-consciousness on the part of S. M. + M. + S. D. and even S. M. + M. + S. D. + R. D.

(2) "*Jolting*." On a number of occasions when M. had been for some time fractious or uneasy, S. M. administered discipline in severe fashion, by producing in the consciousness of M. the hallucination of receiving a heavy blow upon the forehead. M. always thought that I had struck her and her previous mood would be changed to be sure, but hardly, except later, for a better. For awhile she would be in deadly fear of me, and no assurances or denials availed anything. As M. declined in psychical energy the price that she had to pay in fear for a later favorable mood, became excessive. At length S. M. announced that she would no longer "give Margaret a jolt," and this obscure but striking phenomenon ceased.

(3) "*Pulling in*." Late in the case, when M. was becoming a small child in mentality, she "came out" in church, fixed her eyes upon me and was about to sing out "O, you papa!", when S. M. according to her testimony, by a supreme effort "pulled in" M., that is, dragged her unwilling into the depths, causing R. D. to resume her place at the helm instanter. Later M. with eyes like saucers related, "Papa, there's another S. D., there's another S. D! there must be, 'cause I was yanked in just the way I used to yank in S. D." Thus M., who had never known anything about S. M., announced her strong suspicion, never afterward entirely quieted, that another personality existed which could do to her what she herself had so often done to a former personality. Twice more, in emergencies, S. M. was called upon to perform the feat, and not only did she declare that it required a great expenditure of energy but the period following each instance abundantly

proved the assertion.

(4) *Reappearances of former states of personalities.*

According to S. M. and M., on several occasions following the advent and partial education of S. D. there were brief appearances of a S. D. corresponding with what she had been upon her first creation, speechless and uncomprehending. This state was later formally named S. D. a. On April 5, 1911, there twice appeared a state of S. D. chronologically corresponding with what she had been during the previous October, her memories and all that entered into her psychical make-up of that date being reproduced in a very dramatic manner, seeing that the current S. D. was much declined from her former estate. This second reproduction, never seen after April 5, was named S. D. b. Later on the same day, but also on a number of subsequent days, a state of Margaret, not awake but asleep, appeared, which precisely coincided with a M. asleep of the previous January including the peculiar delusions, the memories, and all the marks of that period intact. This was named M-asleep x and was specially fraught with danger. That is, its tendency to take on distinctive peculiarities, to cohere, persist and recur, rendered it liable utterly to split off and set up as a new personality, but by care the casualty was avoided.

(5) "*Ducking under.*" This quasi-technical term was employed by M. for an act by which she could, while awake, voluntarily relinquish control when there was no other personality prepared to take her place at the helm. Usually it was after unfavorable conditions preventing the return of R. D. had prevailed for some time that M., becoming weary and disgusted, "ducked under." But more than once she did so simply from caprice or to show me that she could do it. While the state lasted the body lay like a log except for slight breathing, and if it lasted as long as ten minutes cataleptic rigidity gradually supervened.

(6) *The "going away" of Sleeping Margaret.* Infrequently in the first stage of observation and with growing frequency thereafter S. M. underwent some change in relation to the organism which she declared was an actual leaving of the body. I do not contend for this, but the actuality of some profound inner displacement at these

periods was very strongly indicated. For example, when S. M. first "went away" at a season when R. D. was conscious and awake, the latter invariably became nervous and restless, and experienced a sensation of loneliness or emptiness, as though something or someone were missing. Though the proportion of time during which she was "away" increased as the cure proceeded, the "going" did not seem to depend upon the psychical dynamics, but upon the will of S. M. At last she was to be traced as present only a few minutes a day as a rule, but still the attempts to bring these obscure but significant alterations under the operation of mechanical causes, or anything else than true volition, were fruitless.

(7) *Hyperesthesia?* Margaret, when asleep only, had the power of reading words and parts of sentences by the slightest momentary contact of her fingers with my lips. Whether the words at the moment of this gossamer-touch were spoken, whispered, or only shaped quickly with absolutely no conscious emission of breath, seemed to make no difference.

(8) *Telepathy?* There were many instances, some of them of a complicated nature, of the acquirement by M. of information, all normal doors to which seemed closed. She claimed to derive it from my mind by gazing into my eyes while I was unaware. Never once did she divulge her discoveries and betray any errors. Readers will feel the misgivings and entertain the theories which would no doubt be mine, were one of them the observer and recorder and I the reader. The facts remain and are set forth in the extended Record to be published.

THE DYING OF SICK DORIS, BY PROCESS OF ABSORPTION

When on March 2, 1911, the girl was taken from the life marked by paternal cruelty, routine task work, care and responsibility, into a home of comparative comfort and beauty, where all the conditions of her existence were suddenly reversed, the first blow against the integrity of the Sick Doris complex was struck. During the previous five years, R. D. had come only by flashes while alone in her

room. M. had danced in and out of control, daily, sometimes helping and sometimes hindering, but managing in spite of all to have a pretty good time. It was S. D. who bore the brunt of troubles and who walked the treadmill of routine. Within a few days after the removal, S. D. began to undergo declension, coincident with R. D.'s rapidly increasing appearances and growth of psychical energy. Again, S. D. was steadily restrained from doing embroidery or any other species of needlework. But in such work *her* life had largely consisted, and so a second blow to her being was struck. Her faculties began to wander like the ghost of Hamlet's father. The memories of S. D. began to disappear, singly and in groups, and the same coincidentally to emerge in the consciousness of R. D. There is not room here for any references to the numberless observations, experiments and precautions which marked the therapeutic process to the end. Little by little, yet rapidly, S. D. faded. She took her last walk. Recognizing that she was doomed, she wrote her last letter to Margaret—containing both parting advice and testamentary disposition of her belongings. She lost recognition of Mrs. Prince and myself, forgot all but a little of her old life, came to feel herself a person kept prisoner for some mysterious purpose. Twice when I dressed myself in certain garments to which she had formerly been accustomed, she knew me, and scenes of dramatic pathos ensued, wherein she confided to me the perplexities of her now so darkened state. Three months had not passed since the removal, when S. D. sank into mental infancy, coming only a few minutes at a time, having only a small circle of infantile ideas and prattling speeches remaining, with little baby-plays and gurgling laughter. She could not now walk or stand or hold her head upright, she did not know that her hands were a part of herself, and moved them only automatically. Her visual field had been narrowing and it now shortened to an ultimate fourteen inches, beyond which I was out of the world to her and my words addressed to her were but "noises." In the meantime, of course, M. was making her childish but still competent appearances, and R. D. was gaining in frequency and length of periods, in scope of psychical powers,

and in many interesting ways the mile posts of which are set up in the Record. In this article can be given only a few touches from what was really a marvellous panorama of shifting psychological phenomena. On June 28, 1911, S. D. made her last appearance. Immediately after there was resumption of catamenia, which had been broken off by S. D.'s first advent, and absent throughout the five years of her career. The end of S. R. D., April 15, 1912, is sufficiently noted on page 89.



"SICK DORIS" AFTER SHE HAD REACHED MENTAL INFANCY, PLAYING ONE OF HER FAVORITE GAMES, WHICH CONSISTED IN THE RAPID APPROACH OF MY FACE TOWARDS HERS, AND ITS RAPID WITHDRAWAL. THIS AT ONCE DELIGHTED AND STARTLED HER. SHE WOULD CRY "DO IT AGAIN," BUT AT THE SAME TIME PUT UP HER HAND IN THE PECULIARLY INFANTILE DEFENSIVE FASHION HERE SHOWN.

THE GRADUAL EXPULSION OF MARGARET

Margaret, who had been a factor for nineteen years when the case was taken in hand, made a much slower exit.

Again, while some of her sensory losses worked corresponding gains of aesthesia in R. D., no lost memories of hers ever emerged in the primary consciousness, where they are represented by hiatuses still. Nor did this decadence, other than a sort of reduction to discipline, visibly begin until S. D. had disappeared from the case. Almost immediately thereafter her memories began to diminish, a process which was to continue by definable stages through the three years yet to be allotted her. Never psychically more than ten years old, M. like S. D., grew younger, but with differences. S. D. retreated into an infancy which was never hers, since the so-called "infancy" of her beginnings five years before, had been that of knowledge, not of intellect; but M. was to retrace the steps of her historical development, not indeed to infancy but to about her period when R. D. was five years old. As the months went on M. took up old mannerisms and her thoughts, locution and pronunciation became more and more juvenile. The time came when Teutonisms in pronunciation and construction began to appear, representing the period when in R. D.'s sixth year, M. picked up German tricks of speech, which she discarded on going to school a year later. Then these peculiarities disappeared. She had passed through this stratum of experience and become five again. There were changes in the character of her laughing, which S. M. pronounced to be similar returns to former manners.

M. in turn suffered contraction of the visual field, first in breadth and later in depth, until at length she saw as though within a hollow cone of but a few inches extreme diameter and but fourteen inches long. Suddenly she became blind, and continued so at every appearance of hers during the many months before her end. Last of all it became necessary to interpose a shade between M.'s eyes and the light, or else, a few moments after she put in an appearance, her eyes stung and slender streams of water ran down her cheeks. Even in her blindness she had the power to discern infallibly and at a distance, the expression of my face, though often laughably and sometimes lamentably she was betrayed in regard to the position of objects.

In the meantime her various activities decayed and

dropped out; in turn she ceased to walk abroad, to understand her reading, to sing, to read at all, to comprehend any but certain features in pictures, to make out the meaning of pictures at all, to write, to dictate letters, etc., etc. During her last attempts to write, and afterwards to dictate, a short note, she would fall over asleep from sheer exhaustion. Of course it will be understood that the primary personality was all the while gaining in vigor, making the transitions from one state to another the more striking. On April 19, 1914, M. came in the evening, uttered a few simple, amiable remarks, laughed happily and went to sleep. There was nothing seeming to differentiate this appearance from others of the period, but she was never seen again. As an alternating personality, Margaret had followed Sick Doris and Sleeping Real Doris. For a few months there occasionally appeared indications that M. existed subliminally, but these in turn died out.

CONTINUITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS RESTORED

Still S. M. converses a few minutes in the evening, as a rule, still she professes to come occasionally for a brief observation at other times, while sometimes she puts in no appearance for days. The program takes place generally by pre-arrangement, and has the appearance of depending upon volition exclusively. On the other hand there can be no question that the primary personality is still on deck though slumbering, while S. M. is speaking,—in other words, S. M. does not interrupt the continuity of R. D.'s consciousness as S. D., M. and S. R. D. formerly had done. The Real Doris—the primary personality—has suffered no lapse since April 19, 1914. The physiologist would find nothing now to suggest the physical ills suffered by Sick Doris in 1911. The psychologist would never suspect that the "bright, happy, normal appearing girl, with normal attitude toward life, now so filled with interest for her" was, but a few years ago, a bewildering bundle of disintegrations. If told about the infinitesimal S. M. factor still persisting, he might be given technical pause, but aside from that, he would pronounce her in a high degree of

nervous and mental health. The language last quoted above is part of that employed by Dr. W. K. Walker, Professor of psychiatry in the University of Pittsburgh, after an examination into Doris's condition toward the close of 1914. His testimony is the more weighty in that he was personally familiar with her condition when the prospect of her ever becoming normal was remote indeed. Every succeeding month has only further confirmed the stability and permanence of her resurrected life.



"SLEEPING MARGARET." CHARACTERISTIC EXPRESSION WHEN SHE WAS NOT SMILING.

ABNORMAL MENTAL STATES IN CHILDREN DURING CONVALESCENCE FROM ACUTE ILLNESS WITH REPORT OF A CASE

BY J. G. WILSON, ASST. SURGEON U. S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

IN dealing with children in the contagious Disease Hospital at the Immigrant Station at Ellis Island I have been impressed with the marked stupidity which they often exhibit during convalescence from measles and scarlet fever. Sometimes a child will sit in a perfectly listless way in its bed or crib for many days after its temperature has reached the normal and when the most careful physical examination will fail to reveal adequate cause for the mental apathy. Frank manifestations of hysteria in such cases are rare. Motor and sensory disturbances seldom occur without a demonstrable physical cause.

Moreover these apathetic children usually eat well and their sleep is not disturbed. The listlessness and mental stupidity may coexist with an improving metabolism as witnessed by a gain in weight and a general enhancing of the physical well being of the patient. The abnormality consists chiefly in the supreme indifference which the child exhibits to his surroundings. The average immigrant child convalescent from one of the acute contagious diseases is hard to keep in bed. He desires to play with his fellows and even though he may not understand the language of the other children he is soon quarrelling, playing, and trying to talk with them in the usual normal child fashion. But the type of which I speak exhibits just the opposite characteristics. Such a child refuses to have any thing at all to do with the other children. He will not actively resist advances which they make towards him but he will in no way reciprocate. He will often be considered feeble-minded by both nurses and doctors, because of his marked lack of attention, his refusal to answer questions, and his general

air of stupidity. Sometimes this shut-in attitude will persist for many days and then suddenly change so that a child who has been utterly irresponsible one day, will be found almost normal the day following. Occasionally it happens that this dazed stupid state cannot be changed even by the presence of an own brother or sister in the same ward. I recall an Italian child, who for nearly two weeks after the temperature had reached normal following an uncomplicated recovery from measles sat absolutely listless in his bed, and refused to answer a single question of his little brother who was convalescing from the same disease in an adjoining bed. He would not notice him at all when he approached his bedside and even the presence of his mother when she came to visit him failed to elicit any signs of recognition or interest. We were seriously considering certifying the child as feeble-minded when one day the nurse informed me that she had seen signs of awakening intelligence and that he was beginning to play with the other children. A few days after that there was absolutely nothing abnormal about his reaction to the environment. He talked and laughed in a normal way and passed the Binet tests for his age without difficulty. This patient presented an exaggerated example of a mental state which is so common in our wards as to excite but little comment, but the following case is so entirely unique that I shall report it in some detail in the hope that it may throw a little light into the dark corners of child-psychology.

G. A.—Italian—4 years old—female—admitted September 24, 1915 suffering from whooping cough of a very severe type. In a few days this became complicated with bronchopneumonia which lasted with periods of improvement and subsequent relapses until October 25, when convalescence was well established. The temperature which had previously ranged from slightly above normal to over 104° for almost a month now persistently remained below 99.5° for one week, when it suddenly shot up to 103.8° . This sudden rise was due to an acute otitis media. Paracentesis was done and the temperature fell to 100° the next day. Here it remained for several days. There was evi-

dence of mastoid involvement and consent for operation was obtained. However the symptoms of mastoid involvement subsided and eventually a complete recovery of the ear condition took place. The discharge from the ear practically ceased in about two weeks, but at the end of that time a double external otitis ensued which was severe enough to almost occlude both external auditory canals. This also yielded to local treatment and by the 25th of November two months after admission to hospital the temperature was normal and no signs of ear trouble or whooping cough remained. Five days later she was discharged from the hospital as recovered. Such in brief is the outline of the physical ailments of the patient.



NORMAL ATTITUDE VOLUNTARILY ASSUMED BY CHILD.

The mental symptoms were first noticed November 8, one week after the onset of the acute ear trouble and the paracentesis. On this date the nurse called my attention to the fact that the child seemed to "stay put" in whatever position she was placed for an unusually long time, and that she would even maintain an uncomfortable attitude. Thereupon I examined the patient with the view of determining the truth of the nurse's assertion and found that she had under-rather than overstated the degree of abnormal conduct. The following are extracts from my notes of the case



ARMS AND LEGS WERE PLACED IN THIS POSITION AND THE ATTITUDE MAINTAINED FOR SEVERAL MINUTES, WHEN THEY DROPPED SLOWLY THROUGH FATIGUE.



THE MOUTH WAS OPENED AND LIMBS PLACED IN THIS POSITION. THE POSITION WAS MAINTAINED SEVERAL MINUTES.

November 8. Child will answer questions by a nod of the head and obey a simple command such as, put out your tongue, but she appears stupid. She will maintain any position of the arms or legs in which I place them in a manner suggestive if not absolutely typical of catatonic rigidity. The nurse says that she plays with her toys when alone but that the moment one comes into the room she will immediately cease playing, and crawl under the bedclothes and cover up her head. The child has an internal squint and widely dilated pupils. The squint has been present ever since admission. The dilated pupils have not been noted before.

November 9. The incision in the ear drum made on November 7, appears inadequate for good drainage. There is a pulsating fluid behind the drum. Incision enlarged upwards. Mastoid not involved so far as I am able to determine. The other ear shows an old perforation with a slight discharge. Syringing the ears with hot and cold water gives no nystagmus. Catatonic postures the same as yesterday.

November 9. Midnight. The patient was found sleeping at this hour. I placed the right arm in a raised and awkward position. It fell at once. I replaced it and the patient, partly aroused, maintained the position the same as during the day when in the waking state. She did not entirely wake up, and even after apparently falling soundly asleep again she maintained the position, until I replaced the arm by her side.

November 10. Physical examination by self and Dr. Kemp. Knee jerks exaggerated. Epigastric reflexes very active. No areas of anaesthesia. Possibly slightly hyperesthetic over most of the body. Gait normal. No tremors. Eye grounds showed nothing particularly abnormal. Blood vessels normal in appearance; no tortuosity, over extension, nor pulsation. Nerve head normal in color and appearance. No choking or cupping. Slightly more pigment around edge of disk than normal. No visual abnormality noted with the ophthalmoscope. Still maintains the most awkward positions in which it is possible to place her. Appears absolutely indifferent to her surroundings so long as we are

in the room. When we go out she will continue to stay in the position in which we place her for several minutes. Finally, however, she will let her arms drop and go to playing with her dolls.

November 11. Blood examination by Dr. Belue as follows: Hb 70% W. B. C. 8800 R. B. C. 3.392.000 Wassermann negative. Urine free from albumin.

November 12. 6 P. M. When half asleep the child still maintains arm in whatever position placed, but when sound asleep she does not do this except as follows: at first the arm drops, but on being half aroused by raising her arm again she maintains this position. Then as she drops off to sleep again she still maintains the position till the arm falls slowly by gravity, apparently through fatigue.

November 13. The widely dilated pupils noted for many days past are now much smaller and approximate the normal.



IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN THIS ATTITUDE, SLIGHT SUPPORT WAS REQUIRED. NOTE HOW LEFT HAND RESTS ON CHAIR.

November 17. Child is much better physically, except for an external otitis which still persists. She still maintains any abnormal posture in which placed and is quiet and shut in. She plays normally when alone. She evidently watches us out of the corner of an eye when we place her in the awkward attitudes because now she will not keep them quite so long when we leave the room, but suddenly and deliberately resumes a normal attitude and immediately goes to playing when she is quite sure she is not watched.

November 28. Examined this morning by Dr. Loughran. He finds exaggerated reflexes but is unable to elicit any other abnormality of the nervous system. The supreme indifference of the child is what most strikes attention. This indifference is however rapidly growing less. There is beginning to creep in a little suggestion of resentment in the expression of the face when placed in the awkward attitudes, but there is not the slightest sign of *negativism*. Child is quiet but will answer questions and obey commands. She will not however raise her hands or arms to the awkward positions on request as she would do when this symptom was first noted. If we place her in the attitudes she will keep them till we are well out of sight when she takes her arms down with a sudden movement and goes to her playthings.

November 29. Child discharged from hospital. With the exception of the squint noted on admission, her physical ailments have entirely disappeared and the consensus of opinion of all who have seen her is that she has no mental condition which one can definitely label. The eccentricities of action are rapidly growing less and she gives the impression of one who has been simulating hysteria.

Search of the literature has failed to find any case which conforms to the type exhibited by this four year old Italian child. Koplik in his Diseases of Children mentions a state of catatonia sometimes found in children after acute illness and gives an illustration which resembles somewhat the photographs of my case, but the description is entirely different and I hardly think it can in any way apply. I have found that many immigrant children especially among the Italians will maintain awkward positions in which they are placed in a rather automatic manner, but they do it with an air of resentment, or curiosity, or with manifestation of fear and never with the supreme indifference which this child showed.

REVIEWS

PATHOLOGICAL LYING, ACCUSATION, AND SWINDLING. A STUDY IN FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY. By William Healy, A. B., M. D., Director, Psychopathic Institute, Juvenile Court, Chicago; Associate Professor Nervous and Mental Diseases, Chicago Polyclinic; Author of "*The Individual Delinquent*"; and Mary Tenney Healy, B. L. Boston, Little, Brown Co., 1915. Price, \$2.50, net. Pages, X + 286.

Having seen a typical case of pathological lying only a few hours ago, I am surely in the proper mood to review this work, on my second reading.

This is number one of the Criminal Science Monograph Series supplement to the Journal of The American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, the committee of publication being Robert H. Gault, of Northwestern University, the Editor of the Journal, Frederic B. Crossley, of Northwestern University, and James W. Garner, of the University of Illinois.

The work is dedicated by the authors to that excellent and worthy Judge of the Juvenile Court of Chicago, Merritt W. Pinckney.

The scope of the work and its plan is as follows: introduction, previous studies, cases of pathological lying and swindling, cases of pathological accusation, cases of pathological lying in borderline mental states, and conclusions.

A general abstract of the book will be here presented.

Pathological lying is defined as a "falsification entirely disproportionate to any discernible end in view, engaged in by a person who, at the time of observation, cannot definitely be declared insane, feeble-minded or epileptic. Such lying rarely, if ever, centers about a single event; although exhibited in very occasional cases for a short time, it manifests itself most frequently by far over a period of years, or even a life time. It represents a trait rather than an episode." Pathological accusation is false accusation indulged in apart from any obvious purpose. Swindling is but a natural evolution of the general tendency toward pathological lying.

Out of one thousand young repeated offenders carefully studied, only eight to ten were genuine cases of pathological lying according to the above definition, while five engaged in pathological false accusations without pronounced tendency toward other kinds of lying. The authors exclude from their study every case of doubtful nature and consider only the pure, positive cases, according to the definition offered.

They state it is practically impossible to find a case in which pathological lying is the only delinquency of the individual.

Chapter II gives a review of previous studies of Delbrueck, who coined the new term *pseudologia phantastica*, showed the existence of the combination of delusions or false memories with pathological lying in some cases, and the danger to the family and society of such individuals; of Koeppen, who showed that "the pathological lie is active in character, a whole sequence of experiences is fabricated and the products of fancy brought forward. . . . the liar is no longer free, he has ceased to be master of his own lies, the lie has won power over him, it has the worth of real experience." In the final stage the pathological lie cannot be differentiated from delusion. "All pathological liars have a purpose, *i.e.*, to decorate their own person, to tell something interesting, and an ego motive is always present. They all lie about something they wish to possess." Hysterics, alcoholics, imbeciles and degenerates are apt to resort to pathological lying, Koeppen says. The views of Risch are next presented. He compares the impulse to literary creation in normal people to the morbid romances and fancies of the pathological liar, "the coercive impulse for self-expression, with an accompanying feeling of desire and dissatisfaction" being present in both. But in the individual with *pseudologia phantastica*, fiction and real life are not separated and there is a desire to play the role of the person depicted. The bent of thought is decidedly egocentric, there is a reduction of the powers of attention and they do not like to remember although it appears that they do not remember their delinquencies; there is a special weakness in judgment in the field of ethical discernment. Risch finds that they have a wide range of ideas, and of interests, better than average perceptions, are fluent, are faulty in conceptions and judgments, their heredity is bad, they show instability and excitability, there is a basis of degeneracy. Fundamental is a lack of self-criticism with an abnormal egocentric trend of thought.

Vogt's views are next given. He finds pathological lying to occur in persons with lively imaginations and inclined to auto-suggestion, and calls it a wish psychosis. Delbrueck and Hendrickson compared *pseudologia phantastica* to poetic creations. Stemmermann is quoted as pointing out that the pathological lie may be created in the hypnoidal state with its tendency to daydreaming and increased suggestibility, and she also calls it a wish psychosis. She declares that the pathological lie occurs not according to plan but by sudden impulse, which increases in intensity until it finds its outlet; the pathological liar is cheerful, open, free, because he believes in his stories and wishes their reality, and he displays a characteristic inability to remember his delinquencies. Possible causes, she says, are any factors which may narrow consciousness and increase suggestion and weakness, pregnancy, over-exertion,

monotonous living, long, close work, head injuries, chronic alcoholism. Where pathological lying is associated with puberty, cure may result. She cites a case which makes her believe that the profession of editor may be especially suited to the talents of the pathological liar.

Wendt is cited as finding the condition a symptom not only of hysteria, alcoholism, paranoia, but also of sex repression and neurasthenia; he describes the condition as one of double consciousness, the actual and the desired life running side by side, the latter finally becoming predominant, heightened suggestibility and inadequate powers of reproduction of reality appear, the pathological lying and swindling being the end products.

Joerger, Henneberg, Bresler, Longard, Belletrud and Mercier, Rouma, Forel, and Meunier are also quoted.

Chapter III is given up to the recital and discussion of twelve cases of pathological lying and swindling, while Chapter IV is devoted to the consideration of nine typical cases of pathological swindling. In Chapter V, we have six cases of pathological lying in borderline mental types, the out-and-out insane, the definitely feeble-minded and the recognizable epileptic being excluded from this group. The authors caution us that pathological lying by an insane person does not make a pathological liar in the true sense. They of course recognize that the really insane sometimes lie pathologically. In this connection, it may be well to follow the authors' advice in the introduction: "The only method by which good understanding may be obtained of the types of personality and mentality involved in pathological lying, accusation and swindling, as well as of the genetics of these tendencies, is by the detailed reading of typical case histories. In this fact is found the reason for the presentation of this monograph."

In the last chapter we have the authors' conclusions, which, summarized, are as follows: The correlation of such aberrational states as constitutional inferiority, chorea, constitutional excitement or hypomania, hysteria, traumatic psychoneurosis, psychopathic individuals, epileptic mental states and pathological lying is seen and recognized. The pathological liar is decidedly egocentric, frequently exhibits an undue amount of self-assertion, has very little sympathy for the concern of others, little apperception of the opinion of others, and frequently indulges in the imagery of the heroic role of the self. Memory processes seem to be ordinarily acute. In the "Aussage" or Testimony Test it is seen that the pathological liar shows the same traits in the laboratory as in social life and on the witness stand. As to suggestibility, pathological liars may be willing to deal with their own fabrications and inventions, but not with false ideas others may attempt to force upon them. The term pathological liar should be reserved for otherwise normal individuals who indulge in pathological lying,

which may also occur in the insane, the defective and the epileptic, the authors insist. It seems to me that this point is certainly debatable, since pathological lying is pathological lying, whether it occurs in an otherwise normal or abnormal individual. A qualification of the added type of individual would clear up the question and give a clean cut picture of the case.* Decided inherited instability was the rule; masturbation, including its indirect effect, especially upon the psyche, seems to be an important phenomenon in the authors' cases, while the presence of only one male out of nineteen otherwise mentally normal individuals seems to support the observation that females seem to lie more readily than males. The tendency to pathological lying begins in the early formative years, so that if such a tendency did not develop during these years one would probably never become a pathological liar. The environment was bad in most cases, the early mental experiences in many cases was very bad, early sex experiences received through others, and influence of bad companions playing a role. In five cases some other member of the household was known positively to be a chronic liar. Repression of and worry over emotional experiences, connected, for instance, with discovery of the facts of sex life and questions about family relationships are important. The physical and psychical instabilities of adolescence are important causes of pathological lying. So also are any physical or mental irritative conditions, such as menstruation, pregnancy, social stress and the like, which may act as exciting moments to increase the tendency to lying. Influence of habit in this direction is a factor. Special mental abilities such as linguistic, especially verbal ability with proportionate defects in other fields, is an important consideration.

Socially the condition is important because of the association with other types of delinquency, particularly pathological accusation and swindling. The authors hint that pathological lying may play the part of vicarious delinquency.

The outcome in the case of pathological lying combined with aberrational conditions of another nature depends upon the outcome of these other conditions. Excluding the mentally abnormal cases of pseudologia phantastica, it may be said for the otherwise normal individuals that cure of the tendency sometimes happens even after long indulgence in it. Many years are necessary to be

*One who indulges in pathological lying is a pathological liar. We need, then, to differentiate between the pure, genuine, uncomplicated or typical pathological liar and the complicated or atypical pathological liar. Proper qualification of the latter would simplify and properly explain matters. Thus, we could have pathological lying with epilepsy, feeble-mindedness, etc. In the case of the insane, we should try to differentiate between pathological lying complicated by insanity of one type or another (a pathological liar who subsequently becomes insane) and insanity in this or that type with pathological lying (an insane individual developing pathological lying during the course of and as a manifestation of his psychosis).

certain that recurrence will not occur. Stemmermann's reports are encouraging in this respect, although very few seem to have been cured. Individualization is the bye-word. Total alteration of environmental conditions, the co-operation of an intelligent individual with influence over the afflicted person, specific treatment for any existing physical defects, explanation of the nature of the condition to the patient so that he understands that it is a habit which must be controlled, the possibility of outlet along socially countenanced paths, such as newspaper reporting (as suggested by the results of Stemmermann's case), and general efforts to check the springs of misconduct and divert energies and talents into their most suitable channels are mentioned.

As practically nothing up to the present has been written on this subject in English, this book is a very welcome contribution to psychiatric literature.

Throughout, the authors assume a very conservative and careful attitude in their discussions and conclusions.

May the conscientious author of "The Individual Delinquent"—which must be regarded as a truly epoch-making work in criminology—continue to scatter broadcast the gems of his rich experience with the juvenile delinquent.

MEYER SOLOMON.

THE FEELINGS OF MAN: THEIR NATURE, FUNCTION AND INTERPRETATION. By *Nathan A. Harvey*. State Normal College, Ypsilanti, Michigan. Baltimore, Warwick and York, 1914; viii, 276.

This is an interesting technical essay on the affective aspect of our mental process and, if it be read with others of like nature (as needful suggesters of the very general disagreement on this matter), will be found of considerable scientific value. It is of course most unfortunate that there is as yet no standardized terminology for the psychology and physiology of feeling; the practical result, however, of this lack is general misunderstanding and "scientific disagreement." For an example of this: in the synopsis of chapter ten (and in a synopsis, if anywhere, expression should be exact), one reads: "*It is possible to experience feeling without consciousness, but we are scarcely likely to be conscious without experiencing feeling;*"—the italicized statement sounds to the present writer as nearly a paradox as one finds ordinarily

in cold print, and only by keeping in mind a purely arbitrary set of definitions in use in this book does this particular apparent inconsistency dissolve. But "the present writer" is strongly conscious of discussing feeling, and indeed physiological psychology in general, under exactly the same handicap; most of the type-setters of scientific literature are dependent on this eternal misunderstanding for their occupation, to be sure, but none the less normal psychology needs a terminology even more than does anatomy, already standardized or neurology.

Doctor Harvey's major thesis, "a tentative working hypothesis" which is a bit *overworked* perhaps, is that "feeling is the concomitant of the resistance which a nervous impulse encounters in passing through a nervous arc." Clearly this is good physiology, for it elaborates and accepts the basal and familiar notion of Romanes at an earlier date and of the recondite and elusive "synapse"—concepts of present England, the latter now, like the mines, floating, but not so dangerously, over the world. This indeed is an important thing about this monograph,—it affords a practical "try-out," as the athletes say, to the claims of the synapse in a basal and vital attitude. We have yet to be shown any serious dynamic objection to the resistance-idea, whether the resistance be supposed to be at the synapse or all along the line; on the other hand, on the all-or-none principle, now "in force" it could not well be elsewhere than at the synapse. The elaboration of the arguments is an interesting one in this book and one as simply-stated as may readily be found elsewhere.

In his discussion of the relation of feeling to its "expression," the author seems (if we may use a proper physiologic paraphrase?) to have prehended more than he can readily masticate. On the synopsis of the chapter on expression one may read "2. The expression is caused by the overflow of a nervous impulse out of the feeling center into the expression center." On the contrary, if recent studies in neurotopography trend at all in any one direction, it is towards the *identification* of the integration-centers of these opposed aspects of feeling in the central nervous system. All such work seems to be gradually corroborating the James-Lange view-point.

The basis of the essay all through is distinctly animistic, but the author apparently has missed and misses that Neoanimism

which transcends completely the old-time tradition of dualistic parallelism, of dualism in general, and accepts as true and impressive above all else we know the continuity and the integration of all experience—pure idealism at last made rational by the trend of chemistry and physics themselves. The describer of feeling is about the last kind of writer who should ignore the rational continuum between rage as pure experience and rage as sthenic metabolism, for dynamism obviously is the essence of them both. Why wont psychology simplify itself to this necessary extent as the surest means to progress! The effete elements of the Scholasticism of the eleventh century is out of date in these days of reconstruction, and integration through simplification is the moral order of the philosophic day.

The last chapter in "The Feelings of Man," the sixteenth, deals briefly with the timely topic of motivity in its relations with emotion. No subject is more completely in the current of Behavior than is this,—for to really know one's own motives not to say one's opponents' motives in the vital game, is to have all the "busy Berthas" on one's own side and more or less to take the world by storm. In the present discussion of the matter the reader's impression is one of distinct disappointment—one hates to see good opportunities ignored. "It appears then," says the synopsis, "that the idea or its concomitant is the driving force, which determines that an action shall or shall not be performed, and that feeling is the concomitant of the selective function that determines whether one action or the other shall be performed. Feeling and idea both appear in the motive, each exercising its function, and neither constituting its motive." (p. 271). Here is the same old outworn ignoring of recent developments in mental science which we in the East symbolize *faute de mieux* as "the subconscious." But why waste any thing of value in rehearsing the history of recent psychologic times? For Professor Harvey nothing seems real or in any wise effective in behavior which is outside of, that is, "below," the film of conscious attentive consciousness, bright and active but dynamically only half, or less than half, the effective motivity, actuating or inhibitory, of our lives. It were fatuous to here insist that *feeling*, from the days of the world-mastery of the great lizards, (yes, millions of years before, perhaps), that *feeling* has been determining behavior and has thereby forced the evolution

of the organism in relation with which alone ideas have become possible in the long course of time. Observation of the animals simpler than man suggests well-developed feelings in countless forms wherein no sincere psychologist would posit concepts. Is, therefore, anyone going to really believe that an organism so evolved can be dominated by the human parvenue's ideas rather than by affects?

The volume is well-printed on heavy paper and bound so as to be convenient for use,—as some books are not; it also contains an adequate index and withal much useful discussion of feeling in man, although from one rather localized view-point.

GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.

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SYMPTOMATOLOGY, PSYCHOGNOSIS, AND DIAGNOSIS OF PSYCHOPATHIC DISEASES. By Boris Sidis, A. M., Ph. D., M. D., Medical Director of the Sidis Psychotherapeutic Institute. Boston: Richard G. Badger. Price \$2.50 net. Pages XLX, 439 with index.

This is the second of Sidis' recent series of works on psychopathic diseases, the previous one having been "The Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology."

This book is so full of excellent discussion and penetrating analysis that it is not easy to select from it without omitting much of great value. I shall, however, give a brief outline of what can be expected by the reader and student of this volume.

In the introduction the author protests against and denounces the methods of the Freudian school of psychoanalysis with their conclusions. He does not mince words, but in free, forcible language says exactly what he feels and wants to say.

Since psychognosis as a term was introduced by Sidis, we shall permit him to tell us what he means by it: "Psychognosis is not a special method. All that I wish to convey by it is what the term means, namely a study, an acquisition of a working knowledge of the patient's soul, so to say. The best way is to study all kinds of methods, hypnoidal, hypnotic, and especially by a close observation of the waking states. . . . In other words we must learn to understand not only the patient's physical, nervous and mental condition, not only his history and the development of his present trouble, but we must learn his personality as a whole, his attitude to his external surroundings, his *Weltenschauung* so to say." "The knowledge thus obtained of the patient's psychic life is what I regard as Psychognosis."

The work is divided into three parts (subconscious states and borderland phenomena, psychopathic diseases, and psychognosis and diagnosis), and four appendices, with an index.

Part I, dealing with subconscious states and borderline phenomena, consists of ten chapters. "By the subconscious is meant all processes of intelligence which are subjectively known as conscious but which under special conditions fall outside the range of awareness, or of the knowledge of the individual. The subconscious is essentially a consciousness, a consciousness other than the personal consciousness." "The controlling consciousness may be characterized as the guardian consciousness of the species and of the individual." He describes the methods of working with the subconscious, especially as developed in his *Psychology of Suggestion*. The association method and graphic methods (sphygmograph, plethysmograph, pneumograph, galvanometer) are of no value clinically, he concludes. Introspection and observation, the study of dream states, the use of hypnotic and hypnoidal states and their methods of employment are given special attention. The role of suggestibility is stressed.

Sidis' hypnoidal state is next thoroughly discussed. From his work with frogs, guinea pigs, kittens, dogs, infants and children he is enabled to describe the hypnoidal state as a variable, highly unstable, transitional, borderland, subwaking state, of varying depth and duration, a primitive rest-state or primordial sleep-state, the normal rest-state of lower vertebrates and invertebrates, a sort of passive waking state, still surviving in man, and out of which sleep later arose. Hypnosis and other trance states, also variations of the primary hypnoidal state, were discarded as useless or harmful to higher animals and are now producible artificially in a portion of the human race. The waking, hypnoidal and sleep states are normal, hypnoidal and other trance states subnormal. He discusses the similarities of and differences between these states and shows how phylogenetically the hypnoidal state partakes of the qualities of the states of waking, sleep and hypnosis. It is as normal as the waking or sleep state.

The hypnotic state is then discussed. Sidis discards the incest theory of the Freudians as applied to hypnosis, praises the value of hypnosis in psychognosis and therapeusis, and explains its characteristics. The hypnoid states are characterized by the presence of two or more fully independent complex mental systems, such as can be found in automatic writing, shell hearing, crystal gazing, co-existent double and multiple personalities. Their characteristics are given.

The hypnoidic state is the "formation of a quasi-personality with a more or less definite character, a personality that is inaccessible to direct suggestion" but amenable to indirect suggestion, with resulting bi- or polymorphosis, mono- or polycyclical. Their nature is explained.

Hypnolepsy is the intermediate state of drowsiness or unconsciousness, occurring in the passage from the primary to the secondary personality, but absent in the reverse direction. This is because hypnolepsy is a reproduction of the original attack which brought on the state of double or multiple personality.

Part II, comprising sixteen chapters, deals with psychopathic diseases. The total energy of the neurone is classified into dynamic, reserve, static and organic energy. Nervous and mental diseases are thus classified into three main groups: (1) psychopathies; (2) neuropathies; and (3) organopathies or necropathies. These are clearly explained. A symptomatic classification, based on localization, is given. Then follow chapters devoted to the discussion of the various somatic and psychic symptoms. The discussion throughout this section is of great interest and very valuable. Here are some illustrations: "The tendency to dissociation or anesthesia is in inverse ratio to its biological and social adaptation." "The major motor attacks (of hysteria) are hypnotic in character, being reproductions of conditions that have induced the psychopathic state." ". . . a sensory state has motor and glandular accompaniments or reactions." ". . . different emotions are made up of various peripheral or organic sensations." "Conscious losses are subconscious gains."

Approximately 110 pages are given up to an intensive analysis and illuminating consideration of the nature and structure of illusions, perception, hallucination, pseudo-hallucination, hypnotic hallucination, and the relationship to dreams, reality, functional psychosis, double thinking and dissociation. This is a most valuable portion of this work. Here are a few of the gems: "Hallucinations are of the nature of secondary perceptions." They are "essentially secondary percepts." He denies their central origin. "Normal perception, illusion and hallucination have the same underlying process and as such may be arranged in a continuous series, according to the presence or absence of the primary sensory elements. "The main conditions of hallucination are: (1) a peripheral process, often of a pathological nature; (2) a state of dissociation; and (3) the sub-excitement of secondary sensory and ideomotor elements. He lays emphasis upon the sensory character of and the sensory origin of dreams. "The dreamer dreams with his eyes closed, the insane dream with their eyes open," the difference being in the mode of intensity. "The dream consciousness works in images, in secondary sensory percepts, while in the insane mind the activity is largely representative." The sense of reality is given directly by sensory elements and their combinations and organizations. He protests against the Freudian theory of dreams. "Sensations and percepts cannot change in content or intensity without giving rise to illusions or hallucinations." He insists that the origin and structure of hallucinations (whether

of the ordinary sort, dreams or the pseudo type) are the same as those of normal perception—not of central origin. "Double thinking" is of peripheral character, with central dissociation; for example, in "double hearing" there is "subconscious whispering which comes back to the patient as auditory hallucinations."

"Hypnotic and post-hypnotic suggested hallucinations are not genuine, but are essentially spurious; hypnotic hallucinations, unlike actual hallucinations, are not really experiences; hypnotic suggested hallucinations are only forms of delusions."

"We remember best what we eagerly wish to suppress or forget." "Remembering is a continuous forgetting."

All fixed ideas, morbid impulses and emotions "can be traced by psychognosis to subconscious experiences, originated in early child life."

Part III, with six chapters, is devoted to psychognosis and diagnosis. Psychopathic diseases are recurrent mental systems, originating in a disaggregated subconsciousness, and belonging to the type of recurrent moment consciousness as developed by Sidis in his previous work on *The Foundations of Normal and Abnormal Psychology*, and representing a reversion to lower forms of mental life. He lays great stress upon the fact that they are "adjustments to past conditions. They have no meaning in the present." They are "resurrected moments." "The system with the raised threshold is dissociated."

"Psychopathic states are cases of atavism within the life history of the individual."

Illustrative cases, well analyzed, of psychognosis by hypnosis and hypnoidization are given. A differentiation is made between somo or somatic psychosis or neurosis and psychoneurosis or neuropsychosis. The former has somatic symptoms predominant, the mental side being submerged, so that the victim is apt to fall a prey to quacks, healers and the like; the latter has mental symptoms predominant, with physical symptoms slight or absent. The clinical differences are presented.

The two important etiological factors of psychopathic diseases are: (1) emotional shocks, affecting, owing to the patient's attitude, the central nucleus—interests and emotions—or the life existence of the personality or individuality; and (2) a predisposition to dissociative states. "Functional psychosis requires a long history of dissociated subconscious shocks given to a highly or lowly organized nervous system, dating back to childhood."

Appendix I offers a scheme of examination, Appendix II is an address by T. W. Mitchell on "The Hypnoidal State of Sidis," Appendix III gives us an abstract of T. Brailsford Robertson's valuable paper on "The Hypothesis of Physiological Traces and Hypnosis," and Appendix IV is a paper on "Unconscious Intelligence" by William James Sidis in which logic is invoked to prove that "subconscious processes are conscious."

The above free quotation gives one an understanding of the value of this work. Sidis knows what he wants to say. He knows how to say it. He makes sure that you understand him. There is no ambiguity. He strikes straight out from the shoulder. He deals hammer blows. He pounds his ideas into you. For fear that you may fail to grasp his real meaning, he beats his more important conclusions into you in italics. The reader can almost imagine him delivering his propositions in true Rooseveltian style.

He is a clearheaded, rational, logical thinker. He is a keen analyst. He is aided by a broad, evolutionary viewpoint. There is no harum-scarum thinking to be found here.

It is the sort of work which one wishes to have near one, so that one may refer to it again and again, to reread a chapter here, and then another and another. It is a work that one does not wish to lose from one's book-shelf.

Anyone who is interested in the problems of psychology and psychopathology should be in possession of the volume.

It is the predecessor to Sidis' next volume which takes up the causation and treatment of psychopathic diseases.

MEYER SOLOMON.

MANUAL OF MENTAL AND PHYSICAL TESTS. In two parts: Part One, Simpler Processes; Part Two, Complex Processes. Second, Revised and Enlarged Edition. Compiled by Guy Montrose Whipple, Ph. D., Associate Professor of Education, University of Illinois. Published by Warwick & York, Inc., Baltimore, 1914-15. Pp. 700. Illustrated.

The first part of this important handbook appeared about two years ago, but "the unexpected exhaustion of the first edition found the author quite unprepared to write the text of the second part at short notice; and meanwhile the whole subject of mental tests had so much expanded as to present a task of no small magnitude" indeed to a conscientious author. In view of the "expansion," to say the least, in evidence at the Chicago meeting of the American Psychological Association, Professor Whipple would seem to be the hero of the testing battle, so far.

But even if the testers (how can we speak at all of the tested!) do not as yet know quite "where they are at," these two volumes certainly supply the materials, theoretic and advisory, of ample examination. In fact, the work is the most authoritative compend of ways and means to this always interesting end so far published, and its general correlation with efficiency and wisdom is undoubtedly very high. It remains now to learn how to use it properly.

The whole testing system and habit (at times certainly ex-

hibiting the major symptoms of obsessions, not to say of hysteria) suggests to the student of abnormal psychology an inevitable doubt as to its efficiency in the case of any actual individual *in comparison with* a general sizing-up by an expert such as the psychopathologist gives the paretic or the precocious dement at the very beginning of his decline. Herbart once showed an as-yet inexperienced psychological world how absurd a mathematically obsessed philosopher could make a science appear, and that too a science as far as structural geology at least from mathematical relationships. But Weber's "law" has passed, and more than passed, having served for years as a useful warning to the ultra-precise that precision is just the one kind of thing with which mind, criterion of infinity, has the least to do. Now comes along the twentieth-century attempt to get the amperage of the aurora borealis, and to "sell property rights in the Atlantic Ocean" and certificates of the horse-power of her winter storms. This certainly is all perfectly natural and highly scientific, but *hasty*; so that the younger and more fervent and less thoughtful operatives of this mental gauging-machine, not always as familiar as Shakespeare with the versatility and the intricacies of mind, take their results too seriously. Sometimes without a qualm they take ruthlessly asunder what God hath forever joined together, and metaphorically (as the schools so often used to do literally) judge a boy stupid who is only myopic or obstinately inattentive when he in reality is only a little deaf. Of the practical dangers, that of branding a child as feeble-minded who is only "different" is probably the greatest, and this is ample to illustrate the deep obligations of test-work to society in performing its self-chosen task.

Whipple, Yerkes, Woodworth, to name but a few, have warned the multitude of operatives of the dangers of the mechanism they are using so freely. The next step would seem to be to determine its normal range and speed, and norms, as Whipple urges, for comparison.

Then, after a while, a competitive test ought to be made between the average utility of this kind of written examination, so to say, and the more modern method of oral interrogation. We ought to know next, after standardization of the various test-systems, whether it leads to results as accurate and as generally useful as a personal opinion of some expert or trio of experts based on extended conversation, etc., with the "subject" under investigation. And then we shall need a test system for the best choice of the trio—and so on perhaps ad infinitum, like the far-famed fleas of the poet-philosopher.

This comprehensive and well-considered treatise, almost pioneer of its kind, of Professor Whipple's is sure to have plenty of use, years on end. But the situation which this use implicates is an interesting one. Can't the psychopathologists help its solution?

Sargent School.

GEORGE VAN N. DEARBORN.

THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

ON THE IRRELEVANCY OF DREAMS
IN THE LIGHT OF THE TRIAL-AND-ERROR THEORY OF
DREAMING

LYDIARD H. HORTON

I

WRITING in 1901, Professor Bergson attributes the commonly noted failure of appropriateness in dreaming thoughts to the lack—on the dreamer's part—of sufficient effort or energy for summoning the correct mental associations. In this sense, he treats the absurdity of dreams as a peculiarity of the relaxed nervous tension of sleep, involving an absence of requisite "force." On the other hand, Dr. Freud, in his theory of dreams (scarcely published when Bergson wrote his essay) emphasizes the presence of a positive influence: that of the Endopsychic Censor, who takes the blame for the droll disguises of meaning in dreams. Freud's idea is that the "distortion" or garbling of our thought in dreams is produced by a sort of censorship which prevents the dreaming consciousness from knowing the mind's thought as it is; hence, the real thought that is in play is kept from being outspoken, as it were. But, we are told by the psycho-analysts of the Vienna school that the repressed thought has a way of "passing the censor" and expressing itself through symbols; these are then supposed to be utterances of the Unconscious, from which the deeper meaning of a dream can be interpreted.

Thus there is presented an antithetical picture: Bergson

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emphasizes the deficiency of a necessary force that should be present in order to bring forward the perfectly relevant idea, and install it in consciousness. On the other hand, Freud dwells especially on the presence in the dream of a positive influence, acting to keep the correct mental image at bay: *i. e.*, to hold it below the threshold of consciousness, where it will not "offend the censor."

What my own inquiries into several thousand dreams tend to show is that neither of these conceptions is fundamental; each author has simply set forth the mechanism of dreaming as he has seen it in a particular class of dreams. This has been done (sometimes in masterly and sometimes in magisterial fashion) by the use of parables and symbols appropriate, less to onirocritics than to the writer's particular business; the one writing as a trenchant philosopher, the other as a practical psychotherapeutist. No reconciliation can here be attempted. The discrepancies between the two theories require a new formulation that shall rest on considerations of physiological psychology. And, as a step in this direction (and perhaps as a contribution toward eventual harmony of views about dreams) I would emphasize the importance of what physiologists call the "summation of stimuli," as a resource in explaining the manifestations of irrelevancy in dreams.

STIMULUS-CONTROL IN THE DREAMING PROCESS

Broadly stated, my supposition is that, if the controlling conditions of relevant conversation or of normal mental discourse are analyzed, they will be found to comprise certain distinguishable factors or associative controls, of which, likewise, the analogs or homologs can be delineated as the elements of stimulus-control in dreams. On this basis, a common standard of reference is provided, making possible a parallel between relevant and irrelevant trains of thought, by contrasting the regulated and the (supposedly) unregulated control of the corresponding factors on either side. The *regulated* stimulus-control (recognized as known rules of rhetoric and syntax) is naturally enough, the leading element in the comparison; and the factors in the detailed

working of the comparison, being matters of everyday usage, may be briefly analyzed, as follows:

First, there are the recurring stimuli that keep the mental discourse going; these are often purely external, in dreams as well as in conversations. Second, there is usually some higher unit of associative control, known in controlled-association work as the element of "convergent attention;" this often has the character of "spontaneity" in dreams, or falls into the category of definite purpose, or passionate end, and is often vaguely called Wish. This will be spoken of arbitrarily as the Ulterior Motive. Thirdly, there is the element which I must refer to—following William James—as the Topic of Thought. It often appears quite normally in dreams; but even more than the other two factors, is liable to take an aborted form, and to consist of inchoate residues of recent impressions. At times, it is embryonic and one can trace it out as a sketch or *anlage*, while the dreamer seems to be picking up the thread of thought.

I assume that each one of these elements manifests itself as a process within the nervous mass, involving the functioning of a discrete portion of the neurographic network, or nerve-patterns; and that the imagery of dreams, as well as the mental pictures that take part in any mental discourse, is inseparable from the operation of such substrates. This assumption is made on the same principle that I would state a telephone conversation to be inseparable from the operation of the corresponding instruments, wires, plugs, switchboards and telephone centrals.

MECHANISM OF MENTAL PREPAREDNESS

The idea here presented (of the normal mental discourse) is that the reproduction of any specific relevant image before consciousness is a function of the interplay of the above factors, through their physiological mechanisms; thus partaking of the nature of "reinforcement," "facilitation" (*Bahnung*) or cumulation of their individual effects. This idea, which is that of reciprocal summation occurring between two or three of these factors, is a key—as I view it—to the operations of the mind; but so far as dreams are con-

cerned it has not been made use of as fully as it deserves. And, for this reason, it is the object of the following paragraphs to confer a measure of precision upon the meaning of reinforcement and facilitation in dreams, "with particular reference to the mischances in the mutual working of the three factors.

Accordingly, I shall lay stress on the rôle of adventitious forces (that is, of Chance, rather than Design) as making the interferences with the appropriate recall of ideas in dreams; for there seems to be a functioning of trivial thoughts in the summation of stimuli, which is as much under-rated by Freud, Bergson and others, as it is over-estimated in the conceptions of laymen.

In dreams, we find the mind operating with marked irrelevancy in relation not only to the stimuli playing upon the sensorium, but also in the matter of an apparent lack of purposiveness. Yet the eye of analysis can often detect the fairly persistent activity of given stimuli in the dream, coupled with a somewhat tenacious Ulterior Motive. It then seems as if the manifestations of irrelevancy were due to the absence of that other integration and organization among the brain elements, which I assume to be necessary for the adequate functioning of the topic-of-thought. For the organized topic-of-thought may be regarded as a specially prepared system of facilitations, calculated to impart the well-known effect of "coherency" upon the summation-effect of the next (and usually expected) incoming stimulus—as illustrated in any normal conversation. The topic-of-thought is thus of the essence of regulated thought, in conjunction with that other "higher unit," of which the "reinforcement" is distinguishable as purpose or Ulterior Motive. But all these factors of relevancy, including even the sensorium, maintain their function only on the condition of a certain mental preparedness which is essentially what we mean by the state of vigil, or being awake.

It is this state of preparedness that usually lapses with the advent of sleep; not, I believe, on account of any absolutely inherent peculiarity of the condition of complete repose; but on account of the neglect of any special precautions for maintaining an orderly state of mind on going

to sleep. In other words, we leave our mind to adjust itself, while falling asleep; as we never would think of doing when engaging in conversation. To this unpreparedness of mere negligence, is subsequently added the unpreparedness that arises in regard to unexpected or unforeseeable contingencies. What we reap as a result is the irrelevancy of our responses in dreams, which are analogous to our responses under conditions of emotion, confusion or surprise.

The physiological basis lies in a disintegrative relaxation in the nerve-patterns or neurograms, corresponding to the characteristic relaxation of the reflexes. For this reason, our systems of "reinforcement" or "facilitation," persisting only in a state of disaggregation, are fitful, casual, *i. e.* adventitious in their algebraic effect upon the physiological summations. This is the notion I wish to develop in contradistinction to Bergson's theory, so far as it lays stress upon the effort of selecting a correct percept or apperception for a given stimulus.

THE SUPPOSED LABOR OF RECOLLECTION

On this point of effort, Bergson imagines the *dreaming ego* telling the *waking ego* what is needful to explain the difference between their natures:

"You imagine that in order to hear a dog barking, and to know that it is a dog that barks, you have nothing to do. That is a great mistake. You accomplish, without suspecting it a considerable effort. You take your entire memory, all your accumulated experience, and you bring this formidable mass of memories to converge upon a single point, in such a way as to insert exactly in the sounds you hear that one of your memories which is the most capable of being adapted to it. Nay, you must obtain a perfect adherence, for between the memory that you evoke and the crude sensation that you perceive there must not be the least discrepancy; otherwise you would be just dreaming. This adjustment you can only obtain by an effort of the memory and an effort of the perception. . . . You exert then, continually every moment of the day, an enormous effort. Your life in a waking state is a life of labor, even when you

think you are doing nothing, for at every minute you have to choose and every minute exclude."

Reading this as part of a philosophical exposition of the mechanism of dreams, of which the main object is to emphasize the fact that perception in dreams can be explained in terms of perceptive processes of waking life, one would wish to leave the above statements unchallenged, lest one spoil the balance of parts in the admirable whole. Therefore, one would treat the stressing of "effort" with every allowance for the author's drift toward hyperbole. But that which is unimportant vagueness or exaggeration in a philosophical essay may become misleading ambiguity when seen from a psychological viewpoint. For the psychology of dreams requires more precision than even Freud and Bergson have brought to its study; and we should not rest satisfied with the supposed finality of this idea of *deficiency of effort*, any more than with the idea of *Libido*, or the concept of *censorship* as fundamental explanations of dream processes. So we must aver that Bergson, although brilliantly suggestive in other directions, has, in the present connection, fallen into equivocal statements regarding two entirely different kinds of effort: namely, (a) the effort (of maintaining muscular and nervous tonus) that is incidental to general alertness, *i. e.* to the state of vigil; and (b) the energy of the mental reaction in perception as such.

THE SUBLIMINAL IN PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY

This concept of effort involves a confusion between the dynamic necessities of maintaining a generalized tension of the organism, on the one hand, and that of raising the tension of a particular portion of the memory register (neurogram) on the other. Admitting that these two tensions interact in the organism, it is all the more important that they should be distinguished, and not blended (by confusion of ideas) in the mind of the psychologist. The needed distinction is not possible in the terms or from the viewpoints adopted by Bergson, requiring as it does the physiological standpoint, which he forsakes when treating of "effort." The modern interpretation of the working of the cerebrum

requires us to keep to the fore a conception which traverses this still indefinite formulation of tension and of effort in Bergson's scheme of explanation: namely, the reflex principle, and the allied idea of the summation of inadequate stimuli for the excitation of a memory-reflex. In this is included the concept of a "threshold of consciousness."

The whole problem of the succession of our thoughts in dreams acquires a different aspect if we regard the evocation of memories from the standpoint of the accepted psychophysiological notion of the threshold of consciousness. In psychology, we may then apply the distinction that physiologists have long recognized between so-called *liminal*, *subliminal* and *supraliminal* stimuli or excitations, as abundantly illustrated in the reflex activities of the laboratory frog. Popularly speaking, this means that below the zone of conscious thought there are, as Galton, Janet, Prince have long contended, quasi-mental activities continually going on, although shut off from observation. This idea of subliminal processes (lately enriched by Woodworth's "Imageless Thought") is one that everyday experience, when tutored by psychological insight, is well fitted to confirm and enlarge. For who is there who has not, at one time or another, sensed the "threshold of recall" through a name long sought for in vain, and later slowly emerging after several trials had brought a feeling of "nearness." A long chapter could be written about these reluctant or fleeting memories of which one says, "I thought I had it on the tip of my tongue," or "It flashed by, but now I have lost it." These mechanisms might be spoken of as "threshold phenomena." They are the ones, *par excellence*, to procure the elucidation of the phenomena of dream life.

It is an intrinsic feature of the present argument to treat the appearance of a given image before consciousness as a function of a rise of excitation in a nervous substrate or neurogram. To "flash" the neurogram (supraliminally) takes time, what may be called "finding time;" and the delayed response of the proper experiential equivalent of a stimulus or cue is subject to peculiar variations and mishaps according to the previous excitability or "facilitation" of the corresponding neurograms or nerve patterns. This has

already been set forth distinctly, although somewhat hypothetically, in a previous paper on the "Apparent Inversion of Time in Dreams." It was explained, in connection with the concept of "apperceptive delay" that the headway of previously facilitated neurograms might cause these to flash into consciousness in advance of the neurogram most appropriate to the stimulus. It remains to explain and illustrate a number of the features of this concept; especially is it necessary to define the process of physiological summation in connection therewith. Accordingly, the following example is chosen to illustrate the concurrent effect of two cues in flashing a series of neurograms which represent trial apperceptions of the principal cue or stimulus. At the same time, the principles of apperceptive delay and *oniric inversion* will be conveniently exhibited in their working.

THE DREAM OF THE PANTRY CUPBOARD

Circumstances of the Dream. Having to take in haste a train in the afternoon, I forego my luncheon in order to catch the one o'clock express, which carries no dining car. On the principle that *qui dort dîne*, I decide to sleep as long and as deeply as possible during the "run," which is to be of one hour. Having learned a special technique for inducing states of relaxation, I make the fullest trial of it in these circumstances. The success is made evident by the enjoyment of a deep and refreshing sleep, in which the only specific incident is the following dream:

The Dream: I see a child, apparently six years old, in a plain brown dress with a short skirt, standing on a chair in front of a cupboard, the open door of which reveals the shelves within. The child's back is turned, while it reaches above its head to replace on a shelf, a jam pot, from which liberal sustenance has been taken, as evidenced by the jam-bedaubed hand and the cheek in profile. Suddenly, the child turns from this business, as if caught in the act—*flagrante delicto*—bringing into full view a surprised and horror-stricken visage. The emotion thus portrayed is one I (as dreamer) soon

come to share, as an apprehension justified by an unearthly screech apparently emanating from outside the pantry, first as if from the kitchen nearby, and then as if from outside the pantry window. Finally the sound seems to hover about in unlocalized fashion.

I then awake to the stridulant noise of the car-wheels grinding on the curve, as we turn into the station-yard at my destination.

The characteristic features of this dream are: 1. The extreme irrelevancy of the precursory images. 2. The correct apprehension of the sound's *quality* before the end of the dream. 3. The simplicity of the factors in play, as shown by the subsequent analysis.

The pantry cupboard scene is evidently a phantasy provoked by two accidentally conjoined but logically unrelated stimuli: the one a hunger sensation, the other a sound of screeching wheels. There is, as I view it, automatic representation or "reproduction" of imagery that is relevant to the two jointly, but in varying proportion. The resulting compound of reproductive effects can be visualized very much in the same way as one pictures the composition of mechanical forces through the well-known "parallelogram of forces;" a circumstance of which advantage is taken in the accompanying diagram.

THE GIVEN CUES AND THE INDEX OF RELEVANCY

The figure makes it possible to conceive the effect of *varied reaction* that is produced by the same two reproductive tendencies when operating at different and shifting intensities. It will be seen, from the "phases" of the diagram, how the influence of one reproductive tendency grows as the other dwindles, and how the severally depicted ratios between these influences correspondingly determine distinctive reproductions from memory. Here we can imagine how quantitative relations among the factors of stimulation might determine the qualitative selections in mental reactions. For, in view of this schema, there seems to have been obtained a measure of that "perfect adherence" which is

supposed by Bergson to be so characteristically lacking in the dreaming process.

The violation of the rules of ordinary waking association (relevancy) comes from the fact that the two stimuli in operation, are such as we would, if awake, especially guard against conjoining—having in mind actively the requirement of controlling our responses in relation to specific topics of thought. Such elements of control being here absent, any two other factors are sufficient to control the response. This still shows adaptation of *response* to *stimulus*, but illustrates the bizarre effect of adventitious junctions between otherwise unrelated cues. It follows that it should interest us quite as much to understand the relevancy of the dream images to the wrong cue (hunger) as to comprehend the irrelevancy in regard to the right cue (sound); this discrepancy being especially marked at the beginning of the dream.

The relevancy of the dream imagery to the principal cue (sound) is obviously the inverse of the degree of relevancy to the accessory cue. This may be expressed as an *index of relevancy*, in terms of common fractions, to wit:—

Relevancy to Hunger Cue:

Vertical Co-ordinate
Horizontal Co-ordinate

Relevancy to Sound Cue:

Horizontal Co-ordinate
Vertical Co-ordinate

Thus the one dwindle^s while the other grows, inversely. Eventually there is complete elimination of the Hunger Cue's influence. Especially remarkable is the process whereby one cue may cause irrelevancy of response to another more important cue, with which adventitious conjunction has taken place. The process can be analyzed in purely dynamic terms, applicable not only to this simple dream, but to innumerable other lapses from coherency, in complex cases.

THRESHOLD PHENOMENA OF THE DREAM

The simplicity of the factors in this dream is to be accounted for by the circumstance that I had, when going to sleep, slowly and deliberately relaxed the attention; employing unusual precautions for getting rid of adventitious facilitations. This means that I had reduced to a minimum the interference-rôle of casual memories, which might other-

wise have "perseverated" as sub-excited neurograms, over-ready to add their confusing effect to the summation of forces. But, if I have chosen this dream for illustration, it is precisely because it permits the formulation of the working of two of the factors without the interference of having to consider the third. As it is, the sole interfering factor, to be traced in its operation, is the non-germane cue of Hunger. The factor conventionally named topic-of-thought is removed from the problem—made negligible—owing to the "demobilization" of the corresponding neurograms, during the pre-sleeping period. The preparation for sleep thus gave a clear field for the interactions of the two cues, as we shall now see.

Let us here suppose, then, that the actual sensation or prompting of *appetite* remained sub-excited, in spite of the relaxation. The sound of *wheels grinding* would thus come as a second, more powerful excitation to set the other in operation, by a process of physiological summation in the neurones and at the synapses. Thereafter, the order of events becomes an expression of these interacting influences or reproductive tendencies, which we can visualize as follows:

1. Hunger stimuli, reinforced by a general excitation of the nerve system through a powerful auditory stimulus, sub-excite a group of memories—a whole gallery of pictures, as it were—associated with the satisfaction of hunger; or, in different terms, the available neurograms registered in connection with eating-situations become partially aroused. These are positive responses (subliminal of course) to the non-germane cue of hunger, called the *accessory cue*, and corresponding to "Ulterior Motive."

2. Persistent screeching sounds of *wheels grinding* arouse, by emotional congruity, a set of experiences or mental images previously constellated with surprise-horror situations: *i. e.*, the neurograms for these memories are sub-excited, pre-stimulated, as are already the more activated hunger-neurograms. These are the nascent sub-exitations germane to the *principal cue*.

3. A reciprocal summation-effect (reinforcement) is developed as between the two systems of sub-excited neurograms. That is, the excitation or neurodynamic impulse—

"neurodyn," let me call it for short—spreading from the two sources in question, and escaping through various nerve channels (neurographic canalizations) encounters a neurogram wherein its flow is doubled upon itself; for the "neurodyn" has reached a nerve pattern common to both subexcited registers of memory; a junction-point has been found, as may adventitiously occur whenever any two systems of thought are activated. Accordingly, the tension (neururgic tonus) becomes supraliminal in that neurogram: the neurodyn flows to it until the physiological fact of summation becomes translated into a psychological perception.

4. The psychic correlate of the nerve pattern, thus designated by the *rendez-vous* of nerve impulses from two sensory foci, is flashed into the dream: it is none other than the scene of a child stealing jam and caught in the act. On analysis this proves to have been a most perfect and relevant "selection;" this being, of all my memory-pictures (as I figure it) the only one in which the indulgence of appetite and the emotion of surprise-horror could possibly have coalesced. For, as I may now explain, the dream picture in question corresponds to an experience of my childhood; the cupboard and the child's kilt being contemporaneous with my sixth birthday, as well as the partiality for jam, and my interest in that particular cupboard.

5. Meantime, the auditory areas of my brain have not failed to pass on their excitation continually to the association fields that mediate the memory of emotion and of the muscular action-patterns for surprise-horror, or fear. These incipient innervations within my own nerve-muscle system are at once painted upon the child's face: they are transposed, externalized, in accordance with that histrionic type of association that Emerson, Galton and number of other writers on dreams have long called attention to.


(The "projection" of emotion upon an *alter ego*, either as a feature of insanity or as an incident of dreaming, furnishes a topic replete with cases parallel to this one.)

EMERGENCE OF THE CORRECT EXPERIENTIAL EQUIVALENT

6. The auditory stimulus is coming into its own: the

sub-excited neurograms closely affiliated with (relevant to) the sound in question are now manifested in consciousness.

If these did not show themselves sooner, through the earlier "flashing" of their correlated conscious imagery, it was because not enough time had passed for the stimulus to gather strength: the summation-product of the "neurodyn" from the two sources (hunger-register and sound-register) still remained below the "flashing point." But none the less the sound stimulus had, from the very start, joined with the pre-stimulated hunger stimulus in "flashing" other neurograms wherein the neurodyn had consequently become more rapidly reinforced. This explains how the incorrect images outstrip the correct ones now emerging.



This stage of the dream is characterized by the consciousness of some horror-inspiring sound, which is conceived as originating from the now fading setting of pantry, kitchen, or space outside the window; but the sound-percept detaches itself from one after another of these settings till the screech seems to come from nowhere in particular. (One might

say that the sound was correctly *perceived* at this point but incorrectly *apperceived*.)

7. Next, there is the awakening. All that was missing for a completely normal or relevant recognition of the stimulus is now supplied by the returning sense of orientation, which installs the sound of wheels-in-the-curve amid its proper settings of train and railroad yard.

The change of conditions is not so great as might seem: there has been, as a result of the awakening, only a broadening of the associations: a recollection of all the characteristics of the sound that was so aptly sensed in the dream. For, as Prince has put it, "recollection is only a more perfect kind of memory." ("The Unconscious".)

8. Complete repose of mind and body persist for some time after this awakening—a characteristic condition of rest recalling certain experiments in which I proved (to myself at least) that awareness may be maintained and correct apperceptive processes carried on consistently with a degree of general relaxation comparable to that of sleep itself.

However that may be, I remain strikingly free from any sense of effort, I have no perplexity or memory of perplexity, nor can I detect any psychic or physical condition that would give support to the proposition that I had been engaged in any sort of mental labor of the order of voluntary attention.

So much then for the analysis of the stages of this dream.

THE DOCTRINE OF EFFORT

I am under the impression that my organism, at first in sleep and then in the waking state, had been simply responding to the sound stimulus according to a purely reflex principle: the phantasmagoria taking the shape that we have seen, simply because the organism was responding along the lines of least resistance. To anyone having well in mind the distinction between voluntary and involuntary attention, it will not seem necessary at once to assume that there was "effort;" unless this word is applicable to the

mere fact of nerve conduction. It would seem to be stretching the term to apply it to the definitely timed and delimitable distribution of the impulse from a stimulus, at its regular rate of approximately 100 feet per second or to the incidental delays at the synapses. These are the basic facts contemplated in the conception of Apperceptive Delay which I would offer in place of the conception of Effort.

The delay in reaching the correct apperception of the principal stimulus and the precursory evocation of irrelevant images, and the gradual shifting or orientation toward relevancy, are explainable—according to my view—not as due to increasing effort, but as due to a simple change in dynamic relations between two cues. The bizarre images are to be regarded as incidental, supernumerary processes: a shunting of the stimulus-wave through nerve-switches or synapses, following the line of least resistance. And correspondingly, the escapement of stimulus and its debouching into consciousness as imagery, are to be visualized as depending upon the gathering strength of one stimulus (sound) and the COMPARATIVE WANING of the other (hunger).

But Bergson's theory as to why incorrect images are evoked is almost the exact reverse of my own: he emphasizes the dreamer's lack of power to summon the correct image before consciousness; whereas I insist that mal-apperception is demonstrably a function of the abnormal readiness (facilitation or reinforcement) on the part of other alien images, which thereby possess an advantage at the beginning of the apperceptive process. Bergson's statement on the point of effort is positive:

“What requires effort is the precision of adjustment. To connect the sound of a barking dog with the memory of a crowd that murmurs and shouts requires no effort. But in order that this sound should be perceived as the barking of a dog, a positive effort must be made. It is this force that the dreamer lacks. It is by that and by that alone, that he is distinguished from the waking man.”

THE REFLEX NATURE OF PERCEPTION

Now, in place of the doctrine of effort, as above stated, we shall need to develop the more definite conception of

reflex-facilitation and especially of relative facilitation; first brushing aside those views about "force" which can serve only to becloud the issue of fact.

To start with, we should understand that the cart has been put before the horse, in this insistence upon effort: actually the stimulus of a dog barking, of a door slamming, or of other similar phenomenon, supplies of its own motion sufficient excitation to account for many subsequent association-processes, regardless of any alleged initiative on the part of the perceiving or apperceiving organism. And here is the place to insist again on the fact that the use of our stock of ideas (neurograms) in perception, apperception and in non-forced attention is ordinarily reflex in character and correspondingly effortless.

On the other hand, if we should take literally the conception of Bergson as to the means of precise adjustment in perception, we should have to regard the mind as a book without an index: each cue or stimulus-idea would require a turning of all the pages of experience to find the appropriate mental picture. But, fortunately, the memory embodies devices that are essentially labor-saving, and adapted to the function of economically utilizing the mental register, which is made up of so-called "experiences." The mind's economy has been aptly characterized by R. W. Emerson:

"There is no book like the memory, none with such a good index, and that of every kind, alphabetic, systematic, arranged by names of persons, by colors, tastes, smells, shapes, likeness, unlikeness, by all sorts of mysterious hooks and eyes to catch and hold, and contrivances for giving a hint."

Moreover, when one considers the doubt that has been cast by Thorndike and others, upon the existence of any true intellectual fatigue, and the demonstration of widely spread confusion of ideas on this subject as revealed by laboratory findings and curves for mental work, it seems well to think twice before accepting a similarly questionable concept, like deficiency of force in the dreamer, or his lack of mental effort, as an explanation of the incoherency of dreams.

ADVENTITIOUS FACILITATIONS AND REINFORCEMENTS

If we fall into perceptive or apperceptive errors, when drowsy or when dreaming, it is not, so far as I can discover, due to the dropping out of some supposititious factor named "effort," but on account of specific definable circumstances, which, however, have so far not been given their due weight in any theory of dreams. These circumstances relate to the physiological topics of facilitation (*Bahnung*) and reinforcement, and to the summation of inadequate stimuli below the threshold of consciousness.

Already, in a paper on "The Apparent Inversion of Time" in a certain kind of dream, I have undertaken to apply these physiological notions to elucidating the mechanism of trial-and-error in dreams. A somewhat hypothetical illustration was offered in the shape of the Door Slam Dream; in which instance the slamming of a door was mal-apperceived as the firing of a shot in battle, and made the conclusion of a phantasy of *going to war*, after *enlisting* and so on. This series of seemingly straightforward dream tableaux was discussed so as to bring out the inversion of the original order of the subconscious train of ideas. It was argued that trial apperceptions of the persisting stimulus might become active as a series or chain of reactions (*oniric catena*) in which the stimulus called up one idea, and this another in turn and so on, very much as a locomotive starts a string of freight cars; and all this was supposed to have been made possible by a previously linked-together topic-of-thought namely, War and Enlistment. The accompanying diagram showed how this train of ideas might be started up by the stimulus so that the last link in the chain became the first to manifest itself in consciousness; thus, indicating for any dream of that type, what the mechanism of apparent time-reversal would be. The explanation was made to depend upon the conception of residual tensions, perseverating as facilitations derived from the previous topic-of-thought.

The present paper is in part the same. It completes the theory of time-reversal by showing how the identical phenomenon (*oniric inversion*) may be brought about by a

different pairing among the three assumed factors; namely, in this case, between the stimulus (principal cue) and the ulterior motive (accessory cue). The mutual summations from these two sources, can (as shown in the illustration) be viewed as producing a precursory set of trial apperceptions while the correct apperception is slowly rising into consciousness, thus simulating a time-reversal, as in the Door Slam Dream. But in the Pantry Cupboard Dream, the two cues (hunger and sound) are in concurrent activity and reinforce one another; while in the earlier illustration there is simply a residual facilitation holding over from a (supposedly) waking topic-of-thought. The distinction, to be sure, is one that can hardly be maintained except in the interest of a schematic presentation like the present one. This requires me to speak arbitrarily of reinforcement when dealing with the summation effect of the accessory cue, and of facilitation when speaking of the influence of residual tensions pertaining to the past topic-of-thought.

In either case, whether we deal with an active reinforcement or a passive facilitation, the effect is the same upon the mental discourse of the dreamer: namely, an escape from the course that would normally be dictated by the principal cue, a seeming diversion into side channels of association (like "wool-gathering") and the reproduction in the dreaming consciousness of a series of images that at first appear to have nothing in common with the cue under consideration. But when the complete series is reviewed—and especially when it is completed by a correct waking percept—it becomes apparent that, from the very beginning, the earlier images did bear a certain relevancy to the principal cue after all.

Out of the wonderment caused by the experience of these bizarre trains of thought, with their surprising approximation to the stimulus that wakes the dreamer has arisen the problem of so-called time-inversion, the mechanism of which is here sketched. Thus, whether the trial apperceptions of a stimulus are aroused by reinforcement or by facilitation, it amounts to the same thing in one respect: there is a fanciful filling-in of images ancillary to the "cor-

rect-idea-of-the-stimulus" (*stimulus-idea*) pending the appearance of the latter in consciousness.

* . * *

II

VICARIOUS MANIFESTATIONS OF THE STIMULUS-IDEA

It can scarcely be repeated too often that the "normal experiential equivalent of the stimulus or cue" (*stimulus-idea*) usually is from the beginning a factor in producing the so-called trial apperceptions. These are oftentimes so peculiarly marshalled by the influence of the *stimulus-idea* that they amount to "proxies" or foreshadowings of it. Some writers, not understanding the ultimate character of these trial apperceptions have called them "symbols;" whereby much loose thinking on the subject has been introduced into dream study. And the idea of so-called "symbolism" having gained entrance into the field of dream interpretation, has opened the way for a flood of speculation on the relation of dreams to folklore, mythology and philosophy, a divagation with which the present account can have nothing to do. Suffice it to say that because the alleged "symbol" in the dream actually has the character of a trial apperception, it must necessarily happen that it approximates or simulates at times the sort of vicarious thinking, or reasoning by "proxies" which we call symbolism when encountered in the operations of full consciousness. For practical purposes, the "symbols" of the psycho-analytic schools have only this in common with the formulation of Trial Apperceptions, namely that from both alike inferences can be drawn. But the difference is that the formulation of Symbolism lends itself conspicuously to false inferences as to the mechanism and meaning of what is going on in the dreamer's mind!

Whatever may be said in favor of the psycho-analytic practice of treating dream items as out-and-out "symbols," comporting a transcendental meaning, this is none the less—from a purely intellectual point-of-view—a "lazy man's

method" of reaching out for the implications of a given dream. And this is so because it sets aside many intellectual precautions, which the probability of error, the range of individual differences, and other considerations of method should impose.

That dream items may present vicariously and darkly certain qualities of the non-appearing *stimulus-idea* is demonstrable; but patient care must be used in exploiting the principle thus suggested, lest the bounds of reasonable inference be overstepped. And the current psycho-analytic conceptions of Symbolism do go out of bounds in overriding such salutary checks upon speculation as are furnished by the biological principles of Varied Reaction, Trial and Error, Interferences with Recall, Reaction Time, and other more purely psychological principles that might be mentioned and with all of which the present theory of Trial Apperceptions is in accord.

INCONSTANCY OF VICARIOUS REPRESENTATION

Empirically, that extreme conception of Vicarious Representation which is implied by the psycho-analytic doctrines of Symbolism, rests on the alleged constancy with which certain "symbols," (in the shape of specific dream items affected with a special meaning) are supposed to recur. But after investigating the dreams of a great variety of subjects and collecting several thousand examples through a period of about seven years, I am unable to verify this supposition of constant meaning or fixed symbolism in any positive degree. What I have found is that snakes, umbrellas, sticks, wells, water, treacle, roast beef, burning meat and what not, may appear as images in a dream on account of some cryptic *stimulus-idea* that is acting as an incitement to subliminal free-association, and which controls the "flashing" of the item through some slight bond of similarity, or of contiguity in experience. But, as I have set forth, *snakes* in a dream may "symbolize" a dangerous well; that is, the cylindrical shape, the danger involved and other properties may be "colors" or reflections of the *stimulus-idea* simply by the most tenuous similarities and by the

most adventitious circumstances. For, to invoke again the present theory, the slight influence of the *stimulus-idea* upon a mass of ancillary ideas, of potential Trial Apperceptions, may find itself, in the most impromptu manner, reinforced or facilitated in a particular direction by either or both of the other two factors in stimulus-control, namely the Ulterior Motive or the Topic of Thought. There is thus no necessary fixity in the relation between so-called Latent and Manifest Contents of the dream. Such precarious relationship as there may be in the typical phallic "symbols," quoted by the psycho-analytic schools, cannot justify the application of the conception of Symbolism, except in the narrowest and most metaphorical sense.

The supposed fixity of dream "symbols" is further contradicted if one extends one's study of dreams to include a picture of the different ways in which the same *stimulus-ideas* (let us say those of the sexual life) may be vicariously represented in the form of dream items—above referred to as trial apperceptions. Here it is found that the same dreamer rarely (in some cases never) is discovered to reproduce the same dream item in connection with the same stimulus-idea. On the contrary, the trial apperceptions of sexual *stimulus-ideas* are bewildering in their variety, their remoteness, and their inconceivably far-fetched resemblances; just as they are also captivating to the imagination of the transcendental symbolist by their occasional mimicry of apt phraseology or of pornographic allusions.

THE POSSIBILITY OF SO-CALLED REPRESSION

As to the Freudian formulation of "repression" (*Verdrängung*) as the cause of the cryptic character of dream items, it cannot be rejected altogether; because inhibitions unquestionably do play a part in producing the "symbolism" of some dreams; but, again, not to the extent figured in psycho-analytic literature. In cases too numerous to mention, the alleged deletion of the dreamer's latent idea, as imputed to the Endopsychic Censor, seems to be attributed without any real basis to this mythical Cerberus of the Unconscious Regions. This idea of Censorship seems

largely based upon a misapprehension of the phenomenon here called Apperceptive Delay; which may be defined as the normal lapse of time (finding-time) in the recall of the experiential equivalent of the stimulus. The *stimulus-idea*, in the usual run of cases, must appear tardily because it is gathering speed. Meantime, the trial apperceptions come forward because their inertia has been earlier overcome. Unlike these precursory ancillary images, the stimulus-idea is not likely to be reinforced or facilitated, but is handicapped by starting in the race, as it were, from "scratch." Neither, on the other hand, is the stimulus-idea to be thought of as loaded down by an inhibition; although, in a comparatively few cases, the factors of stimulus-control which I refer to as facilitation and reinforcement may take on a negative turn. But even this admission does not take us back to a belief in "symbolism" and "censorship." It simply takes into account a modicum of cases wherein the apperceptive delay is prolonged by an interference with recall that is more than the normal finding-time.

THE PROBABILITY OF ERRORISMS

In sum, the inconstancy of the alleged transcendental symbols compels us to turn to a more naturalistic conception of the dreaming process, and to view these "symbols" as incidents of trial-and-error reactions, having their seat in the nervous mass. Instead, then, of seeking archaic reasons and viewing dream images as semi-purposeful disguises of latent ideas, we turn to the conception of a physiological delay in reaction-time. And we dismiss the over-worked idea of "repression" by attributing the greater part of its alleged consequences to the normal accidents of the mind or "errorisms," in which it is however, to be acknowledged that inhibition may occasionally exaggerate the Apperceptive Delay, especially in the class of subjects studied by Freud in his clinical work.

The "symbols" themselves are fortuitous consequences of the *stimulus-idea* in operation; and as such they result from adventitious summations. On the principle of the doctrine of chances, it is (barring special cases) unlikely

that the mind of the dreamer shall be prepared to react appropriately to the stimulus that happens to incite the dream; for the sleeping person, unlike the waking subject, has no chance to "see it coming." But, even so, there is a strong probability that the operations of the waking mental apparatus are largely conditioned by the same mischances in the mental preparation for reacting to an arriving stimulus, and that it too, is obligated to go through a series of phases that are essentially those of "taking aim." Biologically and abstractly speaking, this would seem a necessary preliminary to discounting the effect of adventitious forces; and it should be as fundamental in the explanation of mental adjustment to stimuli as it already is in the explanation of the trial-and-error behavior of lower organisms from amoeboids to mammals.

TRIAL AND ERROR IN SCIENTIFIC THEORIZING

Anyone who will take the trouble to place a measuring-worm on the rectilinear edge of a sheet of paper can observe at his leisure the essentials of trial-and-error, in its aspect of external behavior. Before making any straight-forward advance along its narrow lane of discovery, the measuring-worm rears its proboscis and essays to plumb the chasm on either side, and thus, by oscillating from the extreme left to the extreme right, reduces by Varied Reaction the risk of stepping off into space. Having thus made sure of safety first, by otherwise futile precursory "trials," the vacillating end of the animal centers upon the straight edge and fixes itself for the next step. It is only another instance of Nature's inherent prodigality in throwing away "false moves" along the road toward adjustment.

So broadly scattered throughout natural economy are the hints of this process, that even the ancient Latin poet Lucretius imagined the perfection of this universe to have been achieved only after innumerable futile conjunctions had taken place among the atoms. And it is no derogation of the designs of the Almighty to conceive of them as carried out through a process of trial adaptations. The mathematical principle in operation is well exemplified in battle prac-

tice today by the process of "wasting" ammunition as an incident of finding the range.

In the organism of the sciences, something similar takes place, although the individual scientific workers are not always as circumspect in their adventures as the measuring-worm. It is rather in large bodies or "schools" that the scientific theorizers swing from one extreme to another. This has always been true of the pendulum of medical progress; and the present vogue of Freud's conceptions, in the so-called Psycho-analytic Movement, is a case in point. But there is even now a backswing in the shape of the Zurich school's attempt to refute a number of the Freudian generalizations. Standing apart, but also representing an extreme swing in one direction, is the essay of Bergson, which attempts to make of peripheral stimuli and entoptic phenomena (phosphenes) as sure a key to dreams as Freud claims to have forged out of Symbolism, Censorship and Repression.

CURRENT THEORIES OF DREAMS

Seeking to establish a contrast between these authors, in the light of the present theory, one might say that Professor Bergson conceives the dream phantasy to be obedient to the external stimulation (over-stressing especially entoptic stimuli) in a measure that is not verified when one studies dreams "as they come." Dr. Freud, on the other hand, appears to exaggerate the constancy and purposiveness with which the cryptic factor of Ulterior Motive governs the phantasmagoria. As to the remaining element, consisting usually of adventitious facilitations (Topic of Thought), this seems to have afforded the Zurich school their opportunity to view dreams one-sidedly, from an angle distinctively their own.

The theory of Dr. Jung, leader of this school, holds to a curiously amended Freudism, and teaches that the dream has a deep meaning, not only in the regressive sense, but in the progressive sense; regarded thus teleologically, it expresses the *élan vital* of the dreamer, in its movement through Symbolism, toward a higher adjustment of his in-

ternal psychological situation to the requirements of real life. In this way of thinking, the Zurich school apparently endeavors to meet the criticisms leveled at Psycho-analysis, notably by Dr. Prince, on account of its neglect of biological truths. But however unimpeachable these truistic general propositions may be, their specific utilization suggests that so far Dr. Jung has achieved only a glimpse, a trial apperception, of the mechanism of dreams. He simply uses the adventitious topics that arise during dream analysis as a means of exploring the life-purposes of the individual. This is rather an extension of his (Jung's) free-association experiments than a genuine explanation of the total mechanism of dreaming.

While my own argument for a many-sided view of dreams may prove to have quite serious aberrations of its own, it seems to me that the constructive method of Jung is not as eclectic as it purports to be; but that it runs into the same mistakes of *parti pris*, as Freud's reductive method. This is an error conspicuous by its absence in Professor Bergson's presentation of his views, which are extraordinarily clear and suggestive, considering that he has never made a specialty of dream investigation. In fine, what has been lacking is a balanced conception of the dreaming process. This requires an unprejudiced outlook upon all the different permutations and combinations of effects to which the three groups of dream factors lend themselves, as here sketched.

A broader outlook upon the dream must be developed. And this will come, I dare say, by putting aside the doctrine of Symbolism and setting up in its place what I may call a doctrine of Errorism. This would be based on the trial-and-error concept, and would be related through biology to the behavior of all organisms, from animalcula to Man.

It is in the spirit of these ideas that the Pantry Cupboard Dream has been analyzed. In terms of physiological summations and mental reactions, its interpretation remains on the biologic level of the "resolution of physiological states." This does not imply, however, that the same mechanism will not serve to explain the higher moral and social integrations of thought, in competition with current

doctrines of Symbolism; it implies only that such topics would be out of place in dealing with this unusually clean-cut instance of the operation of two out of three of the regulators of the mental discourse here schematized. In this connection, it is perhaps more than I should hope for, to have made intelligible how these factors—by their fits and misfits—can produce the bizarre irrelevancies of the dream. Yet, however arbitrary this scheme of factors may seem, it should none the less be of advantage to any student of dreams to imitate this example of regarding dreams as likely to be affected by “a number of things!”

As a feature of method, some such scheme of determinants, as embodied in the explanation of the Pantry Cupboard Dream, prevents the interpreter from losing sight of the variability of thought, and from overlooking those guarantees of Varied Reaction which Nature has endowed us withal, but which seem to be denied by existing theories of Symbolism.

SUMMARY

In connection with dreams, the physiological idea of “facilitation” and “reinforcement” acquires fruitfulness if we regard the dreamer as mal-apperceiving the stimulus not alone because he is under-prepared in the domain of the correct constellation of memories, but also as subliminally pre-stimulated and over-prepared in the direction of the irrelevant response. Thus, there are two sides to the question; and irrelevancy is not to be thought of naïvely as due to the lack of sufficient energy on the dreamer’s part, to summon the correct image. Apart, then, from any doctrine of effort, we must give heed in every case to the state of pre-perception or of concurrent stimulation out of which the dream, as a mental reaction, is developed.

The illustration given (Pantry Cupboard Dream) emphasizes the non-essential character of “effort” in connection with apperceiving a stimulus; in the relaxed condition of the organism. The trial-and-error feature of the dream is explained by the probabilities in the case: it is attributed to the chances of mis-preparation for reacting to the stimulus;

this, in turn, is laid to the IRREGULAR LAPSING of the (normally) integrated units of control-association. It is thereby implied that there can be such a thing as mental preparedness even in the state of sleep.

Consequences of adventitious facilitation and reinforcement. The mal-apperception of the sound of "wheels-grinding," in the Pantry Cupboard Dream, occurred, not simply because the dreamer was "too relaxed" or could not supply the necessary "effort," but, paradoxically speaking, because he was not relaxed enough: there remained one particular adventitious reinforcement that made the interference with recall, namely a hunger sensation. Had this been eliminated—by indulgence in a moderate meal—the different elements of the dreamer's memory would have been equally lowered in their neururgic tensions. In view of the pains taken to remove all other adventitious facilitations, before going to sleep, it is easy to see what would have happened but for the prepotency of the hunger stimulus; to wit: the correct response would have had an equal chance with the false train of ideas that substituted themselves under the impulse of hunger.

In an ideal state of complete relaxation, even without "effort," the force of a stimulus should normally exert itself directly and more exclusively upon the appropriate and firmly established connection with the stock of ideas. Irrelevant reactions depend upon relative, not absolute, tensions.

II

Vicarious Evocation. The obverse, so to speak, of adventitious facilitation or reinforcement is apperceptive delay: the former favor unduly the evocation in consciousness of more or less alien ancillary images (albeit they are sufficiently cognate to the stimulus to be mobilized by it); while the delay in question represents the overcoming of resistance and time lost at the non-prepared synapses, over which the stimulus-wave must pass to reproduce the correct image. As to this correct image, the crucial point is that, in the simpler cases of apperception, it is really stimulated

first of all, below the threshold and without the preliminary excursions that seem to be implied by the (supraliminal) trains of thought in consciousness. This, at least, is the view I propose as a means of simplifying the conception of a number of paradoxical mechanisms in dreams. The view is supported by the frequency with which the precursory images are proved to have felt, from their incipience, the influence of the *stimulus-idea*.

Accordingly, the apparent groping (*tâtonnement*) manifested in the course of supraliminal processes does not imply a corresponding sequence in the course of subliminal excitation; a fact to which the study of *oniric inversion* bears witness. Neither does the phenomenon of groping necessarily depend upon the supposedly characteristic lack of "force" in the dreaming person. The real explanation lies in a conception of trial-and-error that contemplates mainly the shifting of emphasis in the neurograms, conditioned by relative reaction-times, whereby first the wrong and then the more nearly correct image prevails in consciousness. This view is corroborated by the groping type of behavior illustrated in conditions not those of sleep and relaxation: namely, by everyday waking lapses, illusions, amnesias, and inversions of letters and words when speaking or writing.

The conception of repression, in the outré acceptation of the Freudian school fails to throw a true light upon apperceptive errors; unless it be in those cases, not as numerous as supposed, wherein the apperceptive delay is distinctly prolonged by the existence of a definite inhibition. But in the general run of dreams, on the contrary, it is not the inertia or apperceptive delay that is abnormal and thus produces bizarrie; it is the abnormal readiness of other images, not "wanted," that causes their intrusion and the effect of *malapropos* and incoherency.

This intrusion of images relatively hyperfacilitated or reinforced through adventitious conditions is the basis of the explanation of the apparent inversion of time and it must form the groundwork of any thoroughgoing theory of the dreaming process, with especial reference to the so-called absurdity of dreams.

REFERENCES, NOTES AND CORRECTIONS

A. See titles appended to the two papers mentioned:

1. "Scientific Method in the Interpretation of Dreams;" *Journ. Abn. Psychology*, February-March, 1916. note *erratum*: "Studies in Psychoanalysis" etc., should be "The Theory of Psychoanalysis" by Dr. C. G. Jung, published in *Psychoanalytic Review* and Monograph of Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease (1913-14).

2. "The Apparent Inversion of Time in Dreams;" *Journ. Abn. Psychology*, April-May, 1916.

See reference to Bernard-Leroy, Eugene: "Sur L'Inversion du Temps dans le Rêve;" instead of "non-psychological" (misprint) read: "A *non-physiological* approach to the topic in question."

See Bergson's "Dreams, Mechanism of . . ." B. W. Huebsch, New York, 1914.

- B. For physiological conception of Mental Reactions see views of Prof. Woodworth in "The Consciousness of Relation," in the Columbia University volume in honor of William James. Also "Mechanism of Thought," in Ladd & Woodworth's *Elements of Physiological Psychology*;" Scribners, 1911.

- C. For a discussion of ultimate implications of mechanistic views on mental reactions, see

William James on "Reflex Action and Theism," in "The Will to Believe;" Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1908.

- D. The trial-and-error theory of dreams aligns itself with well-defined conceptions of abnormal and of normal psychology; to wit: the Neurographic Hypothesis of Morton Prince, and the Mental Reaction Theory of Woodworth. For these. see "The Unconscious" (Macmillan, 1914) and "A Revision of Imageless Thought" (*Psychological Review*, January, 1915) respectively.

ON THE UTILIZATION OF PSYCHO- ANALYTIC PRINCIPLES IN THE STUDY OF THE NEUROSES*

JAMES J. PUTNAM, M. D.

I propose to do no more in this paper than to indicate the first steps toward an attempt at the further formulating of relationships between mental processes and physiological processes, on lines analogous to those followed by Dr. Kempf in his interesting communications.¹ My attention has been directed to the desirability of doing this through an effort which I have been making to trace the significance of acroparaesthesia, about which I have just made a communication before the American Neurological Association.

Inquiries of this sort should be all the more in order on account of the fact that the practical interdependence of bodily and mental processes is so close, and shows itself in so many new and unexpected ways. The work of Dr. Cannon on the physiology of the emotions and that of Pavlow on the psychology of digestion illustrate this point. Impressive also is the fact that almost all of the philosophic systems of the day are monistic systems. It is substantially admitted by every one that in whichever direction we move in though , amongst the network of processes which, for the sake of convenience, we still classify separately as "bodily" and "mental," we find the same fundamental principles, or laws, everywhere observed; and we may therefore hope to see the three guides—philosophy, psychology and physiology—coming gradually more nearly within shouting distance of one another. Or, to express the same sentiment in better terms, we may fairly hope, especially since the advent of psycho-analysis on the field, to see intelligent and thorough-going introspection (whether of the

*Read at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1916.

¹Psychoanalytic Review, 1915, Vol. II, Nos. 2 and 4.

trained and philosophic minded layman, working by himself, or of the trained and intelligent patient, working with his physician) joining hands with the skilled observation of animals in the laboratory, each lending support to the other, in new ways. A new step in this direction has been recently made through Edwin B. Holt's attempt to simplify all vital processes by classifying them with reference to their motor outcome,—that is, by treating them all as "motor attitudes" or as modes of "behavior."² This attempt seems far too narrow and exclusive in its scope, but it is welcome in the same sense in which Sherrington's splendid studies of the reflex are welcome, the value of which for psychology and psychiatry has so recently been emphasized by Kempf.

Hitherto, the work of investigators in this field has been almost entirely on genetic lines; but this mode of inquiry, while it is very fruitful of valuable results, is faulty when used in an exclusive way, and needs to be supplemented by a movement of a different sort. It seems altogether logical and advisable, at first sight, to prepare ourselves for our studies of man by making ourselves familiar with the experimental data derived from the careful observation of the animal series, and then of the primitive man and of the child. But to carry out this method in an exclusive fashion seems to me open to serious objection. Holt's *motor attitude* view seems applicable enough when one has to deal only with the fish who darts through the water, either in flight or in pursuit of prey; or so long as one is studying, as by the accurate methods of Sherrington, the scratch reflexes and the locomotion and static attitudes of the dog. But for all our knowledge of motives, even in these cases, we are obliged to depend on our own motives and the inferences we draw from them. And here comes in, as eminently pertinent, the reasoning of Lévy-Bruhl,³ who points out (as Freud has also done) how complex and how intense the emotional reactions are among the savage races, how they reflect the complex

²The Freudian Wish and its Place in Ethics, Henry Holt and Company
1915.

³Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures. See also W.
Trotter: Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Macmillan, 1915.

fears and feelings amongst which these primitive people pass their lives, and how dangerous it is to reason from ourselves to them. We all know this, from our studies into the psychology of the child, and should feel the right to doubt how much we know about the motives of the fish. The same objection applies, so it seems to me, to the Darwinian conceptions of animal evolution. We see the results of struggle and contest among the animals, and can, of course, infer, with some show of justice, the motives or absence of motives that underlie them. But in making the visible result the basis of our conclusions, we must perforce leave out much in the way of motive at which we could not easily arrive through estimating the causes of our own conduct, *yet for the estimation of which a close knowledge of ourselves and of our own childhood is an excellent preparation.* It is only, then, as a preparatory training that I suggest making use of the principles obtained through the psycho-analytic study of the neurotic invalid, in the interest of a new viewpoint for clinical neurology and for physiology; but as such a training I think that they may be of service. Prominent among these principles is that under which "symptoms" are defined as constructive mechanisms, or "compromises," and described as securing real gains, though perhaps of purely temporary and perhaps of economically harmful sorts when looked at from the standpoint of the patients' wider interests.

In the paper on acroparaesthesia⁴ above referred to I made use of this principle (which has, of course, been made familiar through earlier studies of a variety of sorts, and especially, amongst observers, by J. Hughlings Jackson, Virchow and Verworn) by way of pointing out that we ought to be continually on the watch for the constructive element of the neuroses (such as acroparaesthesia, epilepsy, and migraine) instead of accentuating forever their status as calamities. I became greatly interested in this point a number of years ago, while studying the relation of cretinism to the results of an acute destruction of the thyroid gland. The cretin differs from the myxoedematous patient in that

⁴Cf. Publications of the Am. Neu. Assn., to appear in N. Y. Jr. Nerv. & Ment. Dis.

he represents a certain positive type of being, and not simply the degradation of a normal type. In a similar sense, we are all prepared, I think, to believe that the hysterical and the obsessive patient represents the outcome of a partially constructive, not of a simply destructive tendency. The regression toward one's infantile fixations never means simply and solely a real return to infancy as represented by one of its less good phases.

In a similar way, too, it may be said that there is probably something constructive in a migraine, or in acroparaesthesia, or even an epilepsy. These processes are no doubt like weeds that spring up on the failure of the co-ordinations that favor nobler growth. But they spring up as something which has a significance of its own; and this is, I think, one of the best lessons to be gathered from psycho-analytic observations.

Another principle has reference to the question of the significance of *habit*, which plays such a large part in the phenomena of what we will call "morbid physiology" and "morbid psychology" alike. What is this "habit," the literature of which is so extensive? It is easy enough to assume an analogue for it in physical processes, such as inertia; or to say that what one has done once one tends more readily to do again because the paths are broken. But can we not go a little further than this, in a psycho-analytic sense?

It is well known that Dr. Jung has spoken of mental lethargy or sloth (*Traegheit*) of the nervous system, or of the mental tendencies, as underlying many of the phenomena met with in the study of the psychoneuroses; and in the maintenance of this mental lethargy, or sloth, habit seems to play a large part. I have been much interested of late in studying this matter with reference to the mental dullness of which patients so frequently complain, and which obviously serves in part as a defense mechanism against their own critical tendencies or those of the physician. Professor Freud, at the conclusion of a recent communication, remarks, about this phenomenon, what had already occurred to me as true, that it is not to be thought of in a negative sense; as one is inclined to describe habit, but that, on the contrary, it is a symptom having a positive meaning and

playing a positive part, as I have indicated. Freud asserts that it is the equivalent of what has been denominated "fixation." However this may be, I suggest that this habit, even when met with in ordinary neurological conditions, as in relation to migraine, etc., also plays a part analogous to that which it plays in the psychoneuroses. It is a constructive mechanism and to be dealt with as such; and the fact that it leads to results which are socially unfortunate is no argument against this view. Both fixations and habits have a certain value, although I am reminded of the fact that various psychologists have spoken of habits as constituting also obstacles to progress. However, there is a line of one of Emerson's poems which runs, "When half-gods go the gods arrive." We are all familiar with the application, in psycho-analysis, of the principle here implied, since the "half-gods" to which Emerson refers are the subconscious handicaps or fixations which restrain men from sublimation.

In the same sense, it may be that in combatting the neurological disorders such as I have mentioned, the physician ought to make a double effort, in as systematic a manner as possible. That is, he ought to discourage and break up by every means in his power those lower forms of constructive mechanisms which tend to reproduce themselves in a periodic way, but at the same time to encourage assiduously the formation of co-ordinations occupying a broader and more widely constructive place.

To sum up what I have tried to say, and which is to be regarded as only provisional, I believe that the best attitude in which to approach the study either of ordinary neurological processes, or of the phenomena which characterize the psychoneuroses studied by the psycho-analyst, is on the basis of a familiarity with a background of normality, obtained through a study of human beings at their best. The architect who has made himself familiar with the processes of construction elaborated through the genius and industry of the best minds and the best ideals, is in a better position to do justice to the rude architecture of the savage than one who has accustomed himself to savage types alone.

On similar grounds, it is really at once better and more

scientific to approach a splendid piece of work, like that of Sherrington, or the clinical observations of the neurologist, with a mental background formed through the study of the intellectual, the emotional, the volitional, in general terms the ideally constructive life of the human being at his best, than it is to approach such work without this basis of preparation.

We may be forced to assume, in doing this, that the mind, with all that it implies, is virtually present in the so-called lower co-ordinatory centers of the spinal cord, or the neural ganglia of the circulatory apparatus. But to make this assumption, even if it should seem as on its face trivial, is to do something which is really worth doing, and which is certain to provide us with suggestions for scientific observation that are well worth having.

PERMUTATIONS WITHIN THE SPHERE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

or

*The Factor of Repression and Its Influence upon Education*¹

TRIGANT BURROW, PH. D., M. D.

EDUCATION has missed its calling. Current systems of "teaching" have effaced its etymology. It is no longer a process of "leading out," but rather a process of "pushing in." To teach is not to invite originality, but, to enforce conformity. It is not to cultivate, but to prescribe. It is not to release native potentialities, but to efface individuality, and the child who enters the present-day curriculum of the schools is arbitrarily thrust beneath the onerous yoke of dogmatism and rubric.

In view of the educational problems which, at least implicitly, are laid open through the dynamic psychology of Freud, it is interesting to consider the influence of these disciplinary systems of child training upon the subsequent development of the individual in the light of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis studies the subjective life—the feeling or affective life of the individual. It studies the life of the imagination, of the will, of the sentiments, that is,—it envisages the emotional sphere of individual psychology. It is in this sphere that we find the source of human zest. Here arises Man's incentive to achievement, the impulse to human endeavor. Here are hope, love, joy, ambition, interest and aspiration. It is the sphere in which lie the springs of human conduct, and so in this sphere we have the underlying motive power of man's activity.

As we know, the function of psychoanalysis is essentially

¹Read at Washington Psychoanalytic Association, Washington, D. C., April, 8, 1916; and at the Fifth Annual Meeting of American Psychoanalytic Association, May 11, 1916, Washington, D. C.

educational. The disorders which the psychoanalyst confronts are invariably the result of faulty processes of education. Not that these disorders are in any sense characterized by intellectual inadequacy, (on the contrary, the neurotic patient is frequently far above the average intellectually), but by disharmonies in the emotional sphere—the sphere of the will, the interest, the feelings—in short, the sphere in which we find the impetus to those activities wherein we live and move and have our being.

It is noteworthy that nervous patients of the type to which I refer invariably show a marked supersensitiveness in the sphere of the imagination, the intuitions, the affections. These patients are in the widest sense sympathetic. Their sentiments are deep and permanent. Beneath all their suffering and sick disguises they show the quality that we may well characterize as "human"—the element that is so essential to effective living and that gives value and meaning to life. But these human emotions, these sensitive affections, this imaginative feeling, have found no outlet in objective expression. They have lain fallow and have come to naught.

Now psychoanalysis shows us that an inhibiting fear in one form or another has possessed itself of the minds of these patients. This silent, unseen fear, like a stifling pall, has crushed all initiative, all self-confidence, all effort toward spontaneous endeavor. It is because of this fear that the sphere of feeling in these personalities has not come into its own. Psychoanalysis has further shown, however, that these unused energies pertaining to the life of feeling, will and imagination, are by no means crushed out and destroyed through their abnegation and disuse, but apparently in accordance with a law of forces in the mental sphere analogous to that obtaining in the physical sphere, these frustrated energies are converted into other forms of force, for, being driven back upon themselves, we find them issuing again in regressive integrations. These are expressed in such unprofitable rumination; as tend toward mere egoistic satisfactions and toward personal, bodily gratifications, that is,—toward autoerotic interests. The result then of this transformation of forces consists in an introversion of the normal adult libido into regressive, non-productive

bodily sensations, or into mere sexual affects. Such coagulated affects are utterly incompatible with the ideals of the contemporary social mind as presented in the sensitive neurotic patient, and his suffering and inadequacy are the direct expression of the unconscious conflict caused by this inherent discrepancy within his personality. Such, I believe, is the mechanism underlying the fear inhibition which we know to be the essential factor in these disturbed psychic states.

As the average type of individual is less sensitive to human values and obligations, his reaction to this frustration of the interest and zest which normally should flow, contemporarily with his intellectual development, out of the affective, emotional sphere of his being into creative expression, is very different. Here, his enforced introversion issues forth in the actual pursuit of the physical satisfactions represented in the outspoken variations and distortions to be seen in those sexual aberrations, direct and indirect, which characterize very generally our so-called normal human society.

We talk of normal human society, but in reality there is no such thing. It is only normal from the standpoint of human society, but from the standpoint of psychiatry human society is very abnormal. Regarded in the light of the objective tests of mental pathology, many of the manifestations of our social system indicate a condition of marked deflection from the norm.

Viewing the social mind as expressed in its various reactions—its laws, customs and beliefs; its art, its manners and diversions; its conventions, styles and habits—we see in these reactions well marked analogies to the clinical symptoms presented in certain pathological states of the individual, and upon analysis we discover that underlying these manifestations there is a mechanism of development precisely identical with that underlying the pathological processes presented in our clinics. Beneath all of these manifestations of the social consciousness we discover, as in the consciousness of the individual, a miscarriage of the primary inspirational and affectional sphere with the resulting exaggeration and distortion of the sexual instinct.

These disorders are presented in such familiar symptoms as the bizarre costumes of women, for example the French-heeled slipper, or the vanities carried upon their heads in place of hats, or in the jerky, convulsive movements lately substituted for dancing, or in the coquettices and solicitations naively accepted upon our stage as interpretations of art, or in those sudden epidemics of religious hysteria whose onset is indicated by those characteristic paroxysms of twitching, contortion and elation often manifested throughout portions of the social organism in the revivals that are presented from time to time in our communities.

The study then of the neurotic individual and of the social body in the light of psychoanalysis reveals a condition which may be described as an arrest of development in the affective life causing a failure of adaptation to the demands of adult expression and a consequent reversion of interest to primitive bodily satisfactions, (or to their vicarious equivalents,) such as, in the current process of mental evolution, should have been long ago submerged.

Our thesis, then, rests upon the theory of a dynamic permutation of spheres in the realm of consciousness, in accordance with which there takes place a total transposition of affects along wholly disparate planes of integration.

Let us look more deeply into this apparent correlation between the frustrated expression of the affective life of the individual resulting from inadequate methods of education and those subsequent aberrations which cause upon the one hand the repressive reactions we know as nervous disorders and upon the other hand those exaggerations and distortions of the sexual instinct characteristic of current levels of adaptation.

The result of the investigations of psychoanalysis into the earliest sources of biology, or of genetic psychology, necessitates the conception of an original dual psychic system. "Positing the existence of a primary matrix of unconscious processes as the background of mental life, Freud² describes it as consisting throughout of a homogeneous . . . pleasure-principle." "It is the elemental

²Freud, S. *Formulierungen ueber die Zwei Prinzipien des Psychischen Geschehens.* *Jahrbuch Für Psychoanalyt. u. Psychopathol. Forschungen.*

psychic principle constituting as it were the menstruum of consciousness.”³

Later, with the development of the infant there “is thrust in upon the psyche the recognition of a stern outer reality in contradistinction to the benign inner world of fancy. And thus is introduced in contrast to the primal pleasure-principle the principle of reality.”⁴

Out of the reality-principle there is developed conscious, directive purposeful thinking—our logical and intellectual activities and organized scientific ratiocinations—in short, the realm of pure reason. Out of the primary pleasure-principle (which we as well may call the harmony-principle) on the other hand, there develops in adult life, the reactions pertaining to feeling and phantasy or the sphere of affectivity. This sphere may be represented in two ways: in creative social harmony, that is, in the expressions of beauty and the aspirations of love, or in immediate sensuous preoccupations, that is, in the gratifications of sex, or in its negative equivalent of repression.

We see then the inseparable nexus, the psychological concomitance between the intuitive, inspirational, affective sphere of the mental life and what we know as the sexual sphere. We see that these two spheres represent alternative processes flowing out of the original pleasure- or harmony-principle. Here then is the psychobiological account of our dynamic principle of the *permutation of spheres*, for it is seen that the sphere of feeling, interest and inspiration and the sphere of sexuality are but differing aspects of an originally unitary psychic system. These developmental trends are then the two potential outgrowths from the same primary principle of consciousness.

Now if this original psychic sphere, being dynamic and inspirational, is the vital force necessary to human activities, and if exaggerations of the sexual urge vary in inverse proportion to the progressive cultivation of this primary, inspirational sphere, it follows that the educational system which offers the completest inclusion of this sphere in its program of

³Trigant Burrow “Conscious and Unconscious Mentation from the Psycho-analytic Viewpoint.” *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. IX. No. 4. Apr. 15, 1912.

⁴Ibid.

training is psychologically best adapted to meet the needs of the individual as a whole, and that through a suitable evaluation of this sphere in the scheme of education, we are putting into operation those processes which will most effectually offset a vicarious regression to more elemental interests with resulting over emphasis and distortion of the sexual instinct.

The inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the need of the child is above all things an educational program which affords the release of his native interests—the freedom of his individuality through a progressive discharge of affects. He needs to *feel* and to *do* something. He needs to live out his feeling in expression. He needs to find an outlet for his inspirational, affective life in activities which allow the escape of his spontaneous interests.⁵ Of course, at the bare suggestion of freedom for the child the conventional mind is thrown into instant paroxysms of alarm. The unthinking can only see in the principle a menace to bric-a-brac. But freedom is not license. It is not destructive. The freedom the child needs is freedom of expression, and the more he has of such freedom the less, proportionately, is his tendency toward licen

The freedom which we urge then, is freedom of activity, of glad, purposeful, constructive activity, of creative, social activity, the source of whose inspiration lies in human affectivity.

As I have come to view the fundamental needs of human personality in the light of psychoanalytic studies, it has become more and more clear that mere formal instruction in matters of the sexual life would by no means satisfy the healthful needs of the growing mental organism. One of the many erroneous conceptions in regard to the theory of psychoanalysis is the quite common belief that in order to secure the child complete immunity from later incursions of nervous disorders, it is only necessary that we frankly disclose to him the ominous truth that he was born of his mother! But after all, I doubt whether the

⁵ As Adolf Meyer said in an address delivered in 1903, before the New England Association for Child Study. "The emphasis of nature study does perhaps much to bring a healthy turn into education. But we need more; we need greater wholesomeness in the training for human relations and aspirations."

circumstances of his initiation into life are *of themselves* matters of such pressing concern to the child. I doubt if he really cares whether his entrance into the home circle was due to the courtesy of the family doctor or to the delicate attentions of some exotic bird. What the child does care about is his right to be himself—to be dealt with openly and sincerely, to live his life unchecked and un thwarted by a program of parental reserve and by an educational system which is wholly objective and disciplinary and which thus allows no freedom of expression within the sphere of his feeling and imagination.

Now when we come to shape our pedagogic notions in the light of the dynamic principle of the permutation of spheres, we will find, I think, that the cultural processes through which alone outlet is to be given the primary, subjective, inspirational life of man are the activities afforded through those social media of creative expression which unite art production and human service.

The art that is personal and limited is wholly inadequate as a vehicle of dynamic release. The neurotic exaggerations and anomalies of the sexual instinct typical of the footlight virtuoso, with his proverbially jealous, insatiate, narcissistic, self-worship, indicate clearly enough the poverty and incompleteness of such forms of art. The creative expression, whether it belong to the industrial or to the fine arts, must include, along with the beautiful, a social, humanitarian end. For true art is gregarious. The art that is psychologically complete must satisfy an affectional as well as an esthetic need. To revert to the early Greek standard, art must be good, that is, *useful*, as well as beautiful.

As music is of all art forms the most subjective and non-definitive, it should hold the foremost place in the early art expression of childhood. By music, I mean the music that is a daily, living experience—an expression inseparable from life. Belonging to the primary unconscious, rhythm and melody are inherent to the spirit of man and music is thus an organic part of life. As Nietzsche says, "Melody is primary and universal."

By art, then I mean the spontaneous, free, joyous expression of the beautiful and the good, in those universal

social symbols by which outlet is given the primary, inspirational and affectional sphere of consciousness.⁶ If education then, should occupy itself with the affective, inspirational life of the child, as psychoanalysts we must realize that there is a deep need of imparting newer life into our present school systems through a fuller pedagogic appreciation of the natural affectivity of children and of the importance of giving opportunity for its expression in the social aims and services of creative activity.

If our thesis be true it follows that the perfunctoriness and sterility of the educational systems of the day with their deficient opportunity of outlet for the inspirational interests of the child, are the external factors which are responsible for the regressive permutations of consciousness, represented in neurotic affections, whether they are presented under the negative aspect of the neuroses or in the exaggerations and distortions of the sexual instinct presented in the outspoken perversions or in so-called normal life.

Geography, spelling and arithmetic are not all of life. Yet such drills are made the standard of educational requirement. Tasks calling out the affection and interest and imagination of the child are lacking.

When we consider the original elements of mind, it becomes still more clear how indefensible psychologically is such a pedagogic method, for it fails to take account of the dual psychic principle inherent in the very genesis of the mental life. It fails to recognize that the process of development in the individual in whom the harmony principle predominates results in tendencies which are the direct opposite of those possessed by the individual in whom the reality-principle is the prevailing determinant. With the harmony-principle are correlated the subjective tendencies, with the reality-principle the objective adaptations. The mind with subjective tendencies is imaginative, intuitive, inspirational. It is the mind of the creative, temperamental,

⁶I know of no educator who has made so satisfactory an approach towards placing music in its proper relation to the education of childhood as Miss Alys E. Bentley. Using through her system of correlated movements the spontaneous reactions of the human body as a medium of musical interpretations, she arrives with her pupils at what is perhaps the most fundamental and organic expression of musical feeling that is attainable.

artistic personality. The objective mind is exact, deductive, mathematical. It is the mind of the steadfast, laborious, scientific student of research. Yet as broad as are these psychological disparities of type our current educational program takes no account of such essential type-differences.

It seems to me that in our present mechanical, unimaginative routine of "instruction" based upon exclusive objective ideals, we have an example of what may be called the "institutional neurosis." The genus "school ma'am," conjuring visions of an austere, puritanical female, policing formal rows of intimidated children, affords us a familiar clinical symptom of this institutional form of repression.⁷ In this anomalous situation we have again a familiar illustration of the principle of the permutation of spheres. In the typical preceptor with his overzealous emphasis upon stricture and discipline, the psychoanalyst suspects that the real motive is some secret discomfiture—some hidden discrepancy in the life of the teacher himself. And, in reality, upon analysis, we find within him an overweening desire to assert his own will, to coerce, to restrict, to repress the spontaneity of others. His libido has been deflected from its primary, affectional sphere, to a regressive, sadistic plane. Following the introversion attendant upon his own disappointment, the contemplation of childhood fills him with bitterness and pain, and in truth the motive that draws such an individual to the career of teaching is, only too often, an unconscious resentment.

Institutional teaching then, through the enforcement of rule and precept, is too often a form of repression. Teachers cling tenaciously to a method of rigid objectivity because objectivity is rigid. It admits of no latitude, no liberty, no originality. It is the way of observance, of prohibition, of exemplary conformity. In such a curriculum there is no place for the child of poetic fancy, of imaginative genius, of creative talent. In such a program there is no room for the subjective child who is a dreamer of dreams.

⁷It were well if all schools might take pattern from the ideals embodied in the spirit of service and the cultivation of the beautiful as they exist in the camp schools of C. Hanford Henderson. The central inspiration of these educational centres has been well set forth in the works of this remarkable educator. See "Education and the Larger Life," and "What is it to be Educated?"

But the imaginative child who is not permitted to dream upward dreams downward. Inspirational trends which are denied their natural progressive development in appropriate outlets will, according to the law of dynamic transformation,⁸ inevitably disintegrate and regress. And let it be remembered it is to the dreamers that we owe the inspiration which led to the effulgent art of Greece and of Rome. It is to the dreamers that the world must look for its music, its literature and its drama. If Darwin and Pasteur have contributed valuable to the sum of human riches, Shakespeare and Goethe have contributed no less. That which the scientist brings to humanity of objective value is fully matched in the services made possible through the subjective inspiration of the artist, the poet and the seer.

From these considerations it seems to me that the psychopathologist ought feel that he can no longer stand aside and permit the teacher untrained in the principles of dynamic psychology to determine what shall be the educational method of the schools for our children. It becomes incumbent upon the psychopathologist to see to it that our educational program shall no longer thwart and deny the subjective, inspirational life of the child. If prevailing educational methods are a menace to the healthy adaptation of the growing mental organism it is the office of the psychopathologist to make clear the psychological fallacy of such systems.

Surely children are the best we have. If anywhere, surely the hope of the race lies in these immature folk with their eager unspoiled interests and their confiding affections. When all else has grown stale, there is always the freshness and simplicity of childhood to turn to as a source of unending solace and appeasement. It is precisely its spirit of play, its spirit of illusion, its subjective mood that is the charm and delight of childhood. It is their exemption from the stern demands of reality that gives to children their irresistible quality. So, too, with the spirit of mature manhood. His imaginative consolation lies in the domain of illusion and inspiration, as embodied in the expressions of art and

⁸Freud's Psychologie Als Eine Transformations Theorie. M. Weissfeld. Jahrbuch V Band, II Hälft, 1913.

the aspirations of love. Here are the play grounds of us who are older children. Here do we find compensation for the frustrations and denials of the world of actuality. For love and art are the great levelers of circumstance, the supreme consolers, mitigating the oppression of reality and lulling to repose the harried energies of men.

It will be a bright day for childhood as for humanity when educators have awakened at last to the realization that methods of training which obstruct the free expression of the imagination in childhood, repressing their intuitive inspirational life, are responsible for the vicarious development of those distorted, abnormal, anti-social manifestations of instinct existing in adult social life, and for those repressed and thwarted conditions of the more sensitive mind characterizing what is perhaps the most acute expression of human suffering—the conflict within the personality now recognized as the underlying causative factor in nervous disorders.

ON DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF MANIFEST DELUSIONS FROM THE SUBJECT'S POINT OF VIEW*

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(Read in abstract at the Washington meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, 1916.)

I fear that the present paper may be regarded as an elaboration of the obvious. I am, however, the more content with such a view of my analysis in that the psychiatric world of late has been invited to much that is far from obvious. The term 'manifest' in my title suggests that the so-called 'latent' in so-called 'mental mechanisms' is not here to be 'analyzed,' if indeed it be susceptible of analysis in the classical usage of the term. Likewise, the term 'descriptive' in my title indicates that no claim is made to 'explanatory' analysis, if indeed analysis (in the classical sense) ever did 'explain' anything. In short, if the descriptive analysis of the manifest in false beliefs here meant turns out to be a valuable preliminary to work on 'mental mechanisms,' I shall have no objection. But I do feel that so-called 'psycho-analysis' or any other so-called 'analytic psychology' which begins to synthesize (*e. g.* to symbolize) from the outset is more likely to import the examiner's own beliefs (true or false) into the particular psychopathic situation than to extract the patient's beliefs therefrom. And this remains true even if the patient's beliefs are not the *primum movens* of his total attitude or behavior. For,

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granting that *aliquid latens* is actually at work, it is important to know also what the subject thinks is at work. Surely the subject's thoughts about whatever is manifest to him modify his attitude or behavior to some degree, and form at least a part of his rationalization thereof. If the total process of reasoning is not 'conscious,' surely *some part* of the reasoning process *sometimes* is conscious and employs cognitive factors.

I attempt to deal in fine with beliefs and delusions (a) that are *manifest not latent*, (b) by a process that is *analytic not synthetic*, (c) to the immediate end of *description not explanation*, and (d) from a point of view that is *subjective to the believer* and (so far as possible) not subjective to the examiner and without pretense to being objective as the total account of a psychopathic situation.

The attempt is in no sense a critique of analytic psychology and in fact grew out of practical necessities in the clinic of the Psychopathic Hospital in Boston where a stream of internes and assistants, medical and social, flows in and out without particular previous instruction in psychopathology or compensatory knowledge of the world. The prime necessity here was to supply captions, compartments, items indispensable to the proper analysis or later synthesis of a given psychopathic situation. Faced with such a situation as presented by a perfectly lucid patient, the tyro in psychiatric examination is embarrassed by riches of information, by a luxury of woe, which at first seems infinite in dimensions, perhaps hopelessly tangled. Conflicting accounts by the patient, by one or more parties in the patient's *entourage*, by public or social agencies, by previous physicians, to say nothing of the prejudice of first impressions by the examiner, combine to confuse the very elect. The examiner's possible preconceptions that "*nothing manifest is at all likely to be the 'real' explanation*" makes confusion worse confounded. The examiner dashes after Ariadne's thread without due consideration whether or no there is a labyrinth at all. What therefore, I asked, was the indispensable minimum of items required for orientation in a patient's seemingly (to him) altered, seemingly (to us) delusional world?

I offer below a list of such items in an orienting analysis of seemingly false beliefs. The process by which the list was arrived at seemed to possess intrinsic interest and is therefore described, although the value of the items depends in no wise upon the technique of their choice.

The fact that the items are as ancient as the foundations of grammar is of some interest. The descriptive biologist in his capacity as behaviorist might well seek for the sub-headings of his descriptive science in logic itself. Studying as are we a subjective situation rather than primarily an objective history of actual events, it was perhaps natural that grammar and rhetoric rather than logic should supply suggestions for descriptive headings; e. g. (and see also below) what seems necessary to the patient *is objectively not "necessary," but it remains "imperative."*

I have been able to clarify at least my own mind by resort to some of the more obvious categories of grammar for the purpose of analysis of delusions. I feel sure that several of the distinctions made will appeal at once to the majority of psychopathologists as they have appealed to a number of my colleagues in practical work. The categories chosen are, in fact, so many thousand years old, that they cannot fail to be of some value, as I think will appear on inspection of that division of verb theory dealing with person, number, gender, and tense. That is to say, it must be obvious to the layman, to say nothing of the psychopathologist, that it is important to know who inhabits the universe of the patient's false beliefs, how many persons are involved in the delusional universe, what the sex of those persons is, and when and for how long the noxious event or condition is thought to have occurred or lasted. Indeed it may be regarded as a fact, or at any rate as a pious wish, that all proper histories of patients contain enough upon which to ground a judgment as to person, number of persons, sex, and time in the alleged delusions. If grammatical categories are of any special value here, it is only that they give us a certain sense of completeness as to possible items of evidence relative to false beliefs. Clearly enough, the tyro in psychiatric examining often does not know how far to go in the taking of evidence, and rarely ends taking a history without

a gnawing sense that he might well go infinitely farther in securing testimony. Accordingly, I had for some time been seeking some convenient termini for history-taking to which a tyro might safely pin his faith. I find that the grammatical items just listed, not only satisfy the tyro and give him a sense of relative completeness in examination, but they can also serve fairly well as a basis for more elaborate examination.

In addition to these obvious items (person, number, gender, tense), which might as easily have been developed from anybody's inner consciousness as from a review of grammatical categories, I wish to call attention to two distinctions of equal interest but of somewhat more doubtful value, and at any rate of far less obvious derivation from the facts as the patients present them. The two categories in question are those of the grammatical "voice" and of the so-called grammatical "mood," or mode. Before developing what I consider to be the values of the categories of voice and mood, let me repeat that the kind of analysis I wish to support in the first instance is analysis directed at what may be caelld the manifest rather than the latent aspect of the psychopathic situation. I do not mean to say that analyses, itemized as I here suggest for the manifest, would not be equally suitable in the realm of the latent. My plea would be for an *analysis of the manifest in the delusional universe prior to that of the latent*.

Let us turn to the grammatical categories of voice and mood. First as to the category of the voice, with its subdivisions, active, passive, and middle (or reflexive). I learn that my colleagues find the grammatical voice condition as it were to "click into place" in their analysis of a great many delusional situations. In our difficult combination of extensive and intensive work at the Psychopathic Hospital in Boston, where we deal with a great many cases that are not obviously insane or certainly psychopathic, we have naturally developed a technique of examination *more Socratically*. It is clearly not advisable as a rule to ask a patient whether he is in the active voice toward his environment or whether he is passive therein; and it is clearly far from likely that the patient would understand being placed,

as it were, in the middle voice. Nevertheless, it is surprisingly easy to develop what the patient believes as to his active or passive relation to the environment, and this by means of a very few questions. It certainly takes far less than the proverbial "twenty questions" to determine whether the patient is manifestly and subjectively in an active and dominant relation to his fellows, in a passive relation thereto, or in a personal plight of difficulties with himself. Mixtures of these relations also occur. Nevertheless, 't is surprisingly often the case that the total situation conceived by the patient as altered is one to which one of these three categories of the grammatical voice—active, passive, and reflexive—may be given. It is plain that now and then a patient regarding himself as dominant in his environment may assume a passive attitude, as of one in ambush or playing 'possum, or on the principle that "still waters run deep," and the like. It is likewise plain that a patient regarding himself as overwhelmed by his *entourage* may become counteractive to somebody therein whom he takes to be a special foe. In these instances of the subjectively-dominant-person-playing 'possum, and the subjectively-overwhelmed-person-counteractive, we are undoubtedly dealing with *objectively* passive and *objectively* active persons. Subjectively, analysis promptly shows, the patients in question are, as it were, *actively playing 'possum*, and on the basis of being overwhelmed, as it were, *passively counteractive*; that is, active in the capacity of a victim. It would seem a contradiction in terms to speak of the proverbial caged beast as passive; objectively the beast is as mobile as you please; subjectively he is full of feelings of effort, etc., but he is, nevertheless, both objectively and subjectively in the passive voice grammatically speaking. Suppose, now, we are confronted with a patient feeling, as so many feel, "cabin'd, cribb'd, confin'd," despite the objective absence of such bonds, is it not wise to regard the responsive activities of the patient as quasi normal, namely: as not (from the patient's point of view) essentially other than what a normal person would do under the circumstances? The fact that the circumstances are delusional

does not render them any the less credible and credited by the patient.

I think it may be at once recognized that there are certain values attaching to the statement that the patient is in a general way in the active voice or in the passive voice with respect to his environment. It is not so certain that the category of the middle voice is equally valuable. I find that the middle voice again splits up into two; that there probably is an active and a passive form of the reflexive or middle voice. There are probably at least two sorts of internal psychopathic situations which may be characterized by the term *reflexive*. It is, of course, probable that there are two sorts of moral situation in general which comport with this distinction. For the present, however, I am insisting merely upon the value of these distinctions on the psychopathic side. I would make employment here of the distinctions between the forms of self so beautifully described by James in the chapter on the consciousness of self in his *Principles of Psychology*. He there speaks of the following three kinds of self (I omit 'pure ego' from the present discussion): the *spiritual*, *material*, and *social selves*. Dismissing for the moment the social self as having to do largely with the relations of the subject to his environment, I would consider especially the spiritual and material selves, or "ego" and "me" of James' nomenclature. Just as the patient's relations to his environment may be formulated as follows:

- | | |
|-------------|---------|
| (a) Active | PAT>ENV |
| (b) Passive | PAT<ENV |

so we may consider that the patient's relations to himself may be formulated somewhat as follows

- | | |
|-------------------------|--------|
| (c) Reflexive (Active) | EGO>ME |
| (d) Reflexive (Passive) | EGO<ME |

The sign $>$ in this formula obviously means many things. Thus, a patient active with respect to his environment ($PAT>ENV$) may be a patient with delusions of grandeur

giving a variety of orders to his *entourage* or he may be violent and destructive in his environment. He may even, as was pointed out above, inhibit his objective activities for the moment to secure an ulterior end. The (grammatical) activity includes an almost limitless number of forms of action. The point lies in the patient's conception of his relation to the environment. So also with the sign < A total gamut of relations may be covered by this sign, from the extreme instance of the counteractivities of the caged beast to the more ordinary phenomena of the ordinary delusion of persecution. When we come to the relations of the patient to himself, to the reflexive disorders, our difficulties multiply on account of the well-known logical pitfalls of identity and non-identity. It is not necessary to read Hegel to become aware of the difficulties of the concept 'self-activity,' and the concept of 'self-passivity' is not less involved. Just as a normal subject fits his environment and the environment fits him approximately, so normally there is a similarly satisfactory relation between the various parts or categories of the self. We speak of self-control, of being at peace with oneself, of having settled one's own problems, of the serenity of virtue, and the like. These are examples of perfect fit between the spiritual and material selves. The doctrine of humility which prevails in Christianity possibly preaches what the youth believes to be too great a degree of self-abnegation or passivity. It is possible that our current idea of self-control is a little more than that of the Christian self-abnegation than that of the strong man having himself well inhand. However that may be, it is safe to say that psychopaths often show degrees of deviation from what may be called the standard reflexive relation of the self to itself which are entirely convincing, and illustrate both forms of altered relation of the self to itself, namely: the active and the passive forms of reflexive disorder. What the French term *theomanias*, or forms of disease with religious exaltation, occasionally show the spiritual self in entire control of the bodily self. Psychopathic degrees of flagellation may be used as examples of this kind of disorder. Certain delusions of grandeur of a self-contained type of egoism may also illustrate the form.

The passive form of reflexive condition is illustrated by a number of conditions ranging from the feeling of inadequacy of the depressed form of manic depressive psychosis, masturbation, and the like, up to certain forms of suicide.

Enough has been said to suggest briefly the advantages of employing the 'voice' distinction. The tyro in psychiatry—and we may all lay claim to this title as we confront many of our problems—finds a great number of his cases to click into place with the use of this four-fold system of relations as formulated above. A sympathetic harmony with the patient's own attitude is attained by the examiner, whose questions become rather legitimately leading questions, the answers to which speedily betray any loss of dramatic unity which would be endangered by the patient's slipping from one of these four relations to another. The latter, indeed, happens in sundry cases of schizophrenia. If we cling, in our analysis of the lucid patient's beliefs, to what is manifest and subjective in the patient, and strive to understand the patient's behaviour from one or other of these four relations, I believe a certain insight is gained which is the best preparation for more thoroughgoing factorial analysis, and for the syntheses of successful genetic work.


I turn to the equally interesting but more dubious region of the grammatical moods. At this point, I may interject an explanation of my looking in the direction of the moods of grammar for psychopathological categories. As I have set forth more in detail in an article written in honor of Prof. Josiah Royce for the *Philosophical Review*. I had occasion to illustrate the method of Prof. Royce's logical seminary by comparing the facts of one science with the classification and nomenclature of an older science. For reasons which need not concern us, I chose to compare psychiatry with grammar. I had been trying to come to clearness for myself as to the topic of delusions. Finding that many, if not the majority, of delusions are not perverted ideas so much as perversions of the believing process, I was convinced that I should find more to my comparative purpose in the grammar of verbs than elsewhere. Looking through Goodwin's *Greek Moods and Tenses*, I came upon traces of

the old controversy about the true nature of the subjunctive and optative moods. I found, for example, that Delbrück held that the subjunctive was a mood of will and the optative a mood of wish. Knowing that much had been made of the term *wish* by several workers in the field of psychopathology, and feeling that over rationalization of the subjunctive type was the rule in other camps, I became persuaded that much might be learned from the situation in grammar of possible value in psychiatry. Not knowing much about grammar, I was *a priori* not very likely to get very far in correlations.

However, without further consideration of my reasons for effecting such correlations, I will proceed to psychiatric suggestions drawn from the moods. It is often stated that the term *mood* is itself not so good a term as the term *modus*; exactly why the Latin term *modus* should be interpreted in English by the emotion-laden term *mood*, I am not competent to discuss. Strangely enough, however, the English term *mood* so well expresses a certain form of rhetorical situation that every educated person would clearly understand being put in, e. g., the imperative mood, or perhaps the optative mood. It would be less idiomatic to speak of a person as in the subjunctive mood, although a person mulling over hypotheses would probably be the connotation of such a phase. A phlegmatic or matter-of-fact person might be described as usually in the indicative mood without undue stretching of terms. At all events, these four moods: the imperative, indicative, subjunctive, and optative, are apparently the four characteristic moods or modes of the best studied languages, namely; the Indo-European group. Other languages contain a variety of other variously designated moods, but we find these moods reducing as a rule to the standard four. In fact, the majority of fresh designations, such as the potential, conditional, and the like, on the one hand, and the desiderative, precative (prayerful), or jussive (statements of *lux fiat* type), moods, seem to flow in the direction of the subjunctive or the optative, as the case may be.

Without going into this matter at length or justifying the idea by historical data I may briefly say that these

moods may be logically related to one another as in the following diagram of the hypothetical development of moods:



I have developed in my article for the *Philosophical Review* some notion of the layered development of these moods, pointing out that the child of the savage may well start with those bare stems that constitute the imperatives; that upon the layer of the imperatives may develop the matter-of-fact indicatives; and that upon this plateau, the two eminences of the subjunctive and the optative develop. Science is a matter of hypothesis and employs subjunctives. Art is in part at least a matter of imagination and flourishes upon optatives. For a certain type of mind, the wish is father to the thought; optative air-castles secure the subject's happiness. The scientific or hypothetical type of mind attempts to realize itself, as it were, subjunctively. The optative person builds, as we say, castles in Spain; the subjunctive type is gulled by the well-known 'Spanish captive'.

It is a curious thing that of the anciently accepted temperaments, the choleric corresponds somewhat closely with the imperative. The phlegmatic may be said to correspond somewhat with the indicative; the sanguine rather clearly with the optative. Whether the melancholic or atrabilious corresponds with the rationalistic employment of subjunctives is not at present wholly clear to me. The correlation between the temperaments and the moods is sufficiently close to be at least suggestive.

The logician might inquire why we resort to grammatical moods when we have the logical modalities at our command. These modalities, as is well known, consist of the *necessary*, the *contingent*, the *possible*, and the *impossible*. It is clear that the objectively necessary corresponds somewhat closely with the imperative. It is clear that the objectively con-

tingent and the subjunctive are closely allied. The possible and the optative are also not far removed from one another. The relation of the impossible to the indicative is not at first sight close, and only becomes so when it is developed by the logicians that the impossible is not so much the opposite of the possible as it is the opposite of the necessary; and that just as the imperative and the indicative are coupled together somewhat apart from the optative-subjunctive couple, so the necessary-impossible couple is a little apart from the possible-contingent couple. Here again, the correlation of the four-fold systems: logical modality on the one hand, and grammatical mood on the other, is perhaps not exact, though it is decidedly suggestive.

As against a logician who should decry the use of the grammatical moods instead of the logical modalities, I would insist as above stated on the preferential use of grammatical categories for subjective situations where the truth may never be learned, and where, beliefs that we regard as false, the patient regards as true and upon which he proceeds to act accordingly. It may then be urged that the employment of these mood designations is an approximately exact way of expressing inexact situations.

Practically, then, I find my colleagues, although they do not accede to the mood distinction as speedily and, as it were, passively as they do to the use of the voice distinction, to some extent adopting the mood distinction. My own idea is that the degeneration, condensation, collapse, or precipitation of a subjunctive into an indicative;—that is, of an hypothesis into what the patient regards as a fact,—leads to a mental situation of a pretty definite complexion. Signs of pre-existent hypotheses are frequent. Elaborate argumentation is the rule, as after all the hypothesis makers are precisely the eager disputants of the world. On the other hand, when the optative degenerates, condenses, collapses, or precipitates, then again one finds evidence in the resultant indicatives of the pre-existent wishes. In the former case, the subjunctive precipitate is in the form of what may be termed a pragmatic delusion or a para-pragmatic belief, namely; a false belief which requires experience to determine its falsity; whereof we say, "Time

will tell." On the other hand, the optative precipitate is in the form of fantastic delusions which are, as it were, *prima facie* false, that is, false taking into consideration the context and circumstances of the patient. These latter delusions should not require the test of experience. They are not irrational beliefs or rational delusions; they are paraphantastic beliefs or fantastic delusions. I offer as a suggestion, therefore, the conception that *delusions may be descriptively classified as degenerate hypotheses, on the one hand, and as degenerate wishes on the other.* If any one desires to identify hypotheses and wishes, I shall naturally have no objection when proof is brought. The descriptive classifications of delusions would fall together at precisely such time as the distinction of hypotheses and wishes should vanish. I make no point of the ultimacy of the distinction. Whether it would not be possible to divide the characters of men along these lines, I shall not develop here.

So much for a brief statement of certain categories deliberately derived from grammar that may be of some use in the psychiatry and especially in the psychopathology of delusions. I believe that it is clear that the analytical items of person, number, sex, and time, as involved in the noxious events or conditions of the delusional universe, must be of value in description. I believe that the four-fold system of possible relations of the patient to the environment, on the one hand, and of the patient to himself, on the other, each relation splitting into a pair, active and passive, will also more or less appeal to the analyst. The suggestions from the grammar of moods are somewhat more doubtful, but, to say the least, suggestive.

In a given case, how much to the point it may be to ask what degenerated hypothesis is at the bottom of this irrational belief, or on the other hand what precipitated wish; again, how important it may be to ask whether this patient from his own point of view is dominant in his situation or overwhelmed by it; or whether, on the other hand, his difficulties are intrapersonal and relate to disorders in the relative values of his different selves; whether he is in the seventh heaven of neglected bodily concerns, or whether he is hypochondriacally controlled by somatic factors. Again, is

the first person involved alone, or are two persons involved; and is the other person involved in the dual universe conceived as in the second person, namely: as a *you*, or in the third person, as *him* or *her*? The dramatic situation is entirely different when one is *vis-à-vis* and when one is an eavesdropper. Is the situation not monadic, not dyadic, but triadic? Is this a jealousy situation, representing the so-called triangle of the novelists; or is the triangle situation always actually, as a colleague suggests, essentially tetradic in that another model is being more or less unconsciously utilized, upon which to build the actual triadic jealousy situation? All these and numerous other intriguing problems develop in the form, either of hypotheses or of wishes, on the part of the psychopathologist.

SUMMARY

The writer aims at a descriptive analysis of manifest delusions and false beliefs taken subjectively *i. e.* from the patient's point of view. He regards this as an indispensable preliminary to explanatory synthesis of psychopathic situations, even should it turn out that *aliquid latens* is the nucleus of such situations. Practically he proposes a minimum of terms which the tyro in psychiatric examination must aim to get from a lucid patient entertaining or alleged to entertain false beliefs. In addition to (a) The *person* or persons involved, (b) the *number* of persons involved, (c) the *sex* of these persons, (d) the *time*, past, present, or future, in which the noxious event or condition is believed to occur, the writer deals also with (e) the 'voice' in which the patient takes himself to be. The patient from his own point of view regards himself as at odds with the environment

(1) as it were actively . . .

(PATIENT>ENVIRONMENT)

or (2) as it were passively

(PATIENT<ENVIRONMENT), or again as at odds with himself, either

(3) with higher (spiritual) self dominant

(EGO>"ME")

or (4) with lower (material) self dominant

($\text{EGO} < \text{"ME"}$). The writer deals also with (f) the distinction of 'mood,' finding that patients above the 'imperative' level entertain either irrational delusions or fantastic ones. The writer speculates that irrational (pragmatic) delusions represent hypotheses taken as facts (*i. e.* 'subjunctives' degenerating into 'indicatives') and that fantastic (*prima facie* false) beliefs represent wishes taken as facts (*i. e.* 'optatives' degenerating into 'indicatives'). Possibly those who transcend the imperative and indicative levels in normal development split into two classes of persons, those with a leaning toward hypotheses (highest development, men of science) and those with a leaning toward wishes (highest development, artists). In the body of the paper some account is given of the comparative method by which these items of psychiatric analysis were obtained, a fuller account of which has appeared in the *Philosophical Review* in a paper written in honor of Professor Josiah Royce.

¹Southard: On the Application of Grammatical Categories to the Analysis of Delusions; article read in honor of the sixtieth birthday of Professor Josiah Royce at the Philadelphia meeting of the American Philosophical Association 1916. Published in the *Philosophical Review* May, 1916.

ABSTRACTS

THE CLINICAL DELIMITATION OF HYSTERIA. *By Meyer Solomon.*
From the New York Medical Journal, November 6, 1915.

The author touches upon the abuse of the term hysteria, with its many concepts according to different authors. He briefly discusses some of the concepts, from the clinical standpoint, with particular attention to the views of Babinski and of Dejerine and Gauckler.

He recognizes that it would be best to entirely do away with the term hysteria, since it is etymologically and scientifically inapplicable. But if the term is to be continued to be used, and it does not seem that the time is ripe for its complete and permanent abolition, he would limit its application to the clinical syndrome consisting of the gross sensori-motor, including the special sense disturbances which are the bodily effects of a lasting nature flowing out of emotional upset. The crises when of the true type should be included. A state of relative indifference or passivity with respect to the physical condition should be the characteristic mental condition demanded for pure hysteria. If other psychic states are present, they may be named appropriately, or in accordance with present psychopathological or psychiatric terminology where possible.

The following groups should be excluded from what we may agree to call hysteria until a better name is forthcoming: diseases wrongly diagnosed, such as organic disease of the peripheral or other parts of the body, including the nervous system; conditions rightfully belonging under the caption of one of the other psychoneuroses and of the frank psychoses; simulation, deceit and deception; Babinski's pithiatism; Babinski's emotive (including visceral) and reflex phenomena. This would thus leave the group mentioned above (sensori-motor disturbances of the voluntary nervous system, including disorders of the special senses, and the pure major attacks), not due to mere suggestion or simulation, but protracted symptoms not removable by mere suggestion-persuasion. Functional disturbances of the vegetative nervous system and the more definite psychotic reactions are thus excluded from this clinical concept of so-called hysteria. The problem of the classification of the psychoneuroses is thus brought up for consideration.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT.

THE MALINGERER: A CLINICAL STUDY. *By Bernard Glueck, M.D.* Published in International Clinics, 1915, Vol. III, Series 25.

In a very interesting paper, Glueck takes up the problem of the malingerer, comparing him to the ordinary and the pathological liar.

Malingering is a special form of lying. The determinants of ordinary lying may be obvious (conscious) or hidden (unconscious), the degree of participation of the latter depending upon the degree of repression necessitated by social, ethical and aesthetic considerations. In the face of stressful situations the lie serves the purpose of a more direct, less tedious gratification of the instinctive demand for the most satisfactory and least painful adjustment. Glueck accepts the theory of absolute psychical determinism, namely that "no mental production, voluntary or involuntary, can represent anything but a vital part of the person producing it." The expression of a wish is the driving force in both the occasional and the pathological liar. Although not denying the role played in lying by disturbances of apprehension, retention and reproduction, one must realize that back of every lie can be found active forces, conscious or unconscious.

The pathological liar has an abnormal craving for self-esteem, compensates for some real inherent deficiency, by virtue of a ready, fertile phantasy, lack of critique, extreme suggestibility, extremely defective apperceptive faculties, and falsifications of memory.

Malingering is the result of deceit and lying in a definite situation, as a means of self-preservation, to escape from a painful situation. It is common and natural in animals, primitive man, savage and inferior races, and in children. Glueck quotes Ferrari as saying that in children the common causes are weakness, playfulness, imitation, egotism, jealousy, envy, and revenge. The underlying mental processes are those found in normal individuals and, following Freud, consist in a conflict between the pleasure and reality principles, with the victory going to the pleasure principle, thus leading to phantasy of falsification of reality, phantasy being for the afflicted individual reality, by virtue of the endowment of one's thoughts with omnipotent power.

Malingering may occur in the frankly insane, in those apparently normal mentally, and in borderline cases. "Crime, mental disease, and malingering should perhaps (in certain cases) be looked upon as different phases of a mode of reaction to life's problems which belongs to a lower cultural level, which is largely infantile in character." It is often impossible to differentiate the genuine from the fictitious in the production of malingerer. In his rather one-sided experience at the Government Hospital for the Insane the author has not yet seen a malingerer who was otherwise normal mentally; hence he concludes that malingering is probably a morbid phenomenon and always the expression of an

individual inferior mentally. The frequency of malingering in hysterics, neurotics, psychopaths, the frankly insane and grave delinquents is instructive. Recovery from a psychosis may at a later period, as a reaction to a painful situation, lead to malingering of apsychos is. Malingering in the insane is not infrequent.

Excellent illustrative cases are interjected at various places in the paper.

All in all, the author makes a valuable and penetrating contribution to the psychology and make-up of the malingerer and pathological liar. Although he adopts some of the very useful mental mechanisms of the Freudian school, he has carefully avoided the pitfall of the sexual theories, which, were they adopted, would apply to ordinary lying, pathological lying and malingering as well as to all the other reactions to which they have been applied by the Freudian school.

MEYER SOLOMON.

ON THE USE OF THE TERM "PSYCHOANALYSIS" AND ITS SUBSTITUTE. *By Meyer Solomon.* Medical Record, September 18, 1915.

Psychoanalysis is preferred to psychanalysis. Although psychanalysis should have the same meaning as mind or mental analysis, the Freudian school and others, for the most part, have limited the term to mental analysis according to Freud's method, and even with his attitude and in accordance with his conclusions in psychology, normal and abnormal. Although the restriction and limitation of the term in this way is unscientific, narrowminded and arbitrary, nevertheless the history of the term precludes its use in any other sense than that now generally accepted.

After briefly considering the terms abnormal psychology, psychopathology, psychiatry, psychological analysis, bioanalysis, psychobioanalysis, praxiology, anamnestic analysis, psychoanamnesis, psychognosis and mental analysis, the writer concludes as follows: "I must repeat that the term psychoanalysis, on account of its connotations and associations, must be dropped from scientific, psychopathological terminology. When used, it should be used in the restricted sense given to it by the Freudian school and others. To this conclusion I am forced, although I have in the past insisted on the broad, unqualified, etymological employment of this word. Mental analysis or psychognosis, preferably the former, are worthy substitutes."

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT.

REVIEW

"THE DREAM PROBLEM." By Dr. A. E. Maeder, of Zurich; authorized translation by Drs. Frank Mellad Haock and Smith Ely Jelliffe, of New York; *Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series No. 22.* The Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1916, New York. Pp. 43, price \$0.60.

This lecture, given before the Psychoanalytic Congress at Munich (1913) was originally published in the *Jahrbuch für Psychoanalyse und psychoanalytische Forschungen*; its present form will furnish a welcome means of spreading an understanding of the newer tendencies of the Zurich school and of giving out the reasons for the "schism" in Psychoanalysis.

From this paper the student of abnormal psychology should not anticipate any definitive illumination of the problem of dreams; he should expect only a good light on what the psychoanalysts are thinking and saying out loud concerning the dream, in the town and environs of Zurich, Switzerland.

This is, of itself, enough to interest a good many persons: first, psychoanalysts in New York, Boston and a few other American localities, who have to meet the demands of a growing practice among the nervously sick, and who, in talking to their patients, find the psychological medicine of Jung more mellow and adapted to English speaking persons, than the harsh, resistance-provoking sexualized *Neurosenlehre* of Freud. Secondly, there is the growing company of the Analyzed themselves, who demand something more progressive than an explanation of their infantile fixations of the Libido and who are, let us hope, under the inspiration of Dr. Putnam's plea for a Psychoanalysis that shall not live "by bread alone" but shall move forward to a higher *Weltanschauung*. Lastly, to those teachers of psychotherapy, among whom must be counted the moving spirits of the *Psychoanalytic Review*, who are looking forward to a broadening of the sphere of Psychoanalysis and who seem to be working to close the gap that now separates Psychoanalysis from Psychology.

To mention this expectant audience, is to characterize the offering of Maeder: like the work of Jung himself, it is a way of giving the public what it wants, by an adaptation to the demands of opinion, that is palpable, albeit, no doubt, unconscious and sincere.

To the newer ways of thinking, the author seems to do justice, criticising as he does some of the Freudian tenets and asserting the new liberties of thought in the Zurich group. Of the Freudian

"axiom of the dream as a wish fulfilment" Maeder says it is "too indefinite and especially too one-sided, for it actually fails to embrace the important teleological side of the unconscious function. I regard the dream as a means of expression of the unconscious, as a true language."

It is no doubt ignorance that makes the reviewer wonder why a wish, even fulfilled, is not essentially teleological; but it is probably only Freud's failure to give sufficient attention to this aspect that Maeder means to criticize. Other criticisms of Freud (pp. 16-17) for his lack of sufficient emphasis on the manifest content are, on Maeder's part, so awe-inspiringly autosymbolic that one would have to be living strictly *in Psychoanalysis* to profit by them; but it is a relief to hear, in this connection, that Freud "places the manifest dream-content in too one-sided a light." The reason for this, is (we are told) that the Freudian "idea of the 'secondary dream work' is stamped too deeply with the teaching about repression." This has been the opinion of intelligent outsiders for a long time; but now, it is made definite that Wish-fulfilment and Repression are not any longer the "big planks" in the Zurich platform.

The emphasis is laid upon prospective dreams as against regressive dreams; it is regarded as a contrast between Freud and Jung that the one should have become over-occupied with the dreamer's Past, and that the other should look more and more to the Future, a tendency which Maeder finds so clearly expressed in Jung's "fine American lectures" that he does not anywhere, on his own account, properly exploit the idea. His analyses, instead of justifying by conclusions the implied motto "Excelsior," suggest rather a deliberate setting up of a man of straw and the creation of unreal issues regarding the two points of view. Only the vaguest support is given to the following pronouncement: "The prospective road leads to reality; it promises us, therapeutically, the most important insight, just as the retrospective road once meant for us a great scientific gain." (p. 35.) From this viewpoint the phallic symbols of dreams and myths, like those of grail and lance in the legend of Parsifal, receive a new, more sublimated meaning: "In the interpretation of symbols we must not stop short at the concrete sexual act; it is our task to connect the prospective conception with the retrospective. Freud himself, as I gladly admit was the first to give this interpretation by correlating rescue-phantasies of the neurotic with birth dreams." (p. 34.)

Seeing that Freud's birth dream theory has been very much questioned by the otherwise sympathetic Dr. Bleuler, (whose opinion carries weight in Zurich, as elsewhere) and since this theory suggests to the psychologist a truly Cubistic trend in Freud's work, one is not encouraged, by this acknowledgment of Maeder, to think more highly of the sort of Futurism that may be erected

upon such a foundation. One suspects Dr. Maeder of wishing not to seem ungrateful to the Master, while yet, in fact, impugning the very ideas that are the cornerstones of the original Psychoanalysis. Maeder's idea of the re-birth of Psychoanalysis through the prospective outlook will bear analysis on its own account quite as much as the phantasy of the young man who "is still in the uterus and looks out," especially if, as Maeder trustfully says; "the idea of re-birth is an archaic picture for mental development, as Dieterich *has shown.*" (Italics ours.)

The young man looks out and sees a field being ploughed thoroughly. "The field is not merely a sexual symbol . . . (as Freud makes it) "but is also a symbol of the field of activity, the young man's life task. To plough the field does not mean merely coitus, but "to do his work." (p. 32.)

How Maeder does his work is clearly shown by his interest in the visions of "the Florentine B. Cellini"; for, as some may not know, the irrepressible Benvenuto is now among the Analyzed. We submit that this is not the way that the field of Psychoanalysis can be prepared for those seeds of thought from Biology of which ostentation is being made in Zurich, nor yet will the study of myths and historical dreams eventuate in that philosophical development that Putnam has asked psychoanalysts to work toward. For Maeder is plainly yielding to the pleasure-principle of nursing a philosophy only to unify the *credo* of his Zurich confreres. Thereby he has developed such an autosymbolic use of the conveniences of dream analysis that he has forgotten the reality principle that lies in a truly biological view toward dreams, such as Prince has advocated.

One cannot follow Maeder into the detail of the dream analyses he submits, because that would require almost as much space as he has taken to set them forth. Suffice it to say that the longest dream analysis (pp. 6-17), of the Blue Horse dream, exhibits the symbolic or constructive method of Jung and Maeder in all its frailty and teaches us what to expect of the peculiar two-sided view of the symbol. This turns out to be a one-sided view, an ill-disguised cold-shouldering of the immediate, obvious Freudian implications of the dream in question, which is so palpably a sexual, possibly even an incest dream, that only unpracticed persons could pass them by; yet Maeder blinks at all this and uses the dream items as a means of drawing from the dreamer such a mass of associations that one can dip out of it any meaning that one chooses.

In all this groping for meaning and for the definition of symbols there is lacking one vital element: any proper conception of the meaning of *meaning*; and for this reason the paper, as a contribution to psychology, adds nothing to our knowledge. Yet there are glints here and there not to be despised. The cathartic or clarifying function of the dream has evidently been earnestly

studied. But its conception is still obscured by an attempt to identify it with the self-expression of the artist: "The dream is perhaps the primitive work of art." (p. 21, similarly pp. 2, 3, 4, 5.)

Unconsciously, Maeder has fallen into the vein adopted by Emerson in his lecture on Demonology, one of the Fall and Winter novelties of 1839-40: the vein of a coldly glowing amateur of dream investigation, dipping into the science, but showing plainly that he is more at home in poetry and art. Neither author reaches the standard of modern psychological investigation. The difference is that Emerson did not have the opportunity for his "bold experiments with the mind," as he put it; while Maeder has the chance and neglects it.

Emerson, more importantly than Maeder, has expressed not only the prospective function of the dream, but the whole question of the interpretative attitude in a nutshell:

"The soul contains in itself the event that shall presently befall it, for the event is only the actualizing of its thoughts. It is no wonder that particular dreams and presentiments should fall out and be prophetic. The fallacy consists in selecting a few insignificant hints when all are inspired with the same sense."

Maeder is groping for a formula to interpret that which is prefigured in the dream; his analyses of dreams show that he has only found a rule of thumb, supported by the Will To Believe and not by any real grasp of the biologic mechanism of the dreamer's adjustment of phantasy to reality. This paper is a confession of doubt as to the old Psychoanalysis and a confession of hope for the new, which finds itself on fragments of Freudism. It is an altar to an Unknown; as such it is entitled to our respectful consideration; but our respect is somewhat diminished by the fact that the worshippers at this particular altar are continually taking the name of psychology and of biology in vain.

L. H.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAISER. A STUDY OF HIS SENTIMENTS AND HIS OBSESSION. By Morton Prince. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1915. pp. 112, 60 cents, net.

The Divine Right Delusion is with the Kaiser a fixed idea, which is determined by and is a means for the fulfillment of his wishes—to be sole and autocratic ruler of Prussia and the Empire, to be sole arbiter and director of the imperial destinies, to decide everything for the people and treat them like children, to be looked up to as the supreme power. And, says Prince, "this fixed idea with its powerful instinct of self-assertion has awakened in his junker and militaristic supporters sentiments of self-abasement through which they yield submissively to this assumed prerogative of the Kaiser and adopt an attitude of Divinity Worship. Thus

we have a politico-religious cult in which the Kaiser is the God-head."

The ideas of self and of his prerogatives are organized in the Kaiser's mind with instinctive emotions (such as greed of possession, pride, self-assertion or self-display, pugnacity, vengeful emotion, and jealousy). They thus form sentiments, which are deeply fixed and organized systems of emotions centred about an idea of an object. This abnormal development of the self-regarding sentiment with the instinct of self-display explains the presence in the Kaiser of some peculiar traits (his fondness for dressing up in all sorts of uniforms, his heroic attitudes and his fondness for having himself photographed, etc., his self-assumption in such various roles as artist, musician, etc., and that most projecting trait, his love of power, with his contempt for other nations.) "There were (are) also sentiments of World-power and Empire; a desire to have a 'place in the sun,' to possess colonies and, in particular, the Philippines and those of England and France; and to extend the German Empire to the Aegean Sea on the south and the North Sea on the north."

Prince shows conclusively how the conflict between the Kaiser and the democracy in Germany (represented by the Social Democratic Party) is for the Kaiser a purely personal conflict, and that his mental makeup is responsible for his reference to one third of his population and more as "traitors," "a horde of men unworthy to bear the name of Germans," "foes to the country and the empire," etc. In his struggle with democracy he sees no defense for himself and his autocracy except the army, hence the combination of the militaristic and autocratic principles. "It is a fear of democracy not for Germany but for himself." This fear seems to have been "repressed by the pride of his self-regarding sentiment and not allowed to come to the full light of consciousness." As a substitute, so to speak, there has been developed a defense reaction consisting of anger and the sentiment of hatred. But this defense reaction but hides the real obsession which is repressed in the subconscious—the subconscious phobia being a fear of democracy for himself and his House. In this way the Kaiser rationalizes his political objections to democracy.

Prince finds himself of necessity discussing the political situation in Germany, shows the Kaiser's tremendous powers at home, and the aims of the Social Democratic party.

His last sentence in the book brings home a moral: "If the powers of Europe want lasting peace through the overthrow of autocracy and militarism, *i. e.*, Germanism, the obsession of the Kaiser points the way—look to the democracy of Germany!"

To me the book is of the greatest interest. It shows the reader the hidden forces responsible for the greatest war in the history of the world.

Perhaps I feel this way about the book because I believe it expresses the truth and it harmonizes with my views. Whether you agree with Prince in the matter or not—and I cannot see how any fairminded individual can deny the truth as expounded by Prince—you will find a reading or rather study of this little work instructive and well worth your while.

MEYER SOLOMON.

MAN—AN ADAPTIVE MECHANISM. By George W. Crile. Macmillan, New York, 1916. Pp. 387.

Dr. Crile, using a large amount of clinical and experimental data of health and disease, attempts to apply the principle of natural selection to the physiology of man. Considering man as a unit organism and tracing his evolution from the lower stages to the present, Dr. Crile attributes the present domination of man to his superior adaptivity, made possible by his greater complexity and more varied reactions. According to his view: health is a successful adaptation to the environment, whereas disease is the result of incomplete adaptation to the environment.

In the second part of the book the mechanisms of adaptation are considered. It is the nervous system which co-ordinates the various parts of the body, and by virtue of which man utilizes his ontogenetic and phylogenetic experiences. The contact ceptors, distributed throughout the surface layer of the skin and membranes, receive and transmit the incoming environmental stimuli. The chemical ceptors initiating and governing the purely chemical reactions and processes such as respiration, hunger, thirst, coagulation, phagocytosis and immunity, maintain the chemical purity of the body and protect it against foreign proteins, infection, auto-intoxication, and the toxins of pregnancy. In the distance ceptors we see the response of the whole organism through sight, hearing and smell. Dr. Crile's consideration of the psychological and histological phenomena of the emotions in this connection, and their relation to exophthalmic goitre, is admirably keen.

Dr. Crile, believing that "the human organism like plants and other organisms is fundamentally a transformer of energy," attempts to show that a specific group or *kinetic system* of organs comprising the brain, the thyroid, the adrenals, the liver and the muscles has been evolved for the special purpose of transforming potential into kinetic energy. Considering the adaptive variation in the amount of energy stored, the variation of energy transformation in the individual, and the histologic changes in the brain, the liver, the thyroid and the adrenals, Dr. Crile depicts

their sympathetic influence and ably establishes his postulate of a kinetic system.

The third part of the book attempts to apply these facts to the phenomena of health and disease and "to throw light upon many problems of the medical clinic as well as of human relations." The intimate relation between the kinetic system and the emotions is discussed. "Emotion," according to Dr. Crile, "is the physiological preparation of the entire organism for the production of one or another of the great primary motor acts of running, fighting or procreation." The practical application of the "kinetic" theory is most interestingly discussed in the relation to arterio-sclerosis, thrombo-angiitis obliterans, diabetes, cardiovascular disease and Bright's disease. But "the most convincing test of the practical application of the kinetic theory," Dr. Crile believes, "is to be found in the prevention of surgical shock by anociation," *i. e.* the isolation of the brain from all harmful associations. His arguments in this connection are most convincing.

Further adaptations of man as evidenced in the conversion of energy for reproduction, in the maintenance of the standard chemical purity of the body, and in the induced phenomena occasioned by certain drugs, are mechanistically explained. There then follows an elucidation of the manner in which the vast multiplicity of the adaptive responses is achieved and their specificity established. Finally by presenting many penetrating arguments Dr. Crile purposed to show "the transformation of energy by which men and animals are enabled to adapt themselves to their environment" is "effected through an electro-chemical mechanism."

The book is written in an easy and popular style, lending itself to use by the layman as well as by the scientist. One wishes while reading the first one hundred and sixty pages that Dr. Crile had established his postulate of the kinetic system in a briefer and more concise fashion. But when at last, Dr. Crile does present his theory of the kinetic system one is impressed by his many valuable and pertinent applications, some of which shed novel and interesting light upon many important evolutionary clinical and surgical problems. The chapters on "Diseases of the Kinetic System" and "Anociation" are especially excellent.

The text is valuably illustrated by photomicrographs and laboratory tracings, but one wishes that some of the superfluous and mundane photographs such as "Athlete making a Record Broad Jump" and "Portrait of a beautiful woman posing" had been omitted. The sane mechanistic attitude adopted is appealing, and Dr. Crile's keen and able method of attack should cause this book to be interesting as well as valuable to the layman, physiologist, and the psychologist.

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SPOON RIVER ANTHOLOGY. By *Edgar Lee Masters*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1916. Price \$1.25. Pages 248.

Here is a book not exactly within the confines of psychopathology, but I am going out of my way to call the attention of the reader to it. It has made a pronounced sensation in literary circles. It has had a remarkably large sale since it first appeared, for a book supposed to be poetry. It is written in *vers libre* (free verse). The modern school of *vers librist*s has stirred up quite a hornet's nest among poets and others. Some insist that it is poetry, others that it is prose, and still others that it is neither, but betwixt and between. Whatever it is, it is here to stay. And whether you call this author a *vers librist* or what not, the contents of the work make a strong appeal. To the psychologist of the normal or the abnormal, to the criminologist, to the sociologist, to the humanitarian, to him who is interested in characterology this book should appeal strongly.

The plan of Spoon River Anthology is this: Spoon River is a town of the modern sort in America. Here are to be found all the types existing anywhere and everywhere in the country. The author opens the work by taking us to the little grave yard on the hill. He then permits the occupants of no less than two hundred and fourteen graves to tell their little stories. Each one is brief and tells of the most important thing in his or her life. Some are satisfied with a few lines, others take a page, and only a few more than one page. About each little tale a novellette could be built.

Here we find true realism. We hear the story of the murderer, the drunkard, the crooked lawyer, the prostitute, the doctor who performed abortion, the judge, the reformer, the cripple, and the other individuals who surround us in every city or town of fair size.

Few of these are optimistic. There is a vein of pessimism and a feeling of "what's-the-use" of life projected upon the reader. There is a showing up of man. His weaknesses and failings are presented to us. The impression is given that there is an excuse for the worst character portrayed. We sympathize with him or her. We feel a delight in the portrayal because we know ourselves and our fellowmen to be not unlike the characters portrayed, in more than one respect.

The author, who, I understand is a criminal lawyer in Chicago, is a keen observer, a good psychologist, a master in the art of *vers libre*, and an analyst of no mean ability.

I think it is Bliss Carman who, in his critical review of this work, also written in *vers libre* in imitation of Masters, in *The Forum*, ends his excellent review by hoping to God that Masters won't take it into his head to come to New Canaan where the poor critic happened to dwell. If there is anything interesting there requiring translation into *vers libre* I hope to God Masters does find his way there.

As an illustration, here is the simple story of Daisy Fraser:
Did you ever hear of Editor Whedon
Giving to the public treasury any of the money received
For supporting candidates for office?
Or for writing up the canning factory
To get people to invest?
Or for suppressing the facts about the bank,
When it was rotten and ready to break?
Did you ever hear of the Circuit Judge
Helping anyone except the "Q" railroad,
Or the bankers? Or did Rev. Peet or Rev. Sibley
Give any part of their salary, earned by keeping still,
Or speaking out as the leaders wished them to do,
To the building of the water works?
But I—Daisy Fraser who always passed
Along the streets through rows of nods and smiles,
And coughs and words such as "there she goes,"
Never was taken before Justice Arnett
Without contributing ten dollars and costs
To the school fund of Spoon River!

The very first lines in the book hold one:

Where are Elmer, Herman, Bert, Tom and Charley,
The weak of will, the strong of arm, the clown, the boozier,
the fighter?
. All, all, are sleeping on the hill.

MAYER SOLOMON.

THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

PERSISTENT COMPLEXES DERIVED THROUGH
FREE ASSOCIATIONS: MISS Z'S. CASE

C. S. YOAKUM AND MARY C. HILL

The University of Texas

I

INTRODUCTION

DURING the course of a series of memory tests performed with the Binet letter squares, a large amount of free association material was unexpectedly brought to light. Eight subjects had been used in an experiment, the object of which was to determine a norm for the number of consonants that can be memorized in a period of twenty seconds, the consonants being arranged in an order that makes sense collocations practically impossible. One of the subjects performed the tests with an accuracy and ease which none of the others achieved at the beginning of the experiment; the same subject, furthermore, evinced a delight in the tests that was not experienced by any of the other workers. An investigation of this experimenter's method revealed the somewhat unusual fact that, in practically every instance, the letters had been memorized by means of stories which the subject framed to fit these letters, and for which the letters served as a sort of outline or framework.

The stories were created spontaneously and naturally; indeed, the fact that the letters were not arranged in an order that favored the development of logical thought

therefrom made the stories of a singularly free, incoherent, and primitively imaginative type. Oddly enough, the subject's state of mind during the test was strikingly similar to the conscious state during dreams; there was the same breaking down of the critique or "censor," the same passive reception and elaboration of all ideas, regardless of their nature, and the same warmth and intimacy of emotional tone. There was the sense of absolutely free play of fancy, of untramelled subjective expression. The atmosphere of the stories was frequently weird, uncanny, or fantastic, for practically no ideas that would serve to group the letters into meaning were rejected, and the subject's emotional state was precisely similar to the type of feeling tone that is experienced in the dream. But not only was the atmosphere of the stories similar to that of dreams; the material itself was found to be of that same peculiar significance, set apart from reality, and of that same sort of symbolism, wish-fulfillment, and expression of "repressed complexes" that characterize the content of dreams. In a word, the spontaneity of the fancies, their richness, and their flexibility seemed due to the relaxed and, so to speak, twilight state of the mind.

Two processes were obviously at work. One was busied in the memorization of the letters on the different cards and was so successful in the attainment of its object that but one other subject yet tested attained so high a degree of accuracy. The other activity was hidden to the observers and only appeared by accident. Miss Z. herself merely supposed that all of the subjects were memorizing as she did, by rearranging the letters to form stories and readjusting stories that arose spontaneously to fit the chance order of the letters as they appeared on the card. The only objective evidence we had of individual differences was this unusual accuracy of reproduction and the pleasurable emotion evinced by this subject in performing the tests.

This piece of analysis, carried on since Miss Z. first came under our observation some four years ago has, therefore, shifted its viewpoint as the immediate needs of the situation seemed to demand and as the problem grew with the increasing knowledge of our subject's difficulties. The

major portion of the material to be presented here and in later articles, has been collected, however, within the last year, since the memory experiment opened an easier way. To her present clear appreciation of the scientific importance of such analyses, as well as her understanding of the therapeutic value to herself, we owe the permission to record in a permanent way so much as we have set down here.

We acknowledge the ease with which correlations between the introverted symbolizations and fanciful unrealities, and early social myths may be made; but such correlations do not clear up the ontogenetic picture. They are explanatory of these early beliefs and vitalistic explanations, just as studies of modern semantic changes show us the laws that operate in all language growth. We have, therefore, not felt obligated to make these more or less plausible analyses of the material at our disposal. We have sought only to bring to light certain formulations of the mind that have taken place in our subject with such force and energy and have become so fixed in her beliefs as to cause distinct suffering and disadjustment to external social stimuli.

II

BIOGRAPHY AND PERSONALITY

Miss Z. is a young woman of twenty-four, who prepared herself for college while living on a lonesome ranch in Texas. The only real assistance she seems to have had during this period was the encouragement and help of her mother. Her previous schooling was in a convent, in a large northern city, and one of the contrasts so noticeable later in the richness of her inner experiences as compared with the barrenness of her social life in college is symbolized in the above change in her surroundings made by her parents when she was still a girl.

As a student, she has been highly successful. Physically and mentally she has, however, been a source of anxiety to those interested in her welfare. Her pale, aenemic, ethereal appearance has led her physician to offer numerous

suggestions and orders concerning her health. None of these has had more than a passing influence, because while she is persistent in intellectual activities, there seems to exist a resistance to all suggestions concerning her health that amounts to direct opposition.

So far as learned, her plans have centered about some form of life that would include her mother. No special planning beyond a deep sense of duty toward them, has included her father and one brother. Two years ago her mother died. Naturally this was a terrible blow to Miss Z., and the reconstruction of her plans has necessarily gone on very slowly. That she has been able to proceed with her school work and to make any plans at all is evidence of unusual strength of character and of will power.

The following description of Miss Z.'s behavior is essential to any satisfactory comprehension of the analysis we offer in these pages. It is based on the several outlines of personality that have been published recently. We follow in the main the one presented by Wells (*). Such an outline merely gives us a starting point; it does not give the type of understanding that comes with long and continued study of the genetic process. It is markedly deficient in this respect and we shall see that it is possible to add many details that are highly illuminating by even the most casual reference to earlier stages of development.

Intellectually, Miss Z. is of the highest order. She ranks well among the first in school work, in the appreciation of literature, art, and science, and in the applications of these to non-personal objects. Naturally she learns readily and remembers tenaciously her work in the University. Her mental imagery is of high grade, vivid and accurate as to details. Under certain conditions and in times of stress it becomes so vivid that it may be described as hallucinatory in character. Her powers of observation vary. At times they are keen and penetrating, catching the most trivial of details; in other situations, she can easily be described as absent-minded in no slight degree. Roughly we may say that she observes well in the fields that interest her, and takes

*F. L. Wells, *The Systematic Observation of the Personality in its Relation to the Hygiene of Mind*, Psy. Rev. 1914, Vol. 21, Pp. 295-8.

no note of others. The group of interests that are noticeable have been mentioned above in touching on her intellectual capacity. The world of politics, of society, of business, of war, and of world events are almost of no importance so far as observation can discover. The fund of information that interests the ordinary schoolgirl is also lacking or very narrowly limited.

Miss Z. moves quickly and nervously; as she goes from place to place, it is easy to believe that she is energetic and active, and that this is a natural state. Her conversation, when not embarrassed, is similar. She is ready and eager for an expression of views, for repartee, and for intellectual 'sword-crossing.' Continued observation leads us both to decide, however, that these moments of external expressiveness are few and short when compared with the possibilities of motor activity in an entire day.

She has a natural ability at sewing or 'fancy work.' Her mother did not like these occupations, and never learned them successfully. She also failed to teach Miss Z., though she did not wish her daughter to grow up without this ability as she had done. In the laboratory, Miss Z. finds it difficult to manipulate the simplest pieces of apparatus. She is interested and desirous of learning, but seems uncontrollably awkward and unable to learn. She is more than likely to injure and ruin a delicate piece of machinery, though she expends more than ordinary effort to repair it or put it in running order.

In repose, she gives the appearance of one who by natural endowment has unusual grace and dexterity. In contrast to this she has, however, a number of awkward movements both in walking and while talking, that destroy this original impression and give her the appearance of the traditional boy in society. Even when meeting friends, Miss Z. presents an extremely bashful attitude, often mixed with avoidance reactions. Certain special forms of expression may be noted. The tips of the fingers are at times consciously troublesome. In February, 1915, she reported that they had no feeling in them. She said at that time, "The thing that feels *very good* is when I've pressed *very hard* on the tips." Such pressure leaves a very definite

dent in the skin. By experiment at the time, we found that all forms of light pressure could be felt as usual, but seemed to rise slowly to consciousness. If asked to say which finger was touched, she was not certain, but found the right one usually after trying with the other hand. This confirmation while not always necessary, seemed to be desired in each instance by the subject. In testing the finger tips for pain, we could press the head of the pin into the skin till it was almost covered or the skin seemed about to break without any sense of pain. She always reported, "that feels very good," even though the experimenter was forced to stop for fear of injury. Algometer pressure up to this point also felt good. There was practically no stereognostic ability present. A round object felt large and cold, the rectangular end of a footrule seemed smaller but couldn't be distinguished in shape from the round stimulus.

Asked to hold her hands out in front of her with eyes closed, she succeeded, but they hung loosely and trembled as with ague; the fingers hung down *apparently* relaxed. She described the sensation as though she were holding something heavy. With an ink bottle in the hand held out in this position, the sensation did not change; it was the same kind of 'heavy.' When she was asked to make the hands tense and straighten out the fingers, she failed in the first two or three efforts. The fingers wouldn't stay together or out straight from the wrist. Miss Z. remarked that it would be "easier to do this with my eyes open." When she finally succeeded in getting the limp condition out of the fingers the wrists bent out of line as if deformed. At arm's length, with eyes closed, the fingers failed to come together by two inches, the second and third trials always gave success, however.

The exaggerated condition described above lasted but a few weeks. There still remain signs of this condition, in the unconscious picking at the nails and rubbing of the tips of the fingers, pressing the hands together, ungraceful positions of the hands and fingers, squeezing the lower lip together with thumb and forefinger, pulling at the dress in front, and working at desk cover with pencil or pen while talking. An interesting characteristic that is remarked by

all, is her usual speaking voice. This is still that of a girl of perhaps seven or eight, high-pitched and thin with little of the richness and softness of which it is capable. Since the study of her conflicts and history began, noticeable changes are apparent in this speaking voice. Persons who do not know of this study have remarked on the very decided change toward a lower pitch and increased richness of quality.

Under 'self-assertion,' Wells' first four questions receive a negative answer. Miss Z. makes no effort to shape actual surroundings, and states explicitly that other persons may do as they please and hold the opinions they wish. She shows absolutely no ambition to lead others. Intellectually she is apparently ambitious, but other forms of activity are negatived by a desire not to grow up that we shall discuss later. A certain independence of opinion is offset by an unusual readiness to listen to others and to follow suggestion where that falls in intellectual fields. A difficulty drives her momentarily to seek companionship, but she recovers readily, in a day or two perhaps, and then indicates unusually strong silent opposition to the situation. We might easily describe her as dominated with special energy of will in certain limited lines, and wholly unable to bring this to bear in other directions. There is no inclination to face physical danger, but distinct ability to meet it when presented slowly enough to permit voluntary preparation.

All topics under adaptability are answered in the negative.

Miss Z. is quick to perceive and has prompt immediate reactions, but the next day may find none of the suggestions or ideas followed out. She is systematic and persistent in her work and follows a plan with energy in her studies, but her activities beyond this are planless. She has no executive interests, and is lacking in such forms of planning as will make her effective. It is hard to decide whether she intends to obey or not. We will be able to show later that this divides into two spheres, one in which she is prompt and truthful, the other wherein she does not feel the necessity of obedience. Other elements of the moral life as suggested in the 'outline' are easily answered in the affirmative. She

is in reality ruled by a high sense of duty and moral appreciation, a clear feeling of honor and of the rights of others. This last statement will receive specific qualification below.

The work required in physical training at the University was a positive burden to Miss Z. It exhausted her both physically and emotionally and she was especially proud to fail or merely to make a pass. If asked about the sort of exercise she takes, she mentions walking, but so far as can be discovered this consists in very short walks and long periods of day-dreaming. Miss Z. enjoys paintings, and other artistic creations, is dainty in her dress, is appreciative of music and flowers, and is deeply interested in literature. She also apparently enjoys a strong perfume. Food is a matter of indifference so far as any real hunger is concerned. She eats to avoid the attentions of people who are interested in her health rather than to satisfy any longing for food. Certain habits of eating, as a cup of coffee in the early morning before rising, a small piece of toast at breakfast later, no lunch, indicate that we are dealing with a belief which probably also lies back of her distaste for athletics. The same daintiness is displayed here that we found in personal appearance, however.

Miss Z. cannot understand the frivolity of young folks. She finds her greatest pleasure in what persons of her own age would call serious conversation, study, or work. Withdrawal, she may be described as cheerful and buoyed up by some element of strength that is neither superficial nor consonant with a clear knowledge of reality.

Every action of importance receives internal justification, and this tends as a rule to satisfy her. Nevertheless, she is aware that others do not agree, and seems to be patient with this disagreement because she believes thoroughly in her own position and in its correctness. Towards others she is sympathetic and generous, and will not openly criticize or show jealousy. This attitude seems traceable to a distinct detachment from responsibility for the actions and beliefs of others. Although highly sensitive, we find this unfortunately coupled with an inability to forget wrongs, producing a painful moral effort to forgive at times. Forgiveness is not, however, a duty from her point of view.

In attempting to carry out the description under what Wells has termed 'reactions to attitude toward self and others,' we find the discrepancies in our statement that have been kept relatively well separated so far, entering into each question in detail. Miss Z. is very dainty and careful of her personal appearance, but declares she has no interest in the tasks connected with the morning's toilet. She is not at all socially forward, but can at rare moments be an unusually pleasant companion in conversation or imaginative games. This pairing of the extremes with no halfway point is characteristic of her emotional attitude, frankness of expression, need for sympathy, and self-pity. Since the relation to others is only obscurely indicated, it is difficult to state with certainty how much pleasure is actually derived through living in the pleasures and successes of others. Two observers disagree completely on the remaining points. One describes her as a 'good loser,' witty, and tending to emphasize the 'good side of the environment,' the other fails to find anyone of these in a noticeable degree. Both agree that she is not even-natured, and given to bursts of temper with efforts at concealment that, together, leave her exhausted sometimes for days. She is strongly emotional in a number of situations not normally expected to develop emotion.

'Things as they are' are accepted, if they fit some sort of hidden, internal desire, otherwise they are not used at all, they are avoided. Naturally mistakes are seldom acknowledged when they touch the larger problems of reality, though they are rarely committed. Miss Z. belongs to the impractical and visionary, and is definitely influenced by her likes and dislikes. She acknowledges that much time is spent in making up fairy stories and picturing herself as taking part in the incidents of the stories; there is also a definite group of day-dreams; both of these will be discussed in another connection.

All or practically all sexual reactions of both the primary and secondary forms are negativistic. The type of religious beliefs held are firmly retained, but Miss Z. shows no interest in active church work. All interests and ideals are intensely held and are definitely in harmony with her attempts to be

what they are. The failure in producing a final balance lies rather in the discrepancy between the ideals and actions of Miss Z. on the one hand and the social and moral consensus of her group on the other hand.

In the above sketch, certain striking contrasts appear in the conduct of Miss Z. By close observations, similar conflicts may be noted in all normal individuals; but it is unusual to find so many and to find them in such forms as to produce distinct difficulties in adjusting to the environment.

A short summary of these may not be out of place at this point. Miss Z. is anaemic, and physically incapable of ordinary physical activity. She is not concerned about this, though it is a matter of considerable anxiety to her physician. Her appetite for the food placed before her at meals is either none or hidden by some internal resistance. If it is a question of food rather than perfume, she will purchase the latter in preference. Bonbons are highly acceptable. We have also noted her distinct aversion to all forms of physical exercise; again this seems to be a matter of principle rather than the usual distaste for the gymnasium. She shows a natural ability for cooking and fancywork; but they are not fads, and would not be discovered unless exceptional circumstances arose. In matters of handling the utensils connected with these tasks, she shows no natural aptitude. We have mentioned her laboratory experiences above. In experiments where fixed positions are to be maintained with a headrest for example, she shows a strong aversion to this form of apparatus. We shall discuss this point later.

Religion is to her a private matter and her enjoyment is spoiled by the presence of others; early services where only few attend are the only ones she will take part in. The seclusion of her own room is most pleasing; and only in certain crises will she seek the companionship of other women. Except for her instructors, she avoids men, and is ill at ease and positively uncomfortable in their company. Connected with this she shows strong emotional dislikes, but less strong attachments. The balance is not adequate. When an emotional dislike is drawn out in some positive

fashion, she becomes angered, pouts, is resentful, and unable to express herself adequately in the presence of such persons. In extreme cases, she turns cold, and may be prostrated for two and three days with fever or a sick headache.

Under the trials that come to her in which a decision is imperative and involves what we may call 'adult activity,' she expresses over and over the negative wish, "I don't want to grow up."

III

FREE ASSOCIATION MATERIAL

During the course of the memory tests, something like seventy-five or one hundred stories were formed, but as the material frequently overlaps, an enumeration of them all seems undesirable. The repetition of a few typical stories will give the salient complexes involved, and will be at once more concise and more immediately intelligible.

The first point of interest in connection with the "stories" is the variable nature of their sources: some are derived from actual incidents; others are purely creations of fancy; one or two are recollections of dreams; many are echoes of literature; and almost all are types of phantasy, day-dreaming, or wish-fulfillment, whichever term we choose to adopt. Generally the "stories" were characterized by strong emotional tone.

1. DIRECTLY RECALLED EXPERIENCES

Owing to the intricate relationships of the elements of the "stories," it is impossible to find one that may be said definitely to originate from a single source; certain "stories," however, are so largely derived from a common element as to be characterized thereby. Thus, seven groups of the "stories" were dominantly incident ones, that is, "stories" suggested by an actual experience.

In the first "story" of this type the letters which served as the stimulus were:

X	C	J	Y
V	F	N	Q
B	D	L	G

IV.3.¹ X-C "An excuse for-J-Y joy,
 V-F "Very fair -N-Q no quiz,
 . B-D -L-G "Bad lecture gives."

"The scene was in a certain class of mine which inspires very mixed feelings in me. The instructor, in particular, gives me a sort of rebellious, antagonistic feeling when he lectures, so that I am constantly wishing to disagree with him, to be self-assertive, etc. On the other hand, I have a feeling that he really intends to be fair, particularly in his quizzes, grading, etc. Hence, 'very fair-no quiz,' hence also, the next line,-'Bad lecture gives;' since the two facts stand in sharp antithesis."²

L	J	S	W
T	P	Z	R
V	K	C	M

"This 'story' ran: 'Like (L) just (J) Swiveller (S-W), tipsy (T-P-Z) rake (R); very (V) kind (K) could be (C) to the Marchioness (M).'"

"At first glance, the story would seem to be definitely of literary origin; but the subjective setting and the wealth of associations that form the foreground of the picture simply reinstate a past experience. Briefly stated, the scene is this: it is early May in K, and the entire countryside is white with apple-blossoms. In the background looms up a rambling, quaint old house with numerous wings, verandas, and turrets; in the foreground stretches a shady lawn on either side of the broad roadway that leads to the house. The air is heavy with the fragrance of blossoms

¹Numbers refer to the cards in the memory test series.

²We shall give wherever possible, the "Stories" in Miss Z.'s own words. The cue words that 'held' the latter and indicated the "Stories" are given just following the letters themselves. These were written down on the sheet on which the letters were reproduced immediately following the writing of the letters themselves. The longer 'story' that follows was written later in the day or before the next series of tests was begun.

from the orchard, and, beneath the apple-trees, four ladies and a little girl are having five o'clock tea. *Old Curiosity Shop* lies open on the ground, and "Dick Swiveller" and "the little Marchioness" form the theme of an animated discussion. The letters on the card are used to form an extremely awkward series of phrases, while the "story" gives them color and meaning, and serves to hold them in memory."

In a third "incident" story, the setting is less agreeable. The letters that suggested the story were:

F	C	S	D
V	H	J	B
P	N	M	T

"The outline of the story is as follows: 'Fixed (F-C-S-D) with a vehement (V-H) jab (J-B) of her pin (P-N) the mantle (M-T).' The girl sees herself struggling with a pin; she is in her room, a room that she heartily detests; it is almost nine in the morning; there are a dozen trivial little duties to be done; the light is disturbingly poor; and the girl is completely exasperated. It is impossible to 'make things move fast enough;' she feels a quiver of anger, a sudden tightening of the muscles, etc. Then, in rapid succession, she attempts to brush her teeth with a hatpin, to button her shoes with a pencil, and to pin on her hat with a toothbrush."

VI. I.

B	D	C	H
P	T	K	R
N	S	W	Y

(B-D-C-H) But do see her! (P-T) persuade-treat? (K-R-N) corner seeks- won't yield.' (S-W-Y).

"This story recalls accurately an incident of childhood. Mother and I are on a visit to L, and, being only three, Mother wishes me to go with her upon what appears to me a tedious and useless round of calls. Already, when the story opens, I have gone through a series of visits; I am tired

physically and disgusted mentally. I feel that there are limits in the matter of being obliging, and I announce to Mother and Aunt E. that I do not intend to see any more ladies. Naturally, they are shocked, and pay no attention to the remark. We enter the house. I hear the despised rustle of skirts on the stairs, and then the more despised exclamation, 'But do see her!' etc. (This phrasing is not quite accurate, its stiffness being due to the arrangement of the letters.) My mind is quite made up; I have no intention of being bored any longer; I rush to the corner and cover my face with both hands (that is 'corner seeks' in the outline); I do not intend to have any more speculation about which one of the X's I resemble. Aunt E., hoping to allure me, promises any sort of treat if I will be agreeable for only half an hour ('persuade-treat'). I refuse. Throughout the rest of the call, I remain stolidly in the one position, apart from the hostess, Aunt E. and Mother."

T	J	L	G
Z	S	W	R
C	H	B	X

"(T-J-L-G.) Temper, just livid got; (Z-S-W-R), Z. shakes with rage; (C-H-B-X), head breaks."

"The story is created from an incident of my childhood which seems to have made an oddly vivid impression. My dolls were very real persons to me, and, at the age of three or four, it seemed to annoy me inexpressibly if their faces were not attractive. I felt that the face was a clue to the doll's character; so that it became impossible for me to play that she had a pleasant or reliable disposition if I did not like her face. A doll was given me, one with a foolish expression and an exasperatingly insipid simper. I could not tolerate her. Absurd though it was, the sight of her came to throw me into a paroxysm of rage, so that I grew pale, and trembled violently all over. Finally, unable to endure her longer, I seized her one day, carried her from the nursery, and banged her head upon a register, shattering the hated smile. The outline suggested by the letters thus follows the story consistently."

2 THE "STORIES" OF PHANTASY

"The first line of letters read: N-M-G-V. The suggestion was "No means (to) give vent," the initial letters of these words being supplied. The second line read: F-Y-K-H. The suggestion was: "Fairy (c) comes (to) her." The last line read: D-W-C-T. The suggestion was "Dwells with her castle." Thus the letters formed an outline for the story. The incident was founded upon an actual and rather vivid experience. Several years ago, I was out on a large ranch where the greater part of the time I was with Mother or quite alone,—a circumstance which made me long for society, particularly for the society of young people. Hence, I felt pent up and restless. This explains the line 'No means (to) give vent.' The second line continues this incident. I supplied an ideal companion whom I called my 'fairy,' whenever I was lonely or restless, I slipped away where I could watch the clouds, or the hills behind which the fairy lived. At the signal from me she would float out from the blue of the hills, half shrouded in her cloud cape, and come to me; hence the line: 'Fairy comes to her.' A very rich series of fancies was elaborated out of this idea, a favorite being the picture of her castle, which was all alight at sunset from her banquet fires beyond the hills. In fact, the presence of the fairy grew to be a relatively constant thing in my thoughts, and I was forever attempting to find the castle where the fairy lived. Hence the last line: 'Dwells with her,—castle.' Repeating the entire "story,"—"No means to give vent—fairy comes to her—dwells with her, castle,—we find the whole incident symbolically suggested in the letters. The card stood for the entire experience so vividly as to bring back its actual affective coloring."

"(P-F-H-M), pretty fairy (toward) her moves; (S-T-G-V), sight gives (that is); (D-R-L-C), droll, charming.

"I played with the fairy much of the time: sometimes the glimpses which I caught of her were droll and illusive, for instance, the picture of her face in her dewdrop mirrors at dawn, or the soft shadows of her mist-grey cloak as she floated through the fogs and storm-clouds.. Usually, she

was coming toward me; the images were always fascinating."

V.3.

N	G	B	L
R	C	D	H
K	V	S	F

"(N-G-B-L)," No good—blues; (R-C-D-H), rescued her (mind by); (K-V-S-F), clear visions (of the) fairy.

"The source of this story is obviously my favorite fancy of the fairy. My feeling of discontent and lack of means of expression supplies the line: 'No good—blues.' The pleasure and relief which the fairy game afforded, in the restless state of pent up energy, is expressed in the line: 'Rescued her (mind by).' The wealth of suggested images, their beauty and their vividness, furnishes the last line: 'Clear visions of the fairy.' The background in the story was the marvellous blue of the hills, behind which was the fairy's home. Again, the atmosphere was half pleasant, half-painful. The latter quality seems to be a result of the feeling that, after all, even this ideal comradeship was helping to isolate me from people,—to make me 'odd' and 'different.'"

Q	B	V	M
Z	L	S	P
R	T	N	D

"(Q-B-V-M), A queer B. V. M. (an order of nuns of the Blessed Virgin Mary); (Z-L-S-P) said (to) lisp; (R-T-N-D), wrote, no date." A slightly sinister picture of a nun half-mediaeval, half-modern. She is a curious, erratic sort of person, belonging to the B. V. M.'s, the order of nuns I knew in Chicago. On the other hand, she lives in the Middle Ages, and, being unusually intelligent, writes a mass of important history about her own times, particularly about life in a convent. Her face is rather sinister; there is a marked impediment in her speech; a general air of mystery surrounds her. Her writings, valuable as they are, bear no date. Part of the story, that about her valuable writings, suggests a story that I played with during the holidays

(December, 1915). The subject of the nun was suggested by the Sisters of whom I was so fond."

B	C	V	L
N	D	W	P
H	K	Y	S

"(B-C-V-L), By the convent lies the nun; (N-D-W-P) does she weep? (H-K-Y-S), H. (k) comes; Yes!"

"The scene was at the convent where I attended school for several months (in Chicago). The nun (no particular one, as I remember) was lying by the cornerstone of the convent in a state of half-trance, half exhausted. She wore the habit of the B. V. M.'s, but otherwise she seemed mediaeval rather than modern. In fact, she was the typical nun of romance, disliking her life, and chafing at its confinement. Her head was buried in her hands, and great sobs shook her frame. Night was deepening all about her; her suffering and isolation, together with the unusual circumstance of her being outside the convent after dark, filled me with pity and fear. I stole toward her very softly, and she straightway told me her tale. Throughout, I was conscious of the striking contrast between this nun and the light-hearted, sunshiny women whom I had known so intimately in the convent. I had a slight kinaesthetic shiver, and the pleasantly assuring knowledge that I was not a Catholic. It suggested the waking from a dream."

B	D	H	M
T	R	J	Y
G	Z	L	V

"(B-D-H-M), Bid him; (T-R-J-Y), trip joyfully; (G-Z-L-V), gaze leaving."

"That is, tell him to come out and dance wit' the others; stop watching the waltzers from the wall. The scene was at a dance. The rhythm of the motion fascinated me; I was seized with a wild desire to participate, to yield completely to the melody of movement. The story seems to have been partially instigated by a wish. For several

years, I have been in the habit of dancing with the girls after dinner in the evening; I enjoyed it almost passionately. All year I have been missing the custom, longing for the pleasure of the music and the movement, and wishing that I really knew how."

C	L	B	T
G	D	V	K
S	Z	I	W

"(C-L-B-T), Colbert (is a); (G-D-V-K) good viking; (S-M-C-W), S. (Mother's name) and Z-I (mine) on the water. A glorious scene on deck. The day was rather gray, the air damp and chilly, with a delicious tang of salt; the sea was quite rough, and the foam dashed great flakes at us over the railing. Colbert, who was apparently the captain, was a good sailor, and we felt secure in spite of the threatened storm. Mother and I were taking a long dreamed-of trip abroad."

3. THE DREAM "STORIES"

VII. 7, VII. 9, and VII. 10,¹ are so closely related that they may be analyzed best together.

W	P	R	G
S	L	T	C
N	Y	Z	I

"White (sands) princess riding—sapphire (sky)— low, thatched cottage—near you Z. I.

G	C	P	T
Q	Z	Y	X
H	V	D	K

"Going (on) camel—princess (with) tresses queenly—ZYX!—excuse (to) have (the) duke killed?

¹Numbers refer to the cards in the memory test series.

F	D	K	L
P	H	N	Q
J	W	N	C

"Fairy dream keeps living—princess hurries—Z.
quietly jogs (over) white (sands) near cottage."

"The three stories grew out of a dream which was palpably vivid. When the dream began, I seemed to be a child again, curled up in a big armchair with a book of fairy tales before me. But I did not read the stories. Instead, I made a new one, one which was so deliciously fresh and vivid that I felt a strange thrill of wonder and expectancy. I was framing the story myself, yet I did not know what was going to happen. Suddenly, a rare scene appeared. The air was hot and dry; a great waste of white sand stretched before me, and dazzled my eyes, as it gleamed in the brilliant sunshine. Above bent a sky of sapphire, and around the horizon, the white sands and dark blue sky gleamed out in striking contrast. Ahead, mounted on a camel, rode a princess of astonishing beauty. She had a slight, graceful figure, and was dressed in quaint fashion,—her gown of brocaded satin, elaborately puffed and draped. I could not see her face, but the glory of her hair fairly bewitched my fancy. It was of a rich, dark auburn, flowing down in great waves almost to the feet of the camel; it seemed to catch the glint of all the sunbeams in its strange, beautiful lustre. Yet the princess, sad to tell, was as wicked as she was lovely. She was now a fugitive from justice, because she had treacherously caused a duke of her court to be put to death, thereby satisfying some petty, personal dislike. I was pursuing her secretly, jogging quietly behind her on my camel; she was in desperate haste, but appeared greatly fatigued. In fact, as she continued the journey, her symptoms of exhaustion increased, until finally, as we crossed a sort of bridge (the incongruity of a bridge in a desert did not disturb me) and approached a low, thatched cottage, the princess checked her steed and alighted. I realized that I was very near her, and lingered for a moment by the bridge, fearing detection and not wishing to alarm her. A bent, wrinkled old peasant woman, with an ex-

ceedingly evil face, came out to greet the princess, and to offer her refreshment after her dusty ride. The princess nodded wearily, and moved languidly forward. The cottage contained but two rooms, a kitchen and a bedroom; both were rude and meagrely furnished, but scrupulously neat. The princess entered haughtily, and, with an imperious demand for food, passed into the bedroom, and closed the door. The old woman filled a bowl with porridge, into which she mixed some poison. At this juncture, I entered hastily, and explained to the peasant who her guest was. Then I moved slightly in my excitement,—and awoke! I tried to sleep again, and finish my fascinating dream, but I was unable to do so.

"This dream made a singular impression on me, and its source has been a constant matter of wonder. I am quite sure that I have never read a fairy tale like it; indeed, throughout the entire dream, I had the impression of creating something absolutely original, and felt a combined delight of creative work and of wonder and suspense, which puzzled me as I began the dream. Only two clues suggest themselves as a means of analyzing the dream. One is the fact that I was curled up in an armchair. This situation is probably an instance of wish fulfillment: I have formed a habit of sitting on one foot, and it is a frequent source of annoyance to me that I can't sit in this position when I wish to. In fact, a number of these childish habits constantly vex me, and occasion the rebellious thought that I won't grow up. This reflection is of course instantly repressed when I realize that I cannot help myself. The other clue to the dream was the hair of the princess, which was similar to Mother's. It seems impossible, however, to account for the rest of the dream, although it has tantalized me insistently."

4 MATERIAL OF THE "STORIES" OF LITERATURE

W	S	R	Z
T	X	H	M
J	G	L	C

"Will (the) shadows rise (to) vex him? Just the giants

loudly call!" The scene is a combined picture, taken partly from *Pilgrim's Progress* and partly from my thesis study on *Pauline*. In both cases, the figure is a pilgrim just preparing to descend into the Valley of the Shadow. The air is dark with shadows and grotesque shapes of the dusk, yet the scene holds suggestions of infinite softness and peace. As the pilgrim gropes his way before him, he sees the shapes of giants, in combat with each other; he realizes that he, too, must struggle. But his heart is strangely calm and tranquil; and he moves forward serenely; the shouts of the giants echo loudly, but without alarming him, from the distance."

(D-K-F-N-R-Z) "Down (they) come, (but) fall not;
rosy (T-S-H-J-W) 'tis the shepherd; heart's-ease joy wears
(P) perpetually."

"Again the suggestion is taken from *Pilgrim's Progress*, from a favorite scene in the Valley of Humiliation. The land is low and pleasant, singularly green, and sweet with the fragrance of lilies. The pilgrims enter the valley singing the quaint refrain, 'He that is down need fear no fall,' etc. A rosy-faced shepherd lad meets them, and the company are moved to wonder at his merry manner and the fresh, joyous tones of his voice, until the guide explains that the boy wears 'that herb called heart's-ease in his bosom.' I have thought about this story a great deal; in particular I have wished that I might have the shepherd boy's voice."

VII. 3. "The material of this story comes from the same source; the elements, however, are more confused.

B	H	C	K
D	L	F	M
Q	R	X	T

"To Beulah (the) heavenly country they came. Delectable (they) find (the) mountains. Quick river; X too. The X-T did not immediately suggest a corresponding word in the picture; afterward, I supplemented 'Quick river exorcises troubles.' The scene is the land of Beulah, just

beyond the Delectable mountains, and within sight of the heavenly city. The pilgrims pass on to the river which is very deep and swift; but as they enter the water, their burdens are all dissolved, and they press on, light-hearted and care-free. The whole complex of ideas about death is involved in this story.”

IV

ANALYSIS OF THE “STORIES”

The following extensions and ‘explanations’ of the ‘stories’ given above were written by Miss Z. without previous questioning or discussion. Since the ‘analyses’ are all written on the basis of her own belief that there are at least five main systems or trains of ideas involved, we give below her statement of these. The reader will note that Miss Z. oftens finds other groups of ideas, and sometimes a part of one of these groups is found related to some other group. She is not convinced, therefore, that her own classification is complete or exclusive; it simply seemed best when the ‘stories’ were first restudied by her.

As will be seen by the reader, ‘complex five’ is really not a ‘complex’ at all in the sense she uses the term for the other four. To her it was, however, such a striking element in her feelings and experience that its inclusion somehow was a necessity. It is apparently a form of behavior readily called out in the presence of certain stimuli tending to jeopardise the existence of the inner, fanciful beliefs and ideals. It seems to express the disagreeable side of the emotional tone (ambivalency) often found with autistic thinking (Bleuler). Miss Z. extends the term to include the negativistic reaction.

“Keeping in mind five complexes,—(1) *the wish to be a child still*, (2) to have the companionship of younger people (and hence the converse aspect, the reaction against the loneliness of the plains), (3) to be with Mother always, (4) to be like the princess in externals only, and (5) a fifth emotional complex, which is obviously not a direct wish,—we find that the elements of the dreams may be explained

under one or the other of these heads. My next step will be to show that these same factors also furnish the clues that explain the remainder of the material. One or two additional 'complexes' are involved."

I. ANALYSES OF STORIES BASED ON INCIDENTS

"IV. 3 consists largely of a combination of complexes one, four and five. First of all, the incident is based upon complex 'one.' The chief reason for my disliking this person is due to the fact that he seems to me colorless, coldly intellectual, painfully grown up, and sweepingly scornful of all the fancies and dreams that compose the play stage. He is the expression of conventionality, of cold scrutiny of facts, of brusqueness, of all that is most distasteful to me in that grown up state of character against which I struggle almost fiercely. In his presence, I never feel free or natural or at ease.

"Also, he forces me to a painful realization of the conflict that my love for the play stage has occasioned, namely, the conflict between the rebellion at the thought of growing up into a cold, narrow, colorless world of conventions, and the unwillingness to be babyish together with the strong desire to work and think. This person represents to me the complete attainment of maturity and intellectual force; but he represents that attainment as gained at the price of all pleasure that is natural, deep, and delightful. He typifies all the adult characteristics against which I struggle most determinedly.

"Again, perhaps even more intimately, the incident is an outgrowth of the interrelations of complex four. Not only is this person annoying to me in the sense that he summarily dismisses all of the childish ideas to which I am most attached; he exasperates me even more in the apparent view that he takes of me.

"Whenever I go to this class, I feel a distinct, painful discrepancy between my ideal self and my actual self. Because I cannot quite get into sympathy with him, his general questions do not suggest to me the precise nature of the answer that he desires. This causes him to assume, naturally

enough, that I have not a clear idea of the subject. Now if there is one single element of the personal ideal in this connection, it is my desire to show him that other people do think clearly, and that an enjoyment of the play stage doesn't mean 'hot air' at all, nor does it in any way vitiate the ability to do cool, vigorous thinking. The realization that any lack of sympathy prevents me from demonstrating this fact makes me unreasonably angry. It is the sense of painful inability to make my ideal self real in the very instance where I most desire to prove it.

"Clearly, the situation is an expression of complex five. In fact, my every movement during the hour that I am in this class is an expression of rebellion and self-assertion. Although I have been in the course during all sorts of weather, I do not distinctly recollect a single time that I have not been cold, and, although the degree varies, actually quivering all over,— a characteristic expression of anger. Often, for several hours afterward, I note with surprise, at intervals, that my jaws feel hard and rigid, and that my muscles are tense, although nothing disturbing has happened since the class hour."

"IV. 6. Fixed (with a)—vehement—jab of (a) pin—(the) mantle."

"Obviously, the story is an outcome of complex one. It expresses impatience, in fact, exasperation at the oppressive routine of small things that must be done in the mornings; it is the rebellion against the complexities of adult life and adult conventionalities; it is the converse aspect of the desire to remain in the state of childish simplicity. On the other hand, it is not so much the dislike to attend to the troublesome details of dressing as it is the sense of pressure and the feeling that I cannot get to the more important things at once, the feeling that I can't finish the stupid things soon enough."

"Possibly the story typifies a characteristic distaste for mechanism. Certainly, the small details of dressing weigh upon me ridiculously: when I wake, the thought of fastening my tie and collar, of brushing my clothes, cleaning my nails, etc., appalls me with a sense of oppression. I

reconcile myself to the task of my hair by saying to myself, that, when I have finished school, I shall retire to a convent and cut my hair short. I really haven't the remotest idea of doing so; but the thought cheers me sufficiently to go through with the task. Much as the details annoy me, I am not inclined to hurry over them; I pursue the process deliberately, and am extremely slow; the agony is prolonged.

"The incident recalls an attempt, 'in rapid succession, to brush my teeth with a hatpin, to fasten my shoes with a pencil, and to pin on my hat with a toothbrush.' I am constantly doing stupid things like this, constantly thinking about a future end and forgetting the tedious details that lie between me and the attainment of that end. Possibly, it is again the incapacity for mechanism. This distaste extends itself to other fields,—to my hatred for copying bibliographies, to my dislike for the mechanism in parts of my thesis (chiefly the discussion of plot-structure), to my exasperation at the thought of calculating expenses, and, worst of all, to my hatred for sewing and mending. Mother tried to teach me the latter when I was quite small, but it was absolute torture to me, and somehow, I managed to escape it. I remember hearing her say that her mother could never do it, that she had never learned it well herself, and that she did not want me to be handicapped by a similar inability.

"Again, the story is a development of complex four. The prime source of annoyance about dressing is the fact that there is a painful discrepancy between the ideal self and the real self. The case peculiarly involves the elements of the personal ideal.

"The next 'story' is composed of a combination of complexes, chiefly of complexes one, five, four, and, more slightly, of three. The wish to remain a child is completely satisfied in the situation of the story; I am childish in years (just three); I am childish in my disregard of conventions (again the expression of a repressed wish); I am childish in acting upon impulse, without stopping to consider the effect that my action will have on other people. The situation gives a clear example of a still persisting rebellion against the tiresome details of grown up life,—a rebellion that still

expresses itself fiercely in a different form. So much for complex one.

"Complex five is quite as definitely typified in the experience. It is a characteristic expression of anger, one which is identified by a wild feeling of self-assertion, an absolute rigidity of all the muscles, a trembling that makes me weak, etc. So far, it is a characteristic experience. But in the fact the anger finds expression in a definite object,—namely, the satisfaction of knowing that I am defeating the purpose of Mother and Aunt E. the organic disturbances are slightly less pronounced than would be the case where the emotion found no other means of motor expression.

"Furthermore, the story involves the elements of complex four. A considerable factor in the question of personal idealism is the matter of family pride,—of a desire to be representative of the best traits in manners, appearance, abilities, poise, strength, etc. I am inclined to think that the incident has lingered in my memory largely because of the emphasis which it places upon this ideal. Certainly, as a child, the family influence was a deepening and expanding one; furthermore, I recognize it now as a fundamental element of my personal idealism, and as one that is peculiarly strong in the directive force that it exerts upon my conduct.

"Complex three, which is concerned with Mother, is scarcely so well elaborated in the story. Mother, however, supplies the central cause of the incident: the prime purpose of my behavior is to show her that I am not merely passive to her requests; I have a mind of my own. Second, I have been put to considerable annoyance and fatigue in complying with her requests; I wish to show her that when I make up my mind, I can also be a source of vexation. The satisfaction of my vengeance is in direct proportion to the degree of indignation that her requests of me have aroused. Because I realize that she has superior rights to give directions, and because usually I have found her directions considerate and wise, I am proportionately displeased. The fact that in this, as in almost every individual story, Mother forms an indispensable element of the situation seems, in itself, to be a significant fact.

"The absence of complex two is due to the fact that at

the time of the incident, this special complex did not exist. In these early days, no system of ideas had grouped about the problem of social needs. In the story, I have abundant society, in fact, more than I desire. Could it be that the reinstatement of this condition of social sufficiency is of itself an expression of the wish of complex two?"

"VII. 5. "Temper—just livid got—M. shakes with rage—head breaks."

"The incident centers about ideals, not so much personal as social. In the childish experience, it is an ideal of dolls, a hatred for the doll with the weak, insipid, or simpering face. Perhaps it is both typical and significant that, even at this early age, I did not love dolls merely because they were dolls, any more than I now love people merely because they are people. Then, it was a particular doll, or rather a quality of a particular doll, just as now it is a particular person, or a quality of a particular person. Again, it is the note of individualism, selection and discrimination rather than broadly social acceptance. My favorites were never 'good little girls,' they always had positive ideas, hot tempers, and strong wills; they were always inventive, imaginative, energetic, fun-loving. Apparently, the same ideal has now developed into a certain intolerance for the aggressively cheerful people, the aggressively 'flossy' and captivating, the aggressively righteous, and the aggressively intellectual, efficient, or official. I just can't bear them, not so much personally as ideally. The sight of such a person, although it does not cause the childish 'paroxysm of rage,' at least causes the reaction of disgust and of shutting up within myself.

"The story, significantly enough, is dated in the days of dolls and play, of imagination, and of free self-expression. Throughout it satisfies the conditions of child life that I desire."

2. ANALYSES OF STORIES OF IMAGINATION

"IV. 8. The scene was at the convent where I attended school for several months (in Chicago), when about fourteen

years of age. The nun (no particular one, as I remember) was lying by the cornerstone in a state of half-trance, half-exhaustion. My brief stay at the convent made a deep impression upon me. At first, I was fascinated by the wonder of it all, the dim chapels with their ruddy light from the stained windows, the soft glow from the shrines at the altar, and the hush that lay everywhere. There was the mystery of the dark-robed figures, the clink of rosaries as the nuns tripped up and down the stairs, and the faint aroma of incense from the burning shrines before the statues. I busied myself with framing stories about the nuns, their previous homes, etc.; one of them, I fancied, was a countess. Later, as I grew interested in the work and began to feel at home, the first wonder disappeared. Let me say, however, that although the mystery of the situation wore away, I never recovered quite from a feeling of repulsion for the religion that the nuns represented. Instead of growing more into sympathy with them upon this score, I seemed to grow farther away from them; and there developed a sort of horror for the principles of that faith. It was only the beauty of its symbolism that appealed to me. Certainly, however, the experiences at the convent were sufficient to impress my mind vividly, and to furnish the material for much of my subsequent thinking. The image of the convent is a frequent one in my mind; it is usually represented by the most meagre symbols,—the notion of the cornerstone and the gray walls, sometimes supplemented by the background of Chicago. Hence, we have the scene pictured in the opening quotation of this analysis. Obviously, the story is built upon the general idea of the convent, for it has the notion of the cornerstone (the chief feature of my symbolic image) and the nun is ‘no particular one as I remember,’ despite the fact that I had a few very devoted friends among the Sisters, and that I knew the others only slightly. The ‘state of half-trance, half-exhaustion’ is accounted for by the feeling of horror that I had about Catholicism, its unnaturalness, etc., a feeling that is here extended to the representatives of that faith. The next part of the story, however, explains this image more fully.

“She wore the habit of the B. V. M.’s, but otherwise

she seemed mediaeval rather than modern. In fact, she was the typical nun of romance, disliking her life and chafing at its confinement. 'Her head was buried in her hands, and great sobs shook her frame. . . . Throughout, I was conscious of the striking contrast between this nun and the light-hearted, sunny women whom I had known so intimately at the convent.' The significance of these lines is best explained in the separate discussion of the complexes that are involved in the story. The sinister character of this image is apparently due to the secret disapproval that I felt for the life of the nuns. In my ordinary experiences with the Sisters, this preconceived, sinister image was repressed, relegated to the background, half-forgotten; in its place, there was the actuality of the 'light-hearted, sunny women,' apparently perfectly contented and delighted with their secluded life. The living-room of the nuns was a far livelier and gayer place than that of many college boarding houses that I have known, and my previous picture of the sombre, morbid, and unnatural life that the nuns led was quite suppressed by the actual life that I saw them lead. Yet, although it was suppressed, I think that a secret belief in my old idea still lingered. In the story, this belief asserts itself triumphantly, and I have an exaggerated sketch of the unhappy nun of fiction.

"Night was deepening all about her; her suffering and isolation, together with the unusual circumstance of her being outside the convent after dark, filled me with pity and alarm. I stole toward her very softly, and she straightway told me her tale. . . . I had a slight kinaesthetic shiver and the pleasantly assuring knowledge that I was not a Catholic. It suggested the waking from a dream.' This is quite in keeping with the other details of my previous idea of the mediaeval nun. The mental background of disapproval, so completely repressed during the stay in the convent, has taken full control when my attention was unguarded. One single custom of the nuns, or rather, one single regulation of the convent that suggested mediaevalism to me was the rule that forbade the nuns to be outside the convent after dark. I remember vividly a certain afternoon when I went with two of the Sisters across the city. There was a blockade

of the cars; dark came very suddenly; and the little nuns were greatly perturbed. We finally walked home from the State Street Bridge, the Sisters obviously nervous, although there were quite a number of girls with them. This explains the 'deepening of night,' the 'suffering and isolation' of the nun, apart from the others in the convent, and 'the unusual circumstance of her being outside after dark.' Naturally, I am moved with pity; I move toward her softly; and she tells me her trouble. The final 'shiver' of the story is also natural. So completely has the horror of the situation over-powered me, so deeply do I feel the tragedy of the nun's life, and the inevitableness of her vows, that I have almost forgotten that it is her experience and not my own. Hence, I have the 'kinaesthetic shiver' and the 'pleasantly assuring knowledge that I was not a Catholic.' As the picture fades away from me, the emotional experience lingers until suddenly I realize with a gasp of relief that the situation was only an image. It is precisely the assuring sort of recollection that we have when we wake from a terrifying dream.

"Let us see in what manner the story is an elaboration of the complexes.

"In the first place, the chief source of my disapproval of the life of the nuns was the result of my feeling for Mother. It seemed to me almost inhuman for girls to leave their mothers alone just when they would most have enjoyed their society, and to shut themselves up where they could hear little of their family. The idea never attracted me because it ran directly counter to my only plan of staying with Mother always. Thus, the sinister character of the picture is due to the action of complex three.

"In the second place, however, the social wish of complex two is partially satisfied in the conception of convent life. It makes possible a singular community of interests, a singularly strong bond of comradeship, and a singularly deep, abiding type of affection. Because the friendships of the nuns among themselves are never interrupted by external changes, and because they are of life-long duration, they are peculiarly deep, unselfish, and whole-hearted. Again, because they are based upon congeniality of tastes, and unity of conviction, they are singularly stable and, at

the same time, singularly progressive friendships. Finally, although there is abundant time for individual growth, loneliness cannot exist in a household of sincere, warm-hearted women, who are even more satisfying than girls.

"Thirdly, indeed chief of all, the story is an elaboration of ideas about the personal ideal of complex four. It is not the ideal of the regular nun; on the contrary, complex three and my own feelings about religious principles run directly counter to this. But it is an ideal of much that the life of the nun stands for; it is the ideal of simplicity, of whole-hearted devotion to a few deep convictions, and of a certain freshness and strength of thought. Alone in the little study out on the plains, with only history, botany, and Virgil to think of, and with only the landscape of sky and meadow to look at, I naturally developed this ideal. It was a conception of life as very deep and still, full of imaginative beauty, full of sunshine, and full of thought. It was the life of Galahad and of Percival. True, it was the life of the spirit, of a peculiarly deep and subtle sort of peace, of prayer and of contentment, yet it was not unsubstantial, for it was happy, and it was also the most energetic existence I have ever led, before or since. Indeed, lonely as it frequently was, I look back upon the life of this time as I would upon a day of cloudless sunshine. It was the existence of the nun humanized and yet idealized.

"Again, the conception of the nun was subjected to change. History and ethics gave a morbid picture of the convent life; it was unnatural; it was selfish; it was egoistic; it was dangerous because it was essentially a suppression of human tendencies. Much of this I had thought before; most of this criticism I had precluded by adapting the ideal of the nun to my own more social and unrestrained existence. Nevertheless, I began to realize the dangerous potentialities that lay even in my own sunshiny version of the matter. Consequently, in the story, the exaggerated difficulties of the question take precedence of its advantages, and the sombre side of the situation is presented.

"Finally, the interest in convent life is distinctly an outgrowth of complex one. It was the imaginative beauty, the symbolism of the religion that appealed to me. I loved

the soft, tinted lights, the hush and the dimness of the chapels, the fragrance of the flowers and the gleam of the candles on the altars. I did not like the services. But, in my own room and in my own religion, I was glad to add the touch of beauty; it seemed more fitting, more reverent, and lovelier. I liked the bowl of flowers by the picture of the Christ Child, in the little corner where I prayed; I liked the revelry of fancy and beauty, and the encouragement of the play stage that the richer symbolism afforded. Perhaps it was childish; perhaps it was primitively simple; it was also very deep and very charming.

"There is a single suggestion of complex five. It is in the sobs that 'shook' the nun. It is characteristic of this feeling that a power seems to seize me, and that something outside myself shakes my whole frame. The feeling distinguishes it from grief and other emotional experiences; it is distinctly recognizable.

"The play of the fairy, as indicated in numbers IV. 9, V. 3, and V. 1., is an elaboration of 'complexes' one and two, the wishes to remain a child and to have companionship, respectively.

"In the fairy tale that I played, I was always a child. I was carried off with the fairy beneath her mist cloak, or magically transported to the scenes of her evening banquets where the sunset fires flamed beyond the hills. At night, with the stars and the dream hours, she charmed me into sleep with the lightest of elfin lullabies. She was older than I, and consequently more understanding, so that I was never wearied with tiresome explanations to her: with her, I was my whole, free self,—an unrestrained child. On the other hand, she was unsatisfactory, for she could only return to me my own fancies and thoughts; furthermore, although she cheered me in my projects about work and study, I could only enjoy her in my moments of leisure. Thus, she did not correlate quite adequately my conflicting desires to be a child and yet to do active, vigorous work. Moreover, even delightful a phantom though she was, she could not satisfy my craving for the richer and broader experience of other people's society. Yet she helped me to forget my loneliness in the rare world of dreams to which her fairy favor admitted

me. She gave me the keys of fairy-land, but she left me with the human conflicts that even her elfin genius could not quell. She was an expression of the play stage, of the rich and intricate fancies, of the childish dreams and pleasures, of my relaxed and spontaneous self. She was thus the crystallization of 'complex' one into a definite form. In the second place, she offered a substitute for the social needs, for an intimate, understanding companion, for one that was older and wiser, yet equally capable of entering into my oddest and most childish caprices. Thus she represents 'complex' two. Indeed, when the fairy play is analysed, it easily resolves into a symbolization of the unadjusted systems of complexes one and two."

3. THE DREAM "STORIES"

Analysis of VII, 7, VII, 9, and VII, 10, founded upon a single dream:

"I seemed to be a child again.' This statement is unquestionably a part of a complex. As far back as I can remember, I have felt an unwillingness, amounting almost to a fear, about 'growing up.' In fact, it always requires an effort to play the role of an adult; in ordinary experience, I frequently have the impression of adopting artificially the adult manners of associates, although I realize all the while that it is not a true expression. There is a consciousness of conflict much of the time,—of an unwillingness to be babyish, and, on the other hand, of a fierce rebellion at the thought of 'growing up.' I don't want to leave the world of play and wonder and dreams; I don't want to be colorless and brusque and matter-of-fact. I don't want to bother with all the tiresome details of things. I want to work and play together always. Whenever I really relax, I find myself a child again, rested, comfortable, and unafraid. Usually, too, I slip into some childish position, for example, curling up in a big chair. Hence 'curled up in a big armchair with a book of fairy tales before me.' In the light of the preceding statements, this sentence clearly expressed the fulfillment of a wish. I am annoyed by the fact in ordinary life I am grown up and must adopt grown

up postures, etc., when I don't wish to at all. Again, the 'book of fairy tales' symbolizes the whole world of childish delights,—the fascinating dreams and fancies that have never lost their charm for me. It is a return to the play stage again.

"But I did not read the stories. Instead, I made a new one, one that was so deliciously fresh and vivid that I felt a strange thrill of wonder and expectancy.' I was framing the story myself, yet I did not know what was going to happen. Here, again, we have a highly idealized situation. In ordinary life, I find a conflict of desires: I want to work, to have a purpose, to do creative intellectual work; but I wish to play, to dream, to be a child. Ordinarily, there is difficulty in conciliating the two. But, in the dream, the two are adjusted. I have all the relaxed, delightful sensation of being just a child, just myself; yet I have all the glow of energy and strength which comes from expression in an object or ideal. There is the combined delight of creative work and of wonder and suspense.

"Suddenly a rare scene appeared. The air was hot and dry; a great waste of white sand stretched before me, and dazzled my eyes, as it gleamed in the brilliant sunshine. Above bent a sky of sapphire, and, around the horizon, the white sands and dark blue sky gleamed out in brilliant contrast.' An analysis of this scene reveals the fact that it is built up directly from an experience which particularly impressed me. Mother and I joined Father and Brother (who had gone ahead to the ranch) directly from a stay in Chicago. The country we found in Texas was simply a desert, in every sense of the word. It was a desert, as regards social or intellectual life; it was literally a desert in appearance, for little vegetation occurred there. After the fresh beauty of K. woods and lanes, the broad expanse of sunburnt plains and hot skies impressed me with an actual sense of pain. When the summers came, the place was even more intolerable: there was never anything to greet our eyes but this weary stretch of glaring plains and burning skies. The picture of the ranch is always symbolized for me in this aching, glaring blue and white.

"‘Ahead, mounted on a camel, rode a princess of astonishing beauty. She had a slight, graceful figure, and was dressed in quaint fashion,—her gown of brocaded satin, elaborately puffed and draped. I could not see her face, but the glory of her hair fairly bewitched my fancy. It was of a rich, dark auburn, flowing down in great waves almost to the feet of the camel; it seemed to catch the glint of all the sunbeams in its strange, beautiful lustre.’ Here, we have a singular blending of ideas. The princess is an elaboration of fancies about Mother and myself, so closely interrelated that I cannot distinguish the two from each other. The notion of the princess, however, is chiefly from a fancy of my own. At the time of the dream, I was spending the holidays quietly with Mrs. K. The house was very still after the girls had left, and I played (to myself) that I was a princess, a captive in a mediaeval castle. Only a few days before, I had been drying my hair on a balcony upstairs in the sunshine. Still playing with my story, I pretended that I was out upon the parapet that surrounded the tower of my confinement. Like the princess in the fairy tales, I let my hair stream loosely over my shoulders, and waved the tresses wildly, as a signal to the knights who cantered in the courts below, vainly attempting to rescue me. The figure of the princess may have been a remembrance of Mother, or it may have been of my own fancied form of the princess. The rich gown with its satin, brocade, and draping is of slightly doubtful origin. Possibly, however, it is a part of a wish. A great aunt of mine once spent much of her time at the French Court. At her death, she sent Mother a chest of her possessions,—among which was a satin gown that she had worn at court. Mother wished me to wear it when I grew up, but I had never found occasion to do so. I have, however, quite a weakness for the picturesque costumes of the earlier days; in my heart, I half wish we wore them still. In the dream the wish is realized; the rich fabric and the graceful quaintness of the costume are combined delightfully. Of course, in the dream, I am not the princess. On the other hand, she is a beautiful, romantic creature, whom I merely admire silently. Possibly she is Mother. Her hair would seem to substantiate this suggestion, for it is auburn, like

Mother's. The fact that I took a singular pride in Mother's hair seems to explain this part of the picture. I gloried in the fact that it was auburn, that it was such a deep, soft shade, and that it made her skin appear so fair. It was not wonderful, of course, for the dream is exaggerated and idealized, yet I loved to look at it, and to think that Mother's hair was really unusual. The thought of her hair symbolized to me all the warmest, deepest, and happiest thoughts of her,—really the sunshine of things. Hence 'it seemed to catch the glint of all sunbeams in its strange, beautiful lustre.' I am puzzled about the camels; I cannot account for them nor for the fact that I was pursuing the princess.

"Yet the princess, sad to tell, was as wicked as she was lovely. She was now a fugitive from justice, for she had treacherously caused a duke of her court to be put to death, thereby satisfying some petty, personal dislike.' This part of the dream was vague and indistinct. It seems merely to have run hastily through my mind as an explanation for the fact that I was pursuing her. Two possible hypotheses suggest themselves to account for the idea. The first is an absurd notion, not a belief, but simply a disappointment. I had always enjoyed the romances about beauties of history; but I had always found them disappointing. I wanted the heroines to be completely idealized, to be as unusually lovely in character as they were in appearance. With a few exceptions, the majority of such figures in history seemed to be wicked. I had been reading English history, but I had also been forming the opinion that many of the prettiest girls I knew were shallower and less trustworthy than the plainer ones. It was a source of comfort to me, even in my disappointment, that this was true. Hence, in the dream, the dazzling beautiful princess is characteristically disappointing. The beauty is purely external. I am not sure whether the figure was suggested by the history I had been reading or by the half-formulated notion of my own experiences with girls. Either hypothesis seems feasible. The incident of her causing the duke to be put to death was not clear in the dream. I remembered that she had caused someone of her court to be executed, unjustly, but I did not know who it was in the dream. The word 'duke' was suggested by the

letters 'D-K,' and the fact that it was in keeping with the rest of the story. Apparently, I was thinking of the history again.

"I was pursuing her secretly, jogging quietly behind her on my camel; she was in desperate haste, but appeared greatly fatigued. In fact, as she continued the journey, her symptoms of exhaustion increased, until finally, as we crossed a sort of bridge (the incongruity of a bridge in a desert did not disturb me) and approached a low, thatched cottage, the princess checked her steed and alighted. I realized that I was very near her, and lingered for a moment by the bridge, fearing detection and not wishing to alarm her.' Only portions of this section suggest their source in experiences. The jogging along in the heat and dust probably recalls the rides that Mother and I took together; as a rule, the pleasure of being out together was almost marred by the discomfort of the drive. Usually, too, we were both fatigued before we returned. I recognize the bridge as similar to those which we frequently cross on the roads at home. The fact that I had this dream during the holidays,—a time when I longed to be home,—seems to establish the dream as one of the wish-fulfillment type. Again, the drive with Mother realizes a desire of mine for a return of the pleasant days when Mother and I rode together. The low thatched cottage is also suggested from the scenes at home; the tenants' cottages on the farm are small, low, and one-storied. The thatch is supplied, possibly to complete the picturesqueness of the dream.

"A bent, wrinkled old peasant woman, with an exceedingly evil face, came out to greet the princess, and to offer her refreshment after her dusty ride.' Undoubtedly, Mother and I are driving at home. Most of the women in the country, that is, most of the older ones, are bent and wrinkled from their lives of hardship and actual physical labor. Also, I usually think of them (secretly) as people of the peasant class. The evil face is apparently added to complete the drama of the situation; it seems to have no other significance.

"The princess nodded wearily, and moved languidly forward. The cottage contained but two rooms, a kitchen and a bedroom; both were rude and meagrely furnished, but

scrupulously neat. The princess entered haughtily, and, with an imperious demand for food, passed into the bedroom, and closed the door.' I have only a general idea about the origin of this part of the dream. The cottage inside, however, answers precisely to the description of the tenants' cottages at home. The manner of the princess is less certain. I think, though I am not sure, that it is a symbol of a desire to have plenty of servants, to be able just to give directions and not bother about stupid details unless I care to. The sweeping ease of the princess is quite in contrast to my own tedious performance of duties, particularly in the mornings.

"The old woman filled a bowl with porridge, into which she mixed some poison. At this juncture, I entered hastily and explained to the peasant who her guest was. Then I moved slightly in my excitement, and awoke.' The suggestion here probably comes from the story of English history about Rosalynd and the poison. There is also a vivid personal experience of childhood about 'bowl' and 'porridge.'

"This analysis, obviously, still leaves certain factors unexplained. I cannot account for the camels, for the fact that I was playing the part of detective, for the request of the princess for food, for the mad flight of the beautiful but desperate woman, for the evil face of the peasant, or for the thatch of the cottage. The only feasible explanation that I can offer for these elements of the dream is that I was allowing my fancy absolutely free play. I had been wishing for more color, romance, and adventure in my own experience; in the dream, mystery is a potent factor, and the drama of the situation is never spoiled by the interpolation of the commonplace.

"A review of this study reveals the fact that certain groups of thought fall into separate systems that form distinct, insistent elements in all of the material used. First of all, there is the group that deals with the desire to remain in the play stage, to be a child, and the conflict that this wish occasions with the other ideal of work and vigorous purpose. This "complex" accounts for the entire elaboration of the dream from pages (?) to (?). The second system deals with the thought of our home in Texas. Possibly

the dream analysis does not make perfectly clear the significance of this group of ideas. We came to Texas just at a time when I was beginning to feel the need of the companionship of young people. As a child, being the youngest and having only one brother, who was five years older than myself, I had been alone more than is the case with most children. Consequently, I grew into the habit of supplying ideal playmates, and of depending upon imagination rather largely, but I had begun to realize the dangers of self-sufficiency and at the same time really to yearn to be with other girls. I did not want to be 'odd' and 'different' from too much isolation. Also I had begun to realize the wonderful world of pleasure which study afforded, and I was fired with the desire to give my whole energy to school work. The trip to Texas seemed to defeat all of my cherished hopes. The plains offered no opportunity for social or intellectual growth. For a couple of years, I scarcely saw any girls, and school work was practically impossible. True, I tried a couple of months at a convent boarding-school, but the work was not advanced enough to be helpful, and I returned home to study by myself. In time, of course, the first sense of helpless disappointment wore off. Mother and I spent happy hours together, reading, working, and playing,—and we devised a little study where I managed to do a great deal of work. In order to prepare for the University entrance examinations, I divided the days into definite periods, and plunged into systematic work. Yet even such an energetic program I felt to be inadequate. I felt that I was growing into a habit of self-sufficiency, of shutting myself up with thoughts and dreams and fancies, which, pleasant though they were, were painfully inadequate to satisfy my yearning for young people. I felt that I was losing something that I could never quite make up, and at times the desert-like plains and the loneliness almost terrified me with their oppressiveness. Since I have been away at school, I have never quite felt at one with the other girls; I fancied that the feeling must be due to my being so much alone, and consequently to the fact that I had built up a system of individual interests that were difficult to reconcile with theirs.

"The third complex of the analysis involves the group

of ideas about Mother. All of the sunniest and deepest experiences that I can remember center about her. Consequently, this element is a directing force in my thoughts, and points both backward and forward.

"The fourth 'complex' is perhaps little more than an elaboration of the first, yet it seems to offer at least one additional factor not included in the fundamental desire to remain a child. It is the wish symbolized in the outward appearance of the princess,—in her grace, her picturesque costume, and her imperious manner. All of this description expresses an ideal of ease, luxury, authority, and love of beauty and romance."

4. LITERATURE "STORIES"

"This story appears to symbolize the chief elements of all the 'complexes' except number five. In the first place, it symbolizes complex one. Ever since I was quite a small girl, I have wished that life might be simpler, more picturesque, more full of color and beauty. Most of all, I have wished that instead of the intricacies of the moral and spiritual life, instead of the troublesome questions of choice, of ideals, of customs, and of duties, we might have merely the Christian journey to make. It is for this reason that *Pilgrim's Progress* took so deep a hold upon my heart and my fancy. It seemed to me to set forth an ideal conception of life: first of all, it was an unrestrained existence in the out-of-doors; as such, it was a life of beauty and of nature, of a certain childish and primitive delight in the loveliness of the senses; secondly, it was a simple life, free from the adult responsibilities, the adult duties, the adult conventionalities; it was the life of the child. Thirdly, it was the life of imagination and of the play stage. In such an ideal existence, there were no drab lines of routine; the struggles with insistent problems took on the color of romance; they were conflicts with Apollyon, with monsters of terrible mien, with giants, with dragons, with satyrs; they were simple, splendid acts of courage, pressing forward up the Hill of Difficulty, conquering the lions, gaining entrance to the Palace Beautiful, or passing through the dusk and hush that

lie within the Valley of the Shadow. And again, more delightful still, were the Delectable Mountains with their fruits and vines and flowers, the pleasant country of Beulah with its singular balm and beauty and the splendor of the Eternal City where gleamed the robes of the Shining Ones. The entire picture was a revelry of the play stage, of the childish world of dreams, of fairies, and of beauties. In this regard, the story symbolizes complex one.

"Secondly, the story satisfies the social wish of complex two. In such an existence as it pictures, loneliness does not exist. The whole world is a band of pilgrims with common pleasures, common pains, and a glorious, common aim. The pilgrims sing together, not by a fixed plan, but easily, spontaneously, and musically, from unity and from fullness of heart.

"Thirdly, the story clearly realizes the personal ideal of complex four in the character of the shepherd lad and in the pleasant air of the Valley. First, the shepherd boy possesses a singular poise that comes from peace of heart, from 'the herb heart's ease that he wears in his bosom.' He possesses that peculiarly subtle and unquenchable sort of calm, that feeling of absolute trust and security, which somehow forms the background of everything, even though I lose consciousness of it so often. It is a difficult thing to describe; I am not sure that it does not belong in a separate complex, but it seems to fall in most closely with a sort of spiritual idealism.

"Certainly, in other respects, the shepherd boy represents an unattained personal ideal. He is the embodiment of ease and light-heartedness, of perfect assurance and confidence; he is completely at one with other people, even with a company of strangers. He is splendidly wholesome (symbolized by his ruddy color) and sane; and his voice rings out fresh and joyous, rich with the quality of poise. His voice has all of the depth and sweetness that mine lacks so completely.

"Again, the scene is laid in the Valley of Humiliation, symbolizing limited means and an absence of all the longed-for objects that belong to my ideal of luxury. But the Valley, significantly enough, is the place of perfect content-

ment: 'the land is low and pleasant, singularly green, and sweet with the fragrance of lilies.' In a word, the petty annoyances and limitations are no longer felt because of his peace of heart.

"Finally, the story is closely woven about Mother in its aspect of the pilgrimage, etc."

5. DIRECT WISH-FULFILLMENT "STORIES"

IV. 10. "'Bid him trip joyfully, gaze leaving.' 'That is, tell him to come out and dance with the others instead of watching the waltzers from the wall. This story seems to symbolize the social wish of complex two more definitely than do any of the others. It embodies two distinct desires, first, the wish to be with the girls again (a very strong feeling); second, a singularly intense interest in dancing. The evenings at Mrs. K.'s. with the girls were very pleasant, particularly because most of the girls were young (all Freshmen except me) and full of life. They satisfied my social wish. On the other hand, this year, I scarcely know the people in the house by sight; they never visit me in my room unless they have an errand or a message; and we never spend any time together. They are very good and very mature, but they don't know how to play. Naturally, the loneliness is oppressive; naturally, I long to be with the girls again; naturally I find even my fancies and ideals rather insufficient.

"Secondly, the story fulfills the dancing wish. Ever since I was nine or ten, I have desired to take dancing lessons. The little dances that we had in the living room after dinner were peculiarly delightful. I think it is the music of the motion that charms me, even crude though it was in the experiments. I do not think it is the social wish completely, for I love to dance all alone, except that I know nothing about it. My chief desire is to learn how. I am not sure about a formal dance; the idea is only partially attractive in the fact that an evening entertainment does seem a thing of glamor and romance, and, further, in the fact that I do love the music and the movement.

"Complex four, the personal ideal, is also involved,

for one of the troubles of the unfulfilled social wish is the fear that I may grow narrow and selfish, egocentric, etc.; in a word, that I may depart from the ideal of the social self."

Miss Z. has expressed here through the medium of the memory tests a series of thoughts and fancies that ordinarily would find no outlet. Once started by this test, she has found a considerable pleasure and relief in their expression. We hope to show in a later article how far the autistic thinking, begun in early childhood, has separated itself from her actual, social behavior. It is evident already, when we compare the biographical data with the 'stories,' how much trouble this separation has caused her. Even with this material, we can see why her casual class-room companions called her queer and unnatural. Her mannerisms, voice, and other socially unadjusted forms of behavior seem more natural and unaffected as soon as these fancies and unexpressed trains of thought are known to the observer.

As we have noted above 'complex five' is not in reality a wish or ideal or even a system of more or less closely related ideas. The first four 'complexes' appear in Miss Z.'s account to be persistent and to have fairly definite ideas and modes of private behavior developed in connection with them. Only portions of the childish fancies, plans, and ambitions found realization. Other portions just as real and just as desirable could not, or did not, get external satisfaction and social sanction. These latter are summed up in the four complexes. They gave pleasure and happiness when she 'played' with them, but since they failed to obtain social expression they failed to bring full human satisfaction. Further, their greatest pleasure came when actual companionship and social approval were momentarily pushed aside or forgotten. This double train of thought is quite evident from Miss Z.'s account. Its presence explains many of the discrepancies in the objective biographical statement given above. Since both the autistic thinking and the realized thoughts are highly conscious, inevitable conflicts arise, many of which are clearly visible in what Miss Z. has mistakenly called 'complex five.'

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY OF STUTTERING*

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THE word "stuttering" introduced into this title is merely an accidental matter. The reason that it was so entitled is because the process that I wish to refer to, is as far as I know, most commonly found in the speech disorder known as stuttering. But I do not wish to present this paper as a demonstration of treatment for stuttering, or a demonstration of the results of our treatment for stuttering. I merely wish to present a paper as an offering for the illustration of our method of revising, remodelling, remaking a certain mental process. This process is that of visualization.

To make the matter quite clear and to freshen in your minds some of the data that has already been published upon the subject of Visualization Processes, let me first review in brief two or three of the papers that have been recently read or published upon this subject. The purpose of this is not instruction, but to freshen in your minds some of the data which I wish to use in the body of my paper. Let us turn, then, to a summary of previous work.

On May 5, 1915, I read a paper entitled "A Psychological Analysis of Stuttering"¹ before the American Psycho-Pathological Association at its New York meeting. That paper showed that in general, normal individuals during the time of utterance, also before and afterwards, saw in their mind's eye a picture or a visualization of that about which they were speaking. For example, I ask an individual—"where do you live," and he says "45 Charles Street." Then I

*Read at the Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, D. C., May 11, 1916.

¹Swift: Walter B. "A Psychological Analysis of Stuttering," JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY, Oct.-Nov., 1915.

direct questions to ascertain the content of consciousness before, during and after making that utterance, and I find that his answer is somewhat as follows: "I saw my house, the street in front, and the number on the door, with a few trees standing in front."

I find by further questioning that this visual picture came into mind before utterance, was there during utterance, and perhaps lasted a little afterwards. Again I ask the subject to say after me "The dog ran across the street." He repeats it and afterwards I similarly investigate and find that a dog crossing the street was seen. It must now be clear from this as to just exactly what I mean by the words "visual picture, visualization, picture, etc., " during speech.

At the December 30-31, 1915, meeting of the Southern Society of Psychology and Philosophy in Columbus, Ohio, I presented a paper entitled "Further Psychological Analysis of Stuttering."¹ Here I approached the problem a little more completely. While in the previous paper I had limited my investigation to the presence or absence of visualization during speech, in this paper I make an effort to study all the other contents of consciousness before, during and after these pathological utterances of stutterers. My method was that of introspection as before. I first questioned the subjects as to the contents without any leading question. When I found a certain content present, then I asked the subsequent patient that same thing as a leading question; (of course after the questions that were not leading). This paper showed that the contents of consciousness consisted in numerous psycho-pathological concepts which would be out of our line to mention in detail here. The part, however, that that plays in the purpose of this paper is the following: I found that there was in this series of subjects also an absence of visualization before, during and after utterance when stuttering occurred. To make this situation clearer and bring it down to the demonstration of a case, I will insert at this time a case or two that illustrate the presence of visualization in the normal individual and another that shows its absence.

Visualization case No. 1. Woman, aged 22, born in

¹Swift: Walter B. Paper Unpublished.]

Nova Scotia. Comes and submits to visualization tests merely as a normal individual, and placed systematically through all the twenty-five visualization tests described in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in the article entitled "Psychological Analysis of Stuttering" (1, p. 228), which include a test of the presence or absence of visualization before, during and after speaking in twenty-five cases covering all the senses and placed in past, present and future time.

The results of these tests show that she visualized before, during and after utterance in all cases except four. One of these was on taste and may be omitted. This test has always proved unsatisfactory. Two were on muscular movements to test visualization as it accompanies imagined motion. These may also be omitted. We find, therefore, only one straight case where visualization was absent. The rarity of this lends a doubt to its existence, or at least it is overshadowed by the supposition that some other element may have entered, to sidetrack the visualization process at that time.

'My conclusion from this is that this subject visualizes as a constant mental habit before, during and after all her utterances. She would therefore rank as a normal individual as far as this process is concerned. Besides this she personally acknowledges that while she is speaking her attention is always concentrated upon the picture that is running in her mind.

I introduce this subject and this data merely to illustrate the normal process and its prevalence in occurrence.

Visualization case No. 2. Man, aged 21, born in Nova Scotia, brother to subject No. 1, with whom he has lived for years and constant companionship as brother and sister. I mention this fact to show that their environment, and their memories of certain locations must necessarily be somewhat the same. For example after twenty years of observing their home in Nova Scotia, they must necessarily have somewhat the same memories of that home.

This subject submits to visualization tests as an abnormal illustration of visualization processes. He was also put through all the visualization tests mentioned above (1, page

228), and these show the following results: The data show that in the twenty-five questions visualization processes were absent except in six during utterance. To be fair to the average mentioned above, we will omit the unsatisfactory tests and that would make sixteen cases of absence, with three cases where some picture was present. All these six cases occurred at the end of the tests. They therefore attract a semblance of doubt in that some learning process may have been in vogue here; and that they were *therefore* inserted. At best they were weak visualization processes. In general the patient acknowledges himself that he never sees any pictures or "hardly any."

My conclusion from this is that this subject, through repeated tests by the method of introspection, shows that before, during and after all his utterances there is almost constantly an absence of a visual picture at the time of utterance. He also acknowledges practically the same thing himself.

I introduce this subject and these data merely to illustrate the abnormal process or the psycho-pathological findings in an individual where there is almost total absence of visualization processes before, during and after speaking.

Visualization case No. 3. Man, age 19, born in Massachusetts. Comes to submit himself as an illustration of a subject who has been put under vocal drill for three months, and for nine months since has had present in his talking processes an active functioning of these visualization processes. He was put through these same visualization tests (1, page 228) last July with the following data: *almost no visual pictures.*

He was put through these same visualization processes 9 months later with the following results: *almost constant visual pictures before, during and after speech.*

Subject 1 and subject 2, the normal subject and the abnormal subject are of course in one way irrelevant to the contents of this paper, but I merely bring them in here to show, and make more vivid in your memory just the sort of process and just the sort of condition that we are dealing with. In fact they illustrate an abnormal state contrasted with a normal state to supply what I should like to have

been able to supply all in one person. I should like to have had my third subject both before vocal drill began and at the present time, but this you may see would be impossible in one evening if eight months had to intervene. I have introduced the former two subjects therefore to fill in this gap.

In subject 3 you have seen my illustration of developmental psychology as applied to visualization processes during speech. You have seen that these processes have been largely developed. You see they have been developed as an automatic function. You see they have been developed as a pretty spontaneous affair; you see that this man really functions in his talking mechanism just about as well as our normal subject did in the exercise of her normal talking function.

As I said before, this is not the time nor place for the presentation of methods. That would take too much time. It would take more time to prepare such a thing than I could possibly devote to it, and I never care to present the method itself until it is finally and exhaustively formulated and illustrated. If, however, there are a few of you who wish to hear about it in an informal way, I shall be very glad to give it to you in brief outline. But this is only with the understanding that it is no complete presentation of a method or system that I have given out in such form, that I would recommend others to trust themselves in using it. To use this system, it needs to be preceded by some personal supervision, and drill on patients themselves as well as a certain sort of developmental psychology employed to evolve the user in some of his sensory areas; so that he may be able to have such hearing sensitiveness that he will be able to ascertain what is going on, to some degree at least, in the background of his patient's speech utterances during treatment. I have learned the lesson before that brief presentations of this method tempt others to use it too hastily with only disastrous results.

Let us view this situation, then, from the standpoint of the developmental psychologist. We began with a subject who did not use the visualization processes during speech, except occasionally. We have placed the subject through

a three months' long vocal drill, and we finally find that our subject is possessed of a development of visualization processes. In other words, he has now the power to picture the content of the connotation of his utterances before, during and after speaking, and he also has the power automatically and spontaneously to do this pretty constantly in conversation. You have seen the subject do it, and you have heard him acknowledge that he could not do it previously.

Viewing this developmental process as a whole, it seems to me that we have here the acquiring of a certain mental power, or in better words, the application of a certain mental function or brain function, whichever you may be pleased to call it, during his speaking, and it is the application of a function which was surely not present within him before. As far as I can see, this then is a new psychological accomplishment. It is something that I have not found in literature; it is something in fact that I have heard that psychologists denied as possible of attainment, although I cannot quote the reference as authority. I have heard it said that the development of visualization was an impossibility.

From this evidence, it seems clear that the development of visualization processes or the developmental psychology of visualization is an accomplished fact. I could bring in over twenty-five subjects equally as conclusive as the one that I have shown to you in detail. What these results mean, what may be their application, remains for you to say.

Summary: A previous psychological analysis of stuttering published in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology proved that visualization processes were usually absent in stuttering. A further psychological analysis of stuttering at the Columbus meeting of the Southern Society for Psychology and Philosophy showed that just previous to stuttering and afterward there were other psycho-pathological states, and this paper also confirmed the absence of visualization processes. The present case is an illustration of a total supplying of those visualization processes by vocal drill lasting three months. A subject with normal visualization processes is first presented, then a subject with almost entirely absent visualization processes is presented. The purpose of these

is to show the normal and the abnormal. Then the developed case was shown as the final flowering result of developing this psychological visualization. This development was so complete that he compared very favorably with the normal processes in the normal individual who visualized.

In very brief form a complete, automatic, visualization process may be developed by vocal drill in cases where previously there was total absence of all these visualization processes during speech.

In relation to the stuttering, the symptoms disappeared in proportion as the picturing processes developed. This may therefore be considered as the "new treatment indicated" in the article in the *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*.¹ I next plan to present a long series of such cases so treated, presenting both the original absence of picturing and its final development. By that time I think I will be ready to give out my system of treatment in final form.

¹Swift: Walter B. "A Psychological Analysis of Stuttering," *JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY*, Oct.-Nov. 1915.

SOME PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES OF CHARACTER*

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INASMUCH as psycho-analysis leads to a knowledge of the inmost mental make-up and character of a patient, some of the results of such studies seem worthy of report.

A character portrait, from the psychoanalytic point of view, implies a presentation of auto-erotic, narcissistic, and sublimation products. Without psychoanalysis one can but have an inadequate knowledge of these components in any particular case.

Before coming to particular cases, it would be well, perhaps, to make a few meanings clear.

Auto-erotism is a term invented by Havelock Ellis and adopted by Freud. He applies it in the first instance to thumb-sucking: Freud says "Let us insist that the most striking character of this sexual activity is that the impulse is not directed against other persons but that it gratifies itself on its own body."¹ If we generalize this we may say, any activity that finds its satisfaction in itself is auto-erotic, or, auto-erotism is self-satisfaction.

Narcissism is the next stage in libido, or love development. Here the object is the not-self, is another person or thing, but one as like as possible, a mirror likeness, hence the name. Narcissistic love sees in the beloved object itself projected and objectively realized. The narcissistic lover does not see, however, the mechanism of his projection, and therefore has little or no insight. He does not distinguish what he would be from what he is. A difficulty presents

*Read at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, Washington, May 11, 1916.

[†]Three contributions to the Sexual Theory p. 39.

itself here, it seems to me, that of distinguishing between the desire to have and the desire to be. This I will speak of later in connection with specific cases.

The Narcissistic lover sees in the object of his love, only a source of erotic stimulation. In other words he sees merely the means of self-satisfaction.

Sublimation means the transformation of the libido or the blind cravings and longings of the individual into the higher forms of social realities—such as the Family, Art, Science, Literature, Religion, etc., etc. Freud says, "A process which merits the name *sublimation*, has furnished powerful components for all cultural accomplishments." He defines sublimation as the "deviation of sexual motive powers from sexual aims to new aims."¹

With these meanings clear in mind let us now turn to some concrete persons and see them from the psycho-analytic point of view.

Mr. X. is a tall, lean, lanky individual of the carnivorous type according to Bryant and Goldthwait. He is about thirty years old. He has been married nine years to a stout, short, woman about two years younger. There are no children. As to sublimation, he shows the following achievements. He went through a preparatory school, but instead of going to college went into business. Here he was fairly successful, till the death of his partner, when he went all to pieces, nervously. He has a nice house, well-furnished. He owned an automobile. He dresses immaculately. He is hail-fellow well-met and has a lot of friends. But, on the whole, the present stage of his development is narcissistic, trailing along with it a lot of auto-erotic tendencies.

He says he cannot feel any deep and lasting fondness for his wife because she is not tall and slight, like himself. He is active, quick and fond of driving himself at a high rate of speed. She is slow and stolid, substantial and reliable. When the sublimation process became difficult, or blocked, he would jump into his car, pick up some pretty girl, tall and slight enough to suit his fancy, and take her for a tearing ride to some country inn where they would have dinner

¹Three contributions to Sexual Theory p. 39.

together. Remaining inhibitions were still further lowered by drinking, and the ride home was accompanied by fondling and caressing, even masturbating his fair companion. Although he would thus work himself up to a high state of sexual excitement he never went further than this with the girl, but, after reaching home, would partially relieve himself by masturbating.

This erotic activity led to a sort of loathing for his wife. At such times, and for long periods, proper relations, of every sort, with her were impossible. Ostensibly, to her, his reason was that he couldn't bear to think of having children in his nervous condition. Less consciously, but still with a certain degree of awareness, he felt that with children his favored place as an object of care, solicitude and attention, on the part of his wife, would be lost.

The hold his narcissistic attitude had on him is illustrated by the following dream. He thought his wife had a baby. When he saw it, it was a miniature replica of himself.

In conflict with these auto-erotic and narcissistic tendencies was what he called a conscience. He never could masturbate with complete satisfaction. After every bout he loathed himself but then to drown his feelings of self-abasement would be very apt to drink. His conscience, too, prevented him ever going beyond a certain point with girls. The image of his mother, and of his wife, prevented actual intercourse, though the finer qualities of loyalty to a high ideal were not very much developed. Nevertheless Mr. X would be regarded generally as a pretty decent sort of fellow, certainly very pleasant socially. He can tell a story inimitably and has good social gifts and graces, and a keen sense of humor.

Part of the importance of this case for psychopathology lies in the following facts. As a boy he was not strong. At the age of four he had scarlet fever; at six he had diphtheria; at about the same time he had typhoid. After the scarlet fever, his left leg was so bent that he could not use it. His grandfather built a circular concrete path, got him a velocipede, and pushed him around on it every day for nine months before his leg began to bend and follow the

pedal. Because of much sickness as a child he was humored a great deal by his mother.

When he began to go to school he was very desirous to be like other boys. He was especially desirous of pulling back the fore-skin of the glans penis and this he could not do. But he would work and work at it till it was terribly painful.

The first striking pathological symptom came at school, when trying to pass an examination. Suddenly his mind became a blank. He was dreadfully frightened, handed in his papers, and went to his room. This attack lasted only fifteen minutes, however, and he thought no more about it.

An important problem is now evident. Was this sudden amnesia due to his masturbation and to other sexual excesses or were they, and it, symptoms of a constitutional inferiority, preventing psychic synthesis, to use Janet's phrase? Or was it due to a condition brought about by the toxines of the various diseases he had had? Was it a symptom of epilepsy? Perhaps all these considerations are important. But that purely psychic conditions are highly important, if not more so than others, is shown by the following fact.

Last Thanksgiving he was so blue, so lonesome, so homesick, longed so for his mother, he could not speak. He knew words, and knew what he wanted to say, but he could not move his mouth.

Another pathological reaction is here illustrated. After a quarrel with his wife he would not be able to eat anything but boiled milk for a couple of weeks. Cannon's work throws light on this part of the problem.

A definite relation was established between certain feelings and specifically sexual feelings. When his head felt bad, when he felt gloomy, blue, and despondent; when he felt discouraged, and not like making any further effort, then he had not the slightest conscious sexual desire. On the other hand, when he felt happy; when his head was clear, and he did not feel as if in a daze, or in a dream, when he felt courageous, and like making an effort, then he would have definite sexual desires.

From his own self observation, before any psycho-

analysis was undertaken, he had convinced himself that his trouble was due to an excessive sexual activity. Details however, of course, he did not distinguish.

This is a picture of his whole character. He is a man who has gained his satisfaction of life in what Freud calls the fore-pleasures. The excitement of the chase thrills him, capture leaves him cold. In business, as in other things, there is often much preliminary bother without anything being pushed to results. And yet there has been enough success to make the working with him hopeful. He has given up masturbating with his hands but he still masturbates with his mind, in the auto-erotic sense. He is, however, mostly still stuck in the erotic narcissistic stage of personal development.

Mr. Y. is of quite another type, in certain ways. He is highly intellectual and has had much success in intellectual pursuits. In his chosen profession he is an expert and is so regarded by his associates. He has been married fourteen years, and has two children, a boy thirteen, and a girl a little over three.

The history of this man in his libido development, is very significant. He has always bitten his nails badly. He nursed his mother at the age of eight and she would allow him to suck her nipples at the age of ten. At this same age he was taught fellatio by another boy and he practiced it for a year and a half, or more. Then he was taught masturbation. Masturbation he has practiced ever since. He has been an avid reader of obscene books, and had a large collection of obscene pictures, from which he gained much erotic pleasure. His introduction to obscene books and pictures came about through his brother discovering some belonging to his father and showing them to him.

Marriage, to this man, meant largely a legalized opportunity for erotic self-satisfaction. As he has not wanted children he has practiced coitus interruptus and coitus reservatus, excessively, sometimes prolonging the process to two hours or more. When his wife objected he secretly masturbated. Of the two children which he has, the first one was due to an accident. The second one was a doctor's prescription for his wife.

Arrested sexual development in this man is very evident. Prolongation of nursing, its transition to homosexual acts, then to onanism show how firmly fixed he is in the auto-erotic and narcissistic stages. And yet there is the strange contradiction of a remarkably high sublimation. On the other hand, socially, the man lies and steals, in small ways, he says. What ordinarily is called honor is somewhat lacking and yet there are two things which he is very scrupulous about. He does not drink, and will not drink, under any circumstances; and he divides all his money with his wife, feeling she should have half of what he earns. Both of these virtues, if virtues they be, he learned from his mother. The only thing his mother regarded as really wrong was drinking; (his father drank heavily) and as to money, his mother was never fairly treated by his father, so he determined, if he ever married, he would give his wife half of what he earned. As Freud says, "For esthetic reasons one would fain attribute this and the other excessive aberrations of the sexual desire to the insane, but this cannot be done."

It is clear that an essential part of this man's character lies in the dominance fore-pleasure has over him. This is true professionally as well as sexually. Again some of the interest of this case to psychopathology lies in the problem of cause and effect. Were his psychosexual aberrations causes or symptoms?

Like one who wants to play safe in a diagnosis, perhaps it would be wise to say they were both. The capacity for dissociation of one group of elements, like the narrowly sexual, so to speak, and for inhibition of end-results, from the totality making up the man, seems to me, most probably to be constitutional, or congenital. The same nervous system permitting the maternal instinct to express itself in the erotic fashion above mentioned, may be imagined partially inherited and favoring the perversions found in the son. In such a type the psychic barriers of disgust and loathing cannot be reared, simply because the organism never reacts with any of these emotions. Indeed, this patient once said, "I seem to lack the primitive emotions."

This, however, cannot be wholly true, in-as-much as he felt love for his mother and respect for her wishes.

Similarly, his feeling towards his father was admiration in certain respects and strong disapproval in others. In other words, intellectually he has developed far beyond the autoerotic, or even the erotic, stage, though largely fixed, and arrested at the narcissistic stage.

If we again ask, why this arrest of development, only two answers are possible.

(1) Congenital incapacity in the germ-plasm.

(2) Abnormal interference and obstruction in the environment.

Looked at from this point of view it would seem that both conditions obtained. However much one may doubt specific details in heredity, heredity is a very real thing, it means much more than sometimes we are willing to give it credit for. On the other hand an environment which especially encourages and helps to hold one to a primitive stage of development certainly must be responsible, in its turn, for much more than is ordinarily allowed. In the first place we so seldom know what a special environment is that we are not often justified in calling it normal, as we often do so glibly. Only through a psychoanalysis could one know, as in this case, that the mother permitted a ten year old boy to nurse at her breast. Parenthetically, I might say, the identification of wife with mother is illustrated by the fact that his wife allows him to suck her nipples when she is in the right mood. He says he can excite her quickest that way. He has come very close to the conscious playing with incest phantasies. He has excited himself while masturbating, by imagining himself another boy, and having sexual relations with this boy's mother.

Before going on to the next case just one final word. Mr. Y. corroborates Mr. X. He said, "I feel depressed and dizzy. When I have these feelings I don't have any sexual craving at all." Thus one may say that the sexual craving is a complex which in these cases has become disintegrated through repression and has regressed to the infantile stage of auto-erotism.

The question as to whether such cases as these are curable or not leads one outside the immediate interests

of psychopathology and hence I will not consider them from that point of view here.

Mr. F. is still another type of man. He is uneducated and satisfied with his work as cutter in a shoe-factory.

As a small boy he masturbated some but when he matured at the age of ten he was frightened by the appearance of semen and stopped short, never to resume the practice. At the age of seventeen a widow induced him to have intercourse with her. He was with her some half a dozen times, perhaps. At nineteen he married a girl of fifteen whom he has loyally loved ever since. So far as I could judge his marriage has been and is a very happy one. There are two children.

One night he dreamed his wife had a baby. He said, "I love little babies. I can dress them, change their clothes and feed them. I love children anyway, but I love the littlest ones the best, when they are so helpless and I can take care of them."

"You have a lot of the maternal instinct, haven't you," I said. "Yes, I have," he answered. "Mother always said I ought to have been a woman not a man."

It is interesting to note that his complaint was an abdominal swelling with a "bearing down" feeling, and an inner "throbbing."

His mother recently died and he fainted at the news. He also fainted when he saw her laid out. Since her death he has often dreamed of her. The identification of wife and mother is suggested by the fact that ever since marriage he has gone to sleep on his wife's arm. On the other hand, when he is at home, he always gets up and gets the breakfast for his wife.

The striking bisexuality of this man's character is apparent. His sublimation capacities are small and limited and on the whole it is fairly clear that he has reached the narcissistic stage of personal development.

Actually, this man was not very large or very strong, and yet he desired much, both characteristics. His intimate friend, however, was both large and very strong. Here, it seems to me, is something of a problem in psychoanalytic

classification. If a person is not what he would be, and loves that excellence, is he narcissistic?

Narcissus, as you know, fell in love with his own reflected image. But, according to the story, he was himself really beautiful to look upon. This reflection, as I apprehend it, is a necessary characteristic of the narcissistic attitude. What then is the true nature of the attitude of loving superiority while actually being inferior, and knowing it? It seems to me this is one of the essential characters of religion.

This patient's father was a drunkard who deserted his mother when he was an infant. The immediate cause of the separation was as follows. He was a baby, playing on the floor, when his father came in, drunk, and in a fit of temper threw something at him. His mother thereupon refused ever to have any more children by his father, so, soon after, he disappeared.

Though he does not remember it himself, he was told by his mother, that he had "fits" up to the age of six. He did not walk till he was six.

Three months before marriage he had a "fit" and fell off a sewing-machine on which he was sitting at the time. According to the story told him, which he told me, he drooled at the mouth, and quivered all over. It lasted fifteen minutes. He said he lost consciousness. Three months after marriage he had another "fit" in which he fell out of a chair. This lasted only a few minutes but otherwise was similar to one just described. He has had no other similar attacks.

Two years ago he had a sudden feeling as if he were about to faint; he felt dizzy; but did not lose consciousness. He was at his friend's, the big strong man, and he put him on a sofa where he spent the night. The next day he was taken home and for a few days had an intense pain in his abdomen. This left him sore for about two or three weeks when he began to swell. Tubercular peritonitis was suspected and he was operated on but everything was found normal.

The patient was seen only about a week, when he had to leave, so any adequate psychoanalysis was impossible.

What is the psychopathology in this case? Are we dealing with a form of epilepsy or hysteria? What are the congenital and what the environmental conditions accountable for the end results? What relations have his symptoms to sex? One point was made out. Though he was very fond of his wife and they had frequent sexual relations, during the abdominal swellings he never had any sexual desires. Considering what we know about similar cases it is tempting to theorize and imagine the symptom to be a substitute, a transformation of the sexual impulse, and thus a symbol of a partial impulse, perhaps a female one.

In conclusion, to sum up, we have gained through psychoanalysis, an insight into human character never before possible. By means of the concepts, auto-erotism, narcissism, and sublimation, we can grasp character, as a whole, individually, as well as socially. One of the greatest values of this formulation of character, it seems to me, lies in its dynamic, developmental point of view. This, finally, is of the highest value to the helping solve education's greatest problem—How to assist in the development of personal character?

REVIEWS

THE CAUSATION AND TREATMENT OF PSYCHOPATHIC DISEASES.
By Boris Sidis, A. M., Ph. D., M. D., Medical Director of The Sidis Psychotherapeutic Institute. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1916. \$2.50 net. Pp. 418.

The mere mention that a work on the causation and treatment of psychopathic diseases at the hands of Sidis has made its appearance should be sufficient for the discriminating reader and for him who knows who is who in psychopathology to lead to an immediate purchase and reading of the volume. There are few writers on things psychopathologic who are deserving of the consideration and attention of the average reader to the extent to which Sidis rightfully commands the same.

There is not a dull moment in the work before us.. The very first sentence in the introduction begins with the punch behind it and the final sentence in the book is of the same sort. There is no mistaking what Sidis means. He makes certain that he has explained his views clearly and that you unquestionably understand. There is no haziness or ambiguity. He knows exactly what he wishes to say. He knows how to say it. You know what he means. If you do not agree with him, that is another matter. But you at least know where he stands—unequivocally.

A few random shots from different portions of the work will be presented in this brief review.

Sidis insists that psychopathic diseases per se are not inherited but acquired. A susceptible nervous system is prerequisite. He attacks the ultra-eugenists.

He then plunges into the problem of the causes and therapy of functional psychoses.

The twenty chapters of the work are as follows: psychopathic reflexes, main clinical forms of neuroses and psychopathies, the source of psychopathies, embryonic personality and psychopathic affections, the fear instinct and psychopathic states, manifestations of fear instinct and symptoms of psychopathic diseases, the main principles of psychopathic diseases, the law of récession, the law of reversion, the process of degeneration, the impulse of self-preservation in psychopathic diseases, neuron energy and neurosis, clinical cases, psychognosis of psychopathic cases, psychognosis of the psychopathic substratum, psychopathic fears, general psychotherapeutic methods, the method of hypnoidization, clinical cases of hypnoidal treatment, the hypnoidal state and reserve energy.

Here are some of the many points brought out by Sidis. "Psychopathic maladies are the formation of abnormal, morbid

'conditional reflexes' and of inhibitions of reactions of associative normal life activity." There is a discussion of the classification of nervous and mental diseases into organopathies or necropathies (organic), and neuropathies and psychopathies (both functional), the psychopathies being again grouped under two headings: somato or somopsychoses and psychoneuroses.

The real source of psychopathic states is the fear instinct, or any of its lesser manifestations or associated states. Psychopaths are characterized by an embryonic personality, a narrow, suggestible personal life.

The fear instinct is rooted in the instinct of self-preservation which is at the foundation of all psychopathic states.

The manifestations of the fear instinct and the symptoms of psychopathic conditions are given and compared.

The main principles of psychopathic diseases are enumerated as follows: embryonic psychogenesis, recurrence, proliferation and complication, fusion or synthesis, contrast, recession, dissociation, irradiation or diffusion, differentiation, dominance, dynamogenesis, inhibition, diminishing resistance, metathesis and control by modification. These principles are developed.

"The law of recession is the process of a moment's passing from the conscious into the subconscious," while the law of reversion is the passing of the moment consciousness in the opposite direction. The process of degeneration consists in the simplification of the form of life of the psychopath.

There is an excellent presentation of the role of the impulse of self-preservation in psychopathic persons, in which the author terminates his illuminating discussion by asserting that the three psychopathic furies are fear, egotism, and ennui.

Then follows a good chapter on neuron energy and neurosis, with a consideration of the tendency to fatigue and fatigue-fear in psychopaths.

In the next four chapters plenty of well presented clinical cases are given, of many types.

A very interesting and instructive chapter on general psychotherapeutic methods is followed by a description of the characteristics of the hypnoidal state and the method of hypnoidization, with clinical cases of hypnoidal treatment to boot.

The final chapter deals with the hypnoidal state and the principle of reserve energy.

No doubt Sidis has not said all there is to say about psychopathic diseases. Others have said many things that Sidis has not said. And Sidis could say much more than he has given us in this volume. But, taking it all in all, Sidis has presented us with a book which is unquestionably one of the best that has been written on practical, every day psychopathology. His grasp of psychopathic diseases and his knowledge of the makeup of the psychopath is broad indeed, for he has lived with them and studied

them at first hand. He adopts a biological and evolutionary viewpoint which sheds much light on the understanding of the driving forces of the psychopath. The work is replete with original concepts. It is the gift of a master psychopathologist, and one who knows how to tell you, in plain, positive language, what he wishes to say.

Sidis has thrown his hat into the ring with vim and vigor, he insists that fear or its related states, rooted in the impulse of self-preservation, is the sole fundamental cause of psychopathies of functional nature. Mental conflicts and the like cannot, of themselves, produce psychopathic conditions. It is only when the fear instinct is stirred into activity and enters into the conflict that there is any possibility of psychopathic states developing.

I do not say that you will agree with Sidis. But I do say that you cannot ignore this work, because it is written by one of the few really great living psychopathologists, by a man who is rational and level-headed, who knows the lay of the land in psychopathology and who gives you his views in a straightforward manner.

The directness of the presentation throughout the volume is refreshing. You feel that the man who has written the work is standing before you expounding his views in real man to man fashion. He is trying to answer the questions which come to your lips. And when you finish the last chapter, you would like to hear and read more from Sidis, because you know that he has much more to say.

One who reads between the lines and compares certain of the ideas of Sidis with those presented by other workers in the field of the mental sciences, can see a certain degree of resemblance here and there. Great minds oft run in the same groove or come to the same conclusions.

With the particular class of patients that Sidis has had to treat he reports the following results. "Most of the patients, about seventy-five per cent, were cured. About twenty per cent of the patients greatly improved. The remainder, about five per cent, did not respond, on account of the short time of the treatment."

Sidis impresses one as being a thorough-going optimist in in Psychotherapy.

MEYER SOLOMON.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS. A STUDY OF THE TRANSFORMATIONS AND SYMBOLISMS OF THE LIBIDO. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT. By Dr. C. G. Jung, of the University of Zurich, authorized translation, with introduction, by Beatrice M. Hinkle, M. D., of the Neurological Department of Cornell University Medical School and of the New York Post Graduate Medical School. Moffat, Yard & Company, New York, 1916. Price \$4.00 net. Pp. IV+566.

Here is a work of which, if the reviewer wished, he could write a very extensive review, with praise and criticism. But it is out of place in these pages. A few remarks will be sufficient.

The translator offers a brief note, followed by a good "introduction to psychoanalysis and analytic psychology."

The original work itself is divided into two parts. Part one consists of an introduction and four chapters, while part two comprises eight chapters. The four chapters in part one are entitled "concerning two kinds of thinking," "the Miller phantasies," "the hymn of creation," and "the song of the moth," and those in part two are headed "aspects of the libido," "the conception of the genetic theory of libido," "the transformation of the libido; a possible source of primitive human discoveries," "the unconscious origin of the hero," "symbolism of the mother and rebirth," "the battle for deliverance from the mother," "the dual mother role," and "the sacrifice." There are 76 pages of notes.

Jung presents his basic principles in his brief introduction and the first chapter following, and then endeavors to elaborate and apply these ideas by taking up for analysis and interpretation the paper of a Miss Miller, whom he has never met, but who had published an article, based on her personal experience, entitled "Quelque faits d'imagination créatrice subconsciente," and which appeared in Vol. V, Archives de Psychologie, 1906. To prove his thesis and to demonstrate its direct applicability to the production of Miss Miller, Jung brings to bear upon his theme a mass of material culled from various sources. He here gives evidence to us that he is a prodigious worker, and that he has read widely and sought earnestly for evidence to bolster up his contentions.

One must ungrudgingly admire the remarkably fertile imagination of Jung, his sincere quest for knowledge and truth, his groping for the light of day, his struggles for solution of the problem which he has undertaken to solve. He stands aloft, on high mountain peaks, battling for some certain evidence for his theories and conclusions, but, sad to relate he never sees the real light of day or the real meaning of life. Blinded, he treads his uncertain path, bound down by his premises, and, like a Samson, pulling down about him the pillars of society.

The translator and the original author show a profound sincerity, and are so imbued with the truth, nobility and epoch-making nature of their views, that one might almost say that they feel that they are, so to speak, inspired, and are presenting us with the great discovery of the age.

And so indeed it would be, if the premises were true. He who accepts Jung's introduction and the subsequent chapter on the two kinds of thinking, is forever lost in the maze that comes thereafter. He who cannot accept the premises, is saved from being bound and captured by a system of ideas which will fascinate and

enthral him, if he has failed to hold his ground in the critical examination of the premises.

Interwoven with much error, you will find in this work many beautiful thoughts and well-accepted truths. But this should not prevent you from seeing the serious error in Jung's thinking.

His premises Jung accepts as a religion. They are the gospel truth. For them no real proof is required, except a reading of psychoanalytic literature already given to us by Freud and others. Hence it is not surprising to find that the very first sentence in Jung's introduction deals with the so-called incest phantasy. That is accepted. There is no need to prove his case there, Jung assumes.

In the chapter on the two kinds of thinking, without apparently being aware of exactly whither he is drifting, Jung plainly comes out for the hereditary transmission of individual thoughts!!! Unless the reviewer himself is deluded, he believes that if he here presented the brief notes which he has made on the margin of the various pages of this chapter, Jung's case at once falls by the wayside.

He who accepts the transmission of acquired thoughts as a fact, and limits this theory in its practical application to sexual ideas, and more specifically, to sexual ideas concerned with the so-called incest complex, and furthermore believes that with these ideas as the foundation he can, by the unrestrained and playful employment of certain mental mechanisms, prove that all thoughts evolved by human beings at any and every period of human existence, past, present or future, are derived from these basic motivating forces, will agree with Jung.

The reviewer does not wish to plunge into a consideration of the problems involved, but it must be apparent to all, that, despite Jung's forced efforts to be broad-minded, he is bound down by a fixed system of ideas from which he does not cut himself loose.

Jung has presented us, in all sincerity and with the full force of his personality and the very fire of his soul, with a system of ideas than which, spite the many truths included, the undersigned can conceive of none that is a greater menace to mankind and modern civilization. Nor must it be forgotten that this dangerous system of ideas is based, in so far as these particular ideas are concerned, on not a vestige of real proof. Look about you and see modern life as it is and study ancient life as it was, and you can, with the greatest ease, with the true facts of life, shake this entire system of ideas to its very foundation, causing it to totter and to tumble.

Be it said that the translation is most excellent indeed; in fact it is not often that such sympathetic and real translations are made of scientific contributions. All honor to the hardworked translator.

THE MEN OF THE OLD STONE AGE. By Henry Fairfield Osborn. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1915. Pp. 545.

The unconscious not only originates in the childhood of man, but it also may be said to have its origin in the childhood of the world. All workers in psycho-analysis have been impressed with the significant fact that the motives and wishes of the unconscious are barbaric and unethical and that there is a constant striving to break away from the reality of these barbaric motives. The significance of psycho-analysis for the mental sciences has been pointed out in the splendid monograph of Rank and Sachs. It seems fitting at the present moment to apply psychoanalytic principles to the field of anthropology, a field which up to the present has been practically left untouched. Freud's monograph of the psychoanalytic significance of the totem and the taboo and the reviewer's contribution to a study of psychoneuroses among primitive tribes (*JOURNAL ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY*—1915) are instances of the application of psychoanalytic interpretation to anthropological material.

If it were possible to penetrate into the mind and motives of prehistoric man, such data might be able to throw light upon the nature of the unconscious in its most primitive form and in the earliest stages of its development. While the skeletal remains of prehistoric man have been subjected to a searching anatomical investigation on account of their abundance, yet the data on the mental activities of the men of prehistoric times, by the very reason of their remoteness, must of necessity be very fragmentary. Such data has been accumulated and most charmingly presented by Dr. Henry Fairfield Osborn in his recent book—"The Men of the Old Stone Age."

The men of the upper and lower Paleolithic age came into existence about 125,000 years ago and their various races continued to rise and fall until the beginning of Neolithic times, about 10,000 years ago. Before the arrival of Neanderthal man, the traces of the handiwork of man are very scant. This was partly due to the extremely primitive stage of culture which must have prevailed, since in such races as the Ape man from Java or in the Piltdown race, the brain capacity varied between that of the simian brain and some of the existing Australian races. Neanderthal man of Mousterian times was at about the same cultural level as some of the existing Australian and Tasmanian races, particularly since some of the latter were found in the same stage of flint industry as the Neanderthals. This Neanderthal race established stations all over Western Europe, at least fifty of these stations having been discovered. As stated by Osborn—"The dense communal life of Mousterian times may have favored a social evolution, the development of the imagination and a tribal lore, and the beginnings of the religious belief and ceremonial of which apparent

indications are found to be wide-spread among the entirely different races of Upper Paleolithic times. The life is not, however, marked by industrial progress or invention.

"We also cannot avoid the feeling that the abandonment of the free, open life of Chellean and early Acheulean times and the crowding of the Neanderthal tribesmen beneath the shelters and in the grottos had a dwarfing effect both upon the physique and upon the industry itself. The Mousterian implements, as compared with the Acheulean, impress one as the work of a less muscular and vigorous race." (Pp. 248-249.)

Finally, after many thousands of years, the primitive and ape-like Neanderthal race entirely disappeared and was replaced by a race which rose to a much higher cultural level—viz—the Cro-Magnons. This gradual disappearance of the Neanderthals is thus vividly described by Osborn—"Whatever may have been their fate in other regions, certainly the most sudden racial change which we know of in the whole prehistory of western Europe is the disappearance of Neanderthal race at the close of the Mousterian culture stage, which was the latest industrial period of Lower Palaeolithic times, and their replacement by the Cro-Magnon race. From geologic evidence the date of this replacement is believed to have been between 20,000 and 25,000 years before our era. So far as we know at present, the Neanderthals were entirely eliminated; no trace of the survival of the pure Neanderthal type has been found in any of the Upper Paleolithic burial sites; nor have the alleged instances of the survival of the Neanderthal strain or of people bearing the Neanderthal cranial characters been substantiated. We incline to agree with Boule and Schwalbe that the supposed cases among modern races of the transmission of Neanderthal characters are simply low or reversal types, which, upon close analysis, are never found to present the highly distinctive and peculiar combination of Neanderthal characteristics

"There is some reason to believe that the Neanderthals were degenerating physically and industrially during the very severe conditions of life of the fourth glaciation, but the consequent inferiority and diminution in numbers would not account for their total extinction, and we are inclined to attribute this to the entrance into the whole Neanderthal country of western Europe toward the close of Lower Paleolithic times of a new and highly superior race. Archaeologists find traces of a new culture and industry in certain Mousterian stations preceding the disappearance of the typical Mousterian industry. Such a mingling is found in the valley of the Somme in northern France.

"From this scanty evidence we may infer that the new race competed for a time with the Neanderthals before they dispossessed them of their principal stations and drove them out of the country or killed them in battle. The Neanderthals, no doubt, fought with wooden weapons and with the stone-headed dart and spear,

but there is no evidence that they possessed the bow and arrow. There is, on the contrary, some possibility that the newly arriving Cro-Magnon race may have been familiar with the bow and arrow, for a barbed arrow or spear head appears in drawings of a later stage of Cro-Magnon history, the so-called Magdalenian. It is thus possible, though very far from being demonstrated, that when the Cro-Magnons entered western Europe, at the dawn of the Upper Paleolithic, they were armed with weapons which, with their superior intelligence and physique, would have given them a very great advantage in contests with the Neanderthals." (Pp. 257-258). It is evident, that here we are dealing with the gradual disintegration of a race of low mental ability by one of a much higher mental ability—"The chief source of the change which swept over western Europe lay in the brain power of the Cro-Magnons, as seen not only in the large size of the brain as a whole but principally in the almost modern forehead and forebrain. It was a race which had evolved in Asia and which was in no way connected by any ancestral links with the Neanderthals; a race with a brain capable of ideas, of reasoning, of imagination, and more highly endowed with artistic sense and ability than any uncivilized race which has ever been discovered. No trace of artistic instinct whatever has been found among the Neanderthals: we have seen developing among them only a sense of symmetry and proportion in the fashioning of their implements. After prolonged study of the works of the Cro-Magnons one cannot avoid the conclusions that their capacity was nearly if not quite as high as our own; that they were capable of advanced education; that they had a strongly developed aesthetic as well as a religious sense; that their society was quite highly differentiated along the lines of talent for work of different kinds. One derives this impression especially from the conditions surrounding the development of their art." (Pp. 272-275).

Sufficient evidence is at hand to prove that the Cro-Magnons had well developed burying customs. "We must infer that the conception of survival after death was among the primitive beliefs attested by the placing with the dead of ornaments and of weapons, and in many instances of objects of food. It is interesting to note that the grottos and shelters were so frequently sought as places of burial, also that the flexed limbs or extended position of the body prevailed throughout western Europe into Neolithic times, as well as the use of color through the Solutrean into Magdalenian times. It is probable from their love of color in parietal decorations, and from the appearance of coloring matter in so many of the burials, that the decoration of the living body with color was widely practised, and that color was freshly applied, either as pigment or in the form of powder, to the bodies of the dead in order to prepare them for a renewal of life." (p. 305) These burial customs demonstrate an attempt at adjustment even in these remote times,

with the wish for survival of individual personality, as shown by the idea of a soul, probably the first germ of the conception of immortality.

The art of the Cro-Magnons is of intense interest, as in their art we have the first evidence of the exact mental motives of these prehistoric men. "The strongest proof of the unity of heredity as displayed in the dominant Cro-Magnon race in Europe from early Aurignacian until the close of Magdalenian times is the unity of their art impulse. This indicates a unity of mind and of spirit. It is something which could not pass to them from another race, like an industrial invention, but was inborn and creative. These people were the Paleolithic Greeks; artistic observation and representation and a true sense of proportion and of beauty were instinct with them from the beginning. Their stone and bone industry may show vicissitudes and the influence of invasion and of trade and the bringing in of new inventions, but their art shows a continuous evolution and development from first to last, animated by a single motive, namely, the appreciation of the beauty of form and the realistic representation of it." (Pp. 315-316). The paintings in the caverns are thus described by Osborn—"In the archaic drawings of the caverns of Pair-non-Pair La Greze, and La Mouthe most of the animal figures are somewhat heavily and deeply engraved; the proportions are not rude; the head is usually too small with a large short body which is often lightly modelled, resting on thin extremities. Quadrupeds are frequently represented with but two legs, as in the case of the mammoth. That the powers of observation were only gradually trained is shown by the fact that details which in later drawings are well observed are here overlooked; the profile drawings of animals, with one fore leg and one hind leg represented, are quite like those of children." (p. 320).

As one studies the admirable illustrations which are scattered through the book, one is impressed with the fact that these drawings strongly resemble the spontaneous productions of little children, of children less than six years of age. If the analogy can be drawn and the argument sustained, it would seem from the evidence of the art alone, that these adult Cro-Magnons had not advanced in mental ability beyond that of a modern child of six years of age. In their statuettes of pregnant women and women of prominent buttocks, it would seem as though there were deliberate attempts to emphasize the grossly sexual.

The culmination of Paleolithic civilization was reached in Magdalenian times, when the Cro-Magnon race reached its highest cultural development, prior to its sudden disappearance as the dominant race of western Europe. Concerning this culture, Osborn states as follows—"In the variety of industries we find evidences of a race endowed with closely observant and creative minds, in which the two chief motives of life seem to have been the

chase and the pursuit of art. The Magdalenian flints are fashioned in a somewhat different manner from the Solutrean: long, slender flakes or blades with little or no retouch are frequent, and in other implements the work is apparently carried only to a point where the flint will serve its purpose. No attempt is made to attain perfect symmetry. Thus the old technical impulse of the flint industry seems to be far less than that among the makers of the Solutrean flints, while a new technical impulse manifests itself in several branches of art: arms and utensils are carved in ivory, reindeer horn and bone, and sculpture and engraving on bone and ivory are greatly developed. We find that these people are beginning to utilize the walls of dark, mysterious caverns for their drawings and paintings, which show deep appreciation for the perfection of the animal form, depicted by them in most life-like attitudes.

"We may infer that there was a tribal organization, and it has been suggested that certain unexplained implements of reindeer horn, often beautifully carved and known as 'bâtons de commandement,' were insignia of authority borne by the chieftains.

"There can be little doubt that such diversities of temperament, of talent, and of predisposition as obtained to-day also prevailed then, and that they tended to differentiate society into chieftains, priests, and medicine-men, hunters of large game and fishermen, fashioners of flints and dressers of hides, makers of clothing and foot-wear, makers of ornaments, engravers, sculptors in wood, bone ivory and stone, and artists with color and brush. In their artistic work, at least, these people were animated with a compelling sense of truth, and we cannot deny them a strong appreciation of beauty.

"It is probable that a sense of wonder in the face of the powers of nature was connected with the development of a religious sentiment. How far their artistic work in the caverns was an expression of such sentiment and how far it was the outcome of a purely artistic impulse are matters for very careful study. Undoubtedly the inquisitive sense which led them into the deep and dangerous recesses of the caverns was accompanied by an increased sense of awe and possibly by a sentiment which we may regard as more or less religious. We may dwell for a moment on this very interesting problem of the origin of religion during the Old Stone Age, so that the reader may judge for himself in connection with the ensuing accounts of Magdalenian art.

"The study of this race, in our opinion, would suggest a still earlier phase in the development of religious thought than that considered by James, namely, a phase in which the wonders of nature in their various manifestations begin to arouse in the primitive mind a desire for an explanation of these phenomena, and in which it is attempted to seek such cause in some vague supernatural power underlying these otherwise unaccountable

occurrences, a cause to which the primitive human spirit commences to make its appeal. According to certain anthropologists, this wonder-working force may either be personal like the gods of Homer, or impersonal, like the Mana of the Melanesian, or the Manitou of the North American Indian. It may impress an individual when he is in a proper frame of mind, and through magic or propitiation may be brought into relation with his individual ends. Magic and religion jointly belong to the supernatural as opposed to the every-day world of savagery.

"We have already seen evidence from the burials that these people apparently believed in the preparation of the bodies of the dead for a future existence. How far these beliefs and the votive sense of propitiation for protection and success in the chase are indicated by the art of the caverns is to be judged in connection with their entire life and productive effort, with their burials associated with offerings of implements and articles of food, and with their art." (Pp. 358-359.)

The production of polychrome painting on the walls of the caverns has given rise to some interesting generalizations as to the mind of this primitive race. "There is no evidence, that numbers of people entered these caverns. If this had been the case there would be many more examples of inartistic work upon the walls. It is possible that the Cro-Magnon artists constituted a recognized class especially gifted by nature, quite distinct from the magician class or the artisan class. The dark recesses of the caverns opening back of the grottos may have been held in awe as mysterious abodes. In line with this theory is the suggestion that the artists may have been invited into the caverns by the priests or medicine-men to decorate the walls with all the animals of the chase." (p. 360). The symbols on the stones also remind one strongly of the spontaneous drawings of children. "The pebbles of Maz d'Azil are painted on one side with peroxide of iron, a deposit of which is found in the neighborhood of the cave. The color, mixed in shells of Pecten, or in hollowed pebbles or on flat stones, was applied either with the finger or with a brush. The many enigmatic designs consist chiefly of parallel bands, rows of discs or points, bands with scalloped edges, cruciform designs, ladder-like patterns (scalariform) such as are found in the 'Azilian' engravings and paintings of the caverns, and undulating lines. These graphic combinations resemble certain syllabic and alphabetic characters of the Aegean, Cypriote, Phoenician, and Greco-Latin inscriptions. However curious these resemblances may be, they are not sufficient to warrant any theory connecting the signs on the painted pebbles of the Azilians with the alphabetic characters of the oldest known systems of writing. Piette attempted to explain some of the exceedingly crude designs on these pebbles as a system of notation others as pictographs and religious symbols, and some few as genuine alphabetical signs, and

suggested that the cavern of Maz d'Azil was an Upper Paleolithic school where reading, reckoning, writing and the symbols of the sun were learned and taught. The very wide distribution of these symbolic pebbles and the paintings of similar designs on the walls of the caverns certainly prove that they had some religious or economic significance, which may be revealed by subsequent research." (p. 360.)

Thus these various races of prehistoric times seemed to possess, in much the same way that the modern man possesses, strong yearnings and motives, pleasures and pain. Men even in these remote times, tended to emphasize the sexual element, while beautiful color paintings of animals, faces and even in one instance the drawing of a deer reflected in the water, shows that even long ages ago man attempted to break away from reality, the reality of the hunt, the struggle for existence and the monotony of life in the dark caverns. Probably even the primitive religion of the Cro-Magnon race was an attempt at personal identification with some mysterious force of Nature and the wish not to die, symbolized in their strange burial customs, where the body, as with the Egyptians, was supplied with food and clothes for a life beyond the grave. Some of the phallic symbolism of their everyday utensils is interesting, a symbolism so often found in dreams. Symbolism thus has its origin in the remotest ages of the past and so the symbolism of dreams draws its material from this remote ancestry, showing how primitive and archaic the unconscious of man is and how often the dream is merely a fragment of the mental life of our remote ancestors.

ISADOR H. CORIAT.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Mental Life of Monkeys and Apes: a Study of Ideational Behaviour. By Robert M. Yerkes, Henry Holt & Co. Pp IV and 145. \$1.50.

Man—An Adaptive Mechanism. By George Crile, XVI and 387. The Macmillan Co. \$2.50.

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Into the Light. By Bruce MacLelland. Pp. 133. R. F. Fenno & Co. \$1.00.

The Mortality from Cancer Throughout the World. By Frederick L. Hoffman. Pp. XV and 826. Prudential Press.

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THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS AND FUTURE PEACE*

By MORTON PRINCE

I THE INDIVIDUAL CONSCIOUSNESS

THE newer Western psychology is giving us a deeper insight into the human mind than was possible by the older psychology. It is laying bare the hidden yearnings and aspirations and strivings of human beings whether as individuals, or collectively as families, civic communities or nations. And therefore it enables us to discover the real, the true motives which, underlying the superficial motives and apparent motives, determine human conduct, whether that conduct be an individual striving to accomplish his ambition, or a nation striving for World Empire.

This newer Western psychology is teaching us that the older psychology, the academic psychology of the universities is, as our great and lamented William James aptly expressed it, but the clanging of brass cymbals—much noise but without real meaning. The academic psychology is superficial in that it does not touch the profounder motives and mechanisms of human nature.

If we would understand the human mind we must dive beneath the surface of consciousness, beneath the momentary ebullitions of thought. These, we are learning, are but the superficial, phenomenal and momentarily fragmentary manifestations of a larger and profounder consciousness. The teachings of modern investigations, and of our Western

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philosophical thought which those investigations have stimulated, is to regard our conscious thought as only a superficial consciousness and but a fragment of a larger mind which we term the subconscious or unconscious mind. As an English student, the late Frederick Myers, in his studies of "Human Personality" has expressed it, our thoughts and impulses at any given moment are but up-rushes from this larger reservoir of consciousness. And, therefore, if we would discover the motives and springs to human action, the components and realities of human personality we must seek them by exploring not the superficial consciousness but below its threshold in the great underlying consciousness and primitive inborn instincts of each individual. In this underlying subconsciousness, in this larger mind we find the solution of the riddle of personality and, more pragmatically important, the solution of the problems of what we may call the collective consciousness of communities.

By collective consciousness I mean, speaking generally, that unity of thought, those common ideals and that common will which take possession of the soul of a people—whether of small communities or of nations. Just as there is a personal consciousness peculiar to the individual alone, so there is a larger family consciousness, a community consciousness, a civic consciousness and a national consciousness shared in common by the members of the group.

The larger subconscious mind can be reached by various devices: for instance, by putting ourselves in a state of deep reverie or profound contemplation—that is, abstracted from all awareness of the immediate environment. Then there wells up a wealth of images and emotions and thoughts; and memories reaching, perhaps, far back into the past, and knowledge of the previously unknown. And of all this subconscious knowledge in our ordinary state of mind we were profoundly ignorant. But now we may see translucently, with almost a supernatural clearness and brightness of vision, what before was obscure or hidden. Thus to my way of thinking modern Western psychology and philosophy are reaching a point of approachment with Eastern philosophy, for it would seem to me, that it was this same subcon-

conscious mind that Buddha probably reached by profound contemplation. It is only a question of interpretation. Indeed, some Western thinkers, like Frederick Myers, would bring this great subconscious mind into close relation with a transcendental cosmic consciousness of which perhaps the individual consciousness is but one focus of intensity—a sort of vortex in a universal consciousness, or the energy of the Universe.

But we need not enter into that larger metaphysical question which is far beyond my purpose. I want rather to treat of human personality and its ethical and pragmatic bearing upon individual and collective conduct. What then is the great subconscious mind that plays so large a part in personality?

It is impossible for me in such a brief address as this to treat this great subject with any fullness and you will not expect me, or indeed wish me, to do so. I should tire you if I did. It is indeed the great problem of the future. As M. Bergson, the French philosopher, has recently said: "To explore the most sacred depths of the unconscious, to labor in what I have just called the subsoil of consciousness, that will be the principal task of psychology in the century that is opening. I do not doubt that wonderful discoveries await it there, as important, perhaps, as have been in the preceding centuries the discoveries of the physical and natural sciences. That at least is the promise which I make for it, that is the wish that in closing I have for it."

I shall little more than touch upon it, sufficiently only to elucidate the main subject of my address.

PERSONALITY AS EVOLVED BY THE CREATIVE FORCE OF THE EXPERIENCES OF LIFE

In this great underlying subsoil of consciousness are to be found the memories of a vast mass of experiences of life, extending, we may almost say, from the cradle to the grave. Most of them are beyond voluntary recall as memory. By the term "experiences of life" you must understand all our conscious experiences of both our outer and inner life, our conscious experiences with the external world of men and

things about us and our inner thoughts—our soul's thoughts. The subconscious thus includes the deposited experiences not only of our ephemeral everyday life, but of our whole acquired education, acquired from childhood to the grave—our pedagogical, our social, our religious, our ethical, our civic, our political and our patriotic education. It includes everything that has come to us by teaching from our ancestors and predecessors.

Within it, therefore, are to be found the formulated memories of codes of right conduct, codes of ethical precepts and of ideals. These when acquired in early life may have been repressed and lost sight of by the individual who, in later years, developed in an environment governed by antagonistic codes or allowed himself to be governed by instinctive impulses and interests of a conflicting character. But nevertheless they may still be subconsciously conserved ready to be called again into being by favoring influences.

A great mass of such experiences we conceive of as deposited as memories and dispositions to behavior, dispositions that may strive to find expression below the threshold of consciousness in the subconscious realm.

And then among the experiences of the inner life must be reckoned the strivings and conflicts of the soul—all that pertain to the innermost sanctuary of personality and character, the intimate communings with self, the doubts and fears and scruples pertaining to the moral, religious and other problems of life, and the struggles and trials and difficulties which beset its paths; the internal conflicts of the soul with the world, the flesh and the devil—conflicts which each individual may have undergone in efforts to adapt himself to the conflicting circumstances of his real life.

Memories of all these inner experiences, and of these and other unsolved problems of life are deposited in the subconscious mind. Sometimes it happens that, as in sudden religious conversion, they undergo subconscious incubation or reasoning and burst out into flower as a sudden realization of a religious truth.

By the creative force of all these life's experiences cooperating with the inborn primitive instincts—inborn in every individual—the subconscious mind is formed.

And out of the subconscious mind, as the acquired experiences of life, and these instincts are evolved and organized those tendencies, traits, ideals, and habits of mind and action which we term personality and character. I would, indeed, emphasize the primitive instincts because, besides all these acquired dispositions to behavior, there are, of course, inherited dispositions, by which we understand the primitive instinctive impulses coming from all the inborn instincts of human nature. I mean the instincts of fear, and love, and anger, and aversion, and the sexual life, and their kind which motivate human nature.

THE SUBCONSCIOUS AS THE DYNAMIC SOURCE OF CONDUCT

But a small fraction only of all these subconscious memories emerge as conscious processes of thought. The greater portion remain beneath the threshold and tend, unconsciously, to shape and determine our conscious processes—our judgments, ideals, beliefs, conventions, points of view, habits and the tendencies of our mental lives. Whence these come, how they were born, we often have long ceased to remember. For they have not only their roots but the springs which motivate them deep down in the subconscious past. Indeed there is reason to believe that in profound thought it is the subconscious that does the real work. Drawing upon the deposited experiences of the past for the conscious needs of the moment, it thrusts up into consciousness for consideration a selected series of germane ideas. From these our consciousness at such moments does little more than choose those judged adequate to meet the conditions of the problem.

As I said at the beginning, though we cannot by conscious effort attain to all our subconscious knowledge, yet, by special devices, like profound meditation, abstraction, reverie, etc., we can bring a large amount to the full light of consciousness.

Thus it comes about that our reactions to the environment, our moral and social conduct, our sentiments and feelings, our points of view and attitudes of mind—all that we term character and personality—are predetermined by

mental experiences of the past by which they are developed, organized and conserved in the subconscious mind. We react with hatred or with love, with loyalty or disloyalty, with sympathy or with aversion, to the traits, or character, or, principles, or ideals, or behavior of some other being, or group of beings, or nation, because in the past there have been incorporated in our personalities and conserved in our subconscious minds sentiments, points of view, ethical principles, habits of mind, desires, tendencies, primitive instincts, etc., in harmony with or antagonistic to them. We are thus the offspring of our past and the past is the present. It may be that in certain cases such reactions are, as the newer psychology teaches, the outcome, the conscious expression of unrecognized conflicts with subconscious strivings or self-reproaches, if you like. But that is a detail of mechanisms with which we need not concern ourselves here as it does not affect the fundamental principle.

II

THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

Thus far I have been concerned with the development of the consciousness peculiar to the individual—his personality.

But an individual is a unit in a community, and in the development of his personality he acquires systems of ideals and habits of mind and actions which are not peculiar to himself but are common to the community—*i. e.* to a group of individuals united by common ties, and associations, and traditions and interests. These systems may be called a *collective consciousness*, because they are possessed in common by a collection of individuals. Hence it is that we have what is commonly spoken of as the *social consciousness*. It needs but a little thought to appreciate that this embodies established habits of thought and ideals and sentiments which underlie the customs, manners and etiquettes, the habits and modes of living peculiar to social groups, the social, philanthropic and other obligations of one individual to another and to the body of the community; the accepted

principles of social morality. In recognition of such a collective consciousness and the social conduct regulated and determined by it, there has come into being a specialized field of study known as social psychology.

As there are many different kinds of social groups, and as different groups become united into larger groups with common ties, so there are many different collective consciousnesses, or community consciousnesses.

TYPES OF COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

There is the *family* consciousness in which are embodied, among much else, ideals of affection and loyalty of each member to each of the others and to the whole as a unit.

There used to be the *clan* consciousness of feudal times. There is the *caste* consciousness, such as was that of the *samurai* of Japan, of the Brahmins of India, the ancient noblesse of France, the knights of the days of King Arthur in England; and there is that of the military caste of Germany today, and the democracy of America; and so on.

More important for us today from a political point of view and of modern civilization is the civic community consciousness common to groups of individuals united for purposes of commercial, industrial and social interests and orderly government. Thus the citizens of Tokyo and every city have a civic consciousness. And still more important there is in every nation a state or national consciousness.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

Now the first point that I would like to make is that the same principle underlying the development of the consciousness peculiar to the individual and characteristic of his own personality brings about the organization of a collective consciousness. But here it is the creative force of *common experiences*. Through a common ethical and social education, and, in the case of political groups, political education common *habits of thought*, common *sentiments* and *ideals*, common *aversions*, common *desires*, and common *habits of action* are established and firmly conserved in the

consciousness of the members of the group. Similarly a common point of view and a common attitude of mind towards the circumstances of the social organization and of everyday life become developed. And, most important, as I shall presently point out, things and ideas of common experience become possessed of a *common meaning* for every individual.

Further, out of a collective consciousness by the force of common ideals and common desires, there necessarily develops a unity of thought, and common will which impel towards uniformity of behavior. But all is not explicitly conscious. The processes of the mind and conduct, in losing their plasticity and becoming fixed, necessarily become largely matters of habit and of second nature; which means that they have become organized below the threshold of consciousness and have their roots and sources of energy in subconsciously conserved experiences of the past. Each one of us would find it difficult or impossible to explain why he has the same view point as the rest of the community, why the same ideals, the same desires, the same will; why he regulates his conduct in the same way towards everyday life. He would give you undoubtedly an explanation, reasons that seem plausible to himself, but the real reason is that his social and ethical education have left dispositions to thought, dispositions to action—sort of phonographic records—in his subconsciousness, out of which have crystallized, as a sort of resumé, habit reactions. These govern him in spite of himself, even though he struggles hard against their impulses. And this is also in large part the case because through education the primitive instinctive impulses of human nature have been enlisted and harnessed to serve the habits of the social ideals, or brought under control and repressed in accordance with the aims of the community consciousness.

Furthermore we see the collective mind manifesting the same reactions to subconscious processes as does the individual mind. Thus we frequently see the consciousness of a community or nation reacting to the conduct of another community or nation with aversion or hatred, just as Germany does today towards England. The ostensible and

given reason is because of some alleged immorality of conduct, like hypocrisy, that shocks the common ideal. But the real reason is because of a common baffled *subconscious* desire, or jealousy, or fear, dictated perhaps by self interest and unacknowledged, to which aversion or hatred is only the common conscious reaction.

A COMMON MEANING TO IDEALS ESSENTIAL TO A COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

The unity of the collective mind depends in no small degree upon ideas acquiring a *common meaning* for all the members of the community. This principle has far-reaching consequences. I do not refer to the dictionary meaning, or the etymological meaning, but rather to the meaning which ideas connote through their associations and implications. The meaning of the national flag of every nation is easily defined in a dictionary as a piece of cloth of a certain color and design, but it has, over and above this, an additional patriotic meaning for all the people of that nation which it has for the people of no other. And the meaning, when it is awakened, sends a thrill of emotional impulses throbbing through the veins which no dictionary meaning could do. And likewise patriotism, duty, morality, virtue, truth, honesty, valor, humanity, culture, and such ideas too often connote a different meaning to people of different communities and different nations, as we unfortunately see exemplified in the present war. And similarly ideas of relationship like wife, father, emperor, subject, citizen; conceptions such as God, religion, temple, connote different meanings to different people, individually or collectively; and so on. And thus it is that according as ideas have a common meaning in this sense they play a large part in determining the unity of the social consciousness, on the one hand, and variations in the customs, manners and habits of different communities.

Let us not forget that it is one's own personal experiences of life that give that special connoted meaning to ideas which is peculiar to each one of us, and therefore that shape your and my points of view and attitudes of mind

towards the life about us. And according as these experiences are unique for each of us or are shared by the other members of the community, will the *meaning* of a given idea and the point of view and attitude of mind be purely personal or common to a group of individuals as part of a collective consciousness. Consider, for example, the difference in meaning of the word "son" for you and for me, according as the context shows it to mean *your* son or *my* son. Your son means something more and different to you than to me. Why? Because a large number of personal and intimate experiences have woven or systematized about the idea many sentiments and memories which give it a peculiarly personal meaning for you: and correspondingly in my case. And so our points of view and attitudes of mind towards your son and my son are different. But there is also a social meaning which we share in common. This is because, besides those experiences, intimate and personal, peculiar to ourselves, there are many experiences associated with this idea of filial relationship which are common to most members of the community. These are derived from a common social education and environment. They may be ideas held in common of paternal and filial duty and obligations and affections and inheritance, etc. In this way there emerges a collective meaning which belongs to the collective consciousness. The experiences which provide this connoted meaning is called in psychological language the "setting" or "appreceptive mass." But there could be no "setting" or "appreceptive mass" and no persistent connoted meaning to ideas —no persistent point of view—unless life's experiences were conserved when out of mind as subconscious dispositions.

This is one of the principles according to which the points of view and attitudes of mind and ideals of different communities—the collective consciousness of communities—may differ or be identical regarding even the fundamentals of the social organization and conduct. According to differences in the settings appear differences in the ideals of the collective consciousness of different communities, whether of a circumscribed locality or a nation. Such differences underlie the variations in the codes, customs, manners and etiquette of the different classes of society and of nations.

I hardly need say that the formation of a collective consciousness regarding many matters begins in child-life in the home; regarding others, such as political ideals, later in life in the social world. In child-life moral and social ideals begin to be formed. The formative influences here are the family, the school and social environment. The active forces are on the one hand repressive, and on the other creative. Either force may consciously or unconsciously be directed by the environment. Both, of course, are in principle educational. I suppose that in no country does repression play so dominant and large a part as in Japan. By repression the instinctive inborn impulses and tendencies in conflict with the ideals of the collective consciousness are inhibited and kept in check, and thus prevented from forming habits. On the other hand by the creative force of education ideas are instilled and systematized into a collective ideal that shall be a habit of thought. But from childhood and even infancy the individual begins to undergo repression and to accumulate the creative experiences that are to form the meaning of his ideas and establish his points of view. Many of these are the basis upon which manners, customs and etiquette rest. Indeed he is permitted, or directly required, to have these experiences because they are either the necessary resultant of the already existing habits of society or are demanded by society.

Is it any wonder then that nations have a difficulty in understanding, and therefore have a lack of sympathy with the customs and manners and ideals of one another? Ideas through differences in the apperceptive mass come to have a different meaning for different nations. Even those of father, mother, son, daughter, virtue, morality, *set* in a mass of different associated ideas of duties, obligations, etc., have acquired social meanings that show marked variations for each nation corresponding with the social customs and codes of each, such as those of marriage and inheritance. That which is repressed by the social consciousness of one people may be entirely neglected or encouraged by that of another. In this particularly the Oriental and Occidental nations stand sharply contrasted. Note, as a simple example, nudity which is strongly repressed in everyday life

by occidentals, but is disregarded by orientals so that it becomes a commonplace fact of daily life for the child as well as adult. The result is that while with the former nudity has a meaning that excites lively reactions from its apperceptive mass—the social root ideas which have been both its source and the repressing force—with the latter it arouses no more emotional reaction than would pots, kettles and pans. Likewise exposure of the face with Moslems has a meaning and causes reactions that belong to exposure of other parts of the body with people having other social codes. It is impossible, therefore, for one nation to completely understand the meaning of many social ideas of another nation, and therefore the corresponding points of view, without acquiring the same apperceptive mass—that is to say, without undergoing the same social education from childhood to adult life.

Through this same principle we find the difficulty of some nations—nations that are composed of polyglot people, racially and in stock heterogeneous,—acquiring a national consciousness rich in common ideals. Such common ideals as exist are, for the most part, instinctive and of the kind found in primitive tribes. They may be limited to defense of the national domain against encroachments of territory or defense against military aggressions upon national sovereignty and national interests. Such, for example, must be the case of the Austrian Empire with its polyglot people—Magyar, Germans, Bohemians, Roumanians, Slovenes, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, and others. The same difficulty besets, even if in less degree, the United States, with its one hundred millions of people drawn from every race on the globe and now in the “melting pot.” Out of that melting-pot will come some day a people with a national consciousness, common ideals, which will be the spiritual inspiring force of the nation. The same difficulty may arise even within homogeneous nations, wherein the disintegrating influences of modern economic, individual and political development have created heterogeneous class divisions based upon demoralizing social philosophy and selfish conflicting interest to the disregard of the interest of the national whole. Under such conditions the national consciousness becomes shorn of many of its

most spiritual, amalgamating and inspiring ideals that give unity and force to a nation. Among these are ideals of personal self-sacrifice at the behest of national duty, the obligation of the individual to subordinate private rights and selfish interests to the good of the State and the spiritual obligation of universal service in whatever field and wherever required by the State for its safety. In such a situation of disintegrated ideals England awoke at the outbreak of this war, and wondered with the whole world at her internal weakness. Nations like individuals, must sometimes be tried in adversity to find themselves, to recover their ideals. And so England, in the baptism of calamity has found herself, and in the finding has acquired ideals that have crystalized the soul of the nation into a spiritual force.

THE SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AS THE REGULATOR OF SOCIETY

The second point I want to make is that the collective consciousness of the social organization—the social consciousness—plays a greater part in governing and regulating society than laws, or the military or police forces of even the most autocratic government. And this it does through the development of those habits of mind and action that underlie social customs and of an instinctive sense of social obligation which is the foundation of society. Lord Haldane, the former British Minister of War, dwelt upon this fact in a remarkable address just a year before the present war, and pointed out, as I shall also later argue, that it is not chimerical to hope that through the international extension of this type of collective consciousness, it may become a common consciousness of nations—a *world consciousness*. If so, the duties and obligations of one nation to another may be regulated by it, and future wars prevented.

He laid stress upon the fact that the Germans have a word which he thought may be used to designate this particular field of the social consciousness. It is *Sittlichkeit*. The German philosopher Fichte has defined *Sittlichkeit* as “those principles of conduct which regulate people in their relations to each other and therefore have become matters

of habit and second nature at the stage of culture reached, and of which, therefore, we are not explicitly conscious." But Sittlichkeit implies moral principles and it would seem preferable not to attempt to define too narrowly those principles, and therefore the kind of customs of society which perform this function. The fact requiring emphasis is that social customs become so much matters of habit that we are not explicitly conscious of the sense of social obligation and other principles which compel obedience to them.

This field of the social consciousness embraces a code of social ethics and of manners and customs to which the conduct of each member of the community must be conformed under penalty of the social *tabu*. And it embraces what we call the *social conscience* in which are crystalized the ideals, the soul of the community. It manifests itself through that great and powerful arbiter of private and community conduct, Public Opinion—the opinion of the collective consciousness. The code of the social consciousness embodies or connotes duties and obligations which each citizen owes to society and the common welfare and each other. It embodies customs and manners which respect the rights and liberties and happiness which every citizen is entitled to enjoy without molestation by his fellows. It is thus a *system* of thought and customs based upon common points of view and attitudes of mind towards community life, grown into habit, and under which social customs have become established. As the social conscience it is the censor which punishes with the moral reprobation of public opinion infringement by the individual of those customs and of the social codes which the social conscience has established.

Out of this ethical and social system there develops a unity of thought and a common ideal and "common desire which can be made to penetrate the soul of the people and to take complete possession of it."* And necessarily there follows in consequence of psychological laws a "general will with which the will of the good citizen is in accord." This will of the community (inspired by the common ideal and desires) is common to all the individuals composing it.

*Haldane.

Herein lies the power of public opinion to which all governments bow and which all governments seek for their own support. Public opinion contains the potential common will which if not heeded will enforce the ideals of the social conscience.

To realize the truth of all this we have only to examine our own daily social habits and customs and behavior in relation to society. We then see, although we are not explicitly aware of it, that these are dictated by the social consciousness and not by our own personal desires. For if we imagine any radical departure from them we at once feel within us the deterring force of social criticism.

It is interesting to note that such a collective consciousness, in principle, is analogous to Bushido, which Professor Nitobe has so charmingly explained to English readers was "a code of moral principles which the knights were required to observe in the regulation of the ways of their daily life as well as in their vocation." Only Bushido was the collective consciousness of a *caste*, while "sittlichkeit" is that of a whole community or state or nation.

Now it is a commonly accepted fact, as Lord Haldane, pointed out, that the citizen is governed in his social conduct only to a relatively small extent by statutory laws and physical force, on the one hand, and by the dictates of his own individual conscience and his instinctive desires and impulses on the other. To a much larger extent he is governed by the more extensive system of the collective consciousness whether of the civic, state or national community. Even laws, in a democracy at least, must be the expression of the community consciousness, that is to say, of public opinion and the common will, or else they cannot be enforced, and it is really this collective consciousness that is the power behind the law. And still more is it true that the individual in his everyday life is regulated and governed not by law, but by habits of mind and customs and codes. From the moment we rise in the morning to the time we go to bed at night our social behavior is governed not by legal law but by customs and habits. Nearly everything we do, even the time of getting up and the time of going to bed, as well as the kind of bed we sleep in—whether we lie on

the floor as in Japan or on a bedstead as in the western world; what we shall do and what we shall not do, and the way we shall do it; our manners and behavior towards one another; the way we shall live, our ceremonies and our etiquette; in short our daily conduct is regulated by customs established by the principles of the social codes. These become second nature, almost automatic and instinctive. They are, therefore, governed by systems of mental dispositions organized in the mind by the social education.

Indeed, from the very beginning of social life in the nursery, education consists in the repression of the barbaric instincts with which every child is born, bringing the savage impulses of his nature under control and adapting the child and the man to the customs and ideals of the civilization to which he belongs; in other words, to developing in him the community consciousness with its habits of mind and behavior.

Every child is born a savage; he only acquires culture and the common ideals and the common will of the social conscience.

The collective consciousness, then, is the foundation of the social organization; without it the organization would fall to pieces. If this be so, is it not because of the lack of an international collective consciousness, one of ethical codes and possessed in common by all the great peoples of the world—a world consciousness—that the world today has fallen to pieces in this holocaust of war?

A WORLD CONSCIOUSNESS

What hope does psychology hold out to civilization? The common ideals of a collective consciousness respect and protect the rights of individuals and regulate their relations to one another *within* the nation. May it not be that, with time, fostered by systematic worldwide teaching, there may be developed an international consciousness, or world consciousness so far as concerns international relations? And may it not be that the principles of such a consciousness will regulate the nations in their relations to one another to the same extent that the social and national

consciousness within a single nation regulate the relations of the people to one another, and, in the United States today, the relations of the sovereign states of the American Union to one another? In such a world consciousness there would grow up common habits of mind that would become second nature—common points of view, common ideals of right and wrong in the dealings of one nation with another.

Likewise conceptions of humanity, of liberty and of the obligations of one people to another would have a common meaning, which is not the case today. In a consciousness of this kind, among the international habits of thought would be that of respecting the rights and interests of other nations whether large countries like China or small ones like Serbia, and the habit of repressing desires which have for an object the selfish aggrandizement of a nation at the expense of weaker ones. Such a world consciousness would mean desire, grown into habit and customs, to respect the rights of foreign peoples under international law, which, in turn, would be truly the expression of world ideals and desires, not of selfish interests as today, and the habit of looking to arbitration and conciliation to compose the conflicting interests of nation. The imponderable force of such a consciousness would offer the strongest support to international law—the power behind the law,—and out of such ideals and such desires, when established, there would necessarily develop a general will to peace and a will to fulfil the obligations imposed by the ideals.

Theoretically the attainment of a world consciousness of this kind is psychologically possible, and if ever attained it would necessarily have the same binding force in regulating international conduct as has the social consciousness within a nation today. To reach such an end the old world-habit of mind—the habit of thinking in war terms, of turning at first thought to war as a necessary means of settling international disputes, must be broken. A world conscience will be the censor which, like the social censor, will threaten with the *tabu* a breach of treaties of international customs, codes and habits of conduct. The ideals of the German autocracy and of the German military caste as taught, by their philosophers and publicists like Treitschke and

Nietzsche and military writers like Bernhardi and their Kaiser, such ideals as "Might makes Right," "World Empire or Downfall," "It is the duty of great nations to make war on weak nations," "Little nations have no rights which powerful nations are bound to respect," and "Nothing shall happen in this world without Germany being consulted," in short "Kultur" and the worship of force, all such military ideals must give place to the ideals of that collective consciousness of the German people that govern them in their relations to each other within the Empire and to a newly created collective consciousness of the world. The war attitude of mind of the German autocracy and military caste, which, like a mental disease has permeated and taken possession of the soul of the German people in its attitude towards other nations, must give place to a world consciousness.

If such a world consciousness should be developed, one nation will understand another because the ideals of the common consciousness will have the same meaning. We shall think in the same language though we do not speak it. It is not through militarism, nor by piling up armaments, nor by a "league to enforce peace" that a world peace can be perpetually maintained. Such methods can be only temporary. Nor in the future when all nations shall be equally armed to the teeth and all the peoples of all the nations mobilized into armies, as will be the case after this war, can even just aspirations be attained and international disputes and conflicts of interest be settled by arms, because there must result a dead-lock of force. Some other mode must be found. May not these legitimate aims be reached without war when the great nations arrive at an international consciousness, with common ideals, a common understanding, and a common will.*

A world consciousness in international relations—that is the vision I see, the dream that psychology permits us to have. May that dream come true!

*The thesis of such a world consciousness which Lord Haldane ably presented from a legal standpoint and which I have endeavored to develop along psychological lines necessarily, of course, assumes the cooperation of an international police of some kind, just as the social consciousness is supplemented by a civic and national police. There are "Apache" or bandit nations as there are bandits within the social organization of every nation, and in the case of revolutions the rights of foreign nationals must be protected from mob violence.

IS DEMENTIA PRAECOX PROPERLY DESCRIBED AS AN INFANTILE MODE OF REACTION?*

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In all scientific work it is important to be extremely careful in the definition of terms and the selection of words, especially adjectives, for these latter, for the most part, express opinions rather than facts. In no branch of science is this more important than in psychology. Dementia praecox has somewhat frequently been described by psycho-analysts as an infantile mode of reaction to libido without, as it seems to me, any adequate qualification to indicate what is meant. I therefore venture to ask the question contained in the title of this paper with the hope of securing enlightenment as to exactly what is to be understood by infantile as thus used. In doing so I propose to submit certain arguments which would lead me to answer the question in the negative.

The adjective infantile conveys to me the impression of immaturity with normality for the stage of development reached. There is nothing in the term which in any way implies a deviation from the normal. Perhaps, since the normal is a hypothesis, this were better expressed by saying that the description, infantile, would imply that the reactions were appropriate and more or less average for a certain stage of development. In this sense such a description of dementia praecox reactions would indicate that individuals adopting them were suffering from a strict arrest of development and that the reactions themselves were such as corresponded with those of a certain stage of development in the average child. If it is true that the development of the individual epitomizes the evolution of the race, the term infantile must also imply a closer approximation to more primitive types.

*Read before the American Psychoanalytic Association May 10, 1916.

The chief characteristic of adult man which differentiates him from young children and lower animals is social organization which is possible only with the development of a capacity for subordination of individual desires and their sublimation as social interests. Repressions of libido and substitute reactions are the factors which make civilization possible and these are, I believe, peculiar to adult man. Any arrest in development must, if these views are correct, imply a condition in which there is less repression and more open and primitive expression of libido. The average infant, like the lower animals, is stamped by this frankness and freedom from restraint. He knows no shame and openly seeks the gratification of his desires. It is only through training and education that he gradually learns to control and sublimate them.

Are these things true of the dementia praecox individual? Is he not especially characterized by a more or less complete lack of frankness and an excessive repression? And would not this tend to indicate an over-development of the special characteristics of the civilized adult rather than an infantile or more primitive attitude? That the efforts towards sublimation are not successful is true but this does not alter their purpose and adult significance. Viewed in this light dementia praecox reactions appear as caricatures and exaggerations of the average adult mechanisms.

The hypersensitiveness and excessive repression of the dementia praecox patient are not brought about by pubertal development, although they necessarily become more obvious as the demands for social adjustment in regard to libido become more complex and more intense. Similar traits are present even in early life and have led to the admirable description by August Hoch of these personalities as "shut-in," a term which well emphasizes that lack of frankness which stamps them so definitely when the dementia praecox mode of reaction has become more obvious. Thus, even as children, these individuals show characteristics which are strictly adult and they might hence be described as precocious rather than backward in development.

There is a necessary corollary to the views which I am here expressing. If the dementia praecox reaction is an

exaggeration with precocious development of normal adult attributes such traits must be less frequent the lower one descends in the scale of evolution. I wish I could quote figures and cases but this I am unable to do. Nevertheless, I am convinced from general observation that such is the case. Substitutive disorders probably do not occur in lower animals at all. I have, for several years, requested the medical officers of the Illinois School for the Feeble-minded to present to me, on the occasion of my visits to that institution, any patients they suspect of a dementia praecox reaction. So far I have not seen one which satisfied me. On the other hand, except in cases where the "shut-in" tendency has been very marked from early life, I would say that the dementia praecox individual has been up to, and not infrequently exceeded, the average intellectual capacity. It is true that they tend towards an interest in philosophic rather than practical subjects, but these persons are often bright in school though less sociable and practical than the average.

It may be objected that this is the outcome of my personal views as to the definition of dementia praecox, obviously an extremely important point. In this regard let me say, without pretending to give a full description, that dementia praecox is to me not merely a complex of certain symptoms. Formal symptoms may often arise in many different ways and I consider that the disorder is stamped by the mechanism of reaction and not by the end-result. That which seems most to characterize the dementia praecox reaction is the substitution of dream-phantasy for reality. I recognize that feeble-minded children often present evidences of peculiar mannerisms and stereotypies in word and act but I do not admit that these are developed in the same manner as are superficially similar manifestations in dementia praecox nor that they have the same significance.

This brings me to the last point upon which I propose to touch namely, the fact that many of the substitutions of the dementia praecox patient are composed of materials familiar to us in childhood. These persons use childish tools but do they use them as do children? And is not the manner of use more significant than the fact of use? Personally, I am sus-

picious that the confusion between these two issues has led to much error on the part of psycho-analysts in the realm of psychogenic disorders, even outside of dementia praecox. If one fails to accept the facts of the present there is nothing left but imageries of the past. What can be expected but the preservation of the dolls and toys of childhood in the effort to avoid the stern realities of adult responsibility? But the auto-erotism, the homosexuality and Oedipus-like attitude of childhood are not the same as these modes of reaction in the adult. In the former they have the essential quality of primeval frankness whereas in the latter they are subterfuge and inherently repressive. It is true that the dementia praecox individual does not satisfy libido in the manner of the average adult, but that is not because his libido is infantile even though he uses infantile symbols for its expression.

In conclusion let me point out that this question is not one of purely academic interest. If dementia praecox is truly an arrest of development, the hopes of accomplishing much in its prevention are decidedly small, but if, as I think, it represents rather a development along faulty lines, there is at least a possibility that proper education, begun at the proper time, might accomplish something.

A CASE OF PSYCHASTHENIA—ANALYSIS AND CURE

By MEYER SOLOMON, M. D., (CHICAGO)

MODERN progress in mental analysis has given many of us greater courage in attacking the minor psychoses and more hope of affecting an amelioration or cure of the condition.

Papers of a general nature dealing with the principles of mental analysis are found to be very frequent, while citation of specific cases well analysed is not by any means so often resorted to as it really should be.

In this paper, therefore, I have taken up a single case and endeavored to present its analysis in a clear manner. It seems to me that the general principles involved can be better presented by a more extended analysis of a single case than by the brief and superficial recording of many such cases.

It is understood, of course, that no two cases of the sort here considered are exactly alike. There are many types with many subdivisions within each type. Individualization must be the byword.

All that will be offered in this communication, then, is a fairly thorough presentation of a single case, of the psychasthenic group, with the analysis, interpretation, treatment and outcome.

The patient, F. K., aged seventeen, Bohemian-American, was referred to me on August 12, 1915, by Dr. Bayard Holmes, Sr., of Chicago, who had operated on him for appendicitis on May 25, 1915. His complaints were that he was being annoyed by a buzzing, roaring sound, in both ears, and that this had been going on for the past three weeks. For the past week or so he had been suffering from insomnia, headaches, nervousness, weakness, loss of appetite, and constant restlessness.

On further questioning it was brought out that his present trouble began in the following manner: Three weeks

ago, while employed at coloring pictures (he was an apprentice in a low-grade artist's shop), a strange man came into his place of employment and visited his employer. He heard the man say to his employer: "Oh, I see that you have a new boy," our patient concluding that he himself was being referred to. He turned about and looked at the stranger and the latter looked at our patient. He then turned back and went on with his work. The man kept on talking to the employer. He, our patient, did not hear or understand what was being said by this man but he has learnt since that the man had talked about the Blackstone Hotel in Chicago and other things. He found that he was unable to continue his work because this stranger's voice reminded him of the voice which he had heard in the hospital while he was being given ether. This caused him to become so much upset, frightened and restless that he rose from his chair with the intention of leaving at once, but he was so disturbed that he fell. His employer rushed to his aid, assisted him to his feet, gave him some water to drink, and he soon came to himself. He then went home at once, while the man who had been the cause of his sudden trouble remained behind with his employer.

The recollections of his experiences while passing under the influence of the ether will be detailed a little later on.

On the evening of the day on which he had had the disagreeable experience just detailed, F. K. went to a nearby park with a boy friend for a short walk, which terminated in their sitting down on a bench to rest and talk. Suddenly he heard the voice of a man nearby who was speaking to a companion. This voice, too, sounded like and reminded him of the voice he had heard in the hospital as he was being anesthetized with ether. He immediately reacted by becoming frightened, he thought that something was going to happen to him, that he was going to die. He tried to get away without delay by insisting to his friend that they go home immediately. This his friend refused to do, preferring to stay a while longer in the park. Our patient felt that his condition was critical, and, searching for a valid excuse to offer his friend to induce him to leave the park as soon as possible, he informed his companion that he was feeling ill

and could not remain in the park any longer. Thereupon his friend accompanied him home. When he was a few blocks distant from the park he felt well again, because he had left the voice far behind him.

Since these two experiences on the same day three weeks ago, he had been having a whirring, roaring sound in both ears. He does not hear voices—that is, he does not have specific auditory hallucinations. But he has been greatly troubled during that time. Whenever he hears the voice of a person which to him at the moment sounds rather low, he has a recurrence of his fear reaction, and he at once hears the whirring sound in his ears. Consequently whenever anybody speaks in his presence, to him or to others, he pays special attention to the sound of the voice. Furthermore, he is easily frightened by any sound that in any way seems to him to resemble the sound or voice he heard in the hospital. As a result he is frightened by the sounds from automobiles, cars, boat whistles, escaping steam, railroad trains, thunder (and also the sight of lightning), and a host of other things. In fact he states that sounds of almost any sort are now retained by him—by which is meant that he continues to hear them for a little while after they have ceased. Besides, he has now become very observing of all objects that may emit sounds, and he endeavors to avoid them in so far as he can. As a matter of fact he has not been able to sleep well for two weeks, at times having not more than two hours of sleep during the night. It takes him hours to fall asleep, he is restless, tosses from side to side, and is annoyed and startled by all sounds that he may hear—a passing auto, the noise of the street car, and the like. This has resulted in his headaches, his asthenia, his loss of appetite, and his general nervousness. In other words, we have here the beginning of a state of nervous exhaustion or so-called neurasthenia being added to the picture which has been described in the preceding lines.

How far this condition might have progressed, on the physical and mental side, no one can well tell. Whether a full-blown so-called neurasthenic state would have been added to his condition, with all sorts of fears concerning his bodily health, with self-observation, auto- and hetero-

suggestion, and the rest of the complicating features which enter into most of these cases, cannot be said with certainty. But this might very well have been possible. At any rate the boy was apparently headed in that direction. He was already a psychasthenic (in Janet's sense of the word), with fears, incipient taboos, acute attacks of anxiety and fear, and other manifestations. That many phobias, taboos, doubts and the like would have developed on this basis seems to me quite certain. Whether or not he would have remained a pure psychasthenic I cannot say. It is possible that auditory hallucinations of a definite nature might have developed and major psychosis might have made its appearance. Paranoia, with or without hallucinations, might have ensued, or a more pronounced and more rapidly disintegrating mental process, of the dementia praecox sort, for instance, might have been built up on this subsoil.

Of course it is possible that the condition would have evolved to a certain stage and there normal adjustment of some sort or other might have been accomplished by the patient, by his own efforts or with the aid of others. Left to himself, however, and judging from the condition in which I found him, my knowledge of the young man leads me to the belief that normal adjustment would not have taken place without mental help of some sort.

Here, to be sure, was the opportunity to nip a psychosis in the bud, as it were. And I gladly and cheerfully undertook the job.

Physical examination made on the first visit showed the boy to be highly nervous, his heart beat rapidly from excitement incident to the examination, and he suffered from stammering, a condition he has had for the past eight years.

This was as far as I got on the first visit.

I ordered bromide of sodium to allay his nervous condition, trional in hot milk and a warm bath for his insomnia, calmed him, assured him that we would get down to the bottom of the trouble before we were through, and that there was every reason to believe that he would be entirely well before the treatment was finished. He was to report to me again the next day.

The next day he complained that he had been frightened

by the thunder that morning. It was then learned that while under the effects of ether he had seen lightning and heard thunder.

His experiences while passing under the influence of ether preparatory to his operation for appendicitis were now discussed. He remembered that things were black before his eyes, he saw the stars and the moon. He felt that he was in the moon and was trying desperately to get out of it but that he struggled in vain. The moon was crushing him. He thought he was going to die. He heard a whirring sound in his ears. He thought this was the voice of the devil who was speaking to him, who was going to punish him for his sins, and who was now bringing about his death.

It must be said that his arms were held down while he was being given the anesthetic, and that he probably struggled in vain to free himself from this oppression. The whirring sound in his ears may have been due in part to the voice of the anesthetist who was assuring him and instructing him how to take the anesthetic. The patient says it really was thundering and lightning at the time of the operation, but this may or may not have been true. The association of thunder and lightning to stars and moon and the interpretation of the pressure feeling in his arms (where he was held down), as crushing by the moon, is not difficult to see. The whirring sound, probably due in part to the sound of the anesthetist's voice but for the most part to the effects of the ether, and the resemblance of this to the voice of the devil close to the ear is likewise not a far-fetched association. However this may be, this was the experience, as best he could recall it, which he had had before falling under the sleep-producing effects of the ether.

It must be mentioned that the patient had not at all feared the operation. He had full confidence in his surgeon and did not fear any ill effects from the appendectomy which he was about to undergo.

His recovery from the operation was uneventful and he was discharged cured.

Now, although in his first story one got the impression that he had been entirely free from symptoms from the time of the operation until the stranger visited his employer as

related above, it was now found that he had in reality by no means been free from mental trouble in that period of a little over two months.

During all this period he thought much of his experience while receiving the anesthetic and feared that something was going to happen to him. He was actually in fear and the thought constantly recurred to his mind that some punishment was going to be meted out to him. He now recalled, although this may be nothing more than retrospective falsification of memory, that the devil had told him, while he was on the operating table, that he (our patient) was bad, that he did not believe in God, and that he was going to be punished for his sins—he was now going to die.

These very ideas in fact had occurred to him quite frequently from the time he had left the hospital to the day he had met the stranger in his employer's place of business. But they did not obsess him or hold him within their grip to anything like the degree with which they obsessed him following the experiences which led to the rapid increase of his mental symptoms.

The affair at the artist's shop and that other one in the park were but as sparks which set the blaze flaming far and wide. They were as sparks of fire to a train of gunpowder. They were, as is seen, but partial end-products.

I have forgotten to mention that his states of anxiety or fear were accompanied by many of the usual symptoms found in such conditions—flushing of the face, a hot burning sensation in the face, sweating, sometimes a desire to urinate, a confused, swimming sensation in the head, and the desire to run away, to escape from the situation in which he found himself; and finally he would run away.

The great question which now presents itself is this: Why did this boy of seventeen have the ideas which he claims to have had while under the anesthetic? Why did he hear the voice of the devil and why did the devil say just those things to him that I have mentioned above? What sins, in other words, had our patient committed that caused him to be afraid of the devil?

Let us inquire into the life history of this boy and see what information it has to offer. His father and mother

are good parents, he informs us at this stage of the analysis, and as a rule treat him well. He has two brothers, one nineteen, the other twenty-eight; the latter is married.

He has three sisters, all single and aged fourteen, twenty and twenty-one respectively. All the members of his family are healthy. No nervous or mental disease exists in the family so far as can be learned.

The patient was born in Chicago. His family is Bohemian. He does not know at exactly what ages he began to walk and talk but it is learned from his mother that it was about the usual age. He attended school from the age of six to fifteen. He was not promoted twice. He was in the sixth grade when he quit. He was not a bright boy in school and from my personal knowledge of him I may say that he is not at all as bright as the average boy of his age. After leaving school he worked for a year, then was out of work for a short time, again worked for a short time, this period being followed by unemployment for a few months until recently. For two weeks he had been learning how to color pictures. He never returned to this place of employment since the day he had left in the manner above described, he having been advised to quit work for a time. His stuttering, from which he suffers to a moderate degree, began when he was about nine years old, I am told. It has been improving recently, it is claimed. He has had no special diseases of a serious nature, aside from the attack of appendicitis for which he was operated. He smoked cigarettes until two weeks ago when he stopped the practice on his physician's advice. He does not indulge in alcoholic beverages of any sort. He first declared that he had masturbated once or twice a week until a year ago. Later he admitted that he had not ceased the practice. Once he had sexual intercourse. He has no nocturnal emissions or sex dreams, he declares. Apparently masturbation affords him sufficient sexual gratification.

His family is in moderate financial circumstances, and there are no special domestic troubles of which he is aware. Nor is he pressed to make a living of his own.

He is a Catholic because his family are Catholics. The folks at home are very religious, and in general are ignorant

and superstitious. Personally he does not like to go to church. He has been threatened by his mother that if he did not go to church regularly, she would keep him out of the house or the devil would get after him.

For a long time he has been afraid of robbers. For years he has been easily frightened at night by noises.

He admits that he never was a leader. On the other hand he always followed the other fellows. He confesses to having occasionally stolen various articles of fruit from pedlars, etc., with the other boys.

It was not until this point that one of the main points in the analysis of his trouble was unearthed.

Last year he stole ten dollars from his mother. She had left the ten dollars lying on the table at home, he had discovered it and made off with it. Later on during the same day he returned home. His mother asked him whether he knew anything about the ten dollars. He denied any knowledge of it. She suspected that he had taken it and told him so. He proclaimed his innocence. She searched his pockets, and, mirabile dictu! found the ten dollar bill in one of his trousers' pockets. She then gave him a licking. He confessed the theft, promised never to do anything similar again, and his mother forgave him. She promised not to tell his father about this and she has kept her word up to the present time.

He admits that previous to taking this ten dollars from his mother he had frequently stolen smaller sums of money from her pocket-book. At one time he would take a quarter, and then as much as a half dollar. He never told his mother about this. He was never detected in these earlier thefts, nor did his mother seem to have any knowledge that her pocket-book had been rifled. At least she never spoke about the matter. Not having been caught in any of these minor thefts, he had felt no particular remorse for his conduct on these occasions. He believes that this was because no one knew of them and so he gave the matter but little thought.

He did, however, feel remorse for having taken the ten dollars from his mother. The manner in which he had been discovered by his mother had a decided effect upon him.

He regretted his action very much and wished to make amends for it.

Now it so happened that his family, as previously mentioned, were very religious, devout Catholics. Our young patient had been going to confession regularly about once in two months or so from the age of twelve. The last time he had gone to confession had been on the very day before the operation for appendicitis. He had on various occasions confessed his sins to the priest. He confessed his masturbation to the priest, after the priest had questioned him on the point, and he was told not to do it again. He confessed that he had not been going to church regularly but had been in the habit of playing ball and other games with the other boys until the services were over and then going home with the others after church was dismissed. The priest told him he could make amends for not going to church regularly by kneeling and praying and thereafter attending services regularly. He confessed to swearing, which he was told would be forgiven if he would not do it again. He confessed to his thefts, particularly the ten dollar theft from his mother. The priest told him, he says, that he (the priest) would not forgive him for stealing the ten dollars until he had returned it, but that God might forgive him.

Now, from the statements of the priest during the many years during which he had attended confession, it had been impressed upon him that if he stole money the sin would be on his soul until he returned it. If he failed to do this, the Lord would punish him in some way or other, the devil would be after him, and that the sin would be with him, as related in the biblical story of Cain and Abel for instance.

Now, although the patient understood and accepted in its entirety the origin and development and real meaning of the fears which he harbored in the manner in which I have described, still, it is to be appreciated, that one could not be certain of a cure without definite suggestions to him of a therapeutic nature, in order that he might combat the ideas which he maintained. This, furthermore, was to be done without conflicting in the slightest measure with his religious complexes.

I circumvented the difficulties in the following fashion: I told the patient that there had been a misunderstanding on his part as well as on the part of the priest. I showed him, or rather he showed himself, that his mother, the individual from whom he had stolen the ten dollars, knew all about the theft; that he had confessed to her; that she had forgiven him; that she had found the ten dollars in his pocket and so had not lost any of it; and that as a result the entire matter was long "dead and buried;" that that terminated the affair; that there had really been no need to confess this to the priest; that the priest did not know of this aspect of the case (his confession to and his having been forgiven by his mother and the return of the money to her) and so wrongly assumed the standpoint that he did; that the priest thus misunderstood the true state of affairs; that the priest's statement and all that he had heard during confessional did not apply to him in this particular matter because of the extenuating circumstances here present; that had the priest known that he had been forgiven by his mother after confession to her and that the ten dollars had been returned to her, that forgiveness woul have been given him at once; that since the priest's teachings did not hold in his case, it followed as a natural consequence that the Lord would not and did not mean to punish him for the sins which he had been under the impression had not been taken from his soul; that it followed that he had nothing to fear from the devil who, to be sure, was not "after him" in view of the facts above detailed; and that, finally, he need have no fear of any sounds or voices which in any way reminded him of the devil's voice, especially as he had heard this voice in the hospital while under the effects of light etherization.

He realized and accepted the justice and sensibleness of my line of argumentation, and saw the old misdeed in a new light or setting.

This, then, was my weapon. "Now," I said to him, "since these things are true, your fears are in reality absolutely groundless. From now on, when you hear voices or sounds tha bring to mind or resemble that voice and sound which you heard at the operation, or when you react with fear to sounds and voices without knowing just why you do

so, I want you to immediately resort to the following line of reasoning, repeating it over and over again, if possible before you become panic-stricken or as soon as you feel your fear-state coming over you: The reason why I am frightened by this voice or sound is because it reminds me of the voice of the devil whom I feared because of the theft of ten dollars which still clung to me as a sin for which I had not been forgiven. Now, since the real status of affairs is different from what I had thought it was and from what the priest, who did not hear my entire story, thought it was I have, as a matter of fact, no sin on my soul for this ten dollar theft. I have, therefore, no reason to fear the devil or any sounds or voices that seem to me to resemble my conception of the devil's voice. It consequently follows that I need not fear this particular sound or voice and in fact I do not fear it." I then told him other things along this line to give him greater courage, hope and faith in himself. But I insisted that now that he knew the origin and development and grasped the meaning of his mental condition that he must assert his personality in the presence of the disturbing sounds and fight sensibly for freedom from enthraldom by the fears and taboos which were fast besetting him and surrounding him on every hand. The shackles must be thrown off and he must stand up to the encounter with every bit of will power that he possessed, with the whole force of his personality. He would not be doing it blindly but with insight and understanding. And although he is not naturally of a strong and self-sufficient personality or make-up, his aid was enlisted in this manner.

He was told to report again in a week. He did not return until eleven days later. He was very happy. He was no longer frightened by the toots or other sounds emanating from automobiles. That very morning he had passed by a factory where steam was escaping from a pipe and making a peculiar noise which previously had sent terrors to his heart and stirred up all his fears. He now felt not the slightest fear. On the other hand he put his hands deep down into his pockets and with a sense of unalloyed joy watched the steam escape with a feeling of great confidence in himself. He had been feeling so well that two days ago

he had risked going to work at the same place as before. A near-by engine made a noise which frightened him very much and was so disagreeable to him that he quit work.

The whole matter was explained to him again and thoroughly discussed with him in order that he might fully understand and grasp it and to impress it upon him the more strongly. The same suggestions were given him as he had received at the last visit. He was further told not to go to work until I gave him such instructions, and he was permitted to ride his bicycle and to play baseball and other games with his boy friends. He was also put on treatment for constipation.

On his fourth visit, on September 1, he reported that he had been almost free from his fear since the previous visit one week ago. However, I obtained from him two dreams that he had had during the week. In these dreams he met with accidents, which I interpreted as still being related to his fears. He was still much troubled because of falling asleep very slowly, this taking him two to three hours, according to his statement. He admitted that he still paid attention to various noises but they did not frighten him. "I just look where they are and laugh at them," he told me. He usually asked his friends or companions whether they heard this or that noise, at the moment he heard it, and if they said that they did, his mind was at once set at rest. Trional was ordered for his sleeplessness.

On his fifth visit on September 7, he was still doing well. On close questioning it was elicited that four days ago, while passing under a tunnel with a friend, he had heard a roaring sound which caused him to question, with some anxiety, whether it was a train or a recurrence of his trouble. He determined to make certain by asking his friend, in this manner learning whether the latter also heard the same sound. His friend informed him that he heard a train passing overhead. This relieved our patient's beginning fears. The gasoline given off by passing automobiles disturbed him because it reminded him of ether, the operation, and his fears. Distant roaring sounds upset him for the moment, but he immediately came to himself again. Once more the history of his mental condition was

reviewed with him as on the previous visits, and he was given a tonic.

His sixth visit was on September 10, three days later, when he admitted that he was still frightened for a moment by a few of the sounds enumerated hitherto, and that now and then during the day and for one half to one hour before falling asleep at night he was being troubled by the fear that he was going to die as a punishment for the theft. The evolution of his condition and the method of combating it heretofore described were again presented to him.

Following this visit I did not see him again for approximately seven weeks (until October 30), when some information concerning his early childhood fears were resurrected. Fear of the devil had been instilled into him from his earliest years. In fact from the age of four or so, for a period of five years or more, he had been in great fear of the devil. At home, he had been afraid to put his feet under the table lest he be pulled under it or down into he-knew-not-where by the devil. Consequently he had been in the habit of sitting on the chair with his feet drawn up under him while eating at table. When his mother detected this she had told him that he must let his feet hang down under the table or else the devil would pull them down from the chair to their proper position under the table. This but helped to confirm him in the habit of not letting his feet hang down under the table.

Five years ago, while in the gymnasium in one of the city's public parks, he suddenly struck the left side of his head against the parallel bars. He was "knocked out" and "saw stars." When "coming to himself," he was afraid of those about him who were trying to aid him, since, in his confused state, he thought that they had struck him. His left eyebrow was cut but healed perfectly in two weeks. At the time of this accident he was afraid to go home fearing that he would get a licking from his father for having received the wound on his eyebrow. He did not return home that night until after his father had fallen asleep. As a matter of fact his father was very unreasonable with him, continually scolding him, licking him, and interfering with his rights in many different ways. For example, his father was in the habit of interfering with our young patient's

play games, with his keeping pigeons, etc. As a child he was ever in fear of his plans being upset by his father—that his pigeons would be given their freedom and his pigeons' food supply thrown out, and the like.

Since his last visit, about seven weeks ago, he had been practically entirely well and free from his former trouble. Once a week or so the old ideas but not fears would return to him when he heard a peculiar voice, but he overcame them on the spot. For the past six weeks he had been working as an errand boy at the salary of six dollars a week. He now entertained the ardent wish to become a chauffeur. He had been thinking much about automobiles—he wished for one by day, dreamed by night that he was a chauffeur for a rich woman, etc.

On his eighth visit, January 2, 1916, questioning brought out the information that he had been having pinching feelings once or twice a week for two or three minutes and that he had had the thought, hardly amounting to fear, that perhaps he was getting heart disease. He has, however, not experienced this for the past month, and during this time has not given it any thought. He was then employed at running a machine in a box factory where there were all kinds of disagreeable noises which would have thrilled him with horrible fears when he first came to see me. In spite of this he was not at all annoyed by them. In truth all his previous complaints had now entirely disappeared. He had forgotten all about them, he declared.

It is thus seen that the patient was entirely cured of his mental disorder in eight office visits. Of course I did not attempt to change his religious or superstitious ideas. For this re-education, or rather education, extending over many years, and far beyond the confines of my duty and obligation in the case, would have been necessary. Besides, it is questionable whether it would prove successful. It would, on the other hand, do him untold harm, by conflicting with his previous beliefs and leading to problems of life and mental conflicts far beyond his mental capacity. With him it is an instance of "where ignorance is bliss, 'tis folly to be wise."

Special methods, such as hypnotism or Sidis' hypnoidal state, might have been employed; but the analysis was

effected and the treatment successful without them.

The aid of his mother and the priest might have been invoked, if necessary, and indeed was a line of attack held in reserve by me. He was cured without his mother or anyone else at home knowing anything at all about the meaning of his trouble.

While treating him I wondered what course I should have pursued if the history of his case had been slightly different from what it was. Suppose he had not returned the money to his mother. What should have been my line of attack? Hypnosis might have been employed. I might have enlisted the aid of the priest, who would have forgiven him—but this might or might not have helped very much to cure him. The forgiveness of his mother might have been given him again—and this too might or might not have been of curative value to him. And then arrangements could have been made for him to go to work at some light occupation, even if it was nothing more than assisting his father or with the housework, and even if, without his knowing the object, his parents gave him extra money for lunch and other purposes, which he could thus save until he had accumulated enough money to repay the debt to his mother and then be forgiven by the priest (and God).

The lessons in psychopathology to be learned from this single case are indeed numerous but will not be discussed in this place.

NOTE CONCERNING RECURRENCE. In the early part of January, 1916, it was necessary for me to leave my home in Chicago for a considerable period. During my absence from home this history of the case was written. Before writing this paper, however, I wrote to my former patient to learn definitely and positively exactly how he was getting along. This was in May, 1916. As I received no reply from him, I concluded, after waiting a couple of weeks, that he was getting along as well as when I last saw him, and, as is so frequent with patients who have been relieved of their ailments by physicians, he saw no need of going to the trouble to write me that all was well with him, since there was nothing to be gained by him in so doing. Before receiving the proof of this paper, however, I again wrote him to write me a short note, letting me know definitely whether he was free from his former trouble or whether it had returned to him at any time since his last visit to my office. He then wrote me that he had gotten along very well, without recurrence of the trouble, until recently (probably some time in May of this year) when he had a slight recurrence. He added that by self-assertion and the application of the former method of combating the ideas which came to mind he was getting the better of his annoying fears. I immediately referred him to another physician in Chicago for treatment, at the same time sending on to this physician my analysis and report of the case. I have not as yet heard from this physician just how the recurrence came about, the results of the treatment instituted, or the present condition of the patient.

In view of this recurrence certain remarks are called for in explanation.

Even if permanent cure was not effected by the course of treatment given this patient while he was under my care, it does not, in my opinion, in the slightest degree alter the lessons to be learnt from the case as above presented.

Even if, as may be argued, the interpretation of this case as given above is faulty or incorrect, if the patient really accepted the explanation offered to him and wholeheartedly believed in it, that was the weapon to be used in this case for the cure of the condition.

On the other hand, if the facts given in the history are correct and sufficiently complete and inclusive, the appearance of this recrudescence of his mental disorder does not in any way change the nature of the origin and evolution of the disorder as elaborated in the report here offered.

It is plain to me, to be sure, that certain criticisms of the conclusions arrived at by me can be offered by the reader. It may be argued that the analysis did not go far enough, that I did not really get to the very bottom of the disorder and that as a consequence the analysis and interpretation may not be correct, that I did not see the patient often enough during the course of treatment, that I did not treat him long enough, that I should have gained the co-operation of the mother and the priest from the beginning of the treatment.

In reply I may say that although I might have gone further and unearthed more mental material, it is my firm conviction that I actually did get at the essential facts in the case and that my analysis and interpretation of the case are correct. A continuation of the unearthing of mental material in his history after what seemed plainly to be the essential points in the case, *especially in view of the patient's acceptance of and belief in the explanation given him*, would have interfered with the treatment, unnecessarily delayed the initiation of the treatment followed, and perhaps even would have inculcated in my patient doubts as to my understanding of his condition and of the explanation which I eventually would have given him—hence lack of faith in me as his physician. It is unquestionable that, at least where such procedure is unnecessary, too prolonged efforts at analysis and interpretation are quite apt to lead to suspicion and doubt on the part of the patient as to whether the final explanation or interpretation propounded by the physician is after all really true, since he is apt to come to the conclusion that there was too much “fishing” and guess work injected into the case.

Many reasons may be given for my not having seen the patient more frequently. One important reason here given is frequently not mentioned in discussions of this subject. The conditions of practice are not the same as those in an institution. Unless you are doing charity work, it is necessary for the patient to pay for his treatment in proportion to the number and duration of the treatments given him. The more visits the patient makes to the office, the more money it will cost him. No matter who the physician be, unless the patient has had time to become well acquainted with his personality and has implicit faith in his honesty and fairness, it is but natural that the suspicions of the patient as to the real motives and absolute honesty of the physician may be aroused. Furthermore the physician often finds himself in the peculiar position of not being able to insist on exactly those conditions which seem to him to be ideal in the particular case under consideration, since it is requisite that he make the best of things as they are—the inability of the patient (from financial or other reasons) to visit the physician as often as the latter may desire, the conditions of the practice of the particular physician, etc.

This also is a partial explanation of my failure to treat the patient for a longer period than I did, although the necessity of my leaving town early in January made cessation of treatment compulsory. Furthermore the patient was getting along so well that it would have been no simple task to convince him that it was necessary for him to visit me more frequently or for a longer period, without quickly inciting in his mind well-based suspicions concerning my motives.

Whether or not I was wrong in not at once getting into communication with his mother and the priest and taking them into my confidence in order to gain their co-operation and aid, I shall not discuss here. It is sufficient for me that I got along without them so well that I had apparently cured the patient of his trouble before I left town.

The possible reasons for the recurrence and the steps to be taken to effect a permanent cure in this patient will not be enumerated.

AN UNUSUAL CASE OF SPEECH INHIBITION

BY SMILEY BLANTON, M. D.

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MISS L. M. Gardner, the school nurse of Racine, Wisconsin, recently brought to me for examination a boy of nine years who was suffering from an unusual case of speech inhibition.

Through the kindness of Miss Gardner, I was able to get a rather thorough history of the case. I also saw the boy's older brother and his class teacher and the principal of the school. Stephen B. was born in Norway in November, 1906, he was a full-term child and the labor was normal. He has never had a serious illness. There are five children older than Stephen and three younger, and all of them are normal in speech, general health, and intelligence. The mother is a woman of intelligence, and the father has a good position in an automobile factory. The only fact in the heredity that seems to have a bearing on the case is that the father reports that he was late in beginning to talk, and was always of a "nervous temperament."

In 1906, when Stephen was three years old, his parents brought him to America. The passage was rough and the mother reports that Stephen was greatly frightened, especially when on several occasions the waves broke over the ship and flooded the part where they were. She says that for some months after their arrival in America, Stephen was in a highly nervous state, did not sleep well, and suffered from "nervous prostration." Although he made tones and cried he did not begin to talk until about the age of five. At first he only whispered, but in a short time he began to speak normally, and since this time he has spoken normally when in the company of only his parents or brothers. At the age of five and a half he started to kindergarten, where he did not speak or even whisper. Toward the end of the first year, he began to talk in a low whisper audible only a few

feet away. He was two years in the kindergarten because of his backwardness in speech. He was one year in the first, one year in the second, and is now just completing the third grade. All of his school work has been conducted in a low whisper and by means of writing. There is no lack of ability; both the mother and the teachers say that Stephen is very bright and probably above the average in intelligence. School report shows conduct good, health good, scholarship fair. Though all the teachers have treated him with the utmost patience and kindness they have never been able to persuade him to speak in a normal manner.

Some time ago, he was placed in the open air school, thinking this would prove beneficial. During the four weeks he has been in here, he has not spoken in even a whisper. He remains dumb to all entreaties and persuasion. The change from one teacher to another seems enough to inhibit, at least for a time, speech altogether.

The mother reports that at home Stephen talks in a good loud tone and when he is playing with his brothers. However, if he is on the playground with other children, he will not speak, even when playing games. At home, he speaks much less than do his brothers. He seems to try to avoid speaking. For example, if he desires something at the table, instead of asking for it, he gets it himself. The mother says, however, that he sometimes sings after he has gone to bed, and then his voice is full-toned and pleasant.

The mother attributes his peculiarity in speech to a fall down the cellar steps when he was three years old, but there is no sign of injury and this fall is probably of no significance.

Dr. J. W. Hanson, nose and throat specialist, made an examination of the vocal cords and of the ears. His report is:—"Vocal cords normal, hearing normal."

The nurse reports that most of the time he is merry and cheerful, but during the examination by me he seemed sad, dejected, and unhappy. He is rather small for his age, fairly well-nourished, with a refined, intelligent face. He stood stolidly in front of me, but refused to look at me, keeping his stare fixed on something out of the window. When asked to speak to me, to tell me his name, to read,

he remained as though not hearing, staring fixedly out of the window. His hearing was obviously normal, for when I whispered his name and asked him in the same whisper to look at me, he turned his head slowly and looked at me. He also executed commands given in a whisper. He by no means gave the appearance of being merely stubborn, nor is this the impression that the teachers get of him. He appeared to me to be suffering from mental conflict resulting in an inhibition of his speech. To further test him, I suddenly gave him a sharp pinch to see if he would cry out, as would a normal child, but Stephen merely stood still and let the tears flow out of his eyes. He made no sound, did not even sob.

It seems to me that this is a case of a psychoneurosis due to some mental conflict. It is an accentuation of the fear and timidity which many high-strung and neurotic children suffer from when they first leave home for school. It is not uncommon to find children who did not talk for several months after entering kindergarten. The presence of strangers and strange surroundings, and the separation from the home and the mother is enough to inhibit speech altogether for a time. Now, if we imagine this condition accentuated, become permanent, probably affecting the subconscious mind, it would explain Stephen's condition. It would be most interesting to psychoanalyze him and see what goes on in his mind, but this seems impossible as he will not talk nor even write for anyone except his brothers and parents. And even his mother cannot get him to tell her why he does not talk. It is a serious neurosis as regards his adjustment to life, and it is doubtful if he will ever recover enough to enable him to speak and act normally.

This case shows that parents and teachers should not neglect to take notice of cases of excessive timidity in children that prevents them from speaking when in school or with strangers. This excessive fear is due to infantile conflicts and repressions and lack of adjustment, and unless these conditions are removed, a serious neurosis may develop.

VARIATIONS IN THE SENSORY THRESHOLD FOR FARADIC STIMULATION IN PSYCHOPATHIC SUBJECTS

V. THE GROUP OF THE PSYCHONEUROSES

BY G. P. GRABFIELD, M. D.

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THE sensory threshold for faradism has been determined by the Martin method¹ in thirty cases considered to be in the Psychoneurotic group at the Psychopathic Hospital, Boston. In the first orientation study the following conclusion was drawn in regard to this group on the evidence then available: "The psychoneurotics seem to have normal thresholds,—hence there may be an immediate practical value diagnostically, when the diagnosis is in doubt as against the frank psychoses."² This conclusion is corroborated by the present series of cases.

The method used in this group is that of Martin as used in the former groups of cases. The material was taken at random from the admissions to the Psychopathic Hospital. There are in all thirty cases, of which 18 are males and 12 females. On these thirty cases there have been made one hundred and thirteen observations. The average of all these observations is 179 Beta units. The limits of variations were from 41 Beta units to 785 Beta units. The cases fall into five groups, as follows:

- (1) Occupation Neurosis
- (2) Traumatic Neurosis
- (3) Hysteria
- (4) Neurasthenia
- (5) Psychoneurosis *i. e.* those cases in which the form was not specifically stated in the record.

We have examined five cases diagnosed as Occupation Neurosis. Of these, four were males and one was a female.* The observations varied from 91 to 348 Beta Units, 50 observations averaging 195 Beta Units. The cases fall naturally into two groups, the one showing normal threshold values, the other showing abnormal threshold values. In the first group was found a case of a violinist on whom the threshold of the worst hand was found to be entirely within normal limits. The other case was the female on whom the diagnosis of "Writer's Cramp" was made. Careful neurological examination failed to reveal any lesion. This girl was a college student and the "cramp" had affected both hands. She seemed to have some evidence of a neurotic temperament underlying the whole process and perhaps this is one of those cases which could be classed as a true "functional neuropathy".³ Careful tests on this case including all of the affected fingers yielded no observations whose normality could even be doubted, and the patient's responses were such as to make the validity of the observations unquestionable. Of the remaining three cases, all showed pathological values almost constantly in spite of some subjective improvement in some of them. Two of these cases† were cigar makers. All the fingers of both hands were tested on several occasions and it was found that the observations were almost all pathological and that they varied without reference to the patient's subjective condition; the last case was one of a stone cutter in which a similar variation was found. In these cases as in the others careful examination failed to reveal any lesion. It is possible from this objective evidence that there are two classes of this affection—the one a purely psychogenetic affair, the other with a somatic basis.

There were only two cases tested that have been diagnosed Traumatic Neurosis. Both of these had neurological signs of some sort and both showed pathological threshold values. Whether these should be classed among the neurological cases in regard to their pathological physiology rather than among the psychoneuroses cannot be said

*I am indebted to Dr. E. W. Taylor for the opportunity to examine this case.

†I am indebted to Dr. W. E. Paul for the opportunity to examine these cases.

on the basis of two cases but this is a suggestive evidence in this direction.

The remaining cases belong together. First the six cases of Hysteria, of which one was a male and five were females. One interesting point that arose in connection with these cases was the possibility of a faradic hyperesthesia in these cases. Only one case showed pathological values and she also had a quite marked thyreotoxicosis. All the other cases showed values that must at present (until more evidence as to the lower limits of the normal threshold is at hand) be regarded as low, but which we feel sure must be regarded as at least near the lower limit of normal values. Of course, three of these patients were fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen years old, respectively, and this may have something to do with the low values obtained in these cases. There is very little evidence available as to the variations of this threshold with age, but what there is seems to point in the direction that this threshold rises with age. One case (No. 4482) showed neurological signs on the left with contractures. It is questionable whether these were hysterical—however, the threshold on this side was 159 Beta units as compared with 106 on the other side. If we omit this observation from consideration and also the case of Thyreotoxicosis, we are left with 5 uncomplicated cases of Hysteria upon which 18 observations were made, averaging 88 Beta units.

Of the three cases diagnosed Neurasthenia none have a value exceeding 95 Beta units. The average of this group was 81 Beta units. It is interesting in passing to note that in the first study comment was made that the only case in the psychoneurotic group yielding a pathological reading (230 Beta units) was one in which the tentative diagnosis of Neurasthenia was made but in which the diagnosis was in grave doubt. Since that time this case has been committed to the Boston State Hospital with the diagnosis of Dementia Precox.

Finally there is left for consideration a group of fourteen cases in which the diagnosis was simply Psychoneurosis without further specification of the form. Of these only four gave at any time a definitely pathological reading. Of these four the diagnosis was in doubt in three. The fourth

case (3758) was a man aged 42, but of the type which one could call prematurely old. He yielded constantly very high readings and it seems fair to exclude him from consideration at present pending further observations on arteriosclerotic individuals. Excluding these four cases, the remainder (in which the diagnosis is in no doubt) average 117 Beta units. One of these cases gave a doubtful value but did not show the characteristic lively reflexes found in this group⁴ but on the contrary showed sluggish reflexes and certain other slight neurological signs.

So far then the cases in this group seem to fall into two well defined groups—the one with a normal (perhaps low) threshold for the time of day at which they were tested⁵ and the other with a definitely pathological threshold. In the latter group are found certain occupation neuroses and the traumatic neuroses, whilst the former includes all the other types. When all the undoubted and uncomplicated cases in this group are considered (excluding the Traumatic and Occupation Neuroses) we have 38 observations on 17 cases averaging just 100 Beta units. None of these observations are even high and it is probable that this value will be found to be lower than a normal average tested at this time of day⁵. Correlations with emotional tone and other psychic factors do not appear. It is interesting to note that 13 readings on the three chronic alcoholics in this group averaged 251 Beta units, which again demonstrates the effect of alcohol in raising this threshold⁶. It is thus to be seen that the psychoneurotics have a normal sensory threshold to faradism (with the above noted exceptions).

This fact is of diagnostic value, more especially in differentiating these cases from some of the frank psychoses. It will be remembered that 50% of the Dementia Precox cases show an abnormally high threshold value⁷, and so at least it can be said that when the differential diagnosis lies between these two conditions this test will be of aid in half the cases. Again this test would appear to be of value in deciding as to whether a given depression was of psychoneurotic origin or of the graver Manic-Depressive group⁸. It is also possible that we may in this test find a means of separating true Epilepsy from hysterical seizures. The few

cases of true Epilepsy (10 in number) that we have examined show a pathologically high threshold, and, although we have not had any cases exhibiting true hysterical convulsions, the cases with other "spells" of hysterical origin have not shown a pathological threshold value. Obviously, future work might profitably be directed along lines calculated to bring out differences in the results of this test, if such exist, between the various neurological manifestations of Hysteria and true neural lesions.

At first this finding of a normal threshold in psychoneurotic patients seems to be a distinct objection to the validity of the method as considered from a physiological point of view. It would seem that in these cases there must be some disturbance of function even though there is no lesion demonstrable by histopathological methods. Apparently as far as this threshold is concerned such a perversion of function does not exist. This is the more remarkable in view of the fact that perversions of function such as are found in Manic Depressive Insanity appear to exert an influence on this threshold⁸. This is the more remarkable in view of the similarity of the genetic factors in these two conditions. According to Gregg⁹ the chief genetic factor in the psychoneurotic group is heredity—not of the condition itself but of neurotic tendency. Similarly Kraepelin¹⁰ considers the basis of Manic Depressive Insanity to be inherited and goes so far as to describe definite "Anlagen" for the manic and depressive states, these "Anlagen" being found in the personality of the individual. Perhaps the explanation of this contradictory evidence in two similar states lie in the possibility that the Manic Depressive Syndrome implies a graver derangement of function than does the Psychoneurosis *i. e.* enough graver to affect the receptor mechanism in the former and to leave it intact in the latter. If these two conditions are considered to be totally different morbid processes reaching similar ends in different ways there is of course no further explanation of these result necessary.

In conclusion, it is to be emphasized that from the consideration of thirty cases of the psychoneurotic group it has been found that this group, aside from the Traumatic Neuroses

and certain Occupation Neuroses, shows a normal or possibly a slightly subnormal sensory threshold for faradism and that this finding is of value in the differential diagnosis of these conditions from certain of the frank psychoses. No evidence as to the nature of these conditions has been brought forward and more especially is the evidence lacking in the direction of the relation of this group to the Manic Depressive Syndrome. More study is required especially in regard to hysterical anesthesia and hysterical convulsions.

In conclusion, I wish to express my sincerest thanks to Dr. E. W. Taylor and Dr. W. E. Paul for the opportunity of examining certain of the occupation neurosis cases before mentioned, and to Dr. E. E. Southard for the use of the clinical material at the Psychopathic Hospital and for his many helpful suggestions and kindly interest.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Psychoneurotic group of cases shows, with certain exceptions, a normal aesthesia to faradism; possibly certain cases are even hyperaesthetic to this form of stimulation.
2. The exceptions to the finding of normal sensitivity are found in the cases of Traumatic Neurosis and in certain cases of Occupation Neurosis; a certain number of the latter, however, show a normal or hyperaesthesia to faradism.
3. This finding of normal sensitivity in these cases is of diagnostic value in differentiating this group from certain of the frank psychoses which show an hypaesthesia to this form of stimulation.

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CONTRIBUTORS' NOTES

A REJOINER: MAEDER'S DREAM PROBLEM AND ITS CRITIC, L. H.

By SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, M. D.

THE spirit of levity is allowed more or less free expression in much of the criticism of psychoanalysis. It scarcely conceals, or it even serves to throw into strong relief the bitterness which arises, we must feel, however unconsciously, from the truthful probing of psychological investigation into the common unconscious territory of unwelcome material.

The material is that which we seek to repress. The unwillingness to acknowledge it worthy of serious attention and as belonging unescapably to any complete psychological or biological consideration reveals with convincing force the very inherent difficulty in working our way out of this unconscious and its infantile retrogressive hold upon us. There exists instead a native aversion to gathering up its forces and allowing them to contribute to the one unified active purpose of consciousness, which is effective striving toward the ends of reality and the outpouring of personality through these means into the immortal meaning of racial experience.

The task is too big for comprehension in a single practical phase but each one of these points the way and assists in the gathering of the forces, whether in its application to the individual life or in the wider consideration of the method of reaching the necessary understanding and enlistment of unconscious as well as conscious factors and characteristics toward the great ends.

An earnest attitude of appreciation toward this two-fold task, which is the acknowledged task of psychoanalysis, would obtain a broader and profounder view of the realities involved than L. H. the reviewer of the Dream Problem by Dr. A. E. Maeder of Zurich in *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, Vol. XI, No. 3 reveals.

It would find the adherents of psychoanalysis not jugglers with the terms psychology and biology, and it would acquit them of taking these names in vain before the altar to the Unknown.

"A man of straw," the phrase hauntingly recalls just such a startling figure, truly a scarecrow, encountered suddenly in an unexpected spot on a summer walk. It had evidently been constructed with unusual care and skill but unable to stand the stress of time, even the few months between corn planting and harvest, its skillfully deceptive coverings made a ghastly and ineffectual flapping in the wind. And *such* is the conception which L. H. entertains of psychoanalysis, or at least of the constructive analyses and interpretations which Maeder presents, built out of the few "fragments of Freudism" which the reviewer still finds Maeder retaining and like a clever time-server bedecking in the already displayed garments of the Zurich school. The persistence of this "straw man" picture in one's thought suggests that just here underneath such an expression of it there may be discovered a fundamental difficulty in the minds of the critics.

Who of us has not, when confronted with some incident or question that touched our deepest issues but from public expression of which we shrank, taken refuge in a lightness of expression and even perhaps, unaware of the reaction or its unrecognized cause, in a superficial volatility of thought which thus escaped the more serious meaning and its significant application? The opponents do not by any means invariably make light of the pretensions and theories of psychoanalysis. They do, however, by thus unwittingly looking for the unreal, the vaporous, the ill-founded hypothesis and the unsubstantial superstructure—and it must be a keen and well-balanced critic who does not find in anything just what he is looking for—avoid that investigation which not alone probes but lays bare in all its extent of interhuman relationship, those universal beginnings which we shrink from acknowledging as common to us all. These still, however, actively exist as the background of character, containing the very intensive motive power of our highest idealization of feeling and achievement.

This criticism of Maeder's book bears witness in spite of itself to the fundamental difficulty. We have heard so much for and against the theory of repression and the content of the repression, particularly the unwelcome sexual character, that perhaps it is time in the course of things that criticism proceeds to a further point. The extended conception which Freud and his followers have embodied in the word sexual is permeating our thought and doing much to link as Freud has done our highest endeavor and attainment with its no less truly existent and honorable, though biologically earlier manifested, sexual instinct, and recognizing on the other hand the undying persistence of that instinct as an inspirational source and stimulus for every sublimated form which culture asks of us.

This higher, spiritualized if you will, conception of sexuality makes us more willing to go back in individual and racial thought to investigate its earlier more frank and to our adult consciousness even revolting forms of expression. Sublimation has failed in many lives because they were inadequate to culture's demands and infantile and primitive pathways of discharge remained open and became fixation points,—and these are hard facts which psychotherapy has to meet every day. This makes it unavoidable also to investigate all the aberrations of the sexual instinct and its frustrated attempts at expression. Broadly applied psychoanalysis can no more dispense with the "harsh, resistance-provoking sexualized Neurosenlehre of Freud" than do Jung and Maeder and the rest of the Zurich school, for the understanding first of these regressions and fixations and for the catharsis of sexual content in which the conflict lies. Exploration and drainage of the soil must precede the nurture and direction of the long choked personality which is to expand in the freedom of wholesome sun and all, still nourished no less by the elements in which the roots continue their existence.

I repeat that we are becoming accustomed to regard the sexual roots as a part of the reality with which we must reckon, not flauntingly as L. H. would have it, and in a spirit of riotous excess, but as facts which stand at our higher service and because of their unquenchable and un-

deniable power as mental factors, give us a serious responsibility toward them.

As a matter of experience it is not the frankly sexual that is hardest for the patient to accept. There are those whose conflict has discovered so many indirect ways in which to discharge itself that they have succeeded just so far in losing the sexual nature of the ultimate cause of the struggle. This is perhaps the classical type. It may be in hysterical conversion, obsession, anxiety, compulsive thought or action, in any form the symbolic action occupies the center of attention and overwhelms consciousness with its importance. Even the dreams in such cases may be well encased in a concealing symbolism.

There are other cases however which throw an incontrovertible illumination upon these we have mentioned and assist the analyst in his guidance of the former class of patients to an understanding of themselves. The latter cases are too closely similar to the first to separate them into a category by themselves for they manifest the same symptoms and use the same mechanisms and like myth builders and all primitive thinkers and actors the same symbolisms. They differ in this respect. With them the conflict has reached such a point that the unconscious content is breaking its bonds, the symptom mechanisms have not even performed the service of keeping the inner nature of their struggle concealed. Culture even then only permits the unconscious thus to peep through. Were it not so of course society would have to step in with its most drastic restraints. This peeping through therefore but adds to the intensity of the struggle particularly with a highly ethical nature. Needless to say that the revelation of the unconscious in the dream is here more startling than in the more symbolic dreams of the former class. The relief and the healing power in such a case, therefore, of a frank examination of the sexual meaning which belongs to the unconscious and a recognition of its rightful place in every life is immeasurable and is for such an one a most naturally acceptable attitude to take.

I have in mind such a patient, a woman of high ethical ideals, except for the intense infantile selfishness which, even though partially concealed, militated against all her

highest endeavors. She entered the consulting room of the psychoanalyst at her first visit, a complete stranger to him and with no acquaintance with even the name of psychoanalysis, much less any idea of any of its discoveries or hypotheses. She had only her long struggle behind her and to encourage her the statement made outside to her that this physician had somehow helped others and perhaps could help her. His first question as to her reason for the visit elicited the overwhelming statement that her thoughts were all full of sexuality, that the more she struggled against them the more they multiplied and she stated later that her dreams were of such a character that she had to fight sometimes all day in order not to think of them and let their impurity get hold of her. Yet this was a woman of excessive modesty, self-denial in worldly things, in short, displaying in abundance the traits which, if Freud is correct, must have appeared as reactionary measures against such an active, mainly unconscious wish-attitude. We may quote her own words uttered after a long but eminently successful course of investigation and readjustment, when she had learned what a true ethical development of primitive instincts really meant. "To me there can be no difficulty in accepting all the facts in regard to sexuality which psychoanalysis discovers. They are all too plainly actual experiences in my mental life. The actual content is there. The trouble of those who criticize must be this, that they do not look beyond, or they think the psychoanalysts do not look beyond, to a sublimation which is just as real and which is the goal of it all."

Some further experience from this patient's analysis will further on perhaps best illustrate the point I wish to make concerning the difficulty that seems now particularly to confront our critic L. H. I do believe that it is this more than the acceptance of the all-pervasiveness of the sexual which constitutes the fundamental human resistance to psychoanalysis, its practice and its theory, as not only do the critics manifest it but patients as well. The sexual in the position to which culture has relegated it, the limited specific conception of it to which its instinctive force has been crowded down in modern usage, constitutes a ready

scapegoat to bear off the reproach of a more pervasive and perhaps deeper infantile character, which is really in itself antagonistic to the real meaning and service of the sexual but ready to employ its merely pleasurable and unserviceable forms of activity.

This is nothing more nor less than that tendency to inertia which lies fundamental to our natures, that life-old backward roll common to human nature and all nature which in the very intensiveness of its passivity resists effort to accomplishment. It asks merely to be left alone in its own pleasurable omnipotence of effortless thought and sense of security or when the creative, the sexual part of nature, does make some push upward the tendency is backward again to bring back even the conquest made to the level of its own pleasurable enjoyment. All nature must strive against this and man most of all because his creative energy, strengthened also by the force of self-consciousness, probably its result, is strongest of all. This makes the battle largely a fierce conscious one for him, but by far not entirely so. The unconscious impulses which he has not understood for ages, which he has repressed further and further from his consciousness, retain their activity and form this powerful background.

Naturally thus the unconscious strives against its own revelation, naturally with its gathered strength it keeps alive and strengthens the motive against this unveiling of itself and enlisting of itself in conscious service. The conscious service is what we all seek but man has made of it an idol to this extent, that he has limited its capacity and dwarfed its freedom in order to retain this background of security and pleasure. It should be a contributing background of energy, inspiration and even of emotional adjustment. We need a continual return to it in order to prepare for further action. Jung has dealt at length with this service of the unconscious, as well as its dangerous attraction, in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* giving it a broad application (Jung: *Psychology of the Unconscious*. Tr. by B. M. Hinkle, Moffat, Yard & Co., New York) in individual and racial psychology. We have not however attained the balance of this alternation. Social necessity steps in and

interferes with individual desire and as a result of pressure of society on the one hand and the insistent claims of the infantile on the other repression is hurried in to effect a working compromise. So long as repression assists consciousness "to drive back into the unconscious almost the whole of the past, and to admit beyond the threshold only that which can cast light on the present situation or further the action now being prepared" (Bergson: Creative Evolution, p. 5.) it is successful. Alas, the multitude of failures seen in those who have had to retire to a greater or less degree from useful action because of a greater or less degree of mental infirmity, and even the ineffectualness and the dissipated energy of the best of effort, testify to the partial or complete failure of repression and the necessity for recognition of its existence and examination of its character and reasons for failure.

Hence, too much has not been heard of the repression, and psychoanalysis is not welcoming a cessation from its discussion as the reviewer L. H. implies. That is *not* Maeder's idea. He admits that too much insistence on the secondary dreamwork bears the stamp too deeply of the teaching about repression. But in the same paragraph he says: "I do not wish to place myself in opposition to Freud in this matter, (the importance of the manifest dream content) but would regard this new point of view as a broadening out of the present interpretation. . . . Freud, on his discovery of the latent dream content, was obliged to lay the principal stress on this, to the detriment of the manifest content. The complementary or perfecting idea which I suggest today is to be regarded as a portion of the excursion described by all discoveries." This does not read like an "impugning of the very ideas that are the cornerstones of the original Psychoanalysis." Rather it is only upon the well-laid foundations of Freud's psychology that Maeder attempts to build in the process of development of the psychology of unconscious psychical life and its control. This is pre-eminently the case with his dream analysis.

So much then for the fact of repression and its acceptance and, as has been shown, for the lessening opposition to the importance of the sexual content of the repression.

Let us look more concretely at the other factor in the resistance of L. H.'s criticism to which a deeper and thus less consciously recognized opposition is to be attributed.

The patient chosen before for illustration, furnished evidence of this. The first part of her analysis proceeded with greater rapidity and far less friction than is usually the case, since the sexual nature of her repressions had so largely broken bonds and did not have to be discovered by a long associative process. One is tempted here to turn aside to wonder what naïve conception L. H. entertains of psychoanalysis in its methods of work when he suggests the using "of the dream items as a means of drawing from the dreamer such a mass of associations that one can dip out of it any meaning that one chooses." It certainly differs from the passive attitude of patient listening to the mass of associative ideas which follow upon the relation of the dream, opening often unexpected points of view to analyst and analyzed alike into the past history and the patient's regressive and prospective attitude. L. H.'s conception continues to savor of "suggestion" and the whole Janet, Charcot lingo which psychoanalysis has found as unnecessary as it is hostile to the purpose of a true constructive analysis.*

Such an unhindered flow of associations with this patient afforded a marked preliminary cathartic relief. Then, however, her real difficulties began to make themselves felt but became in their awakening strongly resistant. It had been easy enough to admit the sexual content, to free the repressions and even to direct the energy to a certain extent to new constructive work until this struck upon the deeper infantile attitude beneath it all. Then the unconscious began its vital struggle. It strove against a change of basis, against the adoption of an adult independence and readiness to adapt on its own responsibility to conditions of reality. It fought to maintain the same omnipotence of infantile security in the authority of the analyst which it had sought earlier in other objects, and the pleasure-obtaining reactions of the phantasy world. Then it was that the dreams began to manifest the prospective tendencies coming

*See the meaning suggestion for Psychoanalysis in *Technique of Psychoanalysis*, *Psychoanalytic Review*, Oct. 1916.

to awakening in the patient and entering into a very real conflict with the impulses from the long indulged pleasure pathway. Where one has carried through such an analysis it is not difficult to be convinced of the existence of such a prospective quality to the dream nor to accept its serviceableness in understanding the struggle and helping it to a successful issue. At the same time the intensity of this conflict and the stubbornness with which the deeply laid regressive tendency yields convince us that we are dealing, as Jung has pointed out, (*Op. cit.*) with a universal condition present in every individual, normal or abnormal.

Our systems of morals and ethics, all our social organizations have thrown around us such a covering of protection, that in so far as it works, we are reluctant to have it disturbed. It has been essential as it is still for progress and development, it has effected necessary repressions and we can not dispense with it. Yet if we allow it to crystallize about us with no courage to pierce it and examine what lies behind it and permit of no expansion for larger concepts and more comprehensive and flexible adaptations we cannot as a race progress nor can we save individuals from disaster. We are dwelling like children in the apparently safe and comfortable shelter which we have inherited. It is inherently so far easier to accept the conventional ways of thought and the formal psychological ways of consideration and becomes from the very nature and force of these conventions so plausible that we unconsciously withdraw from participation in the courageous excursions into the unknown regions of psychological facts which Freud and his followers are making.

Our resistance is just as strongly intrenched in the universal pleasure seeking unconscious as is that of the patient, except that with the "normal" that is those whose variation is small or not inconvenient, it is more obscured by the partial successes which effective repression has made possible and is not driven by the necessity of an intolerable inner conflict to seek to understand. Those like Freud and Jung and Maeder who have gone out in behalf of the weaker into the fields of the psychological and biological facts working with unknown but tremendous power and influence upon every

life are dealing with realities. Those who from the security of their social and intellectual environment find the bizarre in Freud's discoveries and merely an "awe-inspiring auto-symbolism" in Maeder's development of the other side of the psychical struggle are likewise undeniably surrounded by these realities and the products of them. To such critics we suspect these facts remain a sealed book. The sufferings of others have given them a very clear understanding of the psychological and biological actuality and significance of these things. A fuller knowledge of them would help every one to a more complete control of the realities and possibilities of life, none more so than those who as psychologists and biologists desire a fundamental understanding of the mechanisms and purposes of life. Maeder's conception and use of the dream contributes an important and essential element in this direction. This, we think, is his true meaning of the "teleological side of the unconscious function" as expressed in the dream. The infantile regressive wish has its teleology, its end purpose no less, but that is not truly teleological, for the purpose itself is not directed toward a constructive end which pertains to reality.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL NOTE ON A PHOTO-PLAY

By F. W. LAST (LONDON).

THREE is being shown at the present time a film, called "Temper," which appears to be very successful in its emotional appeal, and which is of some psychological interest as illustrating a current topic of medical psychology.

The plot is shortly as follows: In the first scene, which takes place in a mixed school, a boy chivalrously defends one of the girls in such a way as to contravene the school rules, and he is—somewhat unnecessarily—expelled. In the next scene the boy is at home in evident dread of his overbearing father, to whom, after very considerable hesitation, he brings himself to hand the "letter of dismissal." On this

the father gets into an intense rage, and, despite the tearful entreaties of the mother, horsewhips his son almost to the point of insensibility, finally hurling him out of the room. The boy gradually picks himself up, seeks out his mother, and confides his suffering to her sympathetic understanding for consolation.

In the second act the son is eighteen or so, and is studying at a mixed college. On his way home from work one day he sees the girl he is fond of being insulted by another of the students. He hastens to protect her and a fight ensues. The result of this is that both youths are—again somewhat unnecessarily—expelled from college for brawling in public. In the evening the Principal telephones to the boy's father and informs him of the decision. The father angrily summons the boy to his study, seizes him by the throat, forces him to his knees, and nearly strangles him. Hearing the noise, the boy's mother and the sweetheart (who is conveniently present) come into the room and expostulate with the father. The son seizes the opportunity to get up, with difficulty restrains himself from striking his father, and leaves the house.

In third act the son, now a young man, is an artist living alone. His mother and his sweetheart pay him a visit, and the former discreetly withdraws for a moment so that he may make a declaration of love, with a foregone conclusion. The mother returns and is delighted, and it is arranged that the father shall be told the good news that evening. When this is done, however, the father takes it amiss that the affair should have been settled without his assistance or consent, flies into his customary rage, and forbids the marriage altogether. The mother pleads with him, but unavailingly, and the father, angered by her importunity, assaults her. At this moment the son enters the room, and summing up the situation at a glance gets behind his father and bashes in his head with a large stone seized from a table near by. Mother and son, after being temporarily stunned by the shock of finding that the blow has proved fatal, talk the situation over and decide to concoct a story imputing the murder to robbers. At the coroner's inquest a verdict is returned of "murder by person or persons unknown,"

but the police are not satisfied and discover later an important clue which leads to the arrest of mother and son. They plead guilty, and on the "reconstruction" of the crime the son is found to be the sole perpetrator. The last scene is in the law court, where, mainly through a moving speech of the defending counsel, the son is declared not guilty.

It will be seen that the three acts deal with slight variants of what is obviously a common theme running through the play, namely, a violent conflict between father and son in relation to the son's protection of a woman. That the whole play is nothing but a thinly disguised dramatisation of what Freud has called the "Oedipus complex" is plain enough. It is interesting to observe how the true meaning of the plot becomes more and more clearly revealed as the play proceeds. In the first act nothing is said about the son's personal relation to the girl whose side he takes, nor does the jealousy motive appear; we note, however, the way in which the son and mother are drawn together in opposition to the father. In the second act both the sexual and the jealous motives are more evident; the boy defends his sweetheart from a rival male. In the third act the truth is fully revealed: it is the mother who has to be defended from the father's attack, and the scene appropriately ends in the son murdering the father. The close association between the sweetheart and mother, the former being merely a conventional substitute for the latter, is indicated by their appearing on the scene together in both acts in a way that would be pretty unlikely in real life, and by the mother's rejoicing over the engagement. Finally, it is noteworthy how prominent the sadistic motive is throughout the play, chiefly on the part of the father.

I would remark in conclusion that, as Rank has shown so thoroughly in his "Inzest-Motiv in Dichtung und Sage," investigation reveals the presence of the Oedipus theme, under all manner of disguises, in an unsuspectedly large number of literary productions.

REVIEWS

INSTINCTS OF THE HERD IN PEACE AND WAR. *By W. Trotter.*
T. Fisher Unwin, London, 1915. Pp. 213.

THE CROWD IN PEACE AND WAR. *By Sir Martin Conway.*
Longmans, Green and Co., New York, 1915. Pp. 332.

These two books, both published in the past year, are notable contributions to an important subject, and are certain to be of marked interest to every student of human nature. Although differing widely from each other as regards the treatment of the subject with which they deal, they supplement each other strikingly in several essential particulars, and both deal with moral questions of practical moment. The second of the two which the reviewer recommends but without analysis or discussion records the observations of an astute, outspeaking man, of wide experience; the first, as its name implies, treats of human societies largely from the standpoint of the biologist.

Mr. Trotter is, in fact, an English surgeon, and his book, with which alone this review will deal at any length, represents the expansion of two papers written about ten years ago. In these papers certain doctrines were proclaimed which the author now uses as the basis of inductions which are of special interest at the present moment, in view of the great crisis through which the civilized world is passing and the critical period on which it seems destined soon to enter. The indications are many that the problems presented by the complex relationships between men and social groups are taking a new hold upon the minds of thoughtful men. As Graham Wallas pointed out so well in "The Great Society," social life, especially if taken in a broad sense, is growing daily more complex, and it is certain that this complexity is reflected in the life of thought, and still more of emotion, of the individuals of whom societies and nations are composed.

In Mr. Trotter's opinion it is a mistake to assume that the study of men as they are seen congregated in groups of varying size, should proceed on a different principle from that followed in the study of the individual man. Every individual is, of necessity and by very nature, gregarious. It is not even true, he thinks, that men first became united into families, and that these families then congregated to form tribes, but more probable that, underlying the influences leading to the formation of the smaller and more concrete groups, there was, from the very beginning, a sort of undifferentiated grouping-habit, which has its root deep down in biological tendencies and necessities and justifies the ranging of

gregariousness as an instinct and according to it the same importance with the instincts of self-preservation, food-seeking, and reproduction.

The adoption of this point of view—that men are essentially gregarious, and that there is no distinctive group psychology but only an individual psychology, which, however, must be studied on new lines in order to be adequately understood—places the investigator in a position of distinct advantage. But in order to utilize this advantage it is essential to adopt a thorough-going objectivism; for, the writer thinks, there is but little to be expected in the way of practical hints for conduct from the introspective interpretations that reflect men's wishes rather than their observations. There is justice in this criticism of the introspective method, and yet, in the opinion of the reviewer, it cannot be so cavalierly treated. For it is, after all "as a spirit" that man is, in the final analysis, to be conceived of.

If, then, gregariousness is so fundamental, the question arises, Has it any biologic analogue? The writer answers this question by saying that the tendency to the social life is probably as natural as the tendency to the formation of multi-cellular animals in contradistinction to the uni-cellular. The latter have in some respects a distinct advantage over the former, just as the individual has certain qualities which are lacking to the group or herd. But these advantages are over-balanced by the gain which comes from differentiation and coöordination; and it is a striking fact that the more intelligent of the higher animals, "the dog, the horse, the ape, the elephant, and man," still more the bee and ant, are all social animals. Intelligence and gregariousness go hand in hand.

The next point taken up has relation to the mental characteristics of the gregarious animal. As the first of these, Pearson's conclusion is referred to according to which altruism, which most persons regard as a late result of social intercourse, "is to be regarded as a direct product of gregariousness, and as natural, therefore, as any other instinct." This point is discussed in a later chapter at considerable length, and the position taken is against the view that people work for each other simply because it "pays" to do so. Neither altruism nor gregariousness—nor the religious tendency in which altruism and gregariousness appear in an ideal form—can be considered as determined by any such relatively trivial influence as that of personal gain.

Carrying further the inquiry into the characteristics of the gregarious animal, the author takes up Boris Sidis's well-known book entitled "The Psychology of Suggestion," in which the proposition is maintained that the brutality and cruelty of the crowd are due to the fact that in crowds people appeal, one to another, by virtue of the existence in each individual of a subconscious suggestibility, which, like the other sub-conscious qualities of men, is of an immature and relatively savage stamp.

'This view, that suggestibility is "a disreputable and disastrous legacy of the brute and the savage. . . . and certainly in no way associated at its origin with a quality so valuable as altruism," is not admitted by Trotter. On the other hand, he regards many of the bonds that bind together the members of the various social groups, though classifiable in part under "suggestibility," as being of a rather high order, and not at all necessarily "subconscious" in any objectionable sense.

A broad distinction is to be made, among gregarious animals, according to whether they unite for purposes of offense or for purposes of defense. In either case, however, the herd, to be successful, must be homogeneous, and must refuse to tolerate the tendency on the part of single individuals to disregard the dictates of the whole group.

The individual that grows up in a herd soon learns to feel in many ways a sense of comfort in the presence of his fellows and discomfort in their absence, and this becomes the basis of an imperative instinct of great importance. Loneliness is often a terror insurmountable by reason, and the sensation of warmth which comes from close proximity becomes associated with feelings of security. The contrast between the habits of the dog and the cat, which differ so strikingly as regards their herding instincts is very instructive in many of these respects.

The ultimate form of this dependence of the individual on the herd acquires, among men, an importance which it would be impossible to over-estimate, and limits immensely men's power of learning through experience. The controlling force of this dependence is actually increased by the fact that its very existence is kept half concealed. For every person has a strong longing to feel complete within himself, and "the desire for individual certitude [really, to a great extent, due to mass opinion] is one of profound depth in the human mind." The power to learn through experience is likewise cherished as an attribute of the individual to such a degree that no man would willingly admit that it does not govern a majority of his acts. When one comes to look more closely at the matter, however, the conclusion is inevitable that "the suspense of judgment which science so often has to enjoin" is intolerable to the certainty-loving human being,—"He is too anxious to feel certain to have time to know." And the result is that each individual accepts without qualification and with an intensity that brooks no contradiction, the opinions of the social group about all matters with regard to which scientific certainty is impossible, but ascribes to these opinions the binding force of science. Every citizen feels at liberty to criticize, and, if need be to instruct the expert—whether statesman, educator, or public health officer—upon all subjects the knowledge of which would be desirable for the herd or social group regarded as a whole, but about

which the wisest might really content themselves with an affirmation of their ignorance.

Herd suggestion is accepted as equivalent to an instinct,—that is, a conclusion with regard to which no doubt can be entertained; and each person resting content with this mode of reaching his conclusions is ready, in their defense, to adopt rationalizations, infinite in number, many of which appear nothing but ludicrous when examined by themselves. The English lady who compresses her feet laterally sees no logical reason why she should not subscribe to missions to teach the Chinese lady how absurd it is to compress her feet longitudinally. The white lady who wears rings in her ears sees no reason why she should not smile at the barbarism of the colored lady who wears a ring in her nose. Similar conclusions seem admissible with reference to such matters as the sense of right and wrong. "Conscience and the feelings of guilt and of duty are the peculiar possessions of the gregarious animal. . . . A dog and a cat caught in the commission of an offence will both recognize that punishment is coming; but the dog, moreover, knows that he has done *wrong*, and he will come to be punished, unwillingly it is true, and as if dragged along by some power outside him, while the cat's sole impulse is to escape."

In spite of the fact that the gregarious instinct leads men to accept often without reason, the judgment of their fellows, (which they do in unconscious obedience to the principle that the life, the success and the opinion of the whole group is far more important than those of the individual) one ought not to assume that this suggestibility, if so it may be called, is altogether unfortunate in its results. On many grounds this conclusion cannot be accepted. If, for example, it was possible (which it obviously is not) to eliminate suggestibility by "selection"—that is, by breeding—the result would be that "we should exchange the manageable unreason of man for the inhuman rationality of the tiger."

In other words, the loss, to the individual and to the social whole, of the sense of this sense of intimate relationship, which from one standpoint is definable as unreasonable dependence, would be an irreparable loss. This proposition can be maintained, one might add, not only on grounds of empirical observation and through tracing upward the history of the animal species, but on the basis of the necessary presuppositions of thought itself.

The solution would seem rather to lie in seeing to it that suggestion acts always on the side of reason "If rationality were once to become really respectable, if we feared the entertaining of an unverifiable opinion with the warmth with which we feared using the wrong implement at the dinner table, then the danger of man's suggestibility would be turned into advantages."

The gratification of most of the impulses which we call instincts is attended with a certain sense of pleasure or satisfaction. With regard to the gregarious instinct, however, this is by no

means necessarily the case, and in consequence of this fact the range of situations by way of which instinct can be made use of is enormously increased.

Most important of all, we see, under its influence, a sense of altruism making itself felt, such as makes men willing to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the larger number, at the cost of their own immediate happiness and comfort. As an extension of this feeling, there come in the religious sentiments, which have an origin as deep as any others in existence. From this cause, conflicts rule the day, often assuming terrible intensity, between the individual desire and social obligation, it may be in an ideal sense; or between the judgment of one's own reason and the decisions of the social group, or between two equally stringent herd suggestions.

For the most momentous of these conflicts, one or another of three sorts of solutions are instinctively sought, with regard to which it may be said that that definable as a rational skepticism is perhaps the best and also the least common. The more common outcome is that the "judgment of the herd" is accepted as rational and thorough-going, with the result that men learn to be indifferent to the sufferings characteristic of the existing order of society, or to find specious reasons through which they may be justified. In this way the great class of the "normal, sensible, reliable" people of middle age comes to be formed, and society is established on a firm basis of stability, although at the cost of strong tendencies to narrowness, intolerance and a real insensibility to the evils of the world, though perhaps coupled with an apparent excess of sensibility. This mental stability is to be regarded as a gain, for some reasons, and as a loss for others; and the same may be said of the "instability," which, for its own, narrowly conceived interest—society comes to characterize contemptuously as "degeneracy," though in fact it marks a possibility of progress which a too stable "normality" would forbid.

The third section of the book begins with a study of "man's place in nature and nature's place in man," a study which may be pursued by any one of three methods. One can utilize, namely, that form of psychological inquiry (of the academic sort) "which takes man as it finds him, accepts his mind for what it professes to be, and examines into its processes by introspection of a direct and simple kind." Or one may employ the objective method of investigating human nature* which *psychoanalysis* has made possible, a method which science and humanity owe to the genius of Sigmund Freud. Or, finally, one may study human beings by the comparative or biological method, recognizing that men's qualities and capacities are to be ascertained, at least in some measure, through a study of the qualities and tendencies of the lower

*Cf. E. B. Holt: *The Freudian Wish*.

animals, which represent, after a fashion, the earlier stages of human evolution.

The first, or introspective method the writer does not consider to be very fruitful; and into the question whether he is right the reviewer will not pause to enter. The second, or objective, but still psychological method, is rated as of great value, and the author's remarks upon it, whether in the way of characterization or of criticism, are sound and good.

This portion of the book should be of especial interest to the readers of this Journal, and should be read in the original. The points of agreement between the author and Freud need not be emphasized; but what is worthy of attention is his accentuation of the fact that the influences by which these sex impulses are held in check must be as strong as they and equally worthy of a detailed study. This strength he thinks they would not have but for the fact that the gregarious tendency is itself virtually an instinct and able to confer its powers upon the "sanctions of the herd."

The author also calls attention to the striking fact that the repressions here in question which lead to such important consequences in the form of nervous disease and peculiarities of character, are to be observed the world over, although the conditions which one assumes to be their cause vary greatly in detail. Some "constant" must be present which accounts for this uniformity, and this the writer finds in the jealousy which adults feel toward children, speaking in broad terms (not, of course, as one person to another, but as representatives of one age to representatives of another age). This jealousy is instinctively adopted as a sort of defense mechanism, or rather a compensation for the sense of waning vigor. Stated in this fashion the argument seems bald and unreasonable, but when the author's own words are taken its reasonableness seems greater.

The third, the biological, or genetic method is also estimated to be of great importance, and is obviously the one that the writer feels himself most qualified to use.

I must pass over the details which have reference to the many important observations which are made in the course of this later study, and will only say that the author distinguishes between three animal types of gregariousness, which he characterizes as the aggressive type, (of which the pack-hunting animals,—the wolf, and its descendant the dog,—may serve as an example); the defensive type, (of which the sheep forms a conspicuous instance); and the social type, as represented by our old friends, the industrious ant and bee.

The necessities of life which the habits of these different types, respectively, have engendered, are gone into very interestingly and at some length, with constant reference to the deductions which appear admissible for the case of man. The later chapters

are devoted to the study of the aggressive and the social types, the reasons for the success and the reasons for the failure of the former, especially as it is met with in the case of war.

The type which is destined to endure longest, so the writer thinks, is the social type, which is represented among the lower animals by the ant and the bee. If this type, however, is to maintain itself (which is not regarded as by any means a certainty), it can only be, the writer thinks, through a far greater development of altruism and of rationality than one at present sees any sign of.

It seems to the reviewer that while most of the conclusions of the highly interesting volume are acceptable, and well established too much emphasis is placed on the part which reason may be expected to play in the result. This, of course, is a matter which one could not decide fairly except with reference to some particular point at issue. But it must not be forgotten that the human mind has its three aspects, and it seems probable that we shall never reach the point when the need of a trained imagination will be subordinated to that of trained reason. Again, it seems very doubtful to the reviewer whether our capacity to analyze the human society situation is perfect enough to warrant the pessimistic outlook which Mr. Trotter appears so threatening. Whether this is so or not, it is certain that, taken as a whole, the book is one that should be read by every student of mankind.

As regards the study of the crowd, by Sir Martin Conway, it need only be said here that any one who has studied carefully the far more scientifically conceived arguments of Trotter will find in this more practical study of actual societies, their advantages and their defects, a large array of data for the illustration of the theses to which reference has here been made. Sir Martin Conway is not imbued, to anything like the same degree as Mr. Trotter, with the importance of the principle that every man is, by his very nature, a gregarious animal, and so states the opposition between societies and their members in a somewhat different manner. On the whole the conclusions of the two books harmonize very well; and any one who would like to see the matter carried out still further would do well to read still two more books,—namely, "Les Fonctions Mentales dans les Sociétés Inférieures" by Lévy Bruhl, and "The Freudian Wish" by Edwin B. Holt, of the Department of Psychology in Harvard University.

JAMES J. PUTNAM.

WHO IS INSANE? By Stephen Smith. A. M., M. D., LL.D. (Pp. 285. The Macmillan Co.)

This is a very readable volume of brief essays touching on many of the various questions relating to insanity. It is not a treatise on mental disease, nor does he tackle the problem as the

alienist is obliged to do. As the author is well over ninety years of age it is natural to find him giving many interesting reminiscences of the events he witnessed during a long and active career.

The author's personal knowledge of the insane was gained largely from his official visits to the New York Hospitals, where he met many patients, and had to solve many problems relating to their detention and care. (Dr. Smith was a Commissioner in Lunacy for the State of New York from 1882-1888.)

His remarks on the vagueness of the term insanity and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of its definition are well worth reading.

In one chapter he describes briefly the various epochs of life with the mental troubles peculiar to each.

Not the least interesting portion of this volume is that containing the author's ideas upon the care and treatment of the insane, and his broadly humanitarian views will be a stimulus to those actually engaged in caring for these unfortunates. The author's interest in the care of the insane has continued to the present for he has chapters devoted to the treatment of the criminal, the psychopathic hospital and eugenics.

In the preface the author speaks with pride of his service to the State in bringing about three reforms in the New York State hospitals—namely, the introduction of a training school for attendants, the creation of the State Commission in Lunacy, the removal of the insane from County to State care. All these were of great benefit. It is to be hoped that this gentle optimist was not responsible for the mistakes of over centralization which were later made by the New York Commission.

EDWARD B. LANE.

THE CRIMINAL IMBECILE. AN ANALYSIS OF THREE REMARKABLE MURDER CASES. By Henry Herbert Goddard. The MacMillan Co., 1915. Pp. 154, VII. Price \$1.50.

Dr. Goddard has here reported concisely and in a scientific manner the cases of three imbecile murderers. An appendix gives the hypothetical questions in the Gianini case. Dr. Goddard is impressed as many alienists before him with the lack of understanding on the part of the community, and jurors in particular, of the defective mind. He points out that in each of these cases Binet tests were admitted in the evidence. Dr. Goddard's report ought to be of much assistance to those studying the questions of mental responsibility and this matter is so concisely arranged that it will be useful to those interested in criminal procedure.

Three chapters are devoted to the general subjects of The Criminal Imbecile, Responsibility and the Punishment for Criminal Imbeciles.

It is to be hoped this little book will give much needed help to those who have been groping in more or less darkness in this matter and help put our practice on a more scientific and intelligent plane.

EDWARD B. LANE.

CHARACTER AND TEMPERAMENT. By Joseph Jastrow, Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin. New York and London, D. Appleton & Company, 1915. Pp. XVIII, 596, 8 vo. \$10.140 m.m. Price \$2.50 net.

This thoughtful 200,000-word treatise on "the psychological sources of human quality," a member of The Conduct of Mind Series, is at a glance or a trifle more the work of a man who thoroughly knows his human nature and the scientific methods of discussing it. The wrapper-advertisement accurately states its most conspicuous features: This volume surveys the sources of human nature in the light of modern psychology. It is a broad and readable statement of the foundations of human differences, and a study of the traits upon which education builds, which the vocations select, and which society encourages. It includes an intimate account of the emotional life and of the origins of the sentiments which sway human actions individually and in masses, and of their normal and abnormal expressions. It considers the varied play of the environment and the manner of its working upon the qualities of men which heredity supplies. It reaches definite conclusions upon the psychology of sex and of race topics of immediate concern in the political arena and the conflicts of armed nations. The volume makes a direct appeal to all who are responsible for the training, direction or selection of men, likewise to all practically dealing with the most significant asset of any people—the qualities of its citizens.

There are nine chapters: The Scientific Approach; the Sensibilities; the Emotions and Conduct; the Higher Stages of Psychic Control; Temperament and Individual Differences; Abnormal Tendencies of Mind; the Psychology of Group-trait; Character and the Environment; and the Qualities of Men. There are a very useful analytic table of contents and notes on each chapter, and there is an index.

The leisurely and scholarly attitude of the book will appeal to large numbers of readers even at a time when explicitness and conciseness, if not condensation, are the literary mottoes. The multitude of statements and of propositions will weary rather soon the unscholarly reader despite the well-known clear style of Professor Jastrow; it certainly is not a book for a busy forenoon of anybody, nor for anyone at any time who would not freely associate his cortical neurones. The "meat" is abundantly present, and the persistent reviewer, if not possibly other readers, wishes that

the psychological material might be presented anew in a volume of about sixty thousand words. It's a golfish kind of a work. As an editor of a series, the example that the author sets is not a very good one!

For the neuropsychologist and for the alienist there is much in this book, and much of the precise kind, fundamental as the writings of Henry Maudsley, that the average medical practitioner needs in his "business." Indeed, an adequate readable synopsis of the scientific propositions would make an excellent text-book in part of a psychological course in a medical school, for it would be really wise.

One of the most useful chapters in this latest volume of Doctor Jastrow's is the seventh, dealing with the psychology of group-trait; and of this chapter the most timely part perhaps relates to sexual psychologic differences; it is a thirty-page discussion with a good deal of insight, but neglecting altogether such basal problems as intuition, a topic beginning to be adequately appreciated as a problem for examination. But on the other hand so many topics are mentioned and well oriented that intuition never would be missed.

The book in short is a thoughtful and eminently scholarly general discussion of the many things most universal and most fundamental in human nature, character and temperament for example, which the natural science of a somewhat later day certainly will make more somatically specific. As a part of a general knowledge of man the contents of the volume are of much interest and importance, and not too technically expressed for the average present medical practitioner.

Sargent Normal School.

GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.

AN INTRODUCTION TO NEUROLOGY. By C. Judson Herrick, Professor of Neurology in the University of Chicago. Philadelphia and London: W. B. Saunders Company, 1915. Pp. 344, 12 mo., 137 illustrations. Price \$1.75 net.

This important book (much larger and more "complete," by the way, than its material thickness would suggest), is one which has been long awaited, in a subconscious sense, by very many students of science and philosophy—medical, psychologists, sociologists, physiologists, educators, zoologists, anatomists, metaphysicians, by all, in short, for whom the *integration* of things has its real valuation. In the following paragraph from the Preface, Professor Herrick makes explicit something long felt by multitudes; namely the wholly needless verbosity and ponderosity of most foreign, especially German, treatises on neurology, the essential thing, the *integrative plan*, being lost or at least hidden deep among

the leaves. "This work is designed as an introduction in a literal sense. Several very excellent manuals and atlases of neurology are available, and to these the reader is referred for the illustrations and more detailed descriptions necessary to complete the rather schematic outline here presented. The larger medical text books of anatomy and physiology are, however, often very difficult [and worse] for the beginner, chiefly on account of the lack of correlation of the structures described and their functions. This little book [150,000 words] has been prepared in the hope that it will help the student to learn to organize his knowledge in definite functional patterns earlier in his work than is often the case, and to appreciate the significance of the nervous system as a working mechanism from the beginning of his study." And this last, of course, save for the diagnostician, is the whole essence of neurology; a neurology book that omits or "slurs" it is an undue burden on the shelf.

To students of abnormal psychology, as well as of normal, the up-to-date and concise discussion of the great cortex will appeal as strongly at least as will any other part of the book. The treatment is functional (psychological) rather than conventional in the usual way, and conveys the state of things as known at the beginnings of the Great War—whose heroic victims, it is presumed, with men like William McDougall studying them, will give us almost a new corticology. It is instructive, however, to observe that a proper conservatism, a hesitation to believe too much, even on the best of evidence so far as it goes, leads the author to appear to doubt what he may be later persuaded to accept, namely the Brodmann-Bolton doctrine of the cortical lamination. "In the present state of our knowledge a functional difference between *the layers* cannot be said to have been established *save in very general terms.*" (Italics mine.) Unconsciously Doctor Herrick here admits about all that any student of Brodmann's progressive work could so far desire: first, that the cortex is in layers and, second, that the functional difference has been established "in very general terms," which of course is enough in our present ignorance of the relation of neurone and mentality. (As we shall see before many years, perhaps, when more is known about the inherent *inhibition* of the cortex by way of the kinesthetic influence, the cortical lamination may become important beyond any other aspect of the hemispheres.)

The sensorial nature of pain the author accepts fully, as of course he must, but he does not as yet, seemingly, see his way clear to place pleasure in the same class. Most of his discussion relates to pleasantness rather than to pleasure—two very different concepts, but he curiously enough, on psychogenic grounds, groups pleasure with unpleasantness as things other than sensations.

Such matters are of small account, because matters of judgment, compared with the fact that this book of Herrick's is one of the important and valuable books of recent years. Its numerous

illustrations are well-chosen, well-printed, and well explained; there is an ample index; and the references to the literature are numerous and the choice of an "authority." The author, as well as the educated public, is to be congratulated on a work which is of so much use to so many that it can not fail to be widely bought and learned.

Sargent Normal School.

GEORGE V. N. DEARBORN.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Psychologue de l'Enfant et Pedagogie experimentale. By Ed. Claparede. XII and 571. 8 francs.

Christianity and Sex Problems. By Hugh Northcote. Pp. XVI and 487, F. A. Davis & Co., \$3.00.

Nine Family Histories of Epileptics in One Rural County. N. Y. State Board of Charities, Eugenics and Social Welfare Bulletin. No. VII. Pp. 55 and Charts.

The Control of Hunger in Health and Disease. By Anton Julius Carlson. Pp. VII and 319. University of Chicago Press. \$2.00 net.

Manual of Psychiatry. By J. Rogues de Fursac and A. J. Rosanoff. 4th Ed. Pp. XI and 522. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. \$2.00 net.

Studies in Animal Behavior. By S. H. Holmes, Pp. 266, R. G. Badger. \$2.50 net.

The Mentality of the Criminal Woman. By Jean Weiden-sall. Pp. XX and 332. Warwick & York, Inc. \$1.75.

A Point Scale for Measuring Mental Ability. By Robert M. Yerkes, James W. Briggs, Rose S. Hardwick. Pp. 218. Warwick & York, Inc. \$1.25.

Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious. By Sigmund Freud. Translated by A. A. Brill. Pp. VII and 388. Moffat, Yard & Co. \$2.50 net.

Leonardo Da Vinci. By Sigmund Freud. Trans. by A. A. Brill. Pp. 130. Moffat, Yard & Co. \$1.25 net.

The Fundamentals of Psychology. By W. W. Pillsbury. Pp. VII and 557. The Macmillan Co. \$2.00.

The Intelligence of the Feeble Minded. By Binet & Simon. Trans. by Elizabeth S. Kite. Pp. 328. Williams & Wilkins Co.

The Development of Intelligence in Children. By Binet & Simon. Trans. by Elizabeth S. Kite. Pp. 336. Williams & Wilkins Co.

Mechanisms of Character Formation. By William A. White. Pp. V and 342. The Macmillan Co. \$1.75.

Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. By Sigmund Freud. Trans. by A. A. Brill. 2nd Ed. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 7. Pp. 11 and 117. \$2.00.

THE JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

A MANIC-DEPRESSIVE ATTACK PRESENTING A
REVERSION TO INFANTILISM*

BY RALPH REED, M. D., CINCINNATI.

THE insane have often been spoken of as children. To generalize broadly, one might say that if we except simple states of emotional exaltation or depression, very many of the remaining psychoses tend to lead their victims in one of two directions: either toward the pleasure state of the child or of the superman or god.

This tendency corresponds with racial dreams. Mankind has always striven to escape from the ills of the present either by progress, actual or imagined, to greater knowledge and power (well exemplified by the philosophies of H. G. Wells, Nietzsche, Max Sterner and others) or by attempting, through discarding the complications of civilization, a return to a child-like or Edenic state. This striving is in fact an important element in Christianity,—“Except ye become as little children ye cannot enter into the kingdom of Heaven.” Our heavens are always far beyond us or far behind us.

Assuming, then, the presence of this ‘flight from reality,’ which we know to be such a prominent feature (one might say an essential feature) in many psychoses and psycho-neuroses, it is obvious that it may be a forward striving or a backward or a mixture of the two. If forward, the delusional formations tend to take on a grandiose character.

Last year I reported a case in the Psychoanalytic Review (“A Manic-depressive Episode Presenting a Frank Wish-Realization Construction,” The Psychoanalytic Review, April 1915, Vol. II, No. 2) of an unmarried woman, aged fifty-five, who, after the death of her mother with

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whom she lived alone for many years, manufactured from the nucleus of an old and forgotten love-fancy a complete and clearly defined wish-realization fantasy consisting of marriage, high position, wealth, children and the return to life of her dead parents. She is now somewhat deteriorated, but still lives in the comparative happiness of her delusional formations, since in her case there was no bridge over which she could return to reality.

In this connection, I wish to refer to a recent contribution of value by Bertschinger (Bertschinger, H.: The Processes of Recovery in Schizophrenics, *The Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1916, Vol. III, No. 2) who has well shown that a comparative recovery in certain psychoses is possible if there exists between the point to which the psychosis may eventually evolve and real life some appropriate connecting link. (We all know that in the treatment of the psychoneuroses it is this connecting link or pathway for the sublimation that is frequently so difficult to discover or supply.) Bertschinger speaks of this type of recovery as recovery through evasion of the complex. I do not care for the word "evasion" in this connection, as the process seems to be more a living through and having done with the complex; as he himself says: "It is common in all these cases that a wish-fulfilling or delusional system comes to a certain conclusion. Here the way is opened for recovery." I shall have occasion to refer to this later in connection with the case to be here reported.

Should the "flight from reality" be backward, an opposite type of symptom-complex is the result, and may be manifested as a psychoneurosis or psychosis. Some years ago I had the good fortune to study a case of hysteria in a girl of thirteen years who, following a series of severe psychic shocks, developed a number of trance and delirious states and some clear-cut but highly complicated amnesias. This case presented so many baffling and unsolved problems (as, for instance, in certain intervals a complete amnesia for every alternate letter of the alphabet) that it was never reported. Certain manifestations, however, may have some bearing. After a brief trance-like interval she would often for a few hours at a time lose the last six years of her life,

and revert from thirteen years of age to exactly seven again. In this state she had no memory for anything following her eighth year. Her handwriting and spelling changed, and in dictation she failed to spell words that she had learned since her eighth year; and over the letters she placed the correct diacritical marks as was her habit when learning to write and spell at that age. On other occasions she would revert to what was apparently an infantile state. She forgot the use of her knife and fork, and she crowded food and other objects into her mouth with her fingers. She grasped for small bright objects and conveyed them to her mouth. She refused to speak, and had a babylike stare. At other times she would revert to other ages, but I have mentioned the most striking manifestations of this tendency.

Ernest Jones has mentioned this tendency toward a reversion to earlier life periods, and quotes Pitriss, who gave it the term *ecmnesia*. Jones describes an interesting case of childish behavior in a grown boy, wherein the essential element seemed to be an unconscious determination to return to an infantile state in order to regain the tender solicitude and intimate contact and care of the mother. Jones, I believe, considers the possibility of this motive lying back of much of the foolish and childish behavior in hysteria. (Ernest Jones: Simulated Foolishness in Hysteria, American Journal of Insanity Vol. LXVII. No. 2. October, 1910.) However, it is obvious that other motives may be present. The infantile state, as is well known, holds certain more essential possibilities of pleasure gain denied to adults. Again, the flight into infantilism, like the flight into the psychosis, carries with it the fundamental advantage of freedom from responsibility for one's behavior.

The case I desire to report, that of Mrs. A. aged 30, was remarkable in three ways: the storminess of the attack, the apparent completeness of the recovery, and the clearness of the life recapitulation. My facilities for observation were good, since I have known the patient since the age of four, and until her marriage we were much in each other's company. Before marriage she was exceedingly active in sports and social life. She was slightly erratic, and her accounts of an occurrence usually erred on the side of being too highly

colored with imaginative detail. She was well-liked by every one and never lacked friends and admirers. She was quite the opposite of what we understand as the shut-in type. Her heredity was good. She had no serious love affairs until she met her present husband, whom she married at twenty-two.

For a period of about one month prior to her marriage she underwent a severe depression. She wept almost constantly, longed for death to relieve her from the responsibility of marriage, and could take but little interest in the wedding preparations. Yet none of this depression was betrayed in the daily letters she wrote her fiance. She has since told me that her dominating idea was one of physical unworthiness for marriage. She insists that there was no idea of moral unworthiness. Within three days following her marriage all depression had vanished.

After her marriage she suffered many vicissitudes of removal from one city to another, ill-health, periods of financial stringency, etc. She had three children and one miscarriage. She was very passionate, and *coitus interruptus* was frequently practiced, often to her dissatisfaction. But much of the time her husband was neurasthenic and more or less impotent.

About three years ago she lapsed into a severe depression in which I was unable to see her but know it was characterized by a loss of interest in husband and children, marked psycho-motor retardation and a desire to kill herself with a revolver.

Following this depression her condition merged into a hypomania, during which she talked excessively, expressed everything in the most extravagant and effusive terms, neglected her husband and children, was always down town or paying visits or hastening from one interest to another. During this period she excited her husband's jealousy by a certain free and familiar attitude she took toward her men friends. Seeing her in this state, I recognized it as a definite exaggeration of the naturally intense and active social characteristics I knew so well before her marriage. She gradually grew more restless and discontented, and this condition was not alleviated by the removal of the family

to a plantation in the south. Very lonely here, and being ten miles from the nearest physician, she nursed her husband through a severe illness. Almost daily she took long drives into town to see her physician, both for herself and her husband.

The attack of special interest was now initiated. It began with a very vivid dream, the impressions of which seem to have lingered during the following days and merged into the earlier delusions. She dreamed that negroes had broken into the house and, in order to obtain her husband's money, tortured her by thrusting knives and the handles of hay-forks down her throat and into the vagina and rectum. During the next few days she forced her husband to search the house with a revolver again and again to make sure that there were no negroes hiding about. She developed delusions of poisoning. She thought her husband, her doctor, the plantation overseer, and negroes were trying to poison her. She smelt chloroform on her clothes, and said that the overseer had put it there in order to render her unconscious and seduce her. At the local hospital she was violent, destructive, and refused food.

She was brought to me in April of last year by her husband and family physician. Her psychosis lasted from April to September. It displayed lightning-like changes, and at times at first for an hour or two she would seem quite sane and orientated, and again disorientated and confused. Her delusions of poisoning quickly passed away, although for the first few days she would eat nothing unless it was first tasted by myself. There seemed to be at first a marked element of simulation and hysteria present. She gave me the impression that she was deliberately attempting to act crazy, being at first always worse in the presence of myself or her regular nurse.

During her more lucid moments she stated that she had long been unhappy, that she loved her husband no longer, that for years she had suffered from sexual dissatisfaction, that she really loved her family physician, Dr. B., and that a few days before the beginning of her psychosis she had been sexually intimate with the overseer of the plantation, C. W., that she regretted this very much, but that it was the

result of her loneliness, her emotional starvation, that perhaps after all it had never occurred, or that if it had she must have been unconscious or chloroformed or crazy to have done such a thing.

I was inclined to accept this confession as probably true, and thought that her psychosis might in part be the result of an attempt to cover by the assumption of irresponsibility her feeling of guilt. She went into some detail with respect to the circumstances of this affair, but continued to assert that she was not clearly conscious of the actual occurrence. Discussion, however, produced no change in her psychosis, and the subject was dropped. She continued destructive, violent, negativistic in the sense of doing everything possible to spite or annoy her nurse, and at times would lie for hours with closed eyes waiting for the nurse to leave the room, when she would instantly get out of bed and accomplish some act of mischief.

After a few days she said that she was not married, that she had no children, that she was going to marry Dr. B. who was in love with her and must be sent for immediately. For several weeks she talked of nothing but Dr. B. Gradually she dropped this topic, and in doing so her talk became more profane, vulgar, and obscene. She now began to make violent homosexual advances toward her nurse. Later she began to masturbate. Her eroto-mania was the most violent I have ever seen, producing at times severe swelling and laceration of the vulva. Narcissistic symptoms were prominent in that she would seize every opportunity of posing before the glass, disrobed if possible.

During these manifestations I recognized a gradual recapitulation of life-time experiences. First she went through, or re-acted, many incidents of her married life. She imitated revivalist preachers she had heard and sung religious songs, then on two or three occasions she had a morning nausea, declared that she was pregnant and went through with the greatest dramatic skill and realistic detail the birth of her children. Finally she took up her girl-hood memories. She repeated the slang and catch-words of that day, sang the now forgotten popular songs, and talked much of old friends—in brief she became again in many respects

the young girl I had known before her marriage. Later she reached the period of nursery songs and rhymes, and the childish naughtiness in which she had all along indulged became more marked.

Now more striking infantile characteristics were revealed. She talked very little, and then in a babyish fashion. She asked naive and child-like questions. She drooled at the mouth constantly, and would rub the saliva over her face. She displayed an incessant curiosity about everything in her environment, handling it awkwardly and attempting to place it in her mouth. She was constantly tearing things apart or taking them to pieces 'to see the insides.' She forgot the use of knife and fork, eating with her fingers and spilling her food. She seemed partially to have forgotten how to walk, falling and bumping against furniture or crawling on her hands and knees. She would sit on the floor and amuse herself for considerable periods of time by tearing books and magazines to pieces. Finally she began to soil the bed, and insert the fingers into the rectum and at every opportunity smear the walls and bed with faeces. She would hold the stool when placed on the closet, but immediately afterwards soil the bed. As she began to recover, these habits were replaced by a mania for taking enemas. The drooling habit also was replaced by a constant child-like spitting. We are all familiar with the interest little children often take in spitting as soon as they learn the trick, and how natural it seems to be for them to use it as a means of defense.

Gradually she seemed to grow up. She no longer denied her marriage, but expressed no interest in husband and children. She seemed rather distraite, indifferent and dazed. After a time she expressed a desire to go to her sister's home. She was then allowed to go to live with her father and sister, just as she had before her marriage. Continued separation from her husband was advised. She now asked for her children, and they were brought to her. She began to correspond with her husband, and after her recovery seemed to be complete they began living together.

I did not see her for some months, and then was surprised at the completeness of her recovery. The anamnesis

following recovery may be briefly stated. Her memory for much of the period of her psychosis was lost, particularly for the unpleasant features. For instance, she had no recollection of ever having masturbated at all, either during her psychosis or at any time in her life. She denied having lost any of her love for her husband, but admitted that for some time prior to her psychosis she had been restless and discontented. She was not conscious that her manner toward men during the preliminary hypomania was of a doubtful nature. She denied any erotic interest in her physician but thought that there had been indications that he was interested in her. Because of the loneliness of her situation, the fear that every Southern white woman has of the negro, had been somewhat accentuated, and during the few days prior to the onset of her psychosis one or two incidents, perhaps partly imaginary, possibly with some real foundation, had further aroused this fear. With respect to her confession of intimacy with the plantation overseer, which at first misled me into crediting it with a possible etiologic relationship, her total denial of any such incident was convincing. But she did have the idea for some time that he was in love with her and contemplated her seduction. Notwithstanding this belief, she spent so much time in his company that she thought her husband's jealousy was aroused. An interesting detail was the intense hatred of her nurse expressed after her recovery. She accused her of many acts of impatience and abuse. During her psychosis, although she had many opportunities, she expressed no such complaints. Although it may be supposed that her nurse at times lost patience with her (and the patient remembered nothing of the great provocation she herself had frequently given) yet it was evident that her hatred was clearly exaggerated and abnormal.

COMMENT.

The possible verification, by direct observation of a regressive psychosis, of Freud's theory of the sexual development of the child is interesting.

The mechanism capable of accounting for the patient's

abnormal hatred of her nurse following recovery should be clear.

During her whole psychosis she frequently expressed the belief that she was hypnotized. This was probably an attempt to rationalize what was to her her strange behavior.

It will be noted that Bertschinger's thesis to the effect that recovery may be made possible or facilitated if there exists a suitable social structure between the point to which a psychosis may evolve and real life was ideally realized in the present case.

Notwithstanding her lack of insight, I believe, after reviewing my memories of her whole life, that after her recovery she was more nearly a mentally normal person than she had ever been before. Could this be accounted for by the fact that her psychosis gave her the opportunity for a free catharsis and expression in acts or words of practically a life-time of unconscious or repressed wishes and impulses?

The question of the possibility of recurrence in such a case, and whether a psychoanalysis, made with a view of preventing such a recurrence, would offer too many risks of further upset to be justifiable, is of interest.

THE GENESIS OF A PARANOIC STATE

DELUSIONS OF PERSECUTION BASED UPON A CHARACTER DEFECT IN VOLITIONAL EQUIPMENT*

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THE patient in question is an exceptionally large and robust looking male, thirty-four years of age. Weight, one hundred and sixty-five pounds. Height, six feet. Admitted to the Boston Psychopathic Hospital July 15, 1913. He came willingly to the hospital upon the advice of his brother and sister. For a year previous, he had been living *alone* in an old family home in a small Massachusetts town. From this retreat he had issued letters and post cards which threatened the safety of an elderly gentleman, the father of a school chum of the patient.

Physically he presented very few points worthy of notice. He had a rather short upper lip and a thick nasal septum. No abdominal reflex was obtained on the right side. Patellar reflexes were very active, but equal. Achilles reflexes both present, but unequal: right very sluggish; left active. Serum yielded a negative Wassermann reaction.

Mental examination showed the memory intact and quite normal for recent and remote events, except where the order and significance of events was twisted by his delusion-forming tendency. Retention and the control of his voluntary recollections were proved by his statement of the *pons asinorum*, and his demonstration, without drawing, of the proposition that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right-angles. He shows no evidence of having hallucinations. Emotionally, he seems of an easy-going, optimistic temperament. He takes most kindly to close confinement in the institution. He is modest and unassuming. Shows no exaggerated sense of his own importance in conversation or act. He is rather changeable in his attitude and purposes. He finds the care-free life of the institution quite to his liking. He is easy and natural in his relations with physicians and patients. He busies himself with pen and ink decorative work in which he exhibits considerable artistic talent and some quaint

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conceptions. He supplied much of the organizing energy and the ideas for a minstrel show which the patients carried off. He has no insight into his delusions. In these his pathology seems wholly to consist. They are entirely of a persecutory nature.

The patient was the fourth born of five children, four living, of whom two were older than the patient. All of the other three robust and well. The third-born died at one year of age. His father died at sixty, of "angina pectoris," and his mother at fifty-four of "severe cold and pleurisy." A brother of the mother was a wanderer. He went to Greenland, as a young man, and had expensive habits, such as keeping a four-in-hand. Later, he settled down to the curatorship of a museum, married, and had four children.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE PATIENT

The patient, his younger brother says, was *peculiar* as a child. He was sensitive, easily upset, and had little control of his temper. When twelve years of age, one brother having offended him, the patient crept up behind him stealthily and crashed the coal shovel down upon his head. He had no use for games, was never athletic, nor interested in contests of any sort. He played only when forced to do so. He was always *starting things*. He was full of new-born enthusiasms. But after a movement was launched, it would be found the launching party was not aboard. He would be found already starting something else. His brother says, "he hated to finish things." He was very *erratic* in his school work, had strong likes and dislikes, but his good intellectual acumen served to bring him through when the test came. He was always a *collector*. Even as a child he was *introspective*, often asking what could be the meaning of one remark or another which others had made. It was a morbid introspection for a child. His father decided, while he was yet a child, that it was *useless to endeavor to convince him*. He therefore, ceased to worry about the boy's wrong doings, for he had concluded he could not be influenced by argument.

He attended private schools in an eastern city. He entered a medical school and went through the mid-year examinations of the first year, but he "fell so low in his general

averages that he was not allowed to take the final examinations in the year's work." Here we see again a falling off of his initial interest,—his *lack of tenacity of purpose*. He then worked six months, under a ten thousand dollar bond, as cashier for a trust company. He was then a confidential clerk for the heads of a firm of anchor chain manufacturers. He held this position from 1899 to 1905, rising to a salary of fifteen hundred dollars.

In 1903 when twenty-four years of age, he became engaged to a girl at whose home in the country he had spent a great deal of his *leisure* time, and to whom he was apparently much attached. During the courtship he had one day wired his brother-in-law for five hundred dollars, without any statement of the situation or why he wanted the money. His explanation afterward, was that the girl had a wealthy suitor who had horses, and he suddenly concluded he must have a horse to keep pace and to stand any show in the competition. When this conclusion was reached in his mind a letter was entirely too slow. He must have a horse by telegraph. It was impossible to support such a wife as he was to marry upon fifteen hundred a year. It seemed equally impossible to work up his earning power to the needed point with his employers. This situation meant to his peculiar mental constitution, "Throw it all up," instead of the ordinary human way of holding to what he had until a better turned up.

THE PATIENT BREAKS WITH HIMSELF

His inadequacy to life's exigencies showed itself in this reaction. He left his place. He depicts his own state of mind thus: "The girl was the only thing, and I needed more money." His brother says he was at this time full of get-rich-quick schemes. He had a new anchor chain, which seemed to him likely to revolutionise the industry. But he could get no one else to see it as he did. He schemed to go into the printing business, without experience and without capital. He doubtless thought he saw his way when he left his job. But, whatever it was, the plan proved visionary. He broke his engagement, as he considered this was the only

honorable thing to do—to release the girl, in view of his failure to make good. He did have an excellent offer from another manufacturing concern. Could he have made good in this he would have been able to marry. He tried it but said "I was not mentally able for it. I could not keep my mind on my work. I had just broken my engagement and my mind was wandering. I could not pay attention to the work. I was more than blue. I was almost distracted." Now either this is irrational, for the means of making good and supporting the girl was in his hand, or there is some ulterior element in the case, not yet stated.

This further element we shall see as we proceed. And it is groundless and irrational, but that does not matter for our patient. It was one of the most real of eternal verities for him at that time. He was very much discouraged with himself. He says he was more than blue but never had any idea of suicide. His idea was rather to get away. He tried to think it all over and decided to do the natural thing, that is, to get clear away somewhere and do the kind of things that were interesting to him, that is, do work in the line of natural history. He had always been a collector of natural history specimens.

He made no unseemly haste after breaking the engagement. He sailed August 25, 1905 as passenger on a sailing vessel for Japan, expecting to be seven months on the sea. He had letters to Governor Forbes of the Philippine Islands, hoping to get into the scientific work there, and planning a scientific expedition into New Guinea as an ultimate object. He had a fist fight with the captain after they had been at sea several months and was relieved to get free of the craft in Tokio.

EMERGENCE OF IDEAS OF PERSECUTION

He soon went to Manila and began his efforts to get a post in one of the scientific bureaus. He says he wanted to study fish and fisheries, and they put him to work teaching natives in an intermediate school. He taught hat weaving, geography, and about fish and fisheries. He insists that his persecutions began at this time, about May 1906. The

persecutions took the form first of not getting the job he wanted; then of being amidst petty jealousies within the school, the school being in a turmoil all the time, there being only four positions, but eighteen different teachers during the year; and finally of having the natives alienated from him during the last part of his time there. These were his reasons for his unhappiness, stated upon a cursory review of the situation.

Getting into the matter one finds that the thing which troubled him most was that word was spread by his enemies wherever he went that he was a "moral degenerate." He was never directly told that he was so accused, but he knew, from their actions, that many about him knew of it. He himself defines *degenerate*, as "not having natural desires and feelings,—as not being credited with having instincts of an ordinary man." He found himself accused of being unable to have sexual intercourse. He says he knew from experience this was not true. Still, he must disprove it afresh. In his attempts to disprove this accusation by visiting the tenderloin district in Manila, he found, from noises he heard in neighboring apartments, that he was shadowed by his enemies. This knowledge injected a psychic element into the situation and he was unable to complete the sexual act. This occurred repeatedly. On one occasion, with a razor in hand, he threatened some persons whom he thought had been spying upon him. There seems an hallucinatory contribution to his persecutory beliefs, in his account of these experiences, and in his realistic threats. Further contribution to his troubled state of mind came from the fact that it was considered poor form for teachers to frequent the tenderloin district.

THE SEX ELEMENT

He says all his other troubles started from his being generally known as a moral degenerate, and, we must keep in mind, this means to him sexually impotent. The tip to make it hot for him, was passed along from one official to another, in the United States government, in the Catholic church, and in railroad circles, especially the Pennsylvania

and Union Pacific. The patient considered the source of it all to be in the father of a school friend in an eastern city, to whom reference has already been made. This elderly gentleman whom we shall call Mr. X., was a director of a large railroad company. The opposition of Mr. X., the patient says, was incurred in this way. In June 1905, he quit his position where he had worked six years. At this time, the son, young Mr. X., a fraternity brother of the patient, was courting the sister of the patient's fiancée. At the same time another fraternity brother was courting the same sister. The patient, in conversation, both with his fiancée and with her sister, openly favored the other suitor to the disparagement and ultimate discomfiture of young Mr. X. Young Mr. X. has since married very happily, but his father, being vain-glorious of his family prestige as well as of his personal prowess, could not forgive the patient his opposition to his son's ambition, and therefore was pursuing him relentlessly round the earth, by means of the powerful allies which his position in the business world gave him. The patient says "for all these years Mr. X. has been on my trail. Everything which happens in this world which goes against me, I lay to Mr. X. I can mention no overt act of his which would stand in court as evidence, but he (Mr. X.) knows it is true."

The situation in Manila became intolerable and he left in December 1907, for New Guinea. Sometimes he dwells upon the persecutions in the various forms above enumerated all going back to Mr. X. accusing him (the patient) to the whole official world, of being sexually impotent. At other times he says, as he did of his leaving the place he held for six years, that he was thinking all the time of the girl, and could not get down to work. In any case note how the accusations all turn upon and against himself.

He had two thousand dollars and headed for New Guinea with the expectation of making an expedition into the interior and bringing out specimens which, when sold to American museums, would bring him many times what it had cost him to collect them. Upon arrival he found that an outfit would require more money than he possessed, leaving nothing for expenses. Together with this necessity

for more money, he had in hand the report of the Australian Royal Commission. This report had just appeared, and made the field appear most productive for a scientific expedition such as he proposed. It appeared to him the psychological moment to "strike," American museums for financing a collecting party. He therefore abandoned his plan for an immediate expedition and headed for New York. One evening, on the steamer from Australia to San Francisco, some one sang a song called "Life in the Philippines." The patient observes that he regarded it as "more than a coincidence, that there were so many personal references" to him in the song. His name was not mentioned, but the references to his personal experiences in the "islands" could not be mistaken. So Mr. X. and his minions follow him back to America.

In New York as he was interviewing the director of a great museum for the purpose of financing his New Guinea expedition, it was made known to him that he would have to reckon with his own fraternity in a near-by city, before he could launch his expedition. In fact they were then opposing it, so it seemed to him. And how did he get this information? As he talked to the director, the latter "showed him his fraternity pin." This means the pin was accidentally exposed to the patient's view. Was this pin of the patient's fraternity? No, but that was a "sign of the opposition of my fraternity." At any rate the scheme could not be launched. The failure was laid up to the general financial depression at that time, but he knew it was because of this opposition of his college fraternity. We see in all this the flimsy stuff of which delusions are made.

The patient found he had to go back to the Philippine islands "to fight the record he had left behind him" and "to vindicate himself" and "prove he was a man." Another time he put it, "I had to go back to fight the opposition and to prove myself that I was not a failure." He went back May, 1908. He encountered the same kind of opposition as met him the first time. In a letter to his sister, dated September 4, 1908, from the road construction camp where he was then employed as time keeper, he says "My two years' former horse play seems to be recommencing, and

the funniest part of my experience is that the perpetual trouble I seem unable to avoid comes from the hands of men whom I have every reason to believe think well of me."

From the same camp under date of August 16, 1908, he wrote his brother, referring to his giving up the girl and cutting loose, in a way which showed he had no thoughts of making good again in that quarter. Then later in the same letter he declares he is still in love with her. He then refers to the opposition which developed to the first scientific job planned for him on his first visit to Manila. He says:

"I exhausted every effort to meet any objections I could imagine and did my utmost to make good, when suddenly I became conscious that a rumor, to the effect that I was a moral degenerate, was current throughout the public of the city of Manila, and since, from hints, never from a straightforward statement, have I become convinced that, not only my family, but that more or less members of the public, wherever I have been, even to this very camp, have been aware of it. I cannot believe that there is any individual who bears a grudge toward me, and were it not for the self-evident facts, I could not believe any organization bore a grudge toward me, for I consider that I have acted toward both individual and organization more squarely than they have used me. In fact I have thrown my case to them, I have told much of my most private affairs to them, and today I am completely at their mercy, with no possible way of rectifying what I consider the wrong they have done me. The more I consider it, the more completely damned do I seemed to be. Apparently my worst offense was that I was making good in a job, legally given me by proper authorities, and for this I find it to my interest to come back to the Philippine Islands and have it publicly known that I can cohabit with a woman, which I intend to do. But it does seem a pretty tough penalty on a fellow for trying to start a fishing school. But that will not remedy it. I will never marry without the girl knowing first my history, and I can see myself telling a girl this story. I am damned from a political position, even in a scientific institution, which I coveted, because my story is ever beneath to taunt me. I am damned from literature or any attempt to make my name prominent, because just so surely as my name appears my past will be raked up. You told me that this story was only known among men of little importance. I can tell you that the Archbishop of Manila, upon one occasion, told me that he doubted if General _____ would speak to me, and it is needless to say I have yet to give him the opportunity to turn me down. Even in my retirement out here I dare not be as strong as I would like, for men don't take much stock in the side talk of a moral degenerate. It sounds too much like hypocrisy. And with all of this is the

astonishing fact that personally I do not regard the worst that I have been guilty of is very much out of the way. There are parts of our daily toilet that it would make any one blush to have given to the public, and so it is with me. The notoriety has damned me about as effectually as the guilty conscience of a penitent murderer. I have been goaded and goaded myself into doing several things I would not have done, one of which was writing to E——'s (his former fiancée) sister, which was done more as a matter of showing there was no reason why I should not, and for which I have been bitterly sorry.

* * * * *

"I do not know what organization opposed me and I do not care to know, nor do I wish to be a member of any Philippine branch of such, for although I am far from being a 'little tin Jesus' I have got enough manliness in my degenerated body to prefer to lose my right hand, than to take part as a fellow member in the tactics I have experienced on a sufficiently innocent man to rob such organizations of any claim of honorable manliness. I claim they have treated me with veiled, insinuating cowardice. Of course when I get hints sufficiently direct, it is my duty to protect my honor as best I can and as I wrote you previously it is my unavoidable duty to look up a certain individual in Manila. With certain unavoidable exceptions, such as this may prove to be, I have always forgiven individuals, recognizing them to be but tools of an organization or organizations. I hate to fight, but when I have to fight you can count on my trying to do my best.

"I have overheard remarks,—impersonal,—that I could not answer, hinting that I have been given every opportunity to fight,—yet to fight the enemy entrenched upon their own ground, largely with ammunition furnished by them. I did not lose my mind as completely as it was reported."

"This letter explains that I am damned, why I am damned, and why I can see nothing better than to die out here in the Philippines or New Guinea, or any other old place. No matter if my persecution continues it is my duty to stay here for some time, although I realize that a recent hint that I am a white elephant is a true word said in jest. However, as an American citizen I have a right in these islands and it is not my preference that I am here."

He signs himself to this, "The Black Sheep."

This letter gives the patient's point of view, at that time, August 1908, in regard to his persecutions, and makes it clear that the same trouble has pursued him back to the islands. These persecutions led him to resign his post and go back to Manila.

RETREATS WITH GREATEST STORE OF SELF-RESPECT

Under date of October 6, 1908 he writes from Manila to his sister, that he had given up what was in many respects a gilt-edged proposition, but

"the truth of the matter is," he writes, "that I foresaw friction ahead, or thought that I did, and taking advantage of a moment when everything was rosy, discretion being the better part of valor, I resigned and arrived in Manila in time to take part in the welcome of the battle ship fleet. The islands are in such a state of political potboil, or better of intense political focus, that if you are not an active partisan in politics it seems to be taken for granted that you are a political spy or secret service agent. The realization of this has caused me to abandon hope of living out here in retirement, and with this exception I have now accomplished all that I can expect and all that I returned to do. To attempt any more to accept a political position or get into the competition of life out here would be to invite the return of trouble."

He then speaks of having been favorably received without making any effort himself to "cut ice." He therefore feels he has a "big reserve to the good," and "can withdraw from the Philippines with credit." "My life has been a struggle to gather some self respect and I have more of it now than ever I had before," he wrote in the same letter.

He writes his brother the same day:

"I cannot tell you what a relief this is to me. I no longer feel like shunning the company of any one, nor do I feel that a complimentary word or an appreciation of a respectable God-fearing wife or mother, whether of high or low station, is hypocritical sucking upon my part."

* * * * *

"Only today have I become entirely convinced in my own mind that things are as satisfactory as I can well expect and with it comes the decision that now is the time to pull out.

* * * * *

"There is another point,—omitting the mysterious part which I do not understand, and am glad that I do not understand,—two facts are prominent before me, namely that I owe some very great favors to the organizations of the Knights of Columbus, and the Masons. Not being eligible in the former I can only apply for membership in the latter which I shall do when I return to the East."

After returning to this country, he was decided to try theology, aiming to fit himself to be an "Episcopal priest." He began his residence and study in July 1909, and kept at it till the Spring of 1910.

"I was told in the Philippines that the methods employed against me had been ordered abandoned, and I do know that, had I commanded less influence results would have been different. One of the first questions and most irritating asked me was to find out how much 'pull' I had at Washington, and so my answer seemed unimportant. I caught it full blast, so that I feel I have been fighting a battle for the poor man. In fact I am still fighting, for the opposition is unrelenting; but, whereas before it was a waste and beside the question, by my coming to N——[the theological school] I face it and it becomes a part of my training and my direct business to antagonize it. All straws point to this as my vocation. My almost 'conversion' against my will. My attaining to years of discretion before my taking up the question. My varied experience in the *world*. The one avenue to right my reputation,—not with the world but with myself,—for irrespective of all slander I purpose ministering wherever I can do the most good, and that will not be in believing that so long as I do my duty, the results—be they death, persecution or honor, are of God's choosing."

October 24, 1909, he wrote a long letter to his dearly beloved older brother whose wife is a Catholic. In this he intimates that this brother knows things about what the church wishes of him, which it would be better for both the church and the patient if he knew. He thought efforts were on foot to bring him into the church and to get him to marry the sister of this brother's wife. And still he wants to marry his former fiancée. So the dark influences keep battering him.

"My position here [theological school] may easily be understood. It may be that God with his great wisdom has singled me out to accomplish something for him, and that I am here to gain a foundation for faith. At least I shall stay and give myself a thorough chance. I am very interested in the subjects, which looks encouraging."

He writes March 4, 1910,

"As I get deeper into the game of life losing trick after trick, I see its rules and methods ever more distinctly. I am playing bridge with the cards on the table, whilst my opponents hold theirs in their hands. My mistake was in attempting 'bridge.' 'Cribbage' is more my style. However it is at the bridge table that I am seated and when my mother's photograph has followed my

shoes to the 'Hock Shop' then will I be wise in the ways of 'bridge,'—card-wise with no cards."

In another letter about this time he refers to his dread of Washington on account of politics, his failure at bucking the great organizations, but with all this the reasonableness and harmlessness of his aspirations. He refers to the Philippines as a graveyard of reputations, and says "mine is there."

"I am sorry that I am such a disappointment to all of my family, but my problems have been beyond my capacity. If the world would but become disgusted with me and let me alone I should be happy and I hope of some use to it.

April 21, 1910, he writes his brother, after referring to the Catholic church and to his former fiancée,

"I am very sorry this outside matter should estrange us but I see that it is inevitable and my flopping about, now on the Roman side and now against it, is exasperating to them and to me alike—looking like weakness, vacillation, and cowardice even. I realize that I am plunging over a precipice principally for two reasons,

"First, that I am completely in the hands of the Roman organization as far as my reputation goes, for they have been collecting evidence against me

"And, second, that they would like to help me materially did I allow them to by becoming one of them.

"It has been insinuated to me that this course will mean suicide. My reply is that the sooner I am dead the better for both of us, and I am quite willing to trust God's judgment as between us.

"I have suffered some awfully mean tricks and I have had some extremely generous possibilities offered to me by the Roman Catholics—which have pained me, for if they would only—or you would have only talked plainly and frankly, I could have explained myself—but you too, it seems, must speak diplomatically.

"The Masons have also played equally, if not meaner tricks upon me—but afterward and ever since they have been most generous.

"I must join some organization as soon as possible, for I can not fight all hell by myself, indefinitely."

The above is in the exact order and form as written. He then tells the brother he must choose the Masons, despite his duty to his brother, and despite the fact he is at the "Roman Catholics' mercy" for he yet had another brother and a sister, and the Bishop, and furthermore the Masons have helped him with his fiancée.

He secured an eminently satisfactory position as assistant to a superintendent of a museum of natural history—work to his taste and a chance to work quietly.

He writes his sister about his rooms, June 29 (1910), that they

"give me the feeling that I am not being spied upon, although this may prove elusive. If my enemies are merciless I shall probably break down mentally, but if I am to be unmolested as it looks at present, I think that at last, here I can gather my feet under me. I am not normal mentally, I am brain tired, and feel that whatever I seriously attempt will be destroyed; also if I think seriously I become either despondent or exasperated, so I have to live and think shallowly."

He seems to have an intimation that it is to an insane asylum that his enemies are steering him.

July 16 (1910?) he decides again to be single and notifies his former fiancée, and writes his sister of his discouragement and ends with this, "But why aren't the wilds of New Guinea the simplest, sanest, and easiest way out of it? I think so, I long for them."

Early in 1912 he was made superintendent of a small hospital where a friend was medical officer. He had exhibited some suspicious behavior and had to leave his apartments near the museum. He wished to leave the city. In this hospital position, he had a violent quarrel with a surgeon and left his post after five months tenure. He then went to the old family home in Massachusetts, and lived alone there for one year before entering the hospital, whither he felt he had been drifting for some time.

The family and friends of the patient had certainly spared no means, financial or social, in their endeavor to help this man find himself socially. The wreck of personality must be attributed to inherent defects. By inheritance he had an incapacity to find himself socially.

On admission to the hospital he insisted his former fiancée (whom he really knew was happily married) was to be his wife. He counted her in on all his schemes for an expedition to New Guinea. This expedition seemed to be the first thing for which he was living. He drew up in writing, an elaborate plan for such an expedition.

When he received a letter some months previously,

from his former fiancée, in which she told him of the accomplishment of her marriage, he sent this letter to his elder brother, and wrote him:

"The enclosed letter speaks for itself, you have cut me deeper than anything else could have done. I shall say no more out of regard for your feeling, although you have never regarded mine. For God's sake do not answer this or write to me again, as I credit you with only the best of motives."

He evidently took the marriage as part of the Romanist plot in which this dearly beloved brother was involved, and later he refused to accept the alleged facts. He persistently addressed the lady as "Miss" and by her maiden name.

As samples of the alarming literature he was composing in the summer of 1913 the following are submitted.

"June 28, 1913, Wednesday Letter"—"War is Hell and I propose to make it so. Please see that Mr. X. gets this ultimatum. Either you open negotiations with me before Monday next or I shall proceed with the first step in my self-vindication; and the ethics of the beginning of my feud with X."

"I have undergone the trials of Job to avoid this. I have received precedence at his hands that allow me to run riot mercilessly over men and women, friends and foes.

"Unquestionably my language is offensive. For eight years I have endeavored to act as though I were dealing with a gentleman. I shall see now whether the damn fool can understand plain English. I said that I would use a bitterness that can not be healed. My view of the truth is sufficient to bear me out in this remark."

"If he will put himself in my position he would see that I must do as I say. To stand myself and my most intimate friends in the lime light will be exceedingly disagreeable to all of us, and entirely unnecessarily cruel. However, if you will follow out in your mind any campaign that I can follow, they all lead inevitably to this climax and I propose to force things just as hard as I can. You often can best fight fire with fire. I have exhausted _____'s (his own name) tactics, and now I am fighting X. with _____ X's tactics.

"Perhaps he will understand them better. Until Monday I shall continue a running fire just to prove that my ammunition is in good shape.

Devotedly,
BILL THE PIRATE."

This post card to his former fiancée exhibits the virulence of his paranoia, and reveals again the sex basis of the same.

"July 10, 1913.

Dear Little E:

I shall not leave the bay without you. Tomorrow —— X and the basket of eggs followed by the concentrate of hell. In all the fight so far I think I have not even had a vulgar thought except one—The proper way to capture —— X is to put salt on his tail—for which I apologize and will promise not to repeat. Things are not moving to my liking now—But really imagine Napoleon fleeing down Chestnut St. [fashionable shopping street] panama in hand, coat tail flopping, with your own dear Bill the pirate in pursuit endeavoring to get the neck of a salt bag within the band of his ample breeches. For a pirate what a stern chase.

"Put your tooth brush and your vanity case in the trunk.

Devotedly,

BILL THE PIRATE."

These threatening missives to and about the elderly father of his college friend, produced an increasing anxiety in the minds of the friends of the old gentleman. All were aware of the delusional character of his apparent beliefs. It seemed that the conviction that Mr. X. was the cause of all his unhappiness was strengthening in his mind, and that no certainty existed that he would not suddenly take measures to do violence to this person. For the safety of Mr. X., the patient's brother and sister placed him in the hospital.

MENTAL TRAITS OF THE PATIENT

From the reported interviews with the patient and his brothers, and from the letters of the patient, it is possible to draw up a pretty clear outline of his character and of its development. The development of his paranoid state, studied in detail, shows that his *delusions* of persecution grow directly out of his *feelings of inadequacy*. And these feelings of inadequacy are the quite well warranted reflections of a general anomaly of his character. In this anomaly of his character is involved his sex instinct. In fact, in early manhood this becomes focal, at times. Such an example is the stated purpose of his second trip to the Philippines when he was twenty-nine years of age.

(1) Turning to the mental traits as we find them portrayed in his history, we find a *lack of persistence*, written in large characters, all over his career, from early childhood. His *will* was *capricious*. In the nursery and the school, he never took a willing part in games. He was not skillful, and got no pleasure out of contests. He was always a collector, but his collections, like everything else which interested him, stopped at early stages. Likewise, his studies were pursued spasmodically and erratically. His failure as a medical student was due to the same caprice. There is no question of lack of intelligence. He could have carried off honors in such work if he had persistently wanted to do so. He held to a clerkship for six years. But this is no evidence of persistence. His main interests during that time were social, and he became engaged during the fourth year of his service. His telegram for five hundred dollars for a horse, probably contemplated going into his small patrimony and was not a request for the money as a gift. Even with this interpretation, it is a rather capricious procedure, and indicates lack of careful planning of his career.

Leaving his place with no prospect, his useless invention, and the plan to set up as printer without money or training, are further evidences of the planlessness of his life. The further failure to make good in another business in which his friends gave him a chance, evidences a state of mind quite unable to work as a unit in organized society. These things alone might constitute an adolescent upset produced by the misfortune of forming an alliance which his achievements did not warrant. But they fit in so neatly with his childhood and his later adult career, that they must be considered results and manifestations of the same incapacity to plan his career. The alliance was altogether in line with the family traditions, and would undoubtedly have proved satisfactory to all, if the patient had been as good in mind and character, as were his brothers and sister. Breaking the engagement was logical for him, but it is further evidence of the illogicalness of his character. He was really not able to work or to marry. His disability lay in the poor structure of his will.

He set out for the far east on a sailing vessel. The

teaching position in which he found himself was not to his liking. This alone spelled failure. But he wanted to do something for which no provision had been made, and he was not able to provide the opportunity. He wanted to teach fishing in a school of fishing. His collecting expedition failed at New Guinea and in New York City. It would have failed, had it been financed. He failed in theology. He failed in his quiet museum position, which seemed carefully adapted to his peculiar needs. He failed in his management of the little hospital, by quarreling with the man who befriended him.

This lack of persistence in his character is a pathologic defect in the organization of his volitional equipment. He lacks patience and power of appreciation. Ideas have to be novel and large in order to hold his attention. He is not abnormally distractible, and his powers of inhibition are good. His *defect* is in the *grain or texture of the fabric we call character*, by which one sticks by something till he achieves some individuality thereby. This man, neither as child nor man, learned the supreme joy of successful creative effort. He never acquired habits of industry nor genuine love of work. In the habits of his life this fundamental defect in organization stands out. The logic of the plan by which he was made, left him thus incomplete in his character, and consequently in his social relationships. This incompleteness he had the sensitiveness to register. He felt it, and was unhappy on account of it. But he was impotent to correct it. He knew instinctively that he was a lame duck and a floater, but *he had not the instinctive equipment to integrate his own will and make of himself a man*. Objectification of this,—the seeming causes of this lack of integration of will,—constitutes his paranoic state of mind. His delusions are logical when viewed from within. His persecutions are the objective causes of his unhappiness. The real causes of this unhappiness are subjective. He is defective in his capacity for social integration. To acknowledge this would contribute further to his unhappiness. Hence the persecutions are raised as a defence for his own defect.

(2) Emotionally he shows an *inconstancy* and *inconsistency*, which amounts to the cyclothymic constitution

which is supposed to underlie the manic-depressive form of psychosis. The whole-world is alternately rosy or dark, as he is riding upon the crest of a wave of achievement or is realizing his inadequacy. The emotional rhythm in his case may be understood when it is viewed as the normal emotional reflection of the alternations of his own self-illusionment as to success, and his realization of his failures. Riding upon the crest of a wave of enthusiasm over his engagement, he resigns his position, without business prospects. The depths to which he plunges, lead him to break his engagement, and seek peace and a new start in a long sea voyage and in the Philippines.

In the same letter he says he has given up the girl once and for all, and he also is deeply in love with her, and seems to purpose to marry her. In the height of his persecutions he does not want to join forces with any organization which has persecuted him, and then writes his brother he owes much to the Knights of Columbus, and to the Masons, and must join the only one of these to which he is eligible. Both these organizations had persecuted him. The force of his persecutions broke in 1908, and he felt he retreated from the Philippines at a very auspicious time. He came out with his reputation at a high flood, for him, but he saw trouble ahead if he stayed. He says, he did not then feel like shunning the presence of any one.

Again he, himself, speaks of flopping about, now on the Roman side, and now against it. This is fundamentally fluctuation of belief. But this is probably correlated with change of mood.

(3) With this cyclothymia, there are evidences of marked *irritability* at times, and also times of extreme *depression*. Such episodes as stealthily striking his brother on the head with a coal shovel, his fist fight with the captain of the sailing vessel, and his quarrel with his medical friend in the hospital, show his spasmodic irritability and quarrelsomeness.

Of his depression, he says in 1905, when he could not make good in a position his friends got for him, that he "was more than blue,—was almost distracted."—He writes from the Philippines and from the school of theology, that

he wishes he were dead. He evidently had vague hopes the Philippines would offer a way out, and that was his real thought in regard to New Guinea. But his despondency never took any effective turn in the direction of suicide. His own stated reasons for depression are that he seems to be bucking hopeless odds,—to be fighting all hell alone. He says if he thinks seriously, he becomes either "despondent or exasperated" (depression or irritability when he really confronts life). On this account he "must live and think shallowly." This means he must keep away from life, of which he is no real part. He is like a bird flying against the glass. He can not understand what he is flying against. He knows this and therefore seeks New Guinea, but while in the situation, he is either flying against it, exasperated and irritated, or lying helpless in the cage, dulled and depressed. He says of himself that he will break down mentally if his enemies are merciless, that he is brain tired, and is not normal mentally.

(4) This patient is *mentally awkward*. He is afflicted with a *morbid introspection*—inquiring into motives in others and the reasons for his own feelings. This was shown while he was yet a child. On the mental side this is comparable with the awkwardness of the rapidly growing early adolescent. Both have acquired powers of the uses of which they are ignorant. His father found him awkward mentally and not subject to disciplinary measures availingly with his other children. He soon gave him up as hopeless, considering that nothing he could do would alter the conduct of the boy. The same awkwardness and ill-adjustment are exhibited in his writing to the sister of his fiancée "to show there was no reason why I should not," and then being bitterly sorry for it. This is not unusual in the storm-and-stress period for youths of mystical temperament. But in any it is *mental awkwardness*.

(5) The patient *realizes his mental awkwardness* and is conscious that he fails to measure up to standard. He says in 1908, "my life is a struggle to gather some self-respect." This was the real reason for his giving up his place, for breaking his engagement, and for his going to the east. The theological course appealed to him as a means of righting

his reputation not with the world, but with himself. He knew and wrote that he was playing a game where his opponents all knew his whole game before he made a move, but he was absolutely ignorant of their cards, of what moves they would make, and in fact of the rules of the game. He saw his predicament as playing a game which he did not know. From this source, by the logic of his under-consciousness, he raised up the organizations and a person typifying great power, as the embodiments of the cause of his internal disquietude.

(6) Intimately woven into the texture of his delusional life we find certain *sex elements*. This reaches its climax apparently in his second visit to the Philippines when he writes his brother that he had to come back to the Philippines (1908) in order to have it publicly known that he could cohabit with a woman. The beginnings of his persecutions in the Philippines (1906) involved his being taunted with sexual impotence. No one told him he was impotent, but he felt that everybody thought so. This is the method by which he objectifies his own beliefs and fears for himself. He had either proved himself impotent or had psychasthenic fears of the same. From his account of repeated failures to complete the sexual act in Manila, it is evident he had such an interfering mental factor. His fear that he could not complete the act objectified itself in the noises made by imaginary persons spying upon him for the purpose of seeing for themselves what he could do. And these hallucinations were so real that he threatened with a razor some persons whom he found near-by.

With this evidence of anomaly in the organization of the sex instinct it is entirely within reason to lay upon this ground his act in breaking off his engagement. His proved industrial incompetence seems equally substantial ground, however, upon which to base this action. Probably they are closely interrelated and are jointly responsible for the act. That there is a deep lying sex anomaly running its warp through the fabric of his paranoia, is further indicated by the indecent post card written to his fiancée five days before coming to the hospital. The reference seems to indicate a plan to put a quietus upon the virility,—immediate

sex activity,—of the old gentleman who has come to typify all the shortcomings of his own (the patient's) character. As he, the patient, prepares to sail away with his bride to a world where all will be new and therefore without opposition and enemies, this old man, typifying all his persecutors,—is to be salted down. And the sex activity seems to typify in this particular person, all of that person's opposition. By a double vicariousness this man's sex activity comes to stand for all the patient's persecution. It stands for the person himself, and he stands for all the oppositions and persecutions. It will be recalled, in this connection, that his own explanation of the enmity of this man for him was that he, the patient, wounded his pride and hurt his prestige, by successfully talking against this man's son as suitor for the affections of the sister of his own fiancée. By thwarting this turn of the mating instinct of the son, he thinks he aroused the deathless persecution of the father. In this latest reference to the father his sex activity seems to stand for the whole personality.

(7) The patient says that his *persecution* began in May, 1906, soon after his first arrival at Manila. He was twenty-seven at the time. This was very likely the first explicit paranoid manifestation. He was thwarted in not getting the job he wanted, by the petty jealousies in the teaching staff, and by having the natives alienated from him. Very soon the word passed around that he was a moral degenerate,—sexually impotent. To disprove this he went to the brothels, and was interfered with and spied upon. Also his conscience troubled him because he knew a teacher should not frequent such places. The word was passed through church, government, and railroad circles, and it was all set going by Mr. X. in an Eastern city.

The steamer song referring so specifically to him and the meaning of the fraternity pin on the museum director in New York, show of what flimsy stuff his delusions are made,—what chance occurrences may provide material for beliefs,—how he *violates reality to substantiate what he wants to believe*.

The same persecutions followed him on his second trip to the Philippines. His older brother was later in a plot

with the church to get his fiancée married to another man, and thus get him to marry this brother's wife's sister, a Catholic, and so get him into the church.

He was very leery of political organizations. When locating in Washington he was very careful to select quarters where he would not be spied upon, and wrote of his feeling of security there. But this wore out in eighteen months. His next asylum held him only five months. Then the year alone in the old home. This was peaceful at first, but he soon wrote that things were not going to suit him, and he became more violent in his denunciation of his arch persecutor.

THE ORIGIN OF THE PARANOIC STATE

It seems reasonably certain that his own fear that he was not normal sexually, was mixed up with the origin of this man's delusions of persecution. That this was a fear rather than a fact, he himself asserts. But the fear (mental state) also prevented the completion of the act, on some occasions. That such a sex fear should grow out of a situation wherein, on account of his own economic unfitness, he had set the object of his affections free to marry another, and had gone off into a new world to begin again, is perfectly intelligible, even though his sex instinct and his sex life had been perfectly normal up to the time of breaking his engagement. We have no information leading us to suppose any more fundamental sex anomaly underlying this paranoid state.

The *sex fears*, and the suspicions attending them and assigned as causes of the realization of the fears, are *typical of his whole life*. From his childhood he has realized continually that he could not accomplish things as other persons, and he has been forced to find reasons for his failures. He was hypersensitive, and began as a young child, looking for ulterior motives in others, and was morbidly precocious in introspecting his own mind. The peculiar and unnatural social relations, in which he found himself worked upon his sensitive nature the alternations of despondency and exasperation, these cyclothymic changes depending in part upon the physiologic conditions of metabolism.

The human mind demands intelligibility in its world. Such a misfit mind as that of this patient is no exception to this rule. He has good mental ability. His capacities to learn and to fit ideas together in logical sequence are excellent. The fundamental defect in his mental make-up, we have seen, is in the realm of the will. He has not ordinary capacity to stick to and achieve. He fails therefore to make good as an integral unit in society. His *character*, therefore, remains *infantile*, and yet he had the sensitiveness to realize this difference between himself and other men.

His persecutions are, for him, the logical explanation of the results of his unfitness for social living, or of the defects in his own character. In this case, delusions constitute a natural supplementing or completing of the world, or his experiences of it, for one who is socially incompetent. He has a character defect, and his *delusions*, are the *objectification of his explanations of these defects*. Through his history we find this parallelism,—the worse his disappointment with himself, the more elaborate the machinery used by his enemies, and the more powerful these same enemies. His *foes* as we see them, are of his own household, *within his own mind*. His second defect shows up in his inability to see his own enmity to himself. His abnormal incapacity for achievement is blamed upon others. He runs to cover, in a voyage at sea, in the Philippines, in New Guinea, in a theological seminary, in a quiet museum position, and in the solitary life of an old home in a small New England town. All the time he is really running from his own incapacity to be a man among men, recognize his limitations, and keep up his courage and work away to make more of a man of himself.

The combination of his *inherent incapacity* to fit in with men, and make himself a social unit through achievement, and his extreme *realization of the unhappiness resulting from this incapacity*, lead with the inexorable logic of events to *delusions of persecution*. Blaming others with his unhappiness is the only way to inner harmony for him. This is his defense reaction. Being the possessor of a disjointed subjective world, which cannot be organized, because of his defective capacity to work consistently for worthy ideals, he finds the reason for his abortive undertakings in the

fiendish plan of other persons and organizations, devised for the purpose of his undoing. Given this inadequacy for social living and the realization that life is too much for him, one of his temperament must hold to delusional beliefs in persecutions. This is the only way for him to preserve any integrity of personality and self-respect. For another temperament, with a different balance between self-esteem and self-abasement, it would bring profound discouragement and attempts at self-destruction. In such the primary defect would be in the affects.

In this paranoic personality, the primary defect is in volition and capacity for organizing his personality. His powers for receiving and elaborating ideas being excellent, and he, therefore, being received and dealt with as an equal by well endowed and successful men, he is a great disappointment to himself, when he fails. His self-esteem, wounded by his own failure to develop a character which can locate on a piece of work, and work persistently at the same, does not allow of the relatively delusionless depreciation of self which is found in the depressions of manic-depressive psychoses. The logic of events drives this patient in the direction of a *reasonable explanation of his own defective conative capacity*. His failures, therefore, are attributed to opposition and accusations of enemies who thwart his purposes. By these allopsychic delusions he preserves the integrity of his inner world.

He seemingly fears great organizations. The greatness is really the greatness of his disappointment with himself. This fear drives him to the Philippines, to New Guinea, to the relative solitudes of the museum, the theological school, and the large grounds of an old home. But these persecutions are the figments of his own mind, raised up to hide the *disagreeable, ugly fact of incompetence in himself*. This is what he really says it is, in a darkly veiled manner, when he writes he must *live and think shallowly*, that whatever he seriously attempts, will be destroyed. He realizes that if he ever gets to living a normal life, it will be in a much smaller way than that his ambition pictured for him. He sees that a quiet little career in a museum, is the place where he ought to gather his feet under himself. At the same time

he really knows that his ambition will not let him be content with such an achievement (gathering his feet under him in such a small career), and he sees that he is going to break down mentally,—sees himself drifting to an asylum for the insane. He allows us to see, at times, that he really knows this drift is caused by his own *conative incapacity* to realize his dreams. He dreams of enemies and persecutions which thwart his inadequate purposes. And these imagined explanatory causes gradually organize in his mind as a substantial part of his experience. This false world comes in response to a deep personal need. He must believe in these thwartings in order to preserve his own *self-respect*.

In connection with such an attempt as we have here made to bring out the mechanism of the genesis and organization of delusions of persecution, the question occurs as to whether or not this is a defense-psychosis. That the fabrication of the beliefs in these persecutions and persecutors has found its inception and maturing force in a *defense* of the personality, we have no doubt. The alternatives, in case of such an inherent defect of will,—such an incapacity to develop character through social relations are: (1) to recognize the defect and blame oneself, and (2) to remain blind to the defect and blame society. The persecutory paranoic development is this blaming of society for the flaws of one's own inner constitution. This is a species of loyalty. It is a *defense at all hazards*.

This defense proceeds from instinctive and affective character-elements. It is not a conscious elaboration. The logic used is not of the syllogistic sort. We do not wish to degrade the terms *reasoning* and *logic*, or to supply any new or wider connotation for them. We find no better way, however, to express this *defense of the personality* adopted by a paranoic personality, than to say that the logic of events compels the belief in persecutions which themselves cause the person to fall short in accomplishment all along the road in his character development. These false beliefs are the necessary explanations for the state of affairs within the household. The paranoid mind believes in its delusions by the same token that makes the Kantian believe in God, freedom, and immortality. For each these

are the necessary foundations of the inner life as it is. The inner life is the reality, and these ideas have a borrowed, but no less vivid reality because the most immediately real depends upon them for its being.

This *defense* of the self in this case, does not require any occult or elaborate means for its revealing. The patient's own words, in his conversations and letters, reveal his instinctive defense against his unhappy realization of his own defects, in the form of a world-wide clique of persecutors. The defense is an objective justification.

It may be there could be found in this life a *break or a tear*, in the sense of Bleuler.* Perhaps his breaking-off with his fiancée and his failure to work his way in the world, constituted such a break, and thus provided the place, in the time stream, for the emergence of his delusions of persecution. But if this is the moment of emergence of the paranoic state, the natural history of the character, preceding this moment, must be reckoned more significant for the understanding of the paranoic state, for it is fundamental and essential to an understanding of how the subtle suggestion of persecution gets hold of the mind. His life is a development of an unwelcome and unacknowledged realization that he is a mis-fit,—that he cannot do things as other men do. There develops thus the complement demanded by his pride in himself,—the "fundamental tendency to twist a wide range of experience in keeping with a bias or reactive tendency" which Adolph Meyer refers to as the chief focus of psychopathological inquiry in paranoics.†

The same lack of volitional capacity, shown in the special defect of this character is again emphasized by his resort to delusional beliefs to explain himself to himself. The same boy who is always starting things and can "never bear to finish anything," has such an inability to entertain reasonable doubts, that he is compelled to finish his world right off. The false beliefs are seized as a means of completing and rounding out the world. In this he is a severe dogmatist as Adolf Meyer insists are all paranoics. He has no tolerance for his own slow and imperfect develop-

*E. Bleuler. Affectivity, Suggestibility and Paranoic. N. Y. State Hospital's Bulletin, February, 1912.

†Modern Treatment of Nervous and Mental Diseases. White & Jelliffe. Vol. I. Ch. XIV. The Treatment of Paranoic and Paranoid States, p. 616.

ment. In fact the scheme of working out a career for himself has no abiding place in his mind. He dogmatically assumes that others are to be blamed for his unhappiness.

In reference of the case to Southard's categories,* it seems to afford a good example of "Precipitated subjunctive." This type of mind cannot hold these subjunctives in a state of solution. It cannot wait for the cumulative evidence of events. Events which have already occurred compel the degradation of subjunctives as indicatives. The hypothesis which would make clear the inner unrest, is regarded as accomplished fact, and so a seemingly factual ground is afforded for the subjective instability. Thus, arises the *pragmatic paranoia* which boldly threatens the personal safety of the arch persecutor.

Pursuing Southard's grammatical characterizations, we find, in this case, all three of the voices, but the dominant one is the passive. The outside world is persecuting the patient. With this dominant note of passivity there often emerges a streak of reflexive action as when he refers to himself as a white elephant upon the hands of his family, and again as being compelled to think shallowly because otherwise he becomes exasperated or despondent. At the time of his confinement he was exhibiting more of the active voice attitude (grandeur) than at any previous point in his career. This transition from passive to active (persecution to grandeur) has long been familiar in paranoics. The delusions which have long been ego-centripetal are now on the point of becoming ego-centrifugal.

In the Kraepelinian classification, this case is probably one of the paranoid group of dementia precox. In the time of our knowledge of the case, there has been a decided narrowing of interests and increasing contentment with constricting spheres of activity. This is distantly related to the affect disturbances of hebephrenia. The involvement of the sex life would unquestionably place the case in the *schizophrenic* group for Bleuler. The prognosis must, therefore, be a slow course of deterioration. The personality will become more and more split apart from the social life of which it is a part, and therefore a more and more shrivelled

*"On the Application of Grammatical Categories to the Analysis of Delusions." E. E. Southard, *Philosophical Review*, May, 1916.

entity.

This prognosis contemplates the high probability of a frontal lobe pathology. The only therapeutics any one can contemplate in such a situation is mental, and we must frankly recognize the expected efficacy of such will be inversely proportional to the hold which any pathological process has upon the brain.

The neuro-mental mechanism of this person had a *congenital twist*. The time for most hopeful application of psychotherapy had long past when he came first to a hospital at thirty-four years of age. It is evident, if our analysis is correct, that his delusions and whole pragmatic paranoia can be abolished only by abolishing the subjective need for these false beliefs. These delusions have arisen to provide "harmony at least in the personality." They are an excessive and poorly adapted morbid work of adjustment (Adolf Meyer). To remove them it would be necessary to remove or obliterate the conditions to which they provide correction. To this extent the self and its world must be reconstituted.

The conditions underlying his delusions we have seen are primarily lack of persistence in pursuit of any aim. In how far this could have been corrected by *mental orthopedics* in childhood it would be impossible to indicate from our knowledge of his life and present condition. It is to be supposed, however, that his native twist was allowed to have free course by teachers, as well as by the father, who early decided it was useless to attempt discipline of the boy. Such neglect was most pernicious. In the formative period some means should have been found of securing persistency of interest in some attainment. Such would have been the making of this character. In the absence of such cultural counter-twist, the working out of his paranoic state from the native bias of his mental make-up was inevitable. Education, in the sense of control of character-formation, should have saved him from these enemies of his own household. Since it did not, the work is many times more difficult. It is impossible, if perchance the habits or sets of frontal lobe elements have reached a pernicious or pathological definiteness.

GENETIC ANTECEDENTS OF FREE ASSOCIATION MATERIALS: MISS Z'S CASE

BY C. S. YOAKUM AND MARY C. HILL

The University of Texas

IN a previous paper on Miss Z's case, we presented a short, objective character study, the data gathered under the special conditions of a memory test, together with the free contributions of Miss Z toward the explanation of the material thus brought to light. After this was completed, we began the attempt to bring to consciousness, in relation to these 'stories' and their explanations, other material that might possibly contribute to our understanding of the situation. We do not follow a chronological order in presenting this new material, but shall try to show how it bears on the general behavior of Miss Z at the time this study was made.

Miss Z first came under our observation through the accidental discovery of a rich and varied group of phantasies with which she spent the greater portion of her leisure hours. She is far above the average as a student and has shown special ability in the recovery and analysis of the events leading up to her present condition. She is an honor student in Psychology and English. A short resume of the special characteristics of her case will help to clarify the genetic account we attempt.

The earlier paper gave the details of the emotionally tinged experiences during the memorization of the 'Binet Letter Squares.' This original experiment was an attempt to establish individual memory norms for these letter squares in order to obtain introspective and quantitative data for the same memory process with distraction. This experiment is not reported.

The subjects were instructors, graduate students, and later 12 to 14 year old children. The norms were determined on the usual basis of 36 points for a perfect score in

immediate recall of the 12 consonants. Twenty seconds were allowed for memorizing. The scores range from a low average of 25 points to a high one of 35.56 points. This high average of 98.7 +% of a perfect score was made by Miss Z. It is this subject's score and her way of memorizing, we refer to in this paper.

After the lapse of 4 months, subject Z, as we have designated the person whose result are here discussed, can immediately reproduce the imagery originally revived by a card, or given the setting, the 'story,' can reproduce the arrangement of consonants on the card. This was tested, at random, for some twenty cards without mishap.

A chance statement made by Z, informed the experimenter of the method used in memorizing. The letters were serving as an outline or framework for stories which she framed or which appeared as soon as the card was exposed. A line from one of the squares will illustrate the procedure. V, F, N, Q, G, were the last letters in the middle line and the letters in the bottom line, horizontally arranged. The connection given by subject Z, is (V)ery (F)air, (N)o (Q)uiz (G)ives. The various incidents arose spontaneously and easily. It was seldom that Z had to omit a letter and there is no recorded failure of an incident or a number of incidents appearing during the 20-second interval. These 'stories,' as we have called them, are recollections of actual incidents, literary references, phantasies, and dreams. Z has performed a number of experiments in memory at different times with words, letters, and nonsense syllables. She says she has always used this method. The remarks and questions of the experimenter were the first intimations to her that others seldom used her way of memorizing.

During such experiments, external impressions lose their potency. Yet the subject notes the physiological changes that characterize emotion. She describes her feelings and sense of reality as like those of the dream. Nothing seems to hold back the images and thoughts. All are received and elaborated. Each carries its own emotional memory whether pleasant, or unpleasant, but the present state of mind of Z during our experiment is always excited, anticipatory, and pleasantly-toned. Z enjoys memory tests

and experiments because they reinstate this pleasant, hypnotic, weird, and tensionless experience. We must remember that, meanwhile Z is memorizing, introspecting, or reviving material as a focal train of thought, with extremely high efficiency.

For such extreme abundance and vividness of unrelated imagery and phantasy, we are, as a rule, forced to examine the literature on the abnormal. Vaschide,* in 1897, reported that a number of his subjects held the position of a word in a series memorized, by means of a vague impression of serial order carried by a flow of images, impulses, memories, and emotional tendencies. These associates often bore no relation to the words. They consisted of vague forms, actions, and scenes; Vaschide, himself, had colored images. Though these experiences were connected with indistinct feelings of position, Vaschide denies that the experience of position depended merely on chance. He designates this behavior of his subjects as probably indicating the role of the unconscious.

The case we have examined offers more abundant data than usual. The rapidity of formation, and the spontaneity of the revived memories is unusual. The efficiency in performance, notwithstanding the emotional tone of the memories, is also noteworthy. We have mentioned above the extraordinary permanency of the associations thus momentarily formed by the conditions of the experiment. The attitude of the subject is one of deep interest in the mere process of memorizing. Although the majority of our subjects found the work little more than drudgery, Z had to be recalled to the next task frequently because of the pleasantness or tenacity of the memories revived.

A detailed examination of Z shows (1) that she has a fairly continuous (extending from childhood, and also nearly always present in some form or other) train of imagery not connected with immediate surroundings. The experiments show that this tends to become the central thought process or a part of it, when she is dealing with presented meaningless materials or in the intervals of presentation of materials with meanings, (2) that her attitudes, ideals, and general

*Vaschide, N., *Sur la localisation des souvenirs, etc.*, L'annee psychol., 3, 1897 p. 214.

behavior are more closely united to the significance of this spontaneous imagery than to what is usually called the environment, (3) that an highly emotional, physically exhausting condition results when this free imagery and ordinary thought are forced into opposition.

Z's mental characteristics and social attitudes are distinctly opposite in nature. She is unusually capable of establishing thought relations. Among her associates in college, she is looked upon as queer, but brilliant, and is shunned by the majority of undergraduates, and by college literary organizations that ordinarily eagerly elect persons of her ability. With only her mother as tutor, she prepared herself for the college entrance examinations; and now ranks 'excellent' under all examination methods in University work. She has an especially fine command of language, and is fond of literature and of criticism of content and method in psychology. She does not like physics, chemistry or the biological sciences. Up to the time of this study, failure in gymnasium work gave her as much pleasure as excellence in Browning. For the greater part of her college career, her physician feared a collapse because of her anaemic condition. Socially she is timid and retiring. She realizes this social awkwardness, but, nevertheless, consciously maintains the attitudes of a Princess, one of her childish play phantasies, in her conception of her relation to others.

This short account indicates certain points in which Miss Z finds she is not in accord with others*. She does not believe in conformity to custom and convention and fears that she will unconsciously become dull and stupid as others appear to be. The more apparent complexes may be briefly summarized. In connection with the fear of becoming conventional, we may trace an intense hatred of the very terms 'obedience' and 'naughty.' The outwardly conventional person arouses a strong aversion and her best friends cannot, even in fun, pass beyond certain self-imposed barriers or 'limits.' We may mention two other points of more than ordinary stress, her 'fears' and extreme negative sex interests of a secondary social nature. From her own, inner point of view, Miss Z names four distinct complexes (1) the wish to

*The details are given in this *Journal*, v. XI, pp. 215-257.

remain a child, (2) the wish for closer social relations with people of her own age, (3) to remain with her Mother, and (4) to be like the lovable traits of her dream Princess.* It can, we think, be shown that the objective behavior 'complexes' bear certain definite relations to the inner wishes and desires of which Miss Z has remained conscious. The simple discovery that such wishes and longings exist immediately explain to the observer much of her behavior that is otherwise inexplicable. We trace, as far as our space will permit, the natural history of her growth under four heads; "obedience," social withdrawal reactions, sex relations, and fears. It would be absurd to conclude that we had thereby solved the riddle of this, or any other, intellectually vigorous personality. A few characteristics only are discussed and their bearing on one form of resistance and difficulty emphasized.

In the earlier paper, we called attention to a mistake Miss Z clearly makes when she calls her aversion to a certain instructor, her childish objection to personalities in conversation, and her superior attitude toward some persons a 'complex.' We saw there that these forms of behavior indicated specific conflicts which take place between her emotionally toned phantasies and her interpretation of others' behavior. She is clearly carrying on a double train, or two trains, of thought. The fear of losing her pleasant and spontaneous reveries arose as she saw and felt convention and logical thinking, or as she has called it the "colorless, cold scrutiny of fact," encroaching upon the carefree play of phantasy. As her view of the nature of the total situation in any particular case varied, the nature of the fear and its expression ('sign' seen by the observer) changed.

. OBEDIENCE

This is the term commonly used with reference to the relation between the socially uninitiated and those members of society directly responsible to society for initiation into the traditions and manners of a particular social group. At later stages, the term 'sanction' is often applied to this more or less tenuous function. To indicate the separate functions

**This Journal*, vol. XI, 1916, p. 215.

of the individuals who are the associates in this relation, we use such words as imitation and suggestion, or simply, "obedience to established authority." Miss Z early *experienced* the freedom and exhilaration of unimpeded activity. Direct suggestion* was a stimulus subversive of this feeling without the softening influence of 'associated habits or normal conditioned reflexes.'

At the early age of three, she struggled with her father's parental commands. Her independence extended itself to considerable lengths especially when fatigued or emotionally excited. Painful tensions in the muscles, "the shivering that leaves me weak, the cold, benumbed sensations that persist so long, the weary tension of my jaws, the weakness that makes it hard to walk, and the nausea that I never have unless angry" are phenomena that accompany this conflict regularly.

During the adolescent period, the conflict of wills became internal. We may cite a single typical incident. Miss Z would decide that she ought to attend the theatre. Her decision to attend would last often till the tickets were bought and she was ready to go, then the terror that she was doing something wrong, that she ought not to go, would seize her and she could not be persuaded to attend. So strong was this conflict, that she never actually attended the theatre during the time opportunity was extended to her. Many similar incidents indicate that she felt she was "testing her will." Later developments show resistances toward eating and sleeping and the conventionalities of adult social life.

From the standpoint of her own health and social adjustment, our most difficult task has been to bring her to a simple understanding that obedience means *merely a way used by society to bring its members into wider experiences and to cause them to appreciate the thoughts and feelings of others*. For her it meant the loss of her own power to think, of her own effective life, of her 'self' as connoted by the term

*Angell, J. R. *Chapters from Modern Psychology*, 1912, p. 179. It would be a highly valuable study that presents the physical and neural facts of such organisations. We also know practically nothing of Miss Z's inheritance. She is said to be very much like her mother; and her father is described by his neighbors as 'queer.'

'limits.' The social impulse seems externally to be undeveloped, as a matter of fact its affective tone is so strong that now some of the simplest social experiences are physically over-powering and completely exhausting. Social practice has not had a chance to wear off the first exhilaration of such experiences and her strong imaginative 'empathy' seems unable to do it.

INCOMPLETE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The actual influence of the presence of others throughout Miss Z's development has not been inconsiderable. The extreme joy she obtained from reading, from her dolls, and her games with children, as a child, indicate a highly sensitive and appreciative attitude toward others. Conditions of health, and environment seem to have conspired to prevent social practice; she was quite evidently shielded from the rougher 'give and take' of such relations. In addition, as we noted above, she was intellectually above her group when among children of her own age. We are unable to present so complete a study here as might be desirable. The main features may, nevertheless, be sketched in with some degree of accuracy. An energetic, nervous, imaginative child starts out with her wants almost completely supplied. As she grows in these directions, the external environment ceases to supply the stimuli in inverse relation to this growth.

Throughout her experience runs the regressive wish to remain a child. This means a desire to avoid responsibility, to live in her untrammeled phantasies and to carry out her individually developed plans. We quote a short paragraph illustrating this fact:

"Now this 'splitting' essentially vitiates the power of leadership. I cannot give myself whole-heartedly to a group, because there is only a small portion of me that the group knows anything about. I can't be my natural childish self, because people expect me to be grown up. I can't succeed as an artificial grown-up self because I cannot honestly and completely be so. The result is a certain sort of superficiality and thinness in general social relations and

a corresponding depth of feeling for the few people with whom I feel myself. Naturally, too, the superficial nature of this broader social relation makes me feel company a strain that is almost painful, even though I long for it. Frequently, I take unfrequented ways to my destination simply because I feel that I cannot force myself to speak to people. It is not at all that I do not care for them or that I should not be delighted to talk to them if I could do it naturally. It is simply that the strain of the adjustment is too great."

THE SOCIAL RELATION OF SEX

It is a difficult matter to trace any particular instinct in its process of sublimation. In the case under consideration, Miss Z recognizes clearly the "Mother complex"** and also appreciates the fact that she has not developed evenly in the adjustment of her instincts. Many of her phantasies might readily be construed as the symbolization of this particular relation of sex. Early in her efforts to avoid the deadening influences of convention and adult, 'stupid' routine, this problem arose.

"Now, after the fear of falsehood grew less morbid and terrifying, other fears arose to take its place. In some respects, I was growing up very rapidly; in others, I was not growing at all. I was beginning to realize the complexities of the moral situation and definitely to choose the sort of girl I wanted to be. First of all, I wanted to choose the sort of things that went into my mind: I did not want the sentimental novel; I did not want the common 'trashy' things; I did not even want a good many truths that it might have benefited me to know.

"There was also one other peculiarly strong part of this ideal: along with the fairyland and religion and Mother and the people that I loved best, there was an ideal of myself as a girl. The fear of being 'boy-struck' was almost as intense as my old fear of the story, for it ran directly counter to the picture of the things that I really admired in women. I wanted to be cordial, but nothing more: it hurt me to see

*Jung, C. G. *Psychology of the Unconscious*, 1916, p. 208.

girls making advances. Furthermore, I wanted sufficient balance to do more serious things. Now such a choice essentially involved a 'split' in development. The imaginative and intellectual plans were closed around by a wall of childishness, and I had no desire to pass beyond it, because there was a fairyland inside. The fact that I saw very little of young people for several years made the 'split' develop into a definite and fairly fixed character."

Miss Z used the phrase 'boy-struck' in a discussion that attempted to bring out the conscious grounds of her distaste for the company of young men of her own age. In the endeavor to obtain associations for this term later, we obtained the association 'boys-girls-clothes.' Miss Z does not want to be like a girl she knows, several of them in fact. This particular girl sees every man she meets and can give a detailed description of each one. She will flirt with them or try to attract their attention in some way; whistles and waves to the boys and is always talking about them. Other girls, as well as this one, talked about the men, and 'wasted' a great deal of their time discussing what they would wear, what pleased this or that man, and would say that they wanted to wear those clothes that would attract men. From this Miss Z slipped to her own love of clothing. She also liked pretty clothes but not this way. She said she liked to "go shopping with a real flossy little freshman," because the freshman would ask to see lots of pretty things, and she (Miss Z) enjoyed this, but didn't want to ask the clerk herself. As we shall see later, this conscious love of clothing reappears in her dreams and phantasies in a similar manner. Miss Z is not wearing them; she is *going* to get them. Actually she loves to dress herself in the pretty dresses of other girls; but there is no apparent longing to taste rare and costly foods; and a decided withdrawal from the company of the opposite sex.

An incident occurring during Miss Z's sophomore year in college will show how extreme this timidity is. She had attended a little gathering of college girls and boys one Saturday evening. One of the boys showed a decided preference for Miss Z; so much so that he asked if he might call the following evening. In an impulsive moment, Miss Z

said, "Yes." The next evening the reaction had come on, and Miss Z did not want to go. The girls at the house persuaded her to the point of dressing up at least. They saw that she had on her prettiest dress and that everything was ready for her engagement. All the while Miss Z was insisting that she would not go. Finally the caller appeared and after much persuading and appeals to her honor not to break an engagement, she went down. They went off together, presumably to church, as it was Sunday evening. Very soon afterward, long before church services were over, Miss Z came rushing back to the house and up-stairs, where she locked her room and would let no one in. Thus ended her first and only 'date' during her college career.

MORBID FEARS

Late in the period allotted to the study of Miss Z's case, we learned that she was troubled at various times by fears. We can say only a word here concerning their significance in her development. The 'mother complex' appeared early in her experience and her actual activities were bound up in the relations with her mother. She early knew that her mother had married against the wishes of her family and that the relations between her parents often expressed the bitterness of that early quarrel. Her first serious fear is undoubtedly connected with these strained relations between her father and her mother's family. The symbolism indicative of this became clear through a recent dream. As a small child, she also struggled with the fear of the "attic people."

These lived in the attic of her home and were endeavoring to catch her and carry her away. They were not negroes but they were inky black,—exactly like silhouettes, and, like them, too dark to have distinguishable features. In a word, they were inky-black outlines. The leader was a tall, lank, curly-headed man, wearing knee-breeches and a sailor suit, all of darkest black. He was not ugly nor vindictive looking; but he was dapper, stealthy, and terrifying. It was his business to do the capturing and to lead the prisoners back to his tribe. He was not cruel, but he was

omniscient and inevitable. When the family left the upper floor, the leader stole down from the attic, and moved softly about the bedrooms. If the family left the house, he would even venture down to the first floor.

When anyone came upstairs, he hid in the curtains, the closets, or beneath the beds, his crouching, agile form easily lending itself to the lines of the draperies. He never attempted to catch the grown people; it was only the child that he sought. Worst of all, his supernatural shrewdness made it impossible to escape him. He knew all of Miss Z's habits, all of her thoughts and deeds; he knew just when to watch for her. He was prepared to slip noiselessly behind her and peer knowingly over her shoulder, or to lunge at her suddenly from the shadows and carry her off a captive. It was not that Miss Z. wished to hide anything, but it was the fact that his uncanny knowledge made him inevitable that produced her childish feeling of absolute terror and helplessness.

Other fears common to this period arose. She struggled with the problem of deception in conversation. Terrors connected with blasphemy, boasting, and petty details of conduct involving choice arose in numberless instances.

After the close of the adolescent period during which she suffered from nervous ill health, Miss Z. was troubled little by obsessive fears. She seems to have thrown herself into the preparation for college with a renewed energy and zeal that supplied sufficient outlet for her thoughts. During the period of analysis, some eight years later, the fear of the attic people returned. This time they would seem to inhabit corners of the room in open daylight. She also became afraid of persons who came to the door of her home on business and dreaded being alone in the house. A local condition was partly responsible for the special form her fears have taken. During the spring the University community was alarmed by the nightly prowlings of a weak-minded man. This incident was still fresh in the minds of many who liked to sleep out of doors. However, this particular fear has appeared in her dreams and points definitely to the still older complex.

CONCLUSION

This is not the place to raise theoretical questions, since the presentation of a single case offers certain advantages for generalization difficult to suppress. It is fairly obvious to the reader familiar with the present situation in 'psycho-analysis' and the yet more recent interpretations of developmental processes through myth and primitive social symbolism, that the account presented above is easily transformed into the phraseology of these systems. Jung, however, cautions us, from myth, not to name, if we would avoid power over the thing;* and the selection of such vague terms as 'psychic energy,' 'libido,' and others seems a case in point. To erect an altar to the 'Unknown God' (Jung's 'unknown third;' op. cit. pp. 191f.) at this time is 'regression' with a vengeance.

It is, nevertheless, obvious that we have accepted the method of, and many of the conclusions obtained by, 'psycho-analysis.' We may also recognize explicitly the significance of 'conflict' in the development of personality.† The primary conflict is nothing recondite; it is between instinctive tendencies, integrations that are racial heritages. These integrations make their appearance *in relation* to the environment. Consciousness is the point of tension.‡ Habits are the ontogenetic integrations.** The source of a neurosis as well as of normal growth may often be found in the ordering of the integrations in the particular personality.

The fatal mistake in the integration of conflicts here seems to be in the omission of adequate stimuli or 'objects' at the time of the conflict or tension. Miss Z. produced the 'attic people,' a fairy, the ideal of a nun or of the mediaeval ascetic, the plan to be a nurse or to remain with her mother, the desire to have beautiful clothes, and finally ordered her behavior as far as possible like the Princess, each to supply some 'object' lacking in her 'reality.' However

*Op. cit., p. 2081.

†White, W. A., *Mechanisms of Character Formation*. Macmillan, 1916, pd. 42ff.

‡White, loc. cit. Compare also Dewey, *The Significance of Emotions*, Psy. Rev., vol. 2, 1895, pp. 13ff.

**See Holt E. B., *Response and Cognition*, reprinted as a supplement in 'The Freudian Wish.' Also Prince, *The Unconscious*, pp. 131ff.

her world of 'objects,' of experience, was rich enough occasionally, to present materials incompatible with one or the other of these creations or integrations. Thus arose the secondary conflict and her "limits." These "limits" or resistances show that the organization of impulses has reached such a degree of fixity that stimuli and situations that normally would produce one type of behavior now produce unusual responses. Some activities are over-valued, others are held in the nature of resistances, hence undervalued, and still others obtain no footing whatsoever.

SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION.

Washington, D. C., May 11, 1916

PROGRAM

ADDRESS BY PROF. ADOLF MEYER, *President, Baltimore, Md.*

A

SYMPOSIUM ON DEMENTIA

1. "Arteriosclerotic Dementia,"
Prof. August Hoch, of New York.
2. "Dementia Paralytica,"
Dr. Charles MacFie Campbell, of Baltimore, Md.
3. "Dementia Praecox,"
Dr. Clarence B. Farrar, of Trenton, N. J.
4. "Epileptic Dementia,"
Dr. John T. MacCurdy, of New York.
5. Summary—The President.

B

1. "The Nature of Typical Symbols,"
Dr. F. Lyman Wells, of Waverly, Mass.
2. "Suggestions for a Grammar of Delusions,"
Dr. E. E. Southard, of Boston, Mass.
3. "Demonstration of a Graphic Method of Recording the Precipitating Factors of Epileptic Reactions,"
Dr. L. Pierce Clark, of New York.
4. "The Meaning of Psychoanalysis: An Apologia,"
Dr. Trigant Burrow, of Baltimore, Md.
5. "On the use of Psychoanalytic Investigations in the Study of Neurological Disorders,"
Dr. James J. Putnam, of Boston, Mass.
6. "Some Psychoanalytic Character Studies,"
Dr. L. E. Emerson, of Cambridge, Mass.
7. "A Manic-Depressive Case presenting an Infantile regression similar to the Ecmnesia of Pitriss."
Dr. Ralph W. Reed, of Cincinnati, Ohio.
8. "The Developmental Psychology of Stuttering,"
Dr. Walter B. Swift, of Boston, Mass.

The meeting was called to order by the President, PROF. ADOLF MEYER, at 10 a. m. and at 2 p. m. at the Hotel Powhatan.

Dr. Mcyer delivered The Presidential Address.

SYMPOSIUM ON DEMENTIA.

PROF. AUGUST HOCH, of New York, read a paper entitled "Arteriosclerotic Dementia."

DR. CHARLES MACFIE CAMPBELL, of Baltimore, Md., read a paper entitled "Dementia Paralytica."

DR. CLARENCE B. FARRAR, of Trenton, N. J., read a paper entitled "Dementia Praecox."

DR. JOHN T. MACCURDY, of New York, N. Y.; read a paper entitled "Epileptic Dementia."

A summary by the President closed the symposium on Dementia which occupied the morning session.*

AFTERNOON SESSION

DR. F. LYMAN WELLS, of Waverly, Mass., read a paper entitled "The Nature of Typical Symbols."*

DR. E. E. SOUTHARD, of Boston, Mass., read a paper entitled "Suggestions for a Grammar of Delusions."†

DISCUSSION

DR. SOUTHARD's reply to question as to development of grammar modes.

DR. SOUTHARD said that there was some basis for supposing that imperatives had preceded indicatives in the historical development of a number of languages. He said that in Delbroeck's *Syntactic Forschungen* there were some facts looking in this direction. As for the subjunctives and optatives, it was probable that they developed later than

*Reserved for publication.

†Published under title "The Descriptive Analysis of Manifest Delusions from the Subject's Point of View." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, August—September, 1916.

the imperatives and indicatives, but there was no uniformity in the history of their development. There were, of course, numerous moods with other names but Dr. Southard thought that the majority of these moods looked either in the subjunctive or optative direction.

DR. L. PIERCE CLARK, of New York, N. Y., read a paper entitled "Demonstration of a Graphic Method of Recording the Precipitating Factors of Epileptic Reactions."**

DR. TRIGANT BURROW, of Baltimore, Md., read a paper entitled "The Meaning of Psychoanalysis: An Apologia."

DISCUSSION

DR. JOHN T. MACCURDY, New York, N. Y.: Dr. Burrow has given us an extremely pretty argument which it is very difficult to answer, and if it is not answered we must presumably accept it. Before doing so, however, it might be well to examine two rather fundamental claims that he is perhaps not fully justified in making.

The first is an assumption that the neurosis is a purely environmental product. It is true that psychological research has done much to demonstrate the great importance of environmental factors, but in thus working out an individual etiology we must not forget to keep a wide view over the whole field of psychopathology. This last would not be necessary if the neurosis were a clinical entity showing no relationship to other psychopathic conditions. As a matter of fact, however, the gravity of abnormal mental reactions can be shown to occur in gentle gradations from mild to severe neuroses, to psychoses of the manic-depressive type, to schizophrenic and epileptic reactions. As we approach the latter, environmental factors, although still important, are found to act so differently from the same factors in the milder cases and the normal that we are forced to believe that organic factors are of great moment, even if only in establishing a weak mental constitution.

Now with such a gradation it is impossible to conceive of a neurosis not having some physical basis, in a great

*Reserved for publication.

many cases at least; a view which gains some support from heredity studies. If this be the case, one is not justified in assuming that the neurosis is a purely environmental product.

The second claim is that the neurotic patient is striving towards some higher morality. A somewhat similar view is held by Trotter, who differentiates two types of individual, the stable minded, who are non-progressive and unimaginative, and the sensitive type, who take experience keenly and think for themselves. The latter group gives most to the world, is a higher type, but is frequently neurotic as a result of the conflict between herd traditions and individual experience.

What fallacy there is in Trotter's view and Dr. Burrow's arguments is probably to be seen by the same comparison that we have just made with other abnormal psychic states. If such a conflict be an all-important factor it will presumably become more obvious the more severe the reaction is. But this is contrary to clinical experience. For in the severer psychoses one can safely say the moral fiber seems to be weaker in accordance with the severity of the reaction.

DR. JAMES J. PUTNAM, Boston, Mass.: The problem which Dr. Burrow raises is an important one and touches on matters about which, no doubt, all of us have been thinking, each, however, along somewhat different lines. In my opinion the tendency of a psychoanalytic treatment ought to be in the direction of a better social synthesis on the patient's part; but in Freud's opinion such a result does not necessarily follow. Freud believes that it may occur, although agreeing that such an outcome is exceptional, that fears and distresses may be removed by analysis without any improvement taking place in the moral character.

I think there is room for misunderstanding with regard to the influence of fear. This is undoubtedly a weapon which society instinctively uses to exert pressure on its members; but fear passes by imperceptible gradations into something akin to the mystery which children cultivate the enjoyment of for the excitement that it brings.

DR. SMITH ELY JELLINE, New York, N. Y.: Following Dr. Burrow's paper with great interest and with a great

deal of profit I pictured to myself the gradual swelling of the ethical role of psychoanalysis. I was unable, however, actually to determine whether the direction of his thought was in the line of an absolutistic or of a pragmatic conception of morality. It was extremely difficult for me to gather which conception he followed. Perhaps a straight line was drawn between the two and the alternatives avoided. I am thoroughly in accord with his general outline of the definitely constructive value of the neurosis symptoms, both as defensive and progressive elements in a higher integration of the personality, if they succeed. In many attempts they do not succeed, but if they do not succeed in a higher integration of the personality the neurotic attempt often serves as a factor to prevent a deeper regression and the sinking into a more deplorable state. Hence some of the dangers of wild psychoanalysis as Freud and others have developed it.

DR. WILLIAM A. WHITE, Washington, D. C.: I have not entered into the discussions very much because I have felt that a great many of these questions left me in a state of mind difficult for me to express myself impromptu. I think the difficulty very frequently in all of these discussions is that we are endeavoring to be altogether too concrete—for example, in dealing with individuals as concrete entities—as I endeavored to show in my paper of yesterday. The question of morality is a question of social psychology and has to do with a wider reach of psychic phenomena than those activities limited to individuals. The designation moral or immoral is a critique of the herd and is used in order to get rid of those not useful to the herd. I have no doubt there are many people who have conflicts that might easily come under Dr. Burrow's description of the point of view of higher integration of the social psychic world, and I think that we are perfectly familiar with such examples. We see a certain type of homosexual individuals who have distinctly paranoid trends when they endeavor to repress their homosexuality, but who, when freely leading homosexual existence get over their paranoid ideas. On the other hand we find distinctly homosexual individuals in a high socially useful level, and so it seems that there are distinct

avenues of homosexual sublimations, where such people perhaps do better work than the average well-balanced person. So far as I know we have no criterion by which to tell whether an individual is capable of such sublimation or not, and the only thing to do is to deal with him as a problem and let him come out as best he can.

If we do not become too concrete in our individualistic and rationalistic concepts but leave the way more open it will very materially help keep the atmosphere clear.

DR. JAMES J. PUTNAM, of Boston, Mass., read a paper "On the use of Psychoanalytic Investigations in the Study of Neurological Disorders."*

DR. L. E. EMERSON, of Cambridge, Mass., read a paper entitled "Some Psychoanalytic Studies of Character."

DISCUSSION

DR. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, New York, N. Y.: I would like to add a further stage to Dr. Emerson's scale. Utilizing the paleontological figure of speech already employed, my first rough divisions of the psychic life would be:

1. *Archaic.* This includes the entire racial inheritance up to birth. It is the most compact and condensed period in psychical recapitulation. Thought fossils of this period, if predominant in the life of the individual, usually spell a psychosis of which schizophrenic dissociation is most characteristic.

2. *Autoerotic.* This comprises the first seven years of the child's life, up to the time when the wisdom of the church fathers assumed the Age of Reason. The recapitulation here is from primitive man, post-glacial to social savage. Anthropological data are needed to read its symbolisms. Its thought fossils are more varied and rich, and hysteria, compulsion neurosis, etc., are the happy hunting grounds for the paleo-psyché biologist.

3. *Narcissistic.* This is the period of intense self

*Published under title "On the Utilization of Psychoanalytic Principles in the Study of the Neuroses". Journal of Abnormal Psychology, Aug.—Sept., 1916.

worship, merging into the social. The recapitulation is from primitive man to the beginning of civilization.

4. *Social.* This stratum is being built. It is recent, very recent. Possibly starting with the principle of the death of self as symbolized in Christianity. History is the garnering ground for its comprehension. The evolution of its symbols is locked up in the mythology, the poetry, the literature, art, institutions and customs of the past few thousand years.

The work of the future paleo-psyche-biologist will be to fill in the successive periods and determine the phyla of the various symbols which man uses in his adaptation to the social environment.

DR. EMERSON: I accept Dr. Jelliffe's enlargement of the concept, intending to include under the autoerotic part all he includes under the archaic and phylogenetic; and I also think that there is more truth in Dr. Putnam's position than most of us are ready to admit perhaps. Certainly so far as any particular child is concerned, a social environment already exists for him to come into. And from John Dewey's position that the origin of consciousness itself is wholly social it would seem that a more careful defining of the higher and social aspect of consciousness, in individual personal development, would be desirable.

DR. RALPH W. REED, of Cincinnati, Ohio, read a paper entitled "A Manic-Depressive Case presenting an Infantile regression similar to the Ecmnesia of Pitris."*

DISCUSSION

DR. MACCURDY: I would like to ask Dr. Reed if the patient was perfectly clear in the ordinary sense of the term. For instance, was she oriented during the attack?

DR. REED: Well, part of the time she was quite well oriented and part of the time not.

DR. MACCURDY: This case is really extremely interesting and brings out some highly important points. No

*Published under title "A Manic Depressive Attack Presenting a Reversion to Infantilism." To be published later in *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*.

doubt some cases do get a definite benefit from the psychosis. One is familiar with this in some deliria where the content is remembered. It seems, however, that when consciousness is not clear enough to grasp the false ideas, or where amnesia sets in on recovery, that little or nothing is gained by the attack. It is obvious that in such cases the patient has not been in a position to learn anything of hidden tendencies exposed by the psychosis. The case as I have grasped it—which is all too little—would certainly lead me to think on purely clinical grounds that the case has a poor prognosis. It is not unlike a type of case that Jones reported some years ago, a manic case with a tremendous amount of sexual outlet in delusions and actions. That case apparently recovered, but has since deteriorated quite badly. It will be very interesting to follow the history of this patient of Dr. Reed.

DR. EDWARD J. KEMPF, Washington, D. C.: Sometime ago there was a case at the hospital—a social worker—who had been some two years passing through a psychosis of a more or less active D. P. type. She made excellent recovery and returned to her work. This patient went through an experience something like what we have heard from Dr. Reed. She believes that her sickness did her a great deal of good.

DR. LANE TANEYHILL, Baltimore, Md.: Quite a little better insight is necessary if the patient is thoroughly to understand the transference and know how to respect it in order that there may be some improvement. I once made the mistake of starting to analyse a patient whom I thought was psychasthenic, who after about four or five weeks developed behavior that made it clear that I had a D. P. on hand, with a remission. I found out that a year before, she had been in a hospital in Denver, and had made a remarkably quick recovery, so that the neurologist there had made a diagnosis of psychasthenia. That was a mistake. Although I had not written to him before, there had been some information from him, to which I had paid no attention.

DR. SMITH ELY JELLIFFE, New York, N. Y.: In the psychoanalytic approach to the last dozen or so cases of manic-depressive type I have gained the very distinct impression of how extremely important it is to use the utmost

delicacy in handling the situations that arise. This is true for the hypomanic phase or the mild depressed stages. The former have not been so difficult to guide, but the depressed ones have been very difficult to guide. I feel certain that these patients react very actively to the psychoanalytic mode of approach. Its essential understanding touches these patients to the quick and one must be very careful. Only the dynamic psychologist, however, can comprehend what is going on. This type of case is the one which provides most of the so-called ammunition relative to the harm done by bad psychoanalysis.

DR. L. E. EMERSON, Cambridge, Mass.: I am very much interested in Dr. Reed's case, and Dr. MacCurdy's point as to the possibility of recurrence, and it seems to me that it would be quite possible to help, now that she is recovered, in preventing a recurrence. I do not know that much of anything has been done in such cases, during periods of remission, but it seems to me that in a case of that sort, if psychoanalysis is undertaken during an interval of remission, if it were slowly enough carried out, that the patient might get some more or less conscious attitude toward the repressed unconscious, sufficiently strong to prevent in ordinary events a recurrence. But it seems to me that any very sudden change or very rapid attempt at sublimation might indeed lead to an equally sudden regression into the psychosis. It therefore seems to me that in a case of this sort, psychoanalysis should tread very gingerly and last over a very long period of time.

DR. REED: You will all realize that the situation was and is too delicate to undertake an analysis even if I felt inclined to do so, and I thought it best for the present to let well enough alone. The patient is very close to me through many family connections. I agree with Dr. MacCurdy that the prognosis is probably not very good. I might add that there was a physical element in the case, left out for the sake of brevity. When she came to me she was very much run down in health and emaciated; after two or three months of treatment she developed a severe tonsilitis followed by endocarditis, and a right-sided paralysis, from which she made a complete recovery with the exception of a blind spot on the visual field which has not quite disappeared; all this did not affect the psychosis in any way, which began some time before it, and ended after it.

REVIEWS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN. By *Alfred Binet, Sc. D. and Th. Simon, M. D.* Translated by Elizabeth S. Kite. Publication No. 11 of the Training School at Vineland, N. J. Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1916, 336 p.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE FEEBLE-MINDED. By *Alfred Binet, Sc. D. and Th. Simon, M. D.* Translated by Elizabeth S. Kite. Publication No. 12 of the Training School at Vineland, N. J. Baltimore, Williams & Wilkins, 1916, 328 p.

One can not speak too favorably of the translation of these two volumes. They contain practically all that Binet ever wrote regarding his scale for measuring intelligence. Not only that but they also contain enough of basal and corroborative discussion to show his broad concept of the problem with which he dealt. One can only regret that the translations have had to wait until so many are sufficiently familiar with test methods to feel that they need not read these, the fundamental and initial discussions of intelligence testing.

The translation is sincere and faithful. The personality of the group editing the books has everywhere been suppressed in favor of an unbiased reproduction. A comparison with the originals indicates that one loses practically none of the thought or spirit in the translation. The charm of the style found in the original could scarcely be reproduced in another language.

In all the translation consists of eight separate articles. Five of these deal more directly with the testing of intelligence and constitute the first volume. The other three, forming the second volume, are more directly concerned with the psychology of the feeble-minded.

The first article is actually a justification of the Binet-Simon tests although not written for that purpose. It tells the simple story of the Commission which was appointed to study and regulate the education of defectives. A historical survey of the work with defectives showed this Commission that what was lacking was a "precise basis for differential diagnosis." Consequently Binet and Simon strove first of all to develop a scientific basis for diagnosis.

This new method of diagnosis is described in the second paper. The medical and pedagogical methods of examination are, they feel, less satisfactory than the psychological examination. The pedagogical examination may be one testing school acquisition or one testing information acquired outside school. The latter Binet feels to be the better of the two. The medical examination describ-

ed is by no means unusual, involving the study of the developmental history and heredity as well as anatomical and physiological aspects. The psychological examination consists of a group of 30 questions ranging in difficulty from the ability to follow a moving object with the eye to the ability to define abstract terms. These are the "1905" tests. The authors conclude that the medical examination is applicable in only a restricted number of cases and reveals possible signs of defect. The pedagogical examination is frequently applicable and reveals probable signs of defect, while the psychological examination is almost certain to reveal such signs of defect.

The third paper shows how standardization of the tests was accomplished. Normal children between the ages of three and twelve were studied. So also were institution cases from the Salpetrière. The results on these two groups of children are given separately. Then higher grade defectives, morons, were tested in the schools. Several individual cases are reported in detail and the method of diagnosis by comparison with the norms previously established is clearly depicted.

The fourth paper is the most extensive in its discussion of the tests. It presents the year plan of grading tests and formed the basis of the early American standardizations. Each question is analyzed for its psychological significance. Careful directions for its use and credit are given. Typical answers are discussed. Besides this the authors give emphatic directions for attitude and procedure in giving tests. They also discuss the uses of the scale and illustrate with case histories.

In the fifth paper we have Binet's last word on the subject. There are a number of modifications presented. The tests more dependent upon outside training or education are discarded and the others are given modified age values. Compared with the earlier studies the article has an air of finality which leads one to query whether Binet had not about reached the end of his interest in this line of thought. One wonders whether, even if he had lived, further detailed standardization would not have been left to other workers.

The first paper in the second book deals with the intelligence of the feeble-minded. From the standpoint of showing a knowledge of the defective this paper is most valuable. It can not be said, however, to be as much a document of present day psychology as a sketch of the personality of the mental defective. It is anecdotal. For instance, voluntary attention is discussed by means of illustrations of voluntary attention with the report of some few dilettante experiments. In general, too, the discussions do not deal with the moron who forms our real problem today but with the more easily typified imbecile. The chapter concludes with a schema of thought definitized by its application to the problem of mental defect. Thought is analyzed into direction, adaptation

and criticism. The defective is found lacking in all three of these divisions. The logical prediction follows that psychology will finally become fully a science of action.

The seventh paper deals with the language of the defective. In a field where so little of permanent value has been written this is of exceptional interest. Binet's discussion of the absence of fluent speech in the lower imbecile type is intensely fascinating as well as sane. The imbecile speaks little not because of some type of aphasia but simply because of his lack of development. Aphasia patients indicate by their efforts to speak a desire to use language. The low grade defective evidences no such desire. In other words language is a function of intelligence. The same poverty of expression is found in a proportionate degree in the higher grade defectives. Because the meager language of the defective nevertheless presents involved thoughts Binet deduces that defectives probably think in (concrete) images and even suggests that thought is a vague intellectual feeling behind both concrete and verbal images. He does not, however, distinguish these two forms of imagery. This renders the discussion more ambiguous than it might otherwise be.

In the eighth and last paper translated the authors compare feeble-mindedness or amentia with dementia. The two differ even though the mental age may be very similar. This is interpreted not as a reversion and loss of intelligence on the part of the dement, as for instance in the case of a general paretic, but is looked upon as a "difficulty of functioning." The defective has never developed. Because of this difference the tests on dementia cases show great irregularity in the ability on the different processes while these agree better in the defective.

It would be impossible to enumerate in detail the many aspects of the problems of mental defect and intelligence tests discussed in these two volumes. Almost every problem related to the subject is shown in its proper association. Although the discussions in no place have the air of finality for which we must needs have intensive as well as extensive studies yet they are most valuable. They are primarily sourcebooks on mental examining but they also give the breadth of view, the rational perspective and withal the inspiration which is so much needed today.

FLORENCE MATEER.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELAXATION. By George Thomas White Patrick, Ph. D., Professor of Philosophy in the State University of Iowa. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916. Pp. 280. Price \$1.25 net.

This work consists of an introductory chapter, followed by chapters devoted to a discussion of the psychology of play, laughter, profanity, alcohol and war in the order named, and a final chapter of conclusions.

It is a volume of decided interest to all, including the psycho-pathologist.

The author gives the gist of the views of others, but maintains that the final "why" or basic motive source of play, laughter and the other forms of relaxation have not been directly unearthed by them. In particular does this apply when we seek for the explanation of the special form of relaxation, as, for instance, the specific forms of play.

He regards play, laughter, profanity, the desire for narcotics and the inclination for war as means of relief from the tension and strain of the highest mental functions and brain centres, incident to modern civilization, with the necessary restraint or repression of the primitive impulses to the end of the growing social needs, thus making rest and relaxation more imperative than hitherto. The rest or relaxation from this high tension and overworking of the higher psychic processes, comparatively recently acquired, may take a form which is helpful and normal or abnormal and brutalizing, but being essentially a method of escape from the excessive tension of the higher mental functions with a temporary reversion or regression or prolapse to simpler, more primitive, racially older forms of behavior or expression. The reversionary tendency is rhythmical because man's progress is rhythmical, with series of relapses and recoveries.

Patrick consequently studies the laws of mental tension and relaxation from the psychogenetic, but more particularly from the phylogenetic viewpoint, with the recapitulation theory very much in the foreground. The significance of racial history in the interpretation of the mental life of the child and the man is thus decidedly stressed.

Throughout, the author presents interesting and stimulating discussion. He writes entertainingly and carries one along very easily from chapter to chapter.

He makes a distinction between the play and laughter of children and that of adults, discussing the matter at length. These two chapters are the most interesting. The chapter on war is the weakest, from the point of view of logic, in the volume.

There is one very glaring error in logic in this work. The phylogenetic theory is carried to the extreme, the recapitulation theory being allowed to play much too freely. The possibility of cultural recapitulation (which cannot be discussed here) is practically accepted as fact by Patrick. As it is applied in this work, if one reads between the lines, and follows the author's ideas out to their final conclusions, he practically accepts as true the transmission by heredity of acquired habits of various kinds. I do not offhand deny the possibility of the transmission of acquired traits. The problem has been fought over and over and has not positively been decided, although many believe that acquired traits cannot be transmitted. At any rate, the question has recently been opened

up again and one need not be ashamed to discuss the question of the inheritance of acquired characters. For the most part this discussion has been confined to out-and-out physical characters—and it is difficult enough even in this limited sphere to prove conclusively that acquired character can be transmitted. But we come on different ground when we deal with mental phenomena. To state that certain special mental phenomena or forms of conduct are due to the re-appearance by inheritance of habits indulged in by our human ancestors is to come out unequivocally for the transmission by inheritance of acquired mental habits. A little extension of this means the hereditary transmission of acquired thought of a concrete nature. And this step has already been taken in more extreme degree by Jung (in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* recently translated into English) and others.

Although we must agree with Patrick when he says, on page 53: "It is clear therefore that our daily activity must be made up quite largely of responses of the simpler type, which shall give exercise to our muscles and sense organs and invoke older and more elemental forms of mentality, and at the same time allow the higher ones to rest," we cannot agree when he declares, on page 52: "Hence we can understand why children's play and adult sport take the form of hunting, fishing, camping, outing, swimming, climbing, and so on through the long list. The more elemental these activities have been in the history of racial development, the greater release they afford, when indulged in as relaxation, from the tension of our modern life." Nor can we agree with him when he asserts, on page 53: "The mental habits of the child seem like echoes from the remote past, recalling the life of the cave, the forest and the stream"—thus explaining, for Patrick, the climbing tendency of infancy and childhood, hide-and-seek games, etc., the joy experienced in speed today, children's games of pursuit and capture, the love of animals and their ways found in children, the choice of their instruments of play. The climax is reached when Patrick declares on pages 57 and 58: "Those things which have such a vital and absorbing interest for the boy have had at one time in our racial history an actual life and death interest for mankind. Take, for instance, the jack-knife . . . But at one time it (the knife) meant life in defense and food in offense. Your boy's supreme interest in the knife is a latent memory of those ancient days. Those who could use the knife and use it well survived and transmitted this trait to their offspring. The same could be said of the sling, the bow and arrow, and of sports like boxing, fencing, and fishing." This, to be sure, means the hereditary transmission of acquired mental characteristics—in fact of acquired thoughts. The reasoning is by analogy, which does not necessarily prove anything. All other possible explanations are neglected.

The explanation of the cause of war from this viewpoint, is,

unquestionably, very far-fetched. Patrick will find it hard to convince me or the average man in the street that his phylogenetic viewpoint, with the recapitulation theory overworked, is responsible for the present war in Europe.

All in all, allowing for the fundamental error mentioned above, the volume presented to us is well worth owning and the reader of these pages is urged to read it.

The plea for more rest and relaxation is one in which we must all join. Most of us are being overworked; hence the inter-relationship of this question with problems of economics, politics and the like.

MEYER SOLOMON.

BEING WELL-BORN, *Michael F. Guyer, Ph. D.*, the Bobbs-Merrill Company, publishers, Indianapolis, Ind., xviii + 374 pages.

The Childhood and Youth Series, edited by M. V. O'Shea of the University of Wisconsin, is a series rather more of educational than of sociological or medical interest. The present work is very well done and ought to form an excellent hand book for teachers, social workers, probation officers and other persons on the firing line of practical sociology.

There is a well chosen, brief bibliography and a convenient glossary of biological terms. Both Galtonian and Mendelian aspects of the problem are thoroughly presented.

Chapter 5 deals with the important question of hereditary modifications acquired directly by the body. The conclusion is that acquired modifications are not inherited. Special paragraphs deal with tuberculosis, immunity, nervous and mental disease. It is regarded as scientifically established that two individuals of tuberculous stock should not marry. A decision of the Supreme Court of New York is quoted to the effect that the fraudulent concealment of tuberculosis by a person entering into a marriage relation is ground for the annulment of the marriage. The matter of mental and nervous defects is treated in a separate chapter, Chapter 8.

Crime and delinquency are treated in Chapter 9. The importance of rigidly segregating the feeble-minded and of the early diagnosis of insanity, and the necessity that the insane should all be handled by psychiatrists are insisted upon. Feeble-mindedness when hereditary is regarded as possibly recessive (Goddard, Weeks)

The chapter on crime and delinquency deals especially with the morons, calls attention to the intensification of defects by inbreeding and holds the conception that vicious surroundings are not a sufficient explanation for degenerate stocks. Healy's work on *The Individual Delinquent* is approvingly quoted. That there are no special heritable crime factors is asserted and that there is

no such thing as a born criminal. The book can be commended as dealing briefly with virtually all the best modern work on the topic.

Some insistence is made upon the importance of syphilis in the chapter (6) on prenatal influences.

E. E. SOUTHARD.

EUGENICS, *Edgar Schuster*, Warwick & York, publishers, Baltimore, 264 pages, (Volume in "The Nation's Library Series").

The majority of the books in The Nation's Library Series so far published deal with sociological or economic considerations, and Schuster's Eugenics is far more a sociological work than a medical one. The outstanding feature of the book, which was first published in England in 1912, is the exceeding fairness with which the opposing views of Galton and Mendel are considered. The bibliography includes chiefly works by Galton, Pearson and the Whethams. Favorable notice is given of the arguments of our American worker, Dr. Frederick Adams Woods, with relation to the strong contrasts presented by royalty (contrasts supposed to be due to inborn determiners) and concerning the high percentage of distinguished relationship possessed by the Americans who have been put in the Hall of Fame.

The statement concerning the Solvay Institute, founded in 1902, and "established in a large and handsome building in the Parc Léopold at Brussels," "equipped with a scientific and administrative staff, a magnificent library, and a bibliography of every thing that appears on the subject of sociology" sounds a little pathetic in the midst of the German occupation. Its resources, according to Schuster, are at the disposal of persons making sociological researches, and possibly the German occupation may be regarded as an equivalent.

The practical measures by which eugenic principles may be applied are divided into positive and negative.

Schuster looks rather favorably upon certain marriage regulations and thinks that, besides protecting women from marrying men with venereal disease, the Norwegian proposals of Dr. Mjøen might also affect other eugenic objects such as the disclosure of epilepsy or of a tendency to insanity.

Schuster believes that there is ample knowledge to justify measures for the care and control of the feeble-minded and moral imbeciles to preclude the possibility of propagation. Taxation, he believes, should be adjusted so as not to penalize parenthood among the self-supporting classes. (Compare a certain rebate of income tax allowed to English fathers of families under the Finance Act of 1909.)

The idea that a medical certificate of fitness for marriage should be obtained before permission to marry is accorded, is re-

garded as crude and impracticable. Preference is given to the Norwegian scheme of health declarations before marriage.

Instruction in sex hygiene is commended as of direct eugenic value.

Some familiar tables and statements both of the Galtonian and Mendelian contentions are presented with extreme simplicity.

The most important chapters, medically speaking, are Chapters 8 and 9 on tuberculosis, insanity, feeble-mindedness and epilepsy and on the influence of the environment. Very instructive is the comparison between the inheritance of tuberculosis and that of insanity. "It is as inaccurate to talk of the inheritance of insanity as the inheritance of tuberculosis. The immediate cause of the latter is the attack of a microbe, and of the former it may be one of the many incidents or accidents in the life of the insane person; but in the same way as those who are free from the tuberculous diathesis can repulse the attack without knowing that it has taken place, so those who are free from the insane diathesis can pass with mind unshaken and unconscious of any danger through all the crises of life, whether brought on by outside events or by the changes that occur in the body at certain special epochs. It should be noted that to speak of the definite presence or absence of the insane diathesis is incorrect, for the mental instability which is denoted by this term occurs in varying degrees. In some cases the mind is fairly stable, and then it takes much to unbalance it, in others a less severe strain is needed; while in others again it gives way at the first test."

E. E. SOUTHDARD.

EROS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SEX RELATION THROUGH THE AGES. By Emil Lucka. Translated, with Introduction by Ellie Schleussner, New York: S. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915.

Mythology springs eternal in the human heart. Since the Freudian promulgation of its causes and origins has been given the public, there is no need to descant at any length on its pervasiveness and inevitability. It means simply that it is easier to identify things with the self than to discover their proper nature. Its essence is to use an analogy as if it were a fact. This book is as pretty an example as the printer's press has dropped, of the loose anthropomorphoid manner in thinking. Its culmination and purport is the "psychogenetic law," viz., "Every well-developed male individual of the present day successively passes through the three stages of love through which the European races have passed. The three stages are not traceable in all men with infallible certainty; there are numerous individuals whose development in this respect has been arrested, but in the emotional life of every highly differentiated member of the human race they are clearly distin-

guishable, and the greater the wealth and strength of a soul, the more perfectly will it reflect the history of the race. "The evolution of every well-endowed individual presents a rough sketch of the history of civilization; it has its prehistoric, its classical, its mediaeval and its modern period. Many men remain imprisoned in the past; others are fragmentary, or appear to be suspended in mid-air, rootless. The spirit of humanity has lived through the past and overcome it, so as to be able to create its future."

The three stages are, first, that of the animal impersonalism of mere sexuality, such as is to be observed, so Lucka thinks, in the promiscuity of contemporary savages; second, that of the emergence, through the ideal impersonality of classicism, as that is shown in Plato, of a metaphysical love which ignored real woman and took for its object deifications of her, all symbolized in the cult of the Virgin Mary. In this stage there is a conflict between primitive sexuality and spiritual love. The conflict is resolved in the third stage. "In this stage there is no tyranny of man over woman, as in the sexual stage; no subjection of man to woman, as in the woman-worship of the Middle Ages; but complete equality of the sexes, a mutual give and take. If sexuality is infinite as matter, spiritual love eternal as the metaphysical ideal, then the synthesis is human and personal." The last stage is limited to the Teutonic peoples.

The argument, with its ample quotation from a variety of poets and pietists, with its vague generalizations about the evolution of the European mind, and with its general sentimentalism, is very pretty, like a poem; but far from convincing. It smacks too much of the great antitheses of Hegel, and of the smugness of Hegel. That great fictioneer among historians could have turned the trick no better, even to the last dot of vanity in identifying what is contemporary with him with what is best, and what is best with what is German. The pseudo-science of the use of the theory of recapitulation needs no comment, and the curious discrepancy between man and woman needs much that only a psychanalysis could yield a basis for. The notion that in woman sexuality is personality and personality is sexuality is not unfamiliar, but it needs a great deal more proof than the *ipse dixit* of Mr. Lucka. The notion that only man undergoes erotic change seems to me so contrary to the observed facts as to rest on a basis quite other than the facts.

H. M. KALLEN.

